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SPEECHES OF MR. D. LLOYD GEORGE, THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MR. STANLEY BALDWIN, MR. J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, CAPTAIN EDEN, MR. ELLIS DAVIES, LIEUT.-COMMANDER KENWORTHY, COMMANDER BELLAIRS, MR. L'ESTRANGE MALONE, SIR ALFRED HOPKINSON, MR. THURTLE, LIEUT.-COLONEL MOORE, MR. ARTHUR A. PONSONBY, MR. CRAWFURD AND THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY MR. W. C. BRIDGEMAN, LONDON, HOUSE OF COMMONS, NOVEMBER 13, 1928.

Order read for resuming Adjourned Debate on Question [*6th November*] —

"That an humble Address be presented to His Majesty, as followeth :

MOST GRACIOUS SOVEREIGN,

We, Your Majesty's most dutiful and loyal subjects, the Commons of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in Parliament assembled, beg leave to offer our humble thanks to Your Majesty for the Gracious Speech which your Majesty has addressed to both Houses of Parliament".— [*Major Edmondson*].

Question again proposed.

MR. LLOYD GEORGE : I beg to move, at the end of the Question, to add the words :

"But humbly submit to your Majesty that this House considers that the Anglo-French compromise endangers the prospect of peace in Europe and good relations with the United States, regrets the abandonment of the principle othe limitation on small submarines and cruisers, and considers that the basis of naval discussion should be the extension of the successfull Washington treaties to all classes of combatant ships ; consider that the exclusion of reservists from the computation of military strength is contrary to the spirit both of the Treaty of Versailles and of the Locarno Treaties, and, by making possible the permanent military preponderance of a power or group of Powers in Europe, increases the difficulties of substantial progress towards disarmament ; deprecates the existence of military or naval understandings of an exclusive character with any Power, and considers that the basis of British foreign policy should be the promotion of friendship and co-operation between all nations on the basis of the covenant of the League of Nations and the Peace Pact"

It will be a matter for general regret that the Foreign Secretary is unable to be present at our discussions to-day, but it is

also a matter for general satisfaction and delight that his health seems to be completely restored, and we shall all look forward with great satisfaction to his presence among us again. It is no satisfaction to me to criticise the right hon. Gentleman at all, and least of all in his absence. I do not think the Government have any reason to complain of the attitude which hon. Members on these benches have adopted towards their foreign policy. Once or twice we have been critical, but, in the main, we have supported the right hon. Gentleman. We gave him assistance and support in his Chinese policy—[Hon. Members : "Oh !"] That shows how little hon. Members opposite appreciate the attitude which we took up. The right hon. Gentleman has acknowledged it in this House. I have consistently supported his Chinese policy by voice and vote, and so have my friends on this side.

Sir Clement Kinloch-Cooke : In one division.

Mr. Lloyd George : My friends and I congratulated the right hon. Gentleman upon his achievement at Locarno, and he had very strong support from the Liberal Press in the country. We have always said that the real test of Locarno was its effect upon the progress of disarmament. The right hon. Gentleman himself acknowledged that test, and adopted it. The Anglo-French Pact is a very sinister comment on that. Let us examine the circumstances which led up to the Anglo French Pact, because without doing so it will be quite impossible intelligently to comprehend its real meaning. When the Peace Treaty was signed in 1919, the Allies and associated Powers gave an undertaking to Germany that if she disarmed, if she carried out the Treaty obligations with regard to disarmament, they would follow suit. I have got the actual words here, and I may quote them later on. I am summarising them at the moment. They then entered into a solemn covenant with the allied nations in the League immediately to undertake the process of reducing armaments to the lowest level consistent with safety. Up to the present, the only two Powers who have made any real effort to carry out that undertaking are Great Britain and the United States of America, which is not a member of the League.

We, at any rate, made a start. We abolished conscription. I think we reduced the Army and Navy undoubtedly below the pre-War level. We entered into a Pact with America to scrap a great many of our battleships. That was a start. We have not reduced to the lowest level consistent with safety, and since then we have actually increased our armaments, having first reduced them. A Disarmament Commission was appointed for the purpose ostensibly of carrying out our Treaty obligations to the vanquished Power. Tat Commission has been sitting for years. It has been meandering along and achieving no purpose.

Theve was a very remarkable description in a leading article of the "Times" on the proceedings, and I think I cannot do better than read to the House this extraordinary account of the proceedings of this Commission during the last few years :

"The existence of this Commission is unknown to at least three-fourths of the human race, and public opinion in our own enlightened country is only vaguely aware of it. In a certain smoky committee room in the League Secretariat it is possible from time to time to discover a number of people representing all the States who are members of the League—also the United States of America, and, on occasion, Soviet Russia—who are discussing the technical details of universal disarmament. Some are leading newspapers, some are writing, some are listening to the 35th delegate, who happens at the moment, to be expounding the views of his Government on the technical questions at issue. Others seem to be asleep. The questions discussed are, of course, important. The manner in which they are discussed disheartens the most conscientious observer. In this Commission, in this depressing atmosphere, enlivened only once by an absurd Soviet sensation, the idea of the Anglo-French compromise gradually arose".

That is the origin of the Anglo-French Pact. Having failed to come to any understanding upon a single definite proposal for carrying out our solemn undertaking to Germany, upon the strenght of which she signed the Treaty, some bright intellect suggested that two of the Powers should meet together and see whether they could not arrive at a compromise which should be a basis for disarmament for all the other powers. Let us see what the basis of disarmament is. Theve were three things decided in the Pact. The first was that you should limit all the cruisers armed with 8-inch guns, which means all the cruisers that America wanted. The second thing was that you should have no limit to cruisers armed with 6-inch guns, which we and France needed. The third thing they decided was that you could put up an unlimited number of submarines provided they were not over 600 tons. That is the way the undertaking for disarmament has been carried out in the Anglo-French Pact.

I am told that that compromise has been dropped, the Pact is at an end, and, therefore, it is unnecessary to discuss it. In the first place, even if it be at an end, the House of Commons, surely, has something to say about it. It is something for which the Government are responsible. It is something they did which is provoking a good deal of suspicion, ill-will, and international mis-understanding. This is the first time the House of Commons has had an opportunity of discussing it, and, even if it be at an end, we have a right to discuss it, and, in fact, it is our duty to do so. But is it at an end ? That is the first question I would like to ask. The Prime Minister in a speech which he delivered, I think, at the Albert Hall, said it aroused very

deep suspicion in America. That is right. It undoubtedly has done so. Have those suspicions been eliminated ? If anyone imagines that they have, let him read President Coolidge's speech. It is clear that the suspicions have not been eliminated. There were no threats, but there was an indication of a resolve on the part of America, in the face of the attitude of Europe towards the problem of disarmament, and notably in the face of the attitude which we have adopted towards American cruisers. He indicated very clearly that America proposed to go on with building its 15 cruisers. There are statements that they will probably build fast steamers which are capable of being converted into cruisers.

That is one of the effects of the Anglo-French Pact. But I am going to ask the Prime Minister more than that. Is the policy which is indicated by the Pact at an end ? The actual Agreement may have terminated, in fact, but the Prime Minister in July made it quite clear that we depended upon our getting the assent of America. He went on to say that if we did not get the assent, we must concert together with a view to finding other means. There is no doubt at all that French public opinion is clearly under the impression that we are bound by the principles of the Pact. When Lord Cushendun's attention was drawn to these very remarkable words, he was asked why there was no answer, and he said they thought that silence was better. I do not think it is a case for silence. It is a case for making it quite clear what the intentions of the Government are. There are moments when silence is golden, and there are others when silence is brazen, and I ask the right hon. Gentleman a few questions in order to make it clear whether, not merely this particular Agreement is at an end, but whether the principles which guide and dominate this Agreement have been finally abandoned ? To what extent will the Government pursue the general course indicated in this Agreement on the Disarmament Commission in future ?

My second question is a still more specific one. At Washington we stood for the abolition of submarines. Lord Balfour and Lord Lee, on behalf of the Government of the day, actually proposed it. The United States of America were sympathetic in their reply at that time, and they subsequently gave their adhesion to that policy, and if anyone will look at the letter written to Mr. Houghton which appears in the White Book, he will find that the United States of America are quite prepared to associate themselves with us in a general proposal for the abolition of submarines Have we abandoned that position in favour of a Pact of unlimited submarines under 600 tons ? The third question is this : At Washington we went in for a limitation of craft, and we proposed to proceed with limiting battleships and the very powerful craft. We proposed to go on to discuss the limitation of small craft. Where do we stand now

in that respect? Are we in favour of the limitation of the small cruiser? Because, after all, anyone who knows what happened in the War—and we all have it in our memories—will know, that the most dangerous craft to us is the small craft, and the most useful craft to us also is the small craft.

The next point is this: In Washington we laid down the principle of parity with the United States of America, but with no other naval Power in the world—5.5.3. Anglo-French Pact we departed from that principle and accepted the principle of equality, as far as small craft were concerned, That is a very serious departure from the Washington policy. I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman, among the other questions I have put: Does he depart from the Washington policy of parity with the United States of America but supremacy to other naval Powers, whether it is for great craft or for small craft?

The other question bears upon land forces. Before that unfortunate Pact, we took up the position that in computing the military forces of Europe you must take into account reserves as well as the peace strengh of the armies; and then when you cut down you must cut down all round. We abandoned that position iu the Anglo-French Pact. What is the position now after that Pact has been dropped—if it has? Is it as we were? Are we going to take up the position, the very bad position, of insisting that these colossal reserves in Europe shall be brought into the estimates and computations? Have you considered the question of cutting down military forces in Europe? The Prime Minister stated, in one of his recent speeches, that he stood, by Locarno. The Pact is a complete reversal of Locarno. He talked about it as the keystone of the arch. The keystone has gone; it is an archless rainbow-Locarno.

May I say to the Prime Minister that no vague declarations will be satisfactory in face of the definite and alarming facts of armaments in Europe? There must be some definite, concrete, and material effect given to our Treaty obligations. What are those Treaty obligations? To begin with, I will take the Treaty of Versailles. It is quite overlooked too often by the Allies that there were mutual obligations there. We wrote a letter to the Germann Delegates. It was signed by M. Clemenceau, as President of the Conference, on behalf of all the Powers assembled in Paris. We wrote to the German delegates, and said, " This devastating War which has now come to an end has been largely due to the colossal armaments accumulated by Germany. We therefore mean to bring them to an end." The Germans answered, " We are quite willing to accept your terms with regard to armaments, provided you follow our example afterwards." What is the reply that we got? I think it is right that the House of Commons should be reminded of the Treaty of nine years ago. This is the answer:

"The Allied and Associated Powers wish to make it clear

that their requirements in regard to German armaments were not made solely with the object of rendering it impossible for Germany to resume her policy of military aggression. They are also the first steps towards that general reduction and limitation of armaments which they seek to bring about as one of the most fruitful preventives of war, and which it would be one of the first duties of the League of Nations to promote."

What is the condition that was put by the League of Nations in the forefront of the Treaty?

" The members of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety "—

Hon. Members: Hear, hear !

Mr. Lloyd George : We shall see how that has been carried out.

—" and the enforcement by common action of international obligation. "

Those are our two definite undertakings to Germany. Germany has carried out her obligations. She was to reduce her army to 100.000. She was to scrap her great artillery and all her machinery of war. Three years ago the Council of Ambassadors in Paris, after investigating all the reports sent in by the Allied Control Commission in Berlin, reported that Germany had carried out her obligations. That was over three years ago. What have we done ? What have the Allies done to carry out that obligation ? We had Locarno. There has been a good deal said about " the spirit of Locarno " What is " the spirit of Locarno ? " It was not a guarantee of security of France. The guarantee of security of France was only a means to the end. France said, " I cannot pursue that course until first of all my own frontiers are guaranteed. " The guarantee was given. Britain, Italy, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Belgium handed it in. On the basis of that guarantee France signed a Treaty that henceforth all disputes between her and Germany and the other Powers should be referred to arbitration.

What does arbitration mean ? It means that you apply to the nations the same principles as already have been accepted by individuals, that is that a person's life, property, and honour are subject to the protection of law, and that the sanction of law is the force which the community will wield, and not the individual. The individual, however powerful, who tries to enforce a perfectly legitimate right is guilty of a crime against the good order of the State. That was the principle that was accepted at Locarno. What did the guarantee mean ? Even if you reduced the forces of France, Britain, and all the other Powers to the level of Germany there would be at least five to one behind that guarantee.

But what followed Locarno ? Refusal to evacuate the Rhine-

land, although by the Treaty, France, Belgium and ourselves were bound to leave the Rhineland the moment Germany was fulfilling the obligations of the Treaty. What is the next? An increase of armaments on the part of the signatory Powers.

The armaments of France have gone up since Locarno. The armaments of Italy have gone up since Locarno. Although probably the statement would be challenged I think I could demonstrate that the armaments of this country have gone up. [Hon. Members: " No, no! "] Certainly they have gone up. The aerial armaments have gone up. Take the actual figures of money spent, upon the basis of 1924. [*Interruption.*] You ask me to prove it. If it does not interest the right hon. Gentleman opposite, I will go on with my argument. This is what has happened since Locarno. I have some ground to travel, but I am quite willing to take France and Italy alone as signatories of the Treaty. [Hon. Members: " You said Great Britain! "] I maintain that your figures to-day are 104, as against 100 at the date of the signature of the Treaty of Locarno. If that is not an increase in armaments, what is? That is the second. The third is this: The signature of the Anglo-French Pact is the third answer to Locarno—the agreement between France and ourselves, two signatories of the Treaty of Locarno, that there should be no limit upon submarines under 600 tons, and no limit to small cruisers. And the other one is that when you come to the Disarmament Commission the huge reserves whuh constitute these colossal armies in Europe are not even to be debated by the Commission.

That is what it means. France and Italy and the rest, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia and Belgium, are not even bound to put their figures in, and, if anyone attempts to put the figures in, we are prepared to support the Chair in ruling them out. Those reserves constitute more than three-quarters of the armies of Europe to-day. And this is done without as much as notifying Germany that we have entered into that Pact. Germany is one of the signatories of the Treaty of Locarno. The right hon. Gentleman claimed as the Albert Hall that he treated Germany with exactly the same impartiality as he treated France. Here is an agreement which certainly affects Germany, because it rules out a discussion of three-quarters of the armies of her neighbours. And we have never even sent a note to Germany to say that we had entered into that Pact. We sent a note to Tokio, to Rome, and to Washington, after some delay, but none to Berlin They had to make inquiries, and when they made inquiries there was no copy of the Pact sent to them. It is an incredible arrangement from our point of view. I cannot understand a British Government entering into such a pact. What does it mean? Unlimited submarines, unlimited small craft. We have signed a pact, and sanctioned that within perhaps an hour's sailing of our trade routes. It is an amazing arrangement to have entered into.

Not that we are ever going to have a conflict with France. I believe that that is inconceivable. For 113 years we have had peace with France, and I do not believe, whatever happens, whatever misunderstanding we may have, that we shall ever come to blows. That is not the danger. The danger is panics. Misunderstandings you are bound to have from time to time. There have been three serious misunderstandings with France since I have been a Member of this House. I remember that the Foreign Secretary himself was a member of a Government which had one of the gravest conflicts with France, short of coming to blows. On all these occasions there is always the danger of panic—and you will have unlimited submarines and unlimited cruisers. It is an act of supreme folly for any Government to agree to such a proposal from our own point of view. But what is the effect on America ? There is no doubt at all that it has created a feeling, as the right hon. Gentleman himself called it, of very deep suspicion in America. President Coolidge's speech is full of it. It was not merely the thing itself, but it was the way inwhich it was done. There was the delay in notifying America, which was very serious. There was the fact that it was entered into at the very time that we were negotiating the Kellogg Pact —the Kellogg Pact, outlawing war, entered into openly with banquets and blare of trumpets ; the other Pact negotiated at the same time in a back room in Paris with a point directed against the American claim.

That had a very unfortunate effect upon opinion in America and deepened the disgust with which America regarded this Pact. There is one very great journalist, who does not always appeal to hon. Gentlemen opposite, but who, in the main, supports, His Majesty's Government, and he has given a very fair description of the whole transaction. [Hon. Members " Name "] I refer to Mr. Garvin. [Hon. Members : " He supports you "] I wish he did ; I should be only too delighted to have such a brilliant supporter, but, unfortunately, he is a critic of mine. In the main, as I have said, he supports His Majesty's Government, and let me quote his description :

" By this Pact we have forfeited to an unpleasant extent both confidence and respect ".

He adds later on :

" There has been no more dull, obstinate, mishandling of American psychology since George Grenville ".

I think that is a very fair account of the whole transaction. A good understanding with all Powers, of course, is essential to peace, but a good understanding between us and the United States is more important, almost, than a good understanding between any two countries on earth. Our own interest and the peace of the world depend upon it, and any man who even contemplates the possibility of conflict, and any man, certainly, who advises this country to pursue a course based on

the assumption that such conflict is possible, ought to be treated as a dangerous lunatic. [Hon. Members : " Hear, hear ! "] Yes, and I hope it will reach ears lower down than the hon. Members who are cheering. The United States covets no territory. [Hon. Members : " Oh ! "] President Coolidge said so, and I think the whole of their history bears that out. In the Peace Treaty they refused to take a mandate—if you like to put it in that way—in respect of any of the German colonies. They have only one interest, and that interest is common with our own. [*Interruption*]. I hope the right hon. Gentleman will treat this matter more seriously. I think when we are dealing with a matter which involves the peace of the world, it deserves something a little better than this jejune spirit.

What is our common interest ? That commerce on the high seas shall be immune in the event of war between any nation and another from any piratical attacks from any quarter. That is America's interest. It is our interest. Our food supply depends entirely upon that, and it will be our interest, in that event, that the United States should be able to establish that immunity and make it good. In fact, one day, the United States might conceivably help to protect us against the very evils into which the policy of the Anglo-French Pact would land us. We have been guilty of something which has driven the United States, through its chief officier, to declare a policy of additional cruisers. There is only one thing to do, if I may suggest it to the Prime Minister, and that is to get back to the Washington policy of Lord Balfour, and not merely to make statements—pacific statements and flattering statements. It is of no use to have a long geographical catalogue of compliments to nations. The Prime Minister and the Government must make it clear that they have abandoned the Anglo-French Pact, not merely in the letter but in the spirit, and that they are back to the policy declared at Washington of a definite limitation of naval craft, great and small. It is the only policy likely to be of the slightest use in order to put us back in a better position in reference to the United States and in reference to our obligations under the Treaty.

Now I come to another very important part of this Pact which I think has not attracted as much attention as it ought to attract, but which is very vital. That is the question of land reserves. If we adhere to the policy which we laid down in the Anglo-French Pact, it is fatal to any attempt at disarmament in Europe. We might as well retire from the Commission. We have a solemn Treaty obligation to reduce our forces on land and sea to the lowest level consistent with safety. That was not an obligation merely on our own part. It was an obligation on behalf of the whole of the Allies, and we are bound to see that it is carried out in so far as the whole of our influence is concerned. [An Hon. Member : " How are you going to do it ? "] If

the hon. Members have patience, I will tell them. What are the forces at the disposal of a country in the event of war ? There is first the peace army. The peace army in France is somewhere about 400,000 or 500.000 men. The have a very much larger force of professionals than they ever had before, but the peace army is lower than it was before the War, and it gives the impression of disarmament. But what is the war strength of a nation ? The war strength of a nation means all the men trained to the use of arms in a country provided they can be officered and equipped. You can juggle with figures as much as you like, but that is the war strength of a country—the peace army at its greatest war strength, the whole of the men fit for service who have been trained for war who have the necessary equipment and who can be officered.

In France every young man who is physically fit is entered for training. Before the War I think the training was two years. I think now it is eighteen months, and they are reducing it to a year. But that is not a reduction. The men sent to the front from here in the last two or three years of the War received, on the average, about six months' training. Every young man in France who is physically fit is trained for a whole year and then he passes into the reserve. At the date of the War France had an army—a peace army plus these reserves—of 4,500,000. Some of them, I agree, were only fit for garrison duty. Some woul be put on the lines of communication, but the vast majority of them were men who were sent, either to the trenches or to the base. France put into the field, in the course of the War, between 7.000,000 and 8,000,000 men from beginning to end. She had 4 500,000 trained at the beginning. She had officers, she had guns, she had rifles for them all.

What is the position to-day ? This matter was discussed the other day at the Angers Conference in France and attention was called to it. The French people themselves are becoming alive to it. To-day they have a smaller peace strength, but a larger professional army. I shall give the figures in a moment. They have more officers than they had in 1914. The reserves are larger and, what is much more important is this : They have several times more heavy guns—not several more heavy guns, but several times more heavy guns and several times more machine guns and aeroplanes. In addition to that, they have two very redoubtable weapons that were not even in existence in 1910—tanks and poison gas As a matter of fact, the French Army in the event of war is infinitely more powerful than that great German army that terrorised Europe for nearly a generation, and the Powers in military alliance with France would have 2,000,000 or 3,000,000 equipped with rifles, equipped with guns, the equipment very largely provided by French finance.

Now what about Germany ? We reduced the force of Germany

to 1000,000 men, and no heavy guns allowed at all ; a few light guns and machine guns, but no tanks. M. Briand the other day, speaking at Geneva, said, "Ah, but they have got their reserves." Let us examine that. What reserves have Germany got ? They have got the remnant of the army of 1918, passing away year by year. Ten years gone, 10 years without a single quota of young men trained. That is not all. Take that vanishing remnant, which is disappearing year by year, with no equipment, no guns, no rifles. I know it is said that they are a great manufacturing country and that they could easily provide their men with rifles and with guns. Could they ? I rather think the Minister for War held the same office as I did at the Ministry of Munitions, though I am not sure, and the Chancellor of the Exchequer is another. They have only to draw on our experience. How long did it take even to begin manufacturing ? On ilst January, 1915, after four months of war, we had not turned out more than eight heavy guns. On lst January, 1916, when we had mobilised the whole manufacturing resources of this country, we had only 200. What does that mean ? Everybody who knows anything about the manufacture of these terrible machines of war knows that, first of all, you must get the machinery, and that is what takes the time before you begin. In spite of the fact that we were drawing largely from America, our troops had no rifles within a year after the War began. As a matter of fact, before a single howitzer could be manufactured in Germany, this great army of France would be in Berlin, meeting the Poles, Belgians and Czechoslovaks, and every manufacturing centre would be garrisoned by foreign troops.

That is the position after an undertaking by us, as allied and associated Powers, that we would reduce our armaments to the lowest level consistent with safety ; and the German Army 100,000 men. What a mockery ! And the Anglo-French Pact, what does it say about it ? At the end of ten years after the signature of that Treaty, ten years after we gave that solemn pledge, we have given another, this time not to Germany but to France. We gave a solemn pledge not merely that we would not reduce that gigantie army but that we would not even permit seven-eighths of it to be discussed in a Disarmament Commission. I know it is said : " What about Italy ? Germany has reduced, but one must face all these facts when examining such a question." You may say that France has to think of Italy. Well, I am not going to say a word about the Italian army except this, that anybody who knows what it did, with very inadequate equipment, must be full of admiration for the heroism with which it stormed those terrible heights, with very little support from great artillery ; but it is not comparable in equipment with the great army of France. I doubt whether it has a third of the equipment.

But that is not all. There is a declaration made by M. Mussolini, by the Italian Government, which seems to have escaped attention, but I think it is worth emphasising. It was communicated to His Majesty's representative at Rome—and it is reference to this Pact—on 6th October. It is a very remarkable pledge or declaration :

" As regards land, naval and aerial disarmament, the Italian Government repeat at this point the declaration already made elsewhere to the effect that they are disposed *a priori* to accept, as the limit of their own armaments, any figures, however low they may be, provided they are not exceeded by any other European Continental Power."

That is a very remarkable declaration coming from a great military Power. Italy is not standing in the way ; Italy says : "If you cut down these gigantic armies, provided you arrive at a certain figure, we will conform to it." I am not going to say a word about the Soviet, except this, that I think it was a very great mistake that we treated even the proposals they made as merely something to laugh at. It is one of the greatest possible menaces to Europe. It may be no menace now It has no equipment for invasion. It is formidable inside its own boundaries, but it has no real terror from the point of view of an invader at the present moment ; but the moment that great country recovers economically, it will be a very formidable fact to have a Power like that, with unlimited resources of man-power at its disposal, some of the most brave, recklessly brave, men in the world, with equipment, and I should have thought that, when it suited the Soviet Government, as it does for economic reasons, to disarm and to cut down, it would have been worth while to have taken more seriously into account the proposal which it made. I have always thought so. I thought it was a mistake. It ought to have been examined much more carefully, and then you would have eliminated all the elements that would have justified these huge armies. Germany gone. Italy willing to reduce to the lowest figure that would be accepted by others, and then we, instead of doing that, give a pledge to France that we will not allow millions of men, with their equipment, to be even discussed in a Disarmament Commission.

I know it is said that the French Army is a conscript army, and your army is a professional army, that you have no right to impose upon other countries your own ideas with regard to armies, and that therefore the Government are perfectly right in banishing this discussion of reserves. Anybody who uses that argument must indeed be a simpleton. He cannot possibly realise that a conscript army is just as consistent with limitation of numbers as is a professional army. According to a statement made at Angers that has not been contradicted and anybody who looks into the League of Nations book on the subject will

find this point—France at present has a professionnal army of 300,000 or 400,000, four times the size of Germany's, and it has its reserves. In this country everybody was liable up to a certain date—I forget when the Act of Parliament was passed which abolished it—to serve in the Militia, compulsorily. The Militia was recruited then by ballot. A ballot is just as possible in a conscript army to-day as it was then, and unless I am mistaken, even up to 1870, the army of France with its reserves was recruited by means of a ballot. Universal service was something wich I think followed the war of 1870. You can have a ballot there ; but once you reduce the numbers, how vital it is that you should also reduce the equipment, so as to make it only adequate to the numbers that you have got. You have now got an equipment for an army of 5,000,000.

I am told that it is not a question for us, these land reserves. I do not agree. We have our Treaty obligations. Surely that is a question for us, and we must look ahead. I have read the right hon. Gentleman's speeches, and as far as his recent declaration is concerned, if I may respectfully say so, I think it is quite unexceptionable. I agree that as long as you have these huge armies in Europe, you cannot expect peace. I make this statement, and I know the right hon. Gentleman will not challenge it, that wherever you have had in Europe a predominant military Power, in the end it has always used that supremacy to the detriment of its neighbours. I know that when people talk about Germany in the past, one recalls the intolerable arrogance with which they used their overwhelming military strength. We are rather apt to say : "Yes, but that superciliousness is peculiar to the German nature." That is not historically true. Every great country in Europe that has had military predominancy or naval predominancy, or I would say military predominancy. [Hon. Members : "Oh !"] I draw this distinction between them, that with naval supremacy you cannot invade a country—[An Hon. Member : "What about blockades?"] At any rate, every time you have had a Power in Europe that has had overwhelming force behind it—put it like that—it has invariably abused it, and we have always come in to check it. There have been Spain, repeatedly France, Russia, Germany, and if we had not come in upon each of those occasions, the whole history of Europe would have been changed—national, political, religious. If we had not destroyed the power of Spain, the Home Secretary might now have been a Papist. It is a horrible thought ! He might even have been raiding the premises of the Society for the Promotion of Christian Knowledge for evidence of some low-down conspiracy against the moral and spiritual welfare of this country ! Every time you have had that sort of preponderancy it has been a temptation and until you reduce armaments you are not going to get peace in Europe. It is no use looking merely to ententes or alliances ;

their history has not been satisfactory. It has meant organising forces to fight each other. International ententes are almost as precarious as political ententes. But the Prime Minister and I once were in a Government together—and I was also in a Government with two or three right hon. Gentlemen on the Opposition Bench. Disarmament is the only guarantee of safety. The Prime Minister referred at the Guildhall to certain vicissitudes in our relations with France even during the last 10 years. I think that he exaggerated and I am glad to think that he did. He talked about the last five or six years of our relations as being very good but said that they were strained before that. That is not correct. The Government with which I was associated had the most cordial relations with M. Briand, M. Painleve, M. Clemenceau and—I forget the fourth—[An Hon. Member : "M. Poincare "]. He was at the end ; he only broke out when the Conservative Government came in. He entered into the Ruhr and invaded it, but before that we managed to keep his hands off.

There are two ways of preserving friendly relations in a partnership. One is that each partner should be perfectly independent and firm, with independent judgment, expressing it fearlessly and freely ; but always remember this, that concession in the end is essential to cooperation. What is the next way of preserving friendly relations ? Is it always to subordinate your opinion to the most forcible and aggressive member of the partnership ? You can get peace and good relations, but it is an unmanly and undignified method, and it does not in the end conduce to peace. It has not been tried in this country in relation to France since the days of Charles II until now, then it led in a very short time to the longest and one of the most sanguinary wars we ever had with France. It is better that we should put own own opinions freely, independently and fearlessly, and where concessions are necessary to make them ; but you will not have peace in Europe until we carry out our obligations. The condition of Europe is not altogether satisfactory ; the fire is still smouldering in the peat. M. Clemenceau sent this letter to the German delegates at Versailles after enclosing the treaty. He said :

"After the signature, the Allied and Associated Powers must hold Germany responsible tor the execution of every stipulation of the Treaty ".

What about our stipulations—the evacuation of the Rhine and disarmament to the lowest level consistent with safety ? Germany is demanding, and rightly demanding, that we should now carry out our obligations, seeing that she has carried out her's. What answer have we to give ? Are we to say, " Ah, we are quite impartial " ? The whole of the British Empire signed that bond, every part of it. When it is asked to carry it out, what is it to say ? Is it to say, " We are treating you exactly as

we are treating France—you with your army of 100.000 and France with her army of millions " ? Is the British Empire to say. " We are treating you impartially and fairly " ? Shall Caesar send a lie ?

The Prime Minister (Mr. Baldwin) : About a week ago, because I did not make a speech on the so-called Anglo-French Pact, I was accused of discourtesy. My difficulty, of course, is that I am between two fires. I knew at the time that the Leader of the Opposition made his powerful speech on the first day of the Address, that there was an Amendment in effect censuring the Government in connection with these proceedings, but I did not know when it was going to be put down, and rumours had reached me that there was a desire on the part of the Liberal party to initiate a similar discussion. Had the Labour party been anxious to discuss the question as the Official Opposition, no doubt they could have put it down on Thursday, but they chose another subject, and the lot fell to the Liberals. I repeat now what I said then that, whatever the Leader of the Opposition may think of my conduct, in my view it would have been in the highest degree discourteous had I made a reply before the Debate took place, and had I not spoken in answer to whichever leader of whichever Opposition party had chosen to speak on this subject. I said that I was between two fires, and therefore I shall pay some attention to what was said last week, as well as to what has been said to-day.

In the first place, I wish to follow what has been said from both sides of the Opposition with regard to what is called, not in the Amendment, but in the Debate and in the country, the Anglo-French Pact. I am extraordinarily curious to know who was the man who was first responsible for fixing the word Pact on these proceedings. My own impression is that it must have been the invention of the caption writer of some films. All that was said in the House of Commons was said by my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary, and I thank the right hon. Gentleman for what he said about him ; I rejoice to say that I had a very satisfactory private telegram from Mr. Mackenzie King on Sunday reporting that he is again in good health, and I hope that he will be here shortly. I would like to remind the House of what the Foreign Secretary said on 30th July with reference to this subject. He said in this House :

" At the moment the Preparatory Commission on disarmament is not in session, and not definite date has been fixed for its session, but, as has been publicly announced, conversations have been proceeding between ourselves and the French with the hope of reducing the difference between us, indeed in the hope of finding some compromise upon which we could both agree and which we might then submit to other Powers and perhaps, by our proposals, facilitate progress in the Committee ".

— that is, the Committee on Disarmament.

"These conversations have been successful between the French and ourselves and I am about to communicate to the other principal navat Powers the compromise at which we have arrived, in the hope that it may be acceptable to them also, and that thus a great obstacle to progress will have been removed and a step made in advance." — [OFFICIAL REPORT, 30th. July, 1928 ; col. 1837, vol. 220].

I read these words first of all to remind the House of the terms in which the announcement was made to it, and, secondly, merely to comment in passing on the fact that neither the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George), nor the hon. Member for Brightside (Mr. Ponsonby) made the slightest allusion to what the Foreign Secretary said ; and, in speaking of what took place in the succeeding weeks, which caused them to say what they have said in the country and in this House on this subject, they did not think it necessary to allude to a statement made as recently as the 30th of July.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE : The Foreign Secretary never gave us the slightest suspicion of the character of the arrangements ; he did not reveal in the slightest degree what the arrangments were.

The PRIME MINISTER : It was not thought worth while at that time even to ask him, but, had he been asked, I doubt if he would have replied, because at that time no effect had been given to them, because they had not been discussed by the other naval Powers. This compromise was—and I use the past tense —no more than a perfectly honest, straightforward attemps to get out of the deadlock which had occurred in Geneva, and was threatening the whole work of disarmament.

I will go back for a moment to the early efforts of the Preparatory Comnission on Disarmament. No one knows the difficulties more than the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, and the great difficulty of that Preparatory Commission, when they came to investigate the methods by which limitation should be applied to military, naval and air forces, and to lead to a discussion finally at a disarmament conference, lay in this, that we had submitted a draft and the French had submitted a draft. There was a wide divergence of principle. We, of course, stand for the Power that has a small army, and whose first line of defence is the navy. The French stand for a land force, whose main important armament is, and always has been. their army. There was a wide divergence of principle, a division on the military side and a division on the naval side, and the Committee was split really into two groups. The differences between them seemed unbridgeable, and they adjourned. Then hope centres on the naval confe-

rence at Geneva, which was invited by the United States of America. As we all know, that conference failed.

I am not going into any details with regard to the naval proposals. My right hon. Friend the First Lord of the Admiralty will speak later in the Debate in order to deal with the more technical subject of the size of ships and so forth, but I would observe at this point and I thtnk it should never be forgotten, that we did put forward proposals there which were far-reaching and detailed and which would have led to a strict limitation of every class of vessel, and to an economy of some £50.000.000 over a term of years. That was a proof o our sincerity and that was the kind of disarmament which we should have tiked to have, and should like to have now if we could get it. But it was not acceptable. That is the history of that failure. How neither America nor ourselves would accept the other view is fresh in the memory of all. But after that conference had failed, everyone who had been working at disarmament at Geneva was reluctant to let the matter stand there. It was felt that a fresh effort, however forlorn it might appear to be, should be made. I would call the attention of the House to an extract from a speech delivered by the Italian representative, which is quoted in the White Paper. It is worth quoting at this point. He said :

"I should be prepared wholeheartedly to support the judicious suggestion put forward this morning by Mr. Gibson, the American representative, namely, that we should post-pone our next session until there is some hope of reaching an agreement and should not risk a repetition of the results of the first meeting. Mr. Gibson demonstrated very clearly that if the Commission meàns to reach an agreement we must allow time for conversations to take place between the Governments with a view to eliminating the most salient points of difference".

I merely quote that al this moment to show that the American and the Italians were at that time encouring the other parties to go forward with conversations to see whether any progress could be made. We know that those conversations proceeded.

Before I go on to the subject of the so-called Pact, I sould like to say a word here with regard to what the right hon. Gentleman said about military forces and reservists, because that is an extremely important question. I would say in starting that we have been very strongly criticised on the ground that we have made concessions to the French and covferred some immunity upon them which they do not at present enjoy. Of course, that is not the case. They remain, as all the conscript countries remain, where they always have been. There is no question about that. We wanted to get the conscript countries to share our view of the limitation of land forces and the inclusion of the military reserves. So far, as is well known, there is

no sign of them giving way. We hold our view, they hold theirs, and until they do give way, it is perfectly clear that no progress can be made on military disarmament.

Here I would like to say a word or two about universal service. We have-to persuade these other nations to make concessions. You cannot bully them into doing so. It is no good saying to them, "You have got to do it." We shall make no progress at all by that method. The only way in which we can hope to make progress is by persuasion. The House ought to try to realise the point of view of those who are opposed to us, because that may prevent us saying things about those countries who do not agree with us on this matter which might make their attitude even stiffer than it is at present. I will take the case of France, because France is the country in Europe which has had conscription longest. It is, perhaps, more bound up with her whole system of life than is the case in any other country. Remember this, that France, and those who think with her, regard conscription as an essential part of the doctrine of democracy. It has been so in this country, but it does not follow that it is not so in France, and I want our people to try to realise this in order that they may see what is the difficulty that we are up against in this matter of military disarmament. Universal service is advocated in France by all sections—Right and Left, the extreme Socialists, all—and it is advocated as giving expression to those very principles of equality which were the child of the Revolution. Conscription in France dates from the Revolution. It was first imposed by the Directory at the end of the eighteenth century. It was modified during the period of the Second Empire; so far as my memory serves me, that is all. From that day to this the system has continued, and, as the right hon. Gentleman who leads the Opposition will remember, "the armed nation" was strongly advocated by a man who, I believe, is a friend of his, Jaurès, the great leader in France.

It is not only on the ground of national security and as a protection against external enemies that the French have had conscription. The existence of a conscript army does not necessarily make a country militant. Militarism is a product of the spirit; although I agree thus far with the right hon. Gentleman, that if we have that system we have the powder which may be ignited in certain circumstances, as it was unquestionably ignited in the German Empire. In France they hold the view that if every man has to go to fight when a war begins, the mass of the people will be much less keen about going to fight, and that statesmen will thing twice before they order them to do so. But there is another point. If you look at French history, if you consider the French temperament, you can understand why there has been in France a certain nervousness about having a small and efficient standing army. They are afraid of a *coup d'Etat*. They are afraid that such an army may

lose touch with the people, may lose touch with the principles of the Revolution, by which they stand and to which they believe the greatness of their nation is due, and that with their history and witch their temperament, such an army might become the tool of either a successful general or a successful statesman who wished, to make himself Dictator. France has suffered from that kind of thing before and she is nervous about it. I have just touched on this point to try to give the House the French view, as I see it, in order that the House may realise that it is not irrational, that it is bound up wilh French history, that it is a part ot their own faith and that if we are to get them to alter their system it cannot be dhne by lecturing them or taking the view that we know much better what is good for them. They will have to be approached in other ways.

It has been said often that those who entered on the discussion of this compromise must have known they were foredoomed to failure. I do not quite see why. They had been encouraged by observations from an Italian and an American représentative. During those temporary discussions both England and France had agreed to comprise, and to give up something so as to facilitate a wider settlement and to bring down the existing Washington agreement from the two limitations to further limitations in the hope that these in turn might lead ultimately to a universal limitation. I cannot see that it was so unreasonable that they should do this and should communicate the result to other countries, or think that those countries would not be willing to examine what had been done and in their turn make some concession too. As it has turned out, that view was not right. No concession would be made, and there was no prospect of carryng the matter any further. The whole work has gone for nothing, and such agreement as was come to then is now scrapped, and we have to begin all over again.

A good deal was said about the secrecy of these discussions. There was no mystery at any time. The existence of the conversations was known, and the effect of the agreement as far as it had gone and the next step following was announced by my right hon. Friend. Why was it not published at once, we have been asked ? The reason why it was not published was partly on account of the ordinary diplomatic courtesies and because there were cogent reasons in the character of the conversations. The conversations were tentative tentative in this way, that they could only be final when they had been considered, approved by and embodied in an agreement by the five Powers, and when you are still hoping that conversations may so progress and be so embodied, the very worst thing for them is publicity. I have no stronger authority on my side in saying thal than the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Liberal

party. We may have been wrong in our hopes and expectations, but having the hopes and exectations we had it would have been lunacy on our part, if I may borrow his word. to have made full publication. I have here a most pertinent and apposite quotation from the speech by the right hon. Gentleman. He was speaking in December, 1919. The discussion which he was speaking in immaterial, because the principle is true right through.

" We listened to the case presented on one side and the other, and I make free to confess that, after hearing the whole discussion and hearing what was to be said against the point of view which we adopted at the start, we changed our view. And that is perfectly right. One has to hear every side."

He has had more experience of these discussions than most of us.

" But it would be very difficult to effect a change of course, which was essential if we were to get anything like agreement ; if declarations in the initial stages had been published and discussed and supported on one side and criticised on the other."

Everyone who has negotiated labour matters knows that that is just as true of them as it is of national affairs. There is no doubt about that. We were criticised last year and the Government of the United States were also criticised because it was said there was insufficient preparation. There was no preparation before the Geneva Conference. We tried to get some preparation before this Conference but we failed, and I profoundly regret it.

There is another criticism to which I would like to devote one or two words, and it is that this agreement, so far as it has gone, was directed against some other country. Those who are not at all particular in what they say have gone so far as to say that it was directed against the United States of America by Great Britain and France. There are one or two things I should like to say about that criticism. Here is a telegram which was communicated to the United States Secretary of State. It has already been published, but I will rea it again :

" This compromise has now been submitted to the United States Government in order that they may consider its terms, and, shoul they see fit, give us the benefit of their considered observations and of any suggestions which may occur to them ".

A similar message was sent to Italy, and an intimation of what was going on was afterwards given to Germany.

Captain Garro-Jones : After they had asked for it.

The Prime Minister : Therefore it is equally untrue to say that this agreement was directed against Italy, whose approval was essential if any improvement was to be made. Here I would like to make one observation and one only. Perhaps it is a matter which is not directly connected with the subject of which

I have been speakiug, but I ask the House to bear it in mind as showing how bristling with difficulties is the subject of disarmament. The observation I wish to make is that you have not accomplished everything when you get a limitation in fleets. Disarmament as I have often said, is always less a matter of the spirit than it is of the letter, and just as in the minimum wage the tendency is often for that minimum to be the minimum and the maximum, so when you get a maximum fixed in classes of ships, unless statesmen have real courage, unless they are supported by their own people, there is a tendency for every country to run up to its maximum as soon as it can ; and not only that, but also to see that the maximum in numbers is made the maximum in strengh. I throw that out as a point which has sometimes troubled me when I see difficulties ahead, and as a point which I want the House of Commons to bear in mind. We are not in the least ashamed of the efforts which we have made, although we recognise that we have failed, and we regret it. I am glad to see that so candid and honourable a statesman as Lord Grey said definitely in another place that having heard the statement and read the papers, there was no agreement, there was no treaty. It was a preliminary compromise between two Governments which would depend whether other nations accepted it.

I will just say one word on the point which was raised by the Leader of the Opposition before I deal with the further questions which have been raised by the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs. The right hon. Gentleman referred to the budget of the League of Nations, and I think that his account of the proceedings was lyrical and apochryphal. At any rate, we stand alone only on one question. We were instrumental in reducing the budget of the League by 500,000 Swiss francs. I think it was also very creditable to us that we helped to increase the expenditure and we accepted proposals for putting on an additional 1,750,000 Swiss francs. I think watchfulness in the case of League budgets is just as necessary as in the case of other Budgets. I know it is an ungrateful task to have to shoulder the expense of examining the accounts very closely, but we have had to do the dirty work partly because other people before us had not done it, and partly because of the amount that we were paying. We were sometines in a minority, but I think the Leader of the Opposition is the last person in the world to reproach us on that point.

I would like to say a word or two upon what the right hon. Gentleman said with regard to the Rhineland. As the right hon. Gentleman knows very well, France, Belgium, Italy and Japan are the Powers involved in the interpretation of the Treaty. We desire to see the evacuation of the Rhineland, but we cannot compel the evacuation of the Rhineland ourselves, and even if

we walked out we might cause a greater difficulty. I think there is some real hope now in this direction. The evacuation of the Rhineland is very closely bound up in the minds of certain signatories with the reparations settlement.

Mr. Lloyd George : I am sorry to interrupt the Prime Minister, but this is really a very important point. It was never contemplated that the whole of the reparations obligations would have to be discharged before we evacuated the Rhineland. The only question was whether Germany was performing her obligations under the Treaty. The moment it was found that Germany was performing her obligations under the Treaty we were bound to evacuate the Rhineland.

The Prime Minister : Of course the question arises whether Germany's obligations are being discharged. I am not expressing an opinion on that point. This is a question which will be decided by the Committees to be set up. Of course, I cannot say anything at the present early stage of negotiations between the Powers, but I know that this subject is being approached in a spirit and with a desire to settle it, and I hope that it will lead to a settlement which will mitigate the last troublesome remnant of wartime, that is the evacuation of the Rhineland. I would like to say a word to the right hon. Gentleman opposite in regard to what he said about the Kellogg Pact. I have said on more than one occasion that I agree with the right hon. Gentleman on this point. I attach much more importance to what the right hon. Gentleman does, and if he really thinks that what he calls the Reservations, which were explained by the Foreign Secretary in this House, destroy the effect of the Pact then I do not agree with him. How can they destroy it, and why ? After all, either the right hon. Gentleman suggests or implies that the United States have withdrawn or should withdraw the Monroe Doctrine. He cannot mean this, because that would be a suggestion which we could never make to the United States. Or else the right hon. Gentleman suggests that it is perfectly legitimate for another country to have a reservation and not for us to have one. In that case I disagree with him. I do not think our action is misunderstood by the American Government for one moment. It was never expected that we should get the signature of every country in Europe, but we shall have to examine very carefully the objections which have been raised in the light of what we have signed. We hardly know yet how we shall be able to give effect to it, but we shall have to do it.

The right hon. Gentleman speaks of the British Government being unwilling to meet the American Government, and he says that the Conference of 1927 has broken down. Must we always be wrong ? Let me ask the right hon. Gentleman, whom I know is very widely read, just to remember a little story of Voltaire's Candide. He will remember that ingenuous

youth came with his tutor Dr. Pangloss to England just in time to witness the shooting of Admiral Byng. He inquired the reason, and he was told that it was because the Admiral did not get close enough to the French. His reply was, " The French must have been as far from the Admiral as the Admiral was from the French. In this country they have the habit of shooting an Admiral to encourage the others. " Is it now suggested that we tried to get a mile or two further away from America than they got from us ? The right hon. Gentleman cannot resist the temptation of bringing down an Admiral and in this case of a conference. I think he has brought down two.

Here I want to touch on one aspect of this question, which is more or less common to the Leader of the Liberal party and the Leader of the Opposition, and that is the question of our relations with France. The ideal of the right hon. Gentleman opposite is to go back to 1924. I do not want to make a cheap point by suggesting that Germany is not in the League, but I think I know what he means. What was the key of our policy in 1924 ? Three weeks after the right hon. Gentleman came into office he wrote a letter to the head of the French Government. I endorse every word of it ; it was an admirable letter. I will only give one or two sentences from it. He said :

"It is a policy that can only be initiated with the agreement of France and England".

With regard to the economic stability of Europe, he said :

"Here again, if France and England can but agree the co-operation of other European countries would be assured, and it would be possible for us to approach the United States of America. I repeat. my dear Premier, the condition of Europe can only, I feel convinced, be remedied by joint action between France and England, undertakers with full sympathy for their respective requirements and with wise regard to the interests of the world at large".

When the right hon Gentleman was in office, he never wavered in his application of that method of dealing with the European situation, and his efforts—and he will acknowledge that I have never failed to pay due tribute to them—were successful, and were universally regarded as being successful ; and it was those efforts that gave him his reward in the Londen Conference, which led directly to the Dawes Agreement. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnavon Boroughs spoke about the arcadian relations between himself and the French. They may have been very happy at one time, but they were not when he went out of office, and the difficulty with us was how we should get the French to resume conversations with us.

I would only say this, that the fact that the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition reaped a great success in working with the French does not mean that he did not hold his own point of view, nor does it mean trying to bully them,

because on one important occasion he made a compromise with them and accepted their view, which, in fact, enabled the result to be reached, which was a wonderful success. On the other hand,the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, by what I think was his failure to understand the feelings of the French nation and to sympathise with them, caused the wreckage of his policy, because he could not get their support. When we came in, it was some months before we were able to get back in Paris to that friendly diplomacy which had existed at the time of the arrival of the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition, but which, at the time he went out, was at an end. So far as we are concerned, we do not mean to deviate from the policy we have tried to pursue since we have been in office, which, so far as cordial understanding with the Government of France goes, is the same policy that was pursued by the right hon. Gentleman the Leader of the Opposition. It is not exclusive in its nature ; it is not directed against anyone ; it involves no surrender. Co-operation of that kind is the one way in which Europe can be saved from being divided into two hostile camps. It has numerous achievements to its credit ; progress has been registered in many directions. I am not speaking only of Locarno, but also of the period during which we have had the co-operation of the Germans. They, and the French are working admirably together to-day. They have their difficulties, but are, on the whole, working with good temper and respect for each other's point of view.

We have had a policy of working in close co-operation with the French, but in co-operation with all other countries It has been felt in the remotest corners of Europe. It has contributed to the settlement of minor disputes, but disputes which might in times past have led to very serious trouble. Our one desire in foreign politics is the desire of the British people, and that is to heal the wounds caused by the War and to see the peace of Europe consolidated for the benefit of friends and late enemies alike. There are, however, many difficulties in our way. In disarmament, you will never make progress until you have got the hearts and the wills of the peoples and their leaders turned to it, and to get that you have to eliminate so far as you can every cause of friction between the peoples. Here I must make a complaint about the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnavon Boroughs, who knows better than anybody how easily fears are aroused in nations. I must make complaint of some of the statements that he makes when he writes articles in the Press of foreign countries. They not only make our task incomparably more difficult, but make it perfectly impossible for himself if he should ever come back to office and again deal with foreign statesmen. The House remembers how another great leader of the Liberal party, Mr. Gladstone, in the last

period of Mr. Disraeli's office, made some observations about Austria which gave much offence in that country Fortunately, the Austrian Ambassador of that time was a very great personal friend of Mr. Gladstone. He let him down as lightly as he could. But Mr. Gladstone had to explain himself, and to write a letter, which is probably within the recollection of every student of history, but which contains one sentence which is so relevant that I must read it to the House. He said,in that letter :

"Without discussing the accuracy of certain expressions in the report you have forwarded I proceed at once to the subject. At the moment when I accepted from the Queen the duty of forming an Administration, I forthwith resolved that I would not, as a Minister, either repeat, or even defend in argument, polemical language in regard to more than on foreign Power which I had used individually when in a position of greater freedom and less responsibility".

How can it possibly help us and I put it on that ground, when the right hon. Gentleman writes in a paper in this country :

"Germany having been once snapped by the springs of the Covenant in the affair of Silesia, is too wary to trust her destiny to this new and sinister contrivance forged by France's tame blacksmith, Dr. Benes".

It does not help. How can it have helped in these last few weeks, when questions are always, or will be, under discussion with regard to the evacuation of the Rhineland, when he writes in the "Neue Freie Presse" about the scarcely veiled subservience of this country to France, and speaks about Germany's

"unfair and intolerable Eastern Frontier with Poland".

An Hon Member : "Quite right" !] You may feel that, but, after all the right hon. Gentleman is the author of the Treaty of Versailles. [*Interruption*] It makes it extremely difficult. I do not wish to pursue this subject, but only want to mention that, and to beg the right hon. Gentleman to see if he cannot confine his criticisms to this country.

Mr. Lloyd George : Of course, I have not had notice of these quotations, and I have some right to complain if the right hon. Gentleman is going to quote passages which I have had no opportunity of verifying. If the right hon. Gentleman intended to make a personal attack upon me in reference to articles which I am supposed to have written, I ought, at any rate, to have an opportunity of checking some of those articles. Of the last phrase that he quoted I certainly have no recollection, nor of the former. If the right hon. Gentleman will do me the honour of letting me have the article and the date, I shall check it. I have no recollection of saying anything about the intolerable conditions of the Eastern Frontier, except in reference to what I have always protested against, and that is the Silesian Award, with wich I had nothing whatever to do.

The Prime Minister : I have all the details here, but I will

not use any more quotations this afternoon, and, if I should have given the right hon. Gentleman notice, I regret that I did not do it. I will, however, say this, that it is a little difficult for the head of the Government, after having listened to everything that the right hon. Gentleman said, to refrain from reminding him, or rather, merely telling him of what perhaps he had not thought of, and that is the danger that it really means for us. I am appealing to him to stop it.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY : Stop your own Ministers doing the same thing.

Mr. WHEATLEY *rose*—

Mr. DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr. James Hope) : The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister is in possession of the House.

The PRIME MINISTER : I will just give one extract from a speech of the right hon. Gentleman's. It was at Yarmouth, so there will be no need to give him notice of it. Indeed, there is nothing on the face of it with which I can find fault, but I want to mention it to the House. A great deal was said during the right hon. Gentleman's speech about America. He said, speaking about the suspicions of America :

"I have mentioned that subject in a speech of mine. I said in my speech that they were suspicious, and I regretted it."

But the phrase he used was this :

"The middle West of America was very suscipious of Europe, and this Anglo-French Pact stimulated, engendered and fostere that kind of suspicion."

If the Middle West of the United States is suscipious of us, is it really necessary for a man who has occupied the great position the right hon. Gentleman has to tell them in effect, in a speech in England which will be cabled to every paper there, that there is ground for their suspicion?

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE : The Prime Minister himself said so. He used the same identical words when he said there were very deep suspicions.

THE PRIME MINISTER : I did not justify that suspicion. That is the point. I would make one or two observations about that suspicion, because President Coolidge said it was always plain that Europe and the United States are lacking in mutual understanding. I think President Coolidge is right. I think there is lacking, as between Europe and the United States, mutual understanding. I regret it profoundly but, if I am asked why it is, it is very difficult to find an answer. I thought I would tell the House one thing I have noticed during the time I have been in Office. I do not pretend to see a way out but I think it is worth reflection and consideration. In Europe all her statesmen have got in the habit of meeting at Geneva and talking together, from which they learn not only each other's point of view but, what is very important, each other's idiosyncrasies as individuals, and I think there is rapidly coming into Euro-

pean statesmanship, among European statesmen *inter se*, a desire in negotiation to see the other point of view and to compromise, if something can be effected by that compromise, far more than existed before the War. American statesmen do not know European statesmen, European statesmen do not know American statesmen, and there is no personal intercourse. The only intercourse that takes place is the written despatch that goes across 3,000 miles of ocean. It is a far more difficult thing to get a mutual understanding in those circumstances.

I will make one more observation on that, and I make it to Members of the House. I think it is most important that all of us who may be called upon either to speak about America in foreign politics or about our relations with America should really get to understand, by studying it, the political system of that country and how she carries out any work connected with foreign relations. I say that because it is so different from any European system. On that difference shipwreck has more than once been reached. It is most important for the avoidance of future shipwreck, for the avoidance of possible ill-relations after such shipwreck, that we should be familiar on this side with the marked difference in the political system of the two countries. I should like to remind the House—it really refers to what I was saying—that some of the best work that has been done financially since the War has been the work of financial reconstruction in which America has been engaged with us and with other countries. I attribute the success of that work largely to the fact that the protagonists, the Governor of the Bank of England and the Governor of the Federal Reserve Bank, were not only close personal friends in constant touch, but every time a difficulty was seen coming ahead, one of those two would cross the Atlantic at once, either the englishman to New Yorh or the American to London or Paris, as the case might be, and discussions took place instead of despatches. I wish to say no more about those relations except to define where in my view they stand and where they stand in the view of the British people, and I shall not define them in my own words. I shall define them in the words of one of the greatest Americans and one of the greatest Anglo-Saxons that ever lived, Abraham Lincoln. Sixty-five years ago this Christmas, when America was not the great Power she is to-day, when she was not a World Power, when the Union was split, as it appeared beyond hope of redemption, when the working men of Lancashire were starving, when cotton was not coming in because of that war in America and the Union blockade of the Confederate States, these Lancashire men, to their eternal credit, wrote to Abraham Lincoln and said "Carry on," and Lincoln wrote to them 65 years ago this coming new year, and he finished his letter with these words :

"I hail this interchange of sentiments as an augury that

whatever else may happen, whatever misfortune may befall your country or my own, the peace and friendship which now exist between the two nations will be, as it shall be my desire to make them, perpetual."

So be it.

Mr. Ramsay MacDonald : The Prime Minister's speech, while satisfactory in some respects, was profoundly unsatisfactory in others. I cannot allow his opening sentences to pass without comment. He referred to the position in which he found himself last week when, having been informed, after he came to the House, that an Amendment was to be moved to the Gracious Speech from the Throne, he decided that he was to make no comment upon foreign affairs. I want the House to know this perfectly candidly, that before I knew what Amendment was to be moved to the Address, when as a matter of fact, the assumption was—it had been published in the newspapers—that the party that was to make itself responsible for the Debate on the English-French Agreement was to be ourselves, even then I had not made up my mind to take the part I did. This is the important point, and I am sure my Liberal friends will agree with me as to the importance of the point : I knew perfectly well last Tuesday when we opened the Debate that, unfortunately, the Foreign Secretary not being here, it would be rather awkward to have a reply from that Bench. As a House of Commons man first and foremost and not a party man, I resented that the Government should have made a pronouncement of very first class importance in the other House a week before they said a word to us. When I came to the House of Commons, first of all in 1906, I was taught by very good mentors that when there was to be any important Ministerial statement upon either home or foreign affairs, it was the duty of the Leader of this House – the right hon. Gentleman is not only leader of his party but Leader of the House—to see to it that the statement was to be made as simultaneously as possible in both Houses. That is all I say unless I add that I hope the precedent on this occasion is not going to be established and repeated.

The Prime Minister has been making certain reflections upon the leader of the Liberal party. The leader of the Liberal party can very well look after himself. At any rate, no one in this House would resent it more than he if I stepped in to try to defend him. The Prime Minister made those reflections which were made by one of his followers last week, and when the hon, and gallant Gentleman the Member for Chelmsford (Colonel Howard-Bury), was good enough to deliver a fatherly lecture both to the right hon. Gentleman and myself for hampering the harmony which had been created by the good work of the Government on the Continent, he was talking pernicious nonsense. I would advise him and those who follow him, that

before they make charges like this, they ought to take the trouble to consult their own Foreign Office archives.

The Prime Minister himself took up an attitude to-day which did not differ very much from that which his supporter took up the other day. He has been giving us do understand that somehow or other it is owing to the evil machinations of other people that there is trouble on the Continent and in America. I think I know my Continent pretty well. I think I know those who are responsible for the making and unmaking of opinion on the Continent, not only in one country but, as near as no matter, every country in Europe. I was there the other day. Oddly enough it was not anything I ha done that had disturbed them. It was not even anything the right hon. Gentleman had done or said or written that had disturbed them. What I met with, was a profound distrust of English diplomatic policy because of things for which the right hon. Gentleman himself is responsible as the head of the Government. I was not asked to go and curse the Treaty of Versailles and I did not do so. I was appealed to by friends of this country, by men in important official positions to do the best that I could to help to restore the confidence that pro British elements in Central Europe had forfeited on account of what had happened in connection with this White Paper. The right hon. Gentleman knows it. It did not matter whether you went to Vienna or Prague. I was rather surprised to hear the remarks made by right hon. Gentlemen on the Government Benches. I wish to say that after a very long acquaintance wtth Dr, Benes long before he went into political life on the Continent I always found him delightful to deal with, frankly straight and frankly honourable and a man who would never lend himself to the sort of thing indicated in the extract which the Prime Minister read.

It did not matter where we went, to Vienna, Prague or to Paris, the things that we met with were those extracts which I quoted last week. I am not going to quote them again. It is not necessary to repeat these things. They are on record. The dispatch sent in reply to an inquiry from Berlin is not a full statement of what actually happened ; the contradictory explanations and notes that passed between our Foreign Secretary and M. Briand and between M. Briand and our Ambassador at Paris, Lord Crewe, on the one hand, and then the extraordinary note which passed between Lord Cushendun and our Ambassador in Washington— as a matter of fact I think that it was Mr. Chilton who received the note. I quoted those extracts. The Prime Minister has made no reply at all to-day. That is what has damaged our credit in Europe. We can stand a lot of observations by Leaders of the Opposition and by Leaders of the sub-Opposition or anything else. If he would keep straight himself that would be all right. It is the fact that he—and when I say he I only use the " he " in his representative capacity—and his Government have

forfeited confidence in Europe by the way in which they have dealt with these documents. I hope that we shall all co-operate in an endeavour to remove that misunderstanding.

I never love the Prime Minister more than when he is behaving like an enlightened and wise father, but to-day he went a little too far. I will challenge him on this: Will he quote anything that I have ever said or anything that I have ever written which has put the blame for the failure of Geneva only upon ourselves. That is a pretty fair challenge. I do not know whether one's tongue has slipped—I am afraid that often happens; but honestly and genuinely— not for debating purposes that is exactly the opposite of what I said. In regard to the argument about America and ourselves, I hope that he will understand the position, because it is a fundamental argument. It is not an attack upon us, and it is not an attack upon them. What happened is this. You go to a conference. I have been in conferences, and I know the mental processes that evolve the moment the chairman sits down You are going to discuss a scheme of disarmament, say with two nations involved—and if there be half-a-dozen the difficulties are greater— perfectly genuine both of them and perfectly anxious to get an agreement. But both assume that after the agreement is made they can both be secure in the event of a war breaking out It is the beginning. America say: " In the event of a war breaking out my navy requires to do a certain job ". We all know what the job is. We say: " In the event of a war breaking out our Navy require to do a certain job ". And the Admirals of America and the Admirals of Great Britain, being asked as expert advisers to tell their respective Governments how this job is to be done and how the tonnage is to be distributed in terms and categories of ships, can never agree. When I was in Berlin I discussed that question and explained it with a view to clearing people's minds. It reminded me of the fable of the stork inviting the fox to dinner. The stork quite honestly wished to give the fox a feed, but naturally, as a stork, it prepared the food in stork dishes, and when the fox's turn came it did precisely the same thing It is just as necessary that the Prime Minister should represent accurately the views of his opponent as it is for his opponents accurately to represent the views of his Government.

The Prime Minister, by the reference he made to me and to my friends who agree with our policy, implied that somehow or other we want to quarrel with France. That is not true. He referred to the troubles of the successors of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George). Has he forgotten the troubles of that time? He seemed to have forgotten the relationship that I had inherited with France. It was not a silky, smooth inheritance by any means. I am not going to labour the matter or to explain it further. Under those circumstances, I say at once, that nothing could be done by a

continuation of the policy that had been carried on and which I found. Under those circumstances and to establish a good relationship with France I wrote the letter quoted by the Prime Minister There can be no peace in Europe if there is disagreement between France and ourselves. What we adopted— I am not going to explain it all through—was a very persistently carried out policy—friendship but not subordination. I pleaded again and again, as I pleaded before I went into office and when I had not the ghost of an idea whether I should be kept in office, that the time had come for British Foreign Secretaries to lay down the British policy. In that policy—make no mistake about it—there should be no enmity to France and no enmity to others. There is a sort of idea or assumption—it seems to be in Lord Cushenden's mind—that we must keep alive all alliances and old ententes. Quarrelling with Germany is a fundamental mistake of His Majesty's Government's foreign policy. Experience shows that it is so.

This White Paper—I have no intention of going over it now—was a deplorable affair. I simply say that I do not understand how it could be that was taken to mean that if France and ourselves could by meeting separately and come to an agreement between ourselves we should be carrying out what was in the mind of the American delegate. We had already disagreed—it was not a quarrel—with America, and we had already disagreed with Italy. The idea that France and ourselves by agreeing together could then without any consultation at all, except by the application of that method—which I quite agree is a very bad method—which has been point out by the Prime Minister. Instead of asking the American representative and the Italian representative to come and discuss the matter, France and ourselves discuss the matter and come to an agreement. It does not matter what are its merits. The Government have sent the thing in a dispatch to America and it is a dispatch which does not give the full agreement. No apology and no explanation will do for that. The Government have made a blunder of the first magnitude, and the House of Commons ought to say so.

The Prime Minister has skipped over the contents very lightly. Does he really mean to tell us that those delightful observations which he made upon conscription, which some of us have been at for over 20 years, negotiating with various foreign political parties in order to get the position of the conscript army on to something like a peace footing, does he mean to tell us that that was all that happened and all that was in the mind of the Government ? That is not the case In any event, I hope that he will read his dispatches a little more carefully. They should show all that was in the mind of the Foreign Office when the negotiations were going on. This document which I hold in my hand was something which I wished to read on the last occasion, but I did not do so. I will read it now. Just let the House

observe this; it is on page 21, in a Note sent by the Foreign Secretary to the Marquess of Crewe.

"You should add that the adoption of this suggestion which His Majesty's Government recognise would be a concession to their views on naval classification, would enable them to meet the French Government by withdrawing their opposition to the French standpoint with regard to armytrained reserves".

A very clear bargain.

The Prime Minister gave a very satisfactory general formula. Without in any way doubting what he had in his mind, I am never satisfied with a general formula, and I should like to get from someone who follows him in debate a definite and more detailed answer to the following questions: Does anything still exist of the agreement between ourselves and France? That is very important. Is it not only dead to the world - I mean the large negotiating Geneva worl but is it deal as far as France and ourselves are concerned ? I hope the Noble Lady the Member for the Sutton Division of Plymouth (Viscountess Astor) will permit me to put my questions. She will admit that it is my duty to be so sceptical as to get something which is more definite, in order that we may know precisely where we are. Will this go in any shape or form to the Preparatory Commission, or shall we begin as soon as the Preparatory Commission meets without any understanding at all between France and ourselves? Are we now free to make other proposals regarding trained reserves, or are we bound now to allow the matter to be treated as closed? The Prime Minister completely missed the point on that.

The question about trained reserves is not a question of conscription but a question of how conscription is going to work. It is a perfectly simple proposition.

Mr. Lloyd George : And a question of numbers.

Mr. Mac Donald : Yes. It is perfectly simple to work conscription and to get men into trained reserves. You can work it through Budgets. There may be objections to that. You can work it through equipment. There may be objections to that. You can work it through numbers. You can get a co-ordination of the whole three into one scheme. One of the great troubles that is now facing Geneva in connection with this question of the limitation of trained reserves, so far as I have been able to see, and I have read all the debates that have been published, is that it is one of the great difficulties in the way of disarmament. In so far as the debates are a complete revelation of the position taken up by our representatives, they show that our representatives were not really aware what the real nature of the problem was regarding conscription. They raised points that they ought never to have raised. It was a very badly handled debate from our point of view, and it had an unfortunate result. As far as I could gather, when we started the debate on

trained reserves the European nations were not friendly. Certain of them saw that our position had to be met, and, therefore, they were not unfriendly as listeners to the debate, but so badly did we handle the debate that when it was finished there was not a nation that supported us. Do not let the Prime Minister imagine that when he talks to us about conscription and the history of conscription in France and so on, that he is really ans wering the problem of conscription within the disarmament scheme.

There is one further point on which the Government had better make up their minds. The Prime Ministers will have to say something about that final paragraph which I quoted last week in M. Briand's communication. He cannot get away from that. What does that paragraph mean ? He says that, whether agreement succeeds or fails, there will still be an obligation upon both of us to pursue the same things in other ways. That point ought to be cleared up. I do not know the mind of the Foreign Office on the point, but I do know something of the situation in Europe and I know that that question ought to be answered for the sake of pacifying and clearing up the suspicious feelings which are in the minds of people in Europe. If a Minister says that, as a nation, we have no secret commitments and if any of my hon. Friends puts a question which doubts that statement, everydody on the Government side raises a laugh and shouts. That may be all very well here, but continental nations have secret commitments and they are not shocked at all to suggeist that we have secret commitments. If we have no secret commitments, and I hope we have not and never shall have any secret commitments, it is well that we should be open about it and expose everything that we have done. We cannot do that successfully so long as a suspicion is allowed to remain in the mind of the Continent that we have secret commitments. One hon. Member has suggested that it was a try-on. I do not know. Was it only a try-on ? Or was it something more ? We have not had a reply and I think we ought to have a reply. A reply has to be made and the House of Commons is the place to make it. I hope that who-ever replies on behalf of the Government in this Debate, will pay attention to the questions which I have put. Do let us try to come to some amicable understanding of the whole thing.

May I place before the House one final consideration, which I have already indicated in what I have said about America and the criticism which I have expressed in regard to America and ourselves, a criticism which is common to both of us. You will never get disarmament, and it is worth getting, so long as you pursue it on the assumptions upon which you are now pursuing it. The Prime Minister said something about the Kellogg Pact. He said, quite truly, and we have said it again, and again, that now we have the Kellogg Pact and have signed it,

are we only at the beginning of our troubles. What does it mean? How are we going to carry it out ? That is the whole point. Will the Prime Minister tell me what effect the signing of the Kellogg Pact has had up to now upon our policy in this country ? I know, of course, that there is a large policy which one cannot change in the twinkling of an eye or even in a week or a month. I know that it has to be manipulated and very carefully handled and very carefully thought about. But what have you been talking about at Geneva ? You were discussing the possibilities of war and how far it was possible to reduce armaments pending the War. That was what was going on at Geneva when the discussion was adjourned because the Kellogg Pact had to be signed in Paris. We went to Paris and signed the Pact and declared in that Pact that war should never again enter into our heads as part and parcel of our policies, and then we went back to Geneva and resumed the discussion about war at the same point where we left off.

Let me say this quite clearly. You are not goingt to get disarmament until you get a very considerable psychological change in Europe. We are told that it is security that is wanted. Do not let us babble so much about security. I am not now speaking in a partisan way. I hope we are addressing ourselves to a very serious and very real problem in Europe. The problem is this. You go to Geneva for a conference and the representatives of nine, 10 or 12 nations sit down at the same table to discuss the problem of disarmament. If you start to reduce the number of ships or the number of men you will never get anywhere because when you begin to press the other nations to come to an agreement and to see your point of view, they say : "Oh ! Where does my security come in ?" You can base your security on one or two characteristic foundations. You can say to these people : "Very well. We will give you security from your army, navy and air force." Or you can say to them, in a reasoning sort of way : "My friends ! Go back through the centuries of history that ever you have read and tell me where in that experience you have ever had security from military force. " Having done that, you can say to them : "Can we not consider how we can get security other than by military force ?" You can secure the peoples of Europe by establishing peace. That is the alternative to force. You can tell the peoples of Europe that they can be secured by armaments reduced to economic limits, but which can be expanded at once. You can tell them that by working out a scheme of peace organisation, working mutually together, the nations can get security by peace so that th y do not require to bother so much about security by force. I am certain that you can go on with your disarmament conferences until the Day of Judgment, but unless your change the psychology of the people so that they will take the risks of being at peace, and not always run away from

that, rather than accept the risks of always being half-cock at war, we shall never get the peace which we all desire. I want to warn the Governement of what is so ominous and sinister in their diplomacy. Behind all this is a war diplomacy. This House ought to make its position perfectly clear, and that position should be one of unqualified censure.

Captain Eden : The Leader of the Opposition in the speech which he made in this House last week, and to a lesser extent in the speech he has just delivered, worked himself up to some measure of indignation at the policy which the Government is pursuing at the present time, and he refreshed that indignation with reminiscences of his own recent brief tour to some of the capitals of Europe. I read with great interest the right hon. Gentleman's observations when he came back from that tour, and I gathered that he was a little depressed at the outlook for Europe, not perhaps altogether an inhuman sentiment from the point of view of one who has been Foreign Secretary and is not now in office. I gathered also that he was very dissatisfied with the part which this country was playing in the councils of Europe and the world. We were not pulling our weight as we should. But in his speech the other day the right hon. Gentleman seemed to contradict somewhat his previous criticism when he referred to the "tremendous damage" which the Government's foreign policy had effected on recent occasions. "Tremendous damage" is seldom effected by countries which do not count, which are not important to the immediate history of Europe.

Anyone who has tried to follow this somewhat complicated controversy in recent weeks and months will be reduced to the conviction that the Government have some right to complain of the nebulous nature of the charges which are still being brought against them in connection with recent negotiations. The right hon. Gentleman himself the other day committed what I believe to have been a serious error of fact. Ever since this campaign of misrepresentation began—I will not discuss its origin and causes—various suggestions have been thrown out about undue secrecy, about there being some sinister purpose behind such secrecy. The right hon. Gentleman has dismissed these charges for the time, but it would seem that the existence of those charges cannot for a moment be justified in fact. Let us be quite clear what happened. The original proposal was not of course the original proposal of our own Government. It was not an action arising out of the brain of our Foreign Secretary with a sinister purpose under it. The original motive power which gave origin to the first draft Convention which this country submitted to the Draft Commission came from the chairman of that Commission. The right hon. Gentleman denied that, but if he will refer to the Commission he will find that on the day of its first meeting, 30 th November,

a suggestion from the chairman, which I will not quote now, gave rise to the original draft Convention and later in the spring of this year there was again a fervent appeal by the chairman of the Commission that those Powers who disagreed should make some attempt to find common agreement outside the confines of the Commission itself.

Mr. Mac Donald : Can the hon. and gallant Member refer me to any suggestions that were made that France and England should alone come to this agreement ; should alone undertake these discussions and come to this agreement ?

Captain Eden : I think it is so. The original draft Convention was submitted by England alone, and the other draft Convention was submitted in opposition by France alone. If, therefore, agreement was to be the outcome, not within the confines of the Commission, it could only be between England and France the only two countries who had submitted draft Conventions.

Mr. Mac Donald : May I ask whether an attempt was made at Geneva to come to an agreement with America outside the Commission on which American representatives sat ?

Captain Eden : I do not want to be led astray. The point I want to make is that the suggestion did come from the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission, that we and France, the two countries who had submitted alternative proposals, should come together outside the terms of the Commission and agree. I do not think there can be any doubt on that point of fact, and I only want to emphasise it because it is one on which there has been frank misunderstanding in many cases. Then comes the question : Were we right to try and fulfil the request of the Disarmament Commission ? Were we right to try and find a measure of agreement with the French Government ? Undoubtedly we were, and therefore ought to be acquitted of doing anything wrong in that respect. We therefore reach this point : That it was right to try and reach agreement, but that the terms which we achieved were unsatisfactory ; it is the terms then which have produced this disastrous effect ? It has been admitted by everyone, although the right hon. Gentleman for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) does not seem to have the least idea of it, that the terms which we eventually reached were not the terms which this country was anxious to achieve. We have not agreed upon the original proposals put forward by this country which divided armaments into nine categories and limited each ; that was the policy which we desired. The right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs never seems to have heard of it.

It is perfectly true that we were unable to reach an agreement on those terms, but the comparison I suggest is not between the terms which we should like to have reached and the terms we have got, but the true comparison is between the terms we

have got and the position as it was before those terms were reached. It is not a fair criticism to say that we should have reached an ideal limitation. The true criterion is : Was the limitation embodied in the Agreement an improvement on the condition of affairs which existed before ? That is the only true comparison, and on these lines I suggest that we are entitled to say that in the terms of the agreement, which incidentally offered to the United States of America a measure of departure from the proposals which she had previously rejected, there was something which might reasonably form the basis of future discussion. And that is what the Foreign Secretary said when he stood at that box in July last. He made no other claim. He did not pretend that there was any secret Treaty, any pact, any agreement, which was binding for all time. He said they were tentative proposals which he hoped would be considered by other Governments, and just such proposals as the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission had asked this country and France to work out.

I hope that some of the criticisms which have been uttered in the country, some of which seem to have found an echo in the speech of the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs, will not gain in force or authority in this country. There seems a tendency to cast suspicion upon the pre ent relations of this country and France, as though the friendship which existed between us cloaked some hidden and sinister motive. No one will endorse that. At the moment I suppose our relations with France are very friendly indeed and, personnally I hope they will always continue to be so, because I am certain that these relations form an inevitable basis for the peace of Europe not only to day but in the future. After all, we have only to look back on recent events to realise that the friendship is in no sense exclusive. On the contrary, it is the medium through which alone such progress as has been made in international relations has been achieved. Through that medium the agreements of Locarno were achieved, and rapprochement with Germany made possible. It was through that friendship that Germany was able to find a place in the Council of the League of Nations itself, and but for the friendly relations which existed between this country and France, the League of Nations would not now be in the strong position it is at the moment ; and that in itself has been the instrument which has paved the way for the settlement of difficult problems.

I am convinced that it must be an essential factor in future international relations in Europe that this country and France shall maintain and extend to others the friendship which has bound them together in the past. Surely, it would be a morbid and monstrous doctrine to lay it down that two such countries like France and England, which are bound together in their friendship by every tie which should sanctify it, cannot

continue to use for their mutual benefit and the benefit of the rest of mankind that measure of friendship without in some ambiguous way embittering other nations, or rousing suspicion in other Governments I do not believe that any foreign Government entertains such suspicion for a moment, and if anyone wished for proof of the importance of Anglo-French amity they have only to glance over the history of international relations since the War. On every occasion when the outlook for peace in Europe has been the least happy they have been the occasions when our relations with France have been the least happy.

The most anxious weeks which this country has spent since the War were those which preceded and included the Chanak episode, and it was in the last days of the Coalition when the prestige of this country sank to its lowest ebb. Those were precisely the very months when our relations with France were the least satisfactory. I myself would not blame the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs exclusively for that state of affairs. We are a little more charitable on these Benches than he is on occasions. We realise that it takes two to make a quarrel, but it also takes two to make a compromise. I have often thought that there was some little temperamental contrast which might make it difficult for the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs and his French colleague to see eye to eye. The French for all the ardour of their patriotism are essentially a practical race. The Welsh are oftentimes sentimental. The French are essentially masculine and perhaps a little prickly to handle intellectually ; the Welsh are perhaps a little more gentle, a little more feminine. A Frenchman will always wish to proceed by logic, but a Welshman may wish to proceed by instinct. It is not, therefore, surprising sometimes to see both setting out for the same objective and ending up in opposite places. Nor is it any more surprising, both having arrived at their respective objective and both being endowed with equal volubility, to find that there should be prolonged conferences in various parts of Europe to settle which was right.

There is one note which I think this House should not allow to led drop. I, myself would be profoundly sorry if I thought the outcome of this attempt to find a basis of agreement and the misrepresentation that has centred round it should result for a moment in any misunderstanding among our friends in the United States of America.I do not believe that, thereis really any danger of that for I do not think that that suspicion exists among the best-informed minds in the United States at present. Right or wrong, I am convinced that a greater measure of understanding between this country and the United States is the most important objective that the Government of this country could set bofore us.

The Government should not allow itself to be stopped in that

work by any obstacle however formidable or irritating. Perhaps the irritating obstacle would be the most difficult to overcome. To put it at the lowest, no two peoples in the world have more to lose by a rift in international peace than our own people and the people of the United States. We are all anxious to see disarmament carried into effect. It is world nations like ourselves and the United States who are interested in naval disarmament, and there are still perhaps unexplored avenues which might lead us to hope for better results than have been achieved in the past. I hope that successive Governments in this country, no matter what their political creed, will assiduously pursue good relations between ourselves and America, not only because we need that mutual friendship, but because it is the most important safeguard for world peace in the years that are to come.

Mr. Ellis Davies : It is obvious that the hon. and gallant Gentleman who has just spoken has never studied the Welsh character, and he appears to have forgotten the history of the War. I can hardly think that the gentleman who occupied the position of Prime Minister at that time is either effeminate or sentimental, and he is certainly characteristic of his people. The friends of peace to-morrow morning will read the Prime Minister's speech with regret and despair. Nothing has upset public opinion in this country so much during the last six months as the idea that an Anglo-French Pact had been negotiated. Speaking, or rather writing, on 9th March last, the Foreign Secretary said :

"On the two crucial military and naval questions the British and French were diametrically opposed. British public opinion, with ist traditions, believed that voluntary armies were defensive and that conscript armies implied offensive war."

To-day we had the misfortune of hearing the Prime Minister of England defending the conscript armies of France and approving, though the Pact is no longer in existence, the position taken up by the Foreign Office in the matter. Are we to understand that conscription is also to be allowed to the German Government, or that the French conscript army of 4.000.000 is to remain against an army of 100.000 in Germany ? That is a matter which is of immense and vital interest to us because in the the Pact of Locarno we have bound ourselves, if the French attack Germany, to fight for Germany. On the one hand we have bound ourselves to fight with Germany, a disarmed nation, against a nation which has an army of 4,000,000 men—a conscript army which our Government are willing to allow. When that is realised to morrow, the country's opinion of the Prime Minister will not be very high.

I do not want to quote again the Foreign Office document which has already been quoted, and which suggested that if the Pact ceases to exist there is some urgent obligation on us to

do something else. What is that obligation ? To what does it refer ? Because in 1922 and 1923 we had negotiations for another Anglo-French Pact. I have the documents here - they were published in 1924. It has been assumed all along that France desires security, and the Leader of the Opposition said just now that that was the real position. But is it so ? France has the benefit of the security guaranteed by the League of Nations and of our undertaking under the Treaty of Locarno, and further of a treaty between itself and Poland and another treaty with Czechoslovakia, but notwithstanding these securities the expenditure on French armaments is higher than before the War. I am relying on figures published in the "Manchester Guardian." There has been an increase this year of no less than £32,000,000 in the French Budget. The military expenditure of France to-day is greater than before the War, in spite of the devaluation of the franc. There are 400,000 men in the long-service army. These figures have appeared to-day, and I am not aware that they are disputed. But why is France armed ? Is it for self-defence ? If you turn back to these discussions you will see that there is a note, dated 4th July, 1922, from Lord Balfour to Lord Hardinge, who then represented us in Paris. We had given our undertaking to France as a member of the League of Nations, and the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) offered a pact to France for the defence of its frontiers. Here is what Lord Balfour said to Lord Hardinge :

"M. Poincaré's memo, implies that the French now attach little importance to a Pact, for he was at pains to point out that it either Belgium of France would attack, Britain would of necessessity and from motives of pure self interest be compelled to come to their assistance."

It is not certain whether there was to be protection against Germany. The question then was put to France, "What is the alliance which you seek from us ? and the answer was given quite frankly. They meant an alliance against indirect attack. They did not fear an attack from Germany A note from Lord Curzon to Lord Hardinge on this point stated that by indirect attack they meant an attack of the kind which would be more likely to arise in the future than a direct attack and an instance was given of the situation that might arise if a resuscitated Russia or a resuscitated Germany were to attack Poland. In other words, we were to enter into an alliance with France over and above the Pact of Locarno and the League of Nations. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs and the Cabinet of the time were obviously not satisfied, and refused to enter into that alliance. It was said to night that the Pact is dead, but I am afraid the spirit of the Pact is alive, and I suggest to the House that the real Pact which the French are seeking is that which they sought, and sought in vain, in 1922,

and it is essential for us to understand in this country what is really meant by attack. I pointed out that it was not to defend France against Germany but to meet some possible attack by Germany or Russia on Poland. But what are the implications of that alliance and of that understanding? We were to be in readiness to land troops on the Continent, and there was to be a discussion among the general staffs, naval and military. Is that the meaning of the military and naval Pact?

The Prime Minister to-night declared that he did not want a unilateral pact, but one by which we should also benefit. The alliance implied that the two Governments should engage to regulate in agreement with one another the strength of their respective military, naval and air forces, and there was a stipulation that there should be an understanding between the two general staffs. That was proposed in 1923, and I want to know whether there is anything of that kind being proposed or suggested at the present moment. I accept the Prime Minister's word that the Pact is dead, but people should discuss it on both sides. It was proposed in 1923 that there should not only be that Pact, but that it should be secret. Are these implied negotiations to be secret as in the past? Here is another quotation from the Blue Book:

"If the British Government would prefer not to insert provisions relating to an entente between general staffs in the text of the Treaty, the French Government would be ready to agree, but such power should be embodied in an exchange of notes to be signed simultaneously with, and annexed to the Treaty, such notes to be published at the same time as the main Treaty."

It is because these negotiations have been conducted secretly that we are so sceptical of the assurance we have had as to what really has taken place. Now what is the policy? Is it merely defense against Germany? The Blue Book to which I have referred makes it quite clear that France desires to prevent the union of the German States. According to the Blue Book:

" M. Briand deprecated an Agreement whereby England should come to the assistance of France if she were attacked by Germany, and pleased that the Rhine should be regarded as a frontier common to Belgium, France and England, to be defended in common by all three countries ".

Is that the policy of France? Is that the Pact for which the French are fighting? Is that one of the considerations which have been accepted by the Government as the basis of further discussion. France does not fear Germany. Germany is disarmed. But France has more submarines than we have, and, if one may be frank, let us admit that she does not pay her debts. She has repudiated two thirds of her obligations to British investors, by the devaluation of the franc. I feel sure of one thing about my countrymen, and that is that they are not in favour of any

alliance or understanding with any Power in Europe except with the League of Nations.

Lieut.-Commander BURNEY: The hon. Member who has just spoken seems to see in the Anglo-French agreement some sinister kind of alliance which will carry us very much further than any other alliance which we have entered into with any other country. Surely he is under a complete misapprehension in that respect. I would not have intervened in the Debate were it not for the fact that I was in Washington earlier in the year at a time when the American naval party was making a very strong push to build a big navy. I for one am of the opinion that what has happened over this Anglo-French Agreement is, that it has been purposely topedoed by the big navy party in Washington. Hitherto, every speech that has been made from the other side of the House has astsumed that this country is in the wrong. Propaganda has been spread about, not only in Europe but in the United States, to the effect that it was the British element which was endeavouring to obtain some advantage, and speakers opposite to-day have been only too ready to allow themselves to be taken in by that propaganda. They have arrayed themselves on the side not of their own countrymen, but on that of any foreigner who criticises this country.

What is the actual position? The actual position was, as the hon and gallant Member for Warwick (Captain Eden) has said, that the suggestion for this agreement came not from Britain nor from France, but from the Chairman of the Committee and from the American representative, Mr. Gibson. Why was it suggested that France and Great Britain should discuss this matter? In the words of the Chairman it was

"Because it is necessary that those Governments whose points of view are most divergent should seek to harmonise their views by diplomatic preparation".

Why was it, again, that France and Great Britain were more divergent in their views than any others? The position at that time was this: Great Britain and the United States were in agreement as to the general method by which disarmament could take place. The United States and ourselves wanted a strict limitation by various categories of ships, whereas France and Italy wanted limitation by globlal tonnage That was the great difference in the point of view as to the general method by which disarmament was to come about and in this respect Great Britain and the United States were in agreement. They were not in agreement as to the exact definition of strength, but as to the general method of attaining it. The military powers were in complete divergence in that respect. There is nothing sinister in this situation; there is no secrecy about it. As a result of this situation it was suggested, both by the Chairman and by Mr. Gibson, that France and Great Britain should discuss this matter to see whether they could get somewhat closer together.

What was the object of that discussion? The object was to find a formula which would designate the fixation of strength, but it was not to fix the actual strength of the navy. It was merely to see whether or not a formula could be devised upon which a discussion as to the exact fixation of strength could take place. The exact fixation could not take place until the method had been submitted to every one of the other naval contracting Powers. I do not see how anyone can say that up to this point the action taken by Great Britain was other than what ought to have been taken. It was following logically upon the suggestion which had been made to France and ourselves.

Why did America reject the arrangement to which France and Great Britain came? The American naval experts, wanting to expand the navy, just as the naval experts of other countries want to do, hoodwinked not only their own Government but also the Press of the world. They have drawn a very clever red herring across the track in this discussion of disarmament. The last thing that your expert person, who depends for his livelihood on there being ships, wants, is disarmament. The last thing that the firms who manufacture these ships want is disarmament. When I was in Washington I saw the very pretty play that was going on in the way of propaganda by these two parties. I am not suggesting that it is different in America from anywhere else. Wherever you have great vested interests, those people who live by the fact that the vested interests are in existence, are bound to work for the continuation of expenditure in just the same way as I might come down and suggest that another airship should be built. I have a lot of workpeople dependent on the building of airships.

Now let me examine the official reason that America gives for destroying this Agreement, and let me compare the official reason with the actual facts of the case. What are the two reasons which the United States gave? First of all, in what was termed the "limited class" of ships, she stated that she could not obtain parity with Great Britain because she was precluded from building the number of vessels that she required or the type that she required, whereas in so far as the "unlimited class" is concerned, she was precluded from building those, because if she did build them they would be of no use to her. The reason for that was that they were too small to have the necessary cruising range to carry out her obligations. The reason for the difference between Great Britain's point of view and her's was this: America said that Great Britain had a great chain of far-flung stations throughout the world, at which her ships could re-fuel, whereas the United States, not having such stations, would require ships with great radius of action and therefore of great size. But in the Washington Treaties and Resolutions there is a little clause, slipped in no doubt by the expert, which completely destroys the

foundation upon which the politicians have been discussing this matter,

Politicians have been discussing the question on the basis that America was right, that America must build these bigger ships, and that we were trying to pull the wool over her eyes and get her to build small ships because we wanted small ships and wanted to take advantage of our coaling stations. I shall read this Clause because it is very important. The reason for the breakdown between the United States and this country was stated to be in the limitation of the displacement and the size of the guns carried in the cruisers of what was termed the " unlimited " class. Here is the clause :

" The standard displacement of a ship is the displacement of the ship complete, fully manned, engined, and equipped ready for sea, including all armament and ammunition, equipment, outfit, provisions and fresh water for crew, miscellaneous stores and implements of every description that are intended to be carried in war, but without fuel or reserve feed water on board ".

What does that expression, " but without fuel or reserve feed water on board ", mean ? It means that as that is not taken into consideration in the displacement of a vessel, it is possible to build a 5,000 ton cruiser with a greater radius of action than any warship in existence. That shows at once how this official objection by the United States Government was either due to their experts advising their politicians incorrectly or was due to some other motive. Let me take the question of the eight-inch gun. A few years ago we had a discussion in this House about it. The United States official objection to the Franco-British Pact was that they could not have small ships because they could not get the necessary radius of action. I have shown how utterly untrue that statement is. Let me take the question of the guns. The Americans say that they must have cruisers with eight-inch guns if they are to engage armed merchantmen with any degree of certainty. What is the truth ? It is well known by any naval officer that a naval vessel with a drilled and disciplined crew, would take on any armed merchantman, if the vessel was armed with 4.7 guns. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy), if he were in command of a destroyer with 4.7 guns, would take on any armed merchantman with 6-inch guns. That shows, however plausible may be the political objection to the Pact, how untrue in reality are the objections which have been advanced by America. If what I have said be the truth of the situation, surely it means that although we in this country have been universally accused of having caused a set-back to disarmament any unbiased person must ask if the United States, in refusing to discuss—as they have done—the Anglo-French suggestions, have not been the guilty party in respect of this set-back to disarmament.

We on our side have done everything that we ought to have done. We have carried out these discussions with France at the suggestion of the American representative. We have come to a conclusion with them on a basis which, from a technical point of view, is perfectly sound and good for the United States. We have done more than that. We have got for the first time in history three out of the five leading naval Powers in agreement. Hitherto there has never been agreement among as many as that. Before Members of the Opposition refuse to to take the side of our own country in this matter they ought to delve into the details of this arrangement and see for themselves whether it is not the case that America in effect is saying to us " We want parity with you. We want peace. " But then when she comes to us with this dove of peace in one hand saying that she wants parity she keeps the other hand behind her back, clasping ideas and proposals which would allow her to have a naval superiority over this country. I am not saying for one moment that the United States is not justified in building a navy of whatever size she likes. If she wants to pay for a navy three times the size of this country's navy she is perfectly entitled to do so. It has nothing to do with us at all, whether she has a navy of that size or not but I do object strongly to the statement that while all they want is parity, the suggestions made by us give us an advantage—which is not the fact, the truth of the matter being that if America gets her way it will give, not parity but a great advantage to the United States.

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY: My hon. and galland Friend the Member for Uxbridge (Commander Burney) has I understand been in Washington. From his speech one would suppose, rather, that he had been at Damascus and that on the road a blinding light had struck him. I thank him for his remarks about the absurdity of sending technical experts to disarmament conferences. As I have said before in this House you might as well call a meeting of bookmakers and jockeys to abolish horse-racing and I am glad to have the hon. and galland Member's endorsement of that view. I also make allowance for the fact that the hon. and galland Member has not only been out of this country for some time, but has been struck by a blinding white light, in considering his statement that it was the American " big navy " party which killed the Anglo-French Pact perhaps I had better not call it " pact " but agreement or arrangement or new *entente* or whatever it may be. It was not so. It was British public opinion, with sound instinct, which kille dit. If the hon. and gallant Member had read some of the English papers, of all shades of opinion, he would recognise that fact. A paper like the " Evening Standard, " for instance, a very respectable and not blatently exciting paper referred to it as a case not only of making fools of us but of making

knaves of us. That was the tone of public opinion when the proposed agreement began to leak out principally through French and American papers and official and semi-official leakages.

The opinion among the ordinary work-a-day people of this country—not the politicians, not Bolsheviks, not even Diehards, but the ordinary people—was that it was a mischievous arrangement which would lead to great trouble in the future. I think the public instinct was absolutely right, and I am going to tell the First Lord of the Admiralty why I think it was right and to accuse him and his official expert advisers of having committed a betrayal of the English people in most discreditable circumstances. I am going to show exactly what I mean. This has been a far more sinister business than my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) made it out to be. He attacked the Government hard enough, but even he is not seized of what has lain behind this policy. The Prime Minister, I am afraid, does not know all that is behind it. There is one point in this connection which I hope the First Lord will mention to the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister made a very serious mis-statement in referring to the Kellogg Pact. He said the Monroe doctrine was implicit in the proposals of the American Secretary of State. That is entirely wrong and the Prime Minister has been badly advised. The Monroe doctrine has never been mentioned in any of the American State Department's dispatches, or in the Pact itself, or in any of the documents or correspondence which led up to its signature. The hon. and gallant Member for Uxbridge having been in Washington will know that such is the case.

Even when our own Foreign Secretary—and may I say how sorry I am for the cause of his absence and how glad I am to know that he is recovering from his illness—even when he foolishly tried to draw the American State Department into a discussion about the Monroe doctrine, by mentioning our own Monroe doctrine, the American State Department was not drawn. It is wrong and unfair for the Prime Minister of England, with all the authority he has and all the publicity which his statements will receive, to make such a misstatement as to say that the Monroe doctrine was implicit in the Kellogg peace proposals.

Commander Bellairs : It is not denied. It is implicit in every action which the United States takes.

Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy : They have been invited almost in as plain words as possible, to endorse our Monroe doctrine—if I may use that term—and they have not responded to the invitation. I think it is common knowledge. Both the Secretary of State and President Coolidge have made it well known that the outlawry of war Treaty covers the lesser Monroe doctrine.

Sir W. Lane Mitchell: No, you still have the Monroe doctrine.

Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy: I say the greater covers the less and that the Monroe doctrine is covered by the far greater and wider treaty for the outlawry of war, and Senator Borah and Mr. Morrison and all the others who were the men responsible for the Kellogg proposals endorse that point regarding the Monroe doctrine. Furthermore, the Prime Minister has been advised inaccurately by somebody in the Admiralty on another point. The right hon. Gentleman took advantage of the occasion of a League of Nations Union meeting in the Albert Hall to make a highly controversial speech. I am on the executive of the League of Nations Union and we have complaints from Conservatives, which I admit are justified, of the Union platform being used for partisan attacks on the Government. That is a practice which I have always discountenanced, and I agree with those criticisms, but the Prime Minister himself used the League of Nations platform at the Albert Hall to make a highly misleading statement. I agree with one thing which the Prime Minister said about the devil's work of those who stir up ill-feeling against foreign countries, and I hope to goodness those words will be taken to heart by some of his own Cabinet colleagues.

Sir Robert Lynn: And by your leader.

Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy: When the right hon. Gentleman talks about stirring up suspicion against foreign countries, I wish the Chancellor of the Exchequer and the Home Secretary would remember his words when they are talking about Russia and that Lord Birkenhead when he was a member of the Cabinet had remembered it. It is not so very long ago since the Prime Minister at that Box had to rebuke the Home Secretary for making misleading statements about America in this House. I agree, therefore, very heartily with what the Prime Minister said upon that point and I hope it will be marked by members of the Cabinet who have been breathing fire and slaughter first against China, then against Russia and at intervals against America. The statement of the Prime Minister to which I object is one which I hold the First Lord and his assistants responsible for putting into the mouth of the Prime Minister. It is very appropriate to deal with it here because this is one of the causes of the present mischief between ourselves and America. I think it will be agreed that mischief has been created and that there is suspicion, as the Prime Minister himself admits. This follows on what the hon. and gallant Member for Uxbridge has been saying about disarmament. I agree with him that the American "Big Navy" party and the shipbuilding interests would be delighted at the chance given by this blunder of the present Government. They have even the support of Senator Borah, the leading pacifist of

the United States, who is going to support their navy building programme as the only way to bring about disarmament—which shows that America is really in earnest. The Prime Minister's statement to which I refer is as follows :

" Our policy in naval building is and has been for the past few years to go slow. We have no intention of building in competition with the United States. We were building slow long before we were asked to sign the Kellogg Pact ".

That is untrue, and the Admiralty's own publication, the annual Return of Fleets, published at the beginning of the year, proves it to be untrue. The actual figures show that far from going slow we entered into a building competition and we are stronger to-day especially in cruisers—the only larger ships we are allowed to build under the Washington Treaty of 1921—than any three Powers. The figures of cruisers built since the Washington Conference Agreement of 1921 show, for Great Britain, 9 built and 14 building.

The First Lord of the Admiralty (Mr. Bridgeman) : Does the figure of 14 include built and building ?

Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy : No. Since 1921 we have completed nine. Some more may have been completed during this year but, at any rate, since 1921 we have completed nine cruisers and we have 14 building.

Commander Burney : Some of these were laid down during the War.

Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy : Yes, one or two, but that is of no moment. The total is 23, and that is our addition to the fleet since the Washington Agreement was signed ; and in addition to that the two largest battleships in the world, the "Rodney" and the "Nelson", at a cost of £7,000,000 each. We are the only Power that has built battleships.

Mr. Bridgemam : By agreement.

Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy : I know it is by agreement, but those battleships need not have been built if we had been in earnest in desiring peace, and we could not afford them anyway. We cannot afford £14,000,000 on battleships, and the First Lord ought to know it. The United States have completed, since the Washington Agreement, 10 and have 8 building, a total of 18, against our 23 ; Japan, built 14, building 6, total 20 ; France, built 3, building 5, total 8 ; Italy, built nil, building 6. Take again the average standard of cruisers of 20 years old and less. We have built at the present time, according to the Admiralty publication, 48, againt 12 American, 25 Japanese, 11 French, and 11 Italian cruisers. As I have said, we are equal to any three Powers combined in the only large ocean-going ships we can build under the Agreement, and then the Admiralty advisers allow the Prime Minister at the Albert Hall, on a League of Nations Union platform, to say that we have gone slow in building. The fact is, of course, that we have led

the world in cruiser construction. I dare say a case can be made out for the lenght of our trade routes and our scattered Empire and all that sort of thing, but an equally strong case could be made out for building hundreds of cruisers.

I declared just now that British opinion was instinctive but right about this policy that has been pursued, which culminated in the conversations between the English and French naval experts, and the only conclusion I can come to is that those conversations were to have been kept secret and that the arrangement come to was to have been kept secret. I can find no other explanation to fit the facts, and when the Foreign Office were brought into the plot they thought they could act quite safely in informing the other Powers, not knowing what really lay behind the policy.

Lieut.-Commander Burney : The Chairman of the Preparatory Commission and the American representative at Geneva asked Great Britain and France to try and evolve this agreement.

Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy : The hon. and gallant Member opposite is very simple if he believes that explanation. That was merely the excuse put forward. Does not the hon. and gallant Member see that the Government have been, to use a slang term, in a terrible hole ? In the old days of the Whig and Tory parties, drawn from the same governing class, a Government doing this sort of thing and being found out would have fallen. They were in a terrible hole, and this was an isolated remark by the Chairman of the Committee. An isolated paper put forward by Lord Cecil is drawn in, and as a clever lawyer can make out a brief for the defence, so this excuse is put forward. If the hon. and gallant Member believes it, he is more simple than I took him to be.

Let me catalogue the symptoms that show what has been going on—small things in themselves, but their cumulative offect will be noticed. There were the Rhineland manœuvres this year. the continued occupation of the Rhineland without any real effort on our part to terminate it, and the sudden renewal of harshness of treatment of the German population in the occupied territory. Then the Secretary of State, Mr. Kellogg, after the signature of the outlawry Treaty, visits Dublin and avoids London, and our Foreign Secretary goes from California to Canada and avoids Washington. Going further back, there was the breakdown of the Geneva Naval Conference last year. President Coolidge declares that it broke down because the British experts demanded twicce the tonnage that America could agree to. It broke down on a quibble, a shibboleth. What does it matter whether American cruisers are built with 8-inch guns or with 6—inch guns ? We are not going to fight America. The Government spokesment are always saying that war with America is unthinkable, and even apart from that we are not going

to fight America, because of Canada. Any threat of war with America would lead to the removal of the tariff wall between the United States and Canada, and what would happen then ? Furthermore, even if war did break out, even if we were so insane as to allow our Governments to lead us into war, what would be our strategical position along that 3,000 miles frontier without a fort on it ? But our Admiralty, still obsessed with the 300 years-old doctrine of sea supremacy, could not accept the figures that the Finance Ministers forced on the naval experts at Washington in 1921.

Further symptoms of the policy that has been pursued by the invisible Government of this country—although the right hon. Gentleman the First Lord is very visible on the Front Bench ; he acts as a screen—are the reservations to the Kellogg Pact, the delay in the drawing up of the new arbitration Treaty between this country and America, this unnecessarily heavy shipbuilding, started after the Washington Conference and forced on my right hon. Friend and the Labour Cabinet by the Admiralty staff on the threat of resignation, as everybody knows. I criticised them then from that side of the House and divided the House against then when the first five cruisers were laid down at the beginning of this policy. I say that my right hen. Friend and the Labour Government were bluffed and foozled by the Board of Admiralty on the threat of resignation, and everybody knows it. I am sorry my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs has had to leave the House, but, going still further back, there was his own action in forcing the decision from President Wilson's famous 14 points, that formed the basis of the Peace Treaty, of the second point, which referred to the freedom of the seas, to the effect that peaceable merchantmen should not be interfered with on their lawful occasions outside territorial waters except when international action was being taken. I thought that that was implicit in the Covenant of the League of Nations as a matter of fact, but that was forced out of the 14 points by the action of the British Government.

Now all these symptoms taken together, some of them by themselves unimportant and some of great importance, show the way in which we are drifting, and I am afraid that I must remind the First Lord of what was said by a very great master of the science of war, Clausewitz, to the effect that war is only the same policy, pursued in another form as a policy leading to war. It is only tbe culminating part of a policy that leads to war. If this policy had not been killed by public opinion, it would have led to a situation which might have resulted in war. What it was leading up to was an alliance with France. It was part of a policy that we have pursued industriously, and on the whole very successfully, for 300 years, the policy of sea supremacy. Any Power that threatened us at sea was outbuilt

and fought when we could do it, and, if not, she was overthrown by the help of Allies. The right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs quoted the case of Spain, and he made out that that was a religious war. It was not ; it was a war to burst into the rich markets of the New World by overthrowing Spanish sea power. If it was a religious war, why did we fight our Protestant neighbours, the Dutch ? We overthrew the Dutch because they had a monopoly of the carrying trade and because their sea power was hampering ours. We overthrew France two or three times for the same reasons. It was necessary for us to expand, and we had to have supremacy at sea.

The same reasons have led to our forming alliances as a reinsurance against Germany. My hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs) has studied naval history, and he knows that for 300 years, whenever the Admiralty could force this policy upon successive Governments, they did so, and although we now have a League of Nations and have signed the Washington Treaty, the Pact of Locarno, and the Kellogg Pact, it would be too much to expect that this old, almost hereditary policy would be thrown overboard in 10 years. Ten years have passed since the Armistice, and that is little in the life of a nation such as ours. The only fault that I have to find with this policy is that it is out-of-date. It is impossible to-day. You cannot have sea supremacy by this or by any other nation to-day, and if any nation attempts to get it she endangers the peace of the world. We cannot do it, partly for financial reasons and partly because the great weapon of sea supremacy, the commercial blockade, is almost impossible to-day. You cannot enforce an effective commercial blockade to-day without alienating the neutrals, and also because the whole character of export and import trade has altered, and railways, canals, and motor transport have taken away the efficacy of the blockade. Therefore, sea supremacy by any one Power is impossible. Both we and the Americans, if we seek to gain it, are pursuing a will-o'-the-wisp, and just as the man who pursues a will-o'-the-wisp lands himself into a swamp, we shall run ourselves into the swamp of international hostilities.

Now out of all this good can come. I think we have an opportunity now of undoing all this mischief. We should immediately stop further naval construction. We do not need the cruisers, and we should let the Americans build all the ships they like, without protest, within the terms of the Washington Agreement, of course. We shall have to busy ourselves in this matter if we are to make good before 1931. The Prime Minister spoke of the need of a closer understanding between British and American statesmen. I would like to say that whenever the time of the distinguished diplomat who so brilliantly occupies the position of our Minister at Washington expires, the

experiment should be tried of a Canadian being sent to Washington to represent His Majesty's Government.

Sir R. Lynn : There is a Canadian there now.

Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy : Yes, but he represents Canada. I mean a Canadian to represent this country, and then you would have two Canadians there, because the difficulty of Englishmen and Americans understanding each other, referred to by the Prime Minister, does not apply so much between Americans and Canadians, and we have in Canada a tremendous means of improving our relationship with America ; because we should let it be known—as recently the American Government let it be known, that they do come forward to our point of view about submarines—that we have come round to the American point of view about the future of international law at sea in time of war ; in other words, that we are prepared to accept now what we objected to before namely, the second of President Wilson's Fourteen Points dealing with the freedom of the seas. We have signed a solemn pact and treaty giving up the right of making private warfare as an instrument of national policy. Why should we not say that we will give up the right of private blockade ? That is where the only point of difference between this country and America exists, and yet it is a real point of difference. I said just now that no one believes that the people of this country would permit even a Conservative Government to get us into the position if war danger with America, but there is a difference of opinion, which may become very difficult indeed with America.

I wonder if the hon. Gentleman the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs would be kind enough to ask the First Lord of the Admiralty to look at a book which has recently been published, the third volume of the papers of Colonel House. It is well worth reading. He describes the proposal that was made in 1917 that we should lend America some capital ships after the War in the by no means impossible event of the German Navy being left intact. We were trying to persuade the American Government to build destroyers in greater numbers to combat submarines, and to delay the further construction of capital ships. They felt that they must have a strong navy after the War, and the proposal was canvassed that we should lend them some of our capital ships, and that in case of a German attack upon us, the Americans would lend us the ships back. What a long way we have travelled since then ! Last year we raised objections to the Americans putting eight inch guns into cruisers. What a gulf there is between 1917, when we were prepared to lend our own capital ships, and now, when we say that we cannot possibly face the building of a few extra cruisers by America with eight-inch guns. What a distance we have drifted, and it shows the danger of continually drifting. That proposal was endorsed, according to Colonel

House's papers, by Lord Balfour and Amiral Lord Fisher. It did not come to anything, for reasons that are explained, but the fact that we could find a leading Conservative ex-Prime Minister and the greatest Admiral of the day endorsing the proposal, shows the intimate relations there were between the two nations. I hope that before many years are over, they will again become as intimate. There is not much time to lose before 1932, because the Washington Treaty expires then, and the nations will be free to build battleships and any other ships without let.

There is one other proposal which I have to make. It is not my own idea, but was contained in a letter to the " Times " by a well-known American, Dr. Flexner He pointed out how the apparently insoluble reparations difficulty was solved by a meeting of non-experts and non-politicians. The Dawes scheme was drawn up by men who were not professional diplomats or politicians, and he suggests a similar body to consider armaments That is a rather valuable suggestion, and I think that the approach to America might be made through some such body if the Americans were prepared to appoint one.

I apologise for having detained the House ; I have kept it longer than is my wont, because this is a subject on which I feel very keenly. I cannot in any way understand the proposal that France should be allowed to build submarines under 600 tons without limit, that being the size of nine-tenths of the German submarines that did the damage to our ships in the war. I cannot understand this country having at Geneva in 1927 wrecked the Conference with America on a rock, on a snag, namely, the attempt to limit the American 8 inch gun cruisers, while having unlimited right of building similar gun cruisers. I cannot imagine us supposing that that would be accepted by the United States. The only conclusion to which I can come, taking into consideration other symptoms of policy, is that the whole arrangement was made to deceive, and that, just as in the past when we were faced by a wealthy power—France under Louis XIV, and Spain in Elizabeth's reign whom we could not out-build at sea, we insured ourselves with alliances, so I am afraid that this is the same policy of reinsuring ourselves with alliances against America in future. I do not say that those responsible for this policy are working for war. France wants us to bind ourselves closely to them so that, if there be a danger of another war over the Rhine, we will be her sure ally. I am afraid that it is once more the old British policy of reinsurance against a very powerful nation, and I am glad to say that I believe public opinion has thoroughly checked it, and completely stopped any such policy. Experts, as long as they are the servants of Governments, are necessary and useful ; when they attempt to master Governments, they lead nations into war.

Commander Bellairs : It is quite fitting that the hon. and gallant Gentleman the Member for Central Hull (Lieut-Commander Kenworthy), who takes all knowledge as his province, should cover so wide a field ; and so far from his speech being long, it was a marvel that he was able to mention so many subjects within the limits of time that he took. I do not propose to follow him at all, but I would say this in regard to America. I agree with him that it is a matter of utter indifference to us what armaments America has, or what ships she chooses to build, but if America raises the subject of parity, we are bound to follow suit, and that was the case very largely in the discussions at Geneva. The hon. and gallant Member made a speech which was very appropriate in parts to the Navy Estimates, and he found fault with our building. The Admiralty have gone to the very limit in abstaining from building, and anybody who knows anything about the obsolescence of cruisers knows that the Admiralty are following a mere replacement policy, in which they are stretching the age of the cruisers to considerable limits, with the idea that there can be no outbreak of war. The real question that we have to discuss is the question which was raised by the Leader of the Opposition, that of security, and let me say this in regard to America. I agree with the hon. and gallant Member that our position in the past was one of practical, close alliance. He gave one instance ; I will give another. There was a time when America was concentrating the whole of her fleet in the Pacific, and it was a well understood idea that this country would look after the Atlantic, and America would look after British and American interests in the Pacific. Presently I will come to the point when suspicion was first engendered.

What is the position of Germany, with which we have been mainly concerning ourselves of late ? The Treaty of Versailles created 38 nations instead of 26, and it will be common ground to any one who has studied history that, when there is a multiplicity of nations, there is an increased chance of war. That was shown by the history of the Italian principalities and republics ; it was shown by the Greek republics, and when the world was practically united under Rome, there was practically a cessation of war. Instead of one racial trouble in Austro-Hungary, we now have four racial troubles, and instead of one Alsace-Lorraine there are no less than eight or nine Alsace-Lorraine in Europe to-day. It is a Europe in that form that we have to interpose, and the Government are quite right not to go nearly so far as the Opposition in guaranteeing the security of all these different nations. The British policy cannot be to give security to every nation, because that would simply mean that, if the League of Nations were able to order us about, we should have to employ the British Navy and have to have a much stronger Navy than we have to-day.

When the Leader of the Opposition said that our policy should be to give the sense of security to every nation, he no doubt meant the Geneva Protocol over again. He said that the policy of the Opposition would be to revive the Geneva Protocol. That is not my idea of the British policy. I should much prefer to go back to the old Canning idea which looked to friendship with America and which looked to the British Empire. That would, of course, take us a great deal out of the European outlook in which we always seem to be getting into trouble.

I do not propose to deal with the Anglo-French Pact, because that is dead and gone. If there were a mistake in the method of talking diplomacy—and I think there was—it is because we did not take the Americans into our confidence right from the first. We repeated the mistake we made at Geneva. We went to Geneva with a very big scheme, and we surprised the American delegation with our proposals. The American Admirals were not prepared to discuss the question of battleships ; they were taken by surprise, and they showed their ignorance to the politicians, and no officer likes to do that. There was another mistake which we never made at Washington, and that was that we allowed the Admirals to talk, and they straightway began to fire broadsides at each other. After all, the Admirals are experts to advise ; they are dangerous talkers, and they ought never to have been brought into the Conference at all, but to advise behind the scenes. In the Geneva Protocol business we went to the other extreme. Not a single member of the Naval War Staff was taken to Geneva, and that was a great mistake. You must have the advice of your experts. Not until the Admiralty heard what they were up to at Geneva in negotiating the Geneva Protocol did they race one of the War Staff there to try to stop the mischief which was going on. There is no mistake as to what was intended by the Geneva Protocol. I must devote attention to this point, because the Leader of the Opposition has stated explicitly that if the Socialist party get into power they will revive the Geneva Protocol. I take the official report on the Protocol to show what the idea was :

" Our purpose was to make war impossible, to kill it, to annihilate it. The plan drawn up leaves no loophole. It prohibits wars of every description, and lays down that disputes shall be settled by pacific means. "

That is under the League of Nations ; but both Russia and the United States are outside the League of Nations. That would mean that if the United States were to try to coerce any South American Republic Geneva might order us to take sanctions against the United States—they might be economic sanctions or military sanctions—and that would be the position of every nation under the Geneva Protocol. But there was a more insidious idea, that we might have to use coercive methods against a European nation which was declared the aggressor by the

League of Nations. They might be economic sanctions or military sanctions, but there could be no doubt whatever that the British Navy would be the weapon employed to carry out the blockade by sea, and this would inevitably raise the whole question of the attitude towards neutral trade with the United States.

Lieut-Commander KENWORTHY : May I point out that that applies also under the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Commander BELLAIRS : No, the Covenant of the League of Nations leaves us freedom of action. In the League of Nations any one nation can dissent from action But the Geneva Protocol would be a binding thing, and the British Navy would have to take action. Is it any wonder that from that moment, in 1924, suspicion was engendered in America, and that the whole of America began to look upon the British Navy as a possible aggressor ? So far from bettering our relations, it was at that point that suspicion in America was started.

These mistakes were committed. In the first place, no attempt to get expert advice was made by the politicians who represented us at Geneva in the discussions on the Geneva Protocol. If they had gone to their war staffs in the first instance, as they had to go to them afterwards, I am perfectly certain they would have been told that what they had done would mean an increase of armaments. Of course, it was said in the Geneva Protocol that disarmament was to come about. That was included in the scheme of the League of Nations ; and we have seen the result during the eight years since the Treaty of Versailles was passed ! Further, the method adopted under the Protocol was undemocratic, because the people of this country were not to be consulted. If the League of Nations told us to take action, we had to take action. Where is democracy there ? Another thing —the whole of the Empire, both the self governing Dominions and India, opposed the Geneva Protocol, and therefore it tended to disrupt the Empire. As this will be an active subject when the General Election comes, whereas the Anglo-French Pact will not, being dead and gone, we shall rub in at the General Election what has been said on this matter by the supporters of the Opposition. The right hon. and gallant Member for Newcastle-under-Lyme (Colonel Wedgwood) said :

" The Protocol involves risk of war and not the security of peace. "

That is this Geneva Protocol, which the Opposition say they will revive if they are returned to power. Then the right hon. Gentleman the ex-Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Socialist Government writing in the " Manchester Guardian " on 14th September, 1927, said :

" The text of the Protocol seems to me to be a mass of contradictions and of ambiguities in regard to disarmament. "

The hon. and gallant Member and his colleagues may rely on it

that when we fight at the General Election we shall rub those quotations into the electors.

Mr. L'ESTRANGE MALONE: I think I can assure the hon. and gallant Member for Maidstone (Commander Bellairs) that we shall have plenty of things to rub into the Conservative Government when the next election comes. I do not intend to follow the general discussions on the Anglo-French Pact, but I wish to refer to two particular matters arising out of those discussions. The hon. and gallant Member for Maidstone referred to the part played by the admirals in those discussions. He said, and I think quite rightly, that admirals ought to advise, but not to lay down the law. The House ought to know more definitely the relations between the fighting services and the Foreign Office in those discussions. I am very sorry that the representative of the Admiralty is not here now, because this more concerns his Department than the Foreign Office.

The UNDER-SECRETARY of STATE for FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mr. Godfrey Locker-Lampson): I will take a note and communicate with him.

Mr. MALONE: Thank you. What I should like to know is, who is responsible for running these technical conversations with other Powers? Who originated these conversations with France? Were they originated by the Foreign Office? Did the Foreign Office send a memorandum or a note to the Admiralty instructing the Admiralty staff to get into touch with the French war staff? Was that how it was done? Did the Cabinet consider the question very carefully? Did they consider the desirability of allowing the French to take control of the Mediterranean, and all the other questions which I will discuss in a minute? Did they convene the Committee of Imperial Defence? Did the Committee of Imperial Defence approve the policy, and then instruct the Admiralty to go over to France and to meet the French war staff and discuss these questions, and then formulate its policy. Or, what is probably just as likely, have the Admiralty been conducting these negotiations all the time, and did they instruct the Foreign Office to fall into line after the Admirals at the Admiralty and the Admirals of the French Admiralty had drawn up some sort of agreement? I would like to know whether the Foreign Office have been taking the lead all this time, or have been following the lead of the Admiralty and the other fighting Departments? I, personally, believe that throughout all this years certainly, and probably for many years before, conversations have been going on between the British and the Franch Admiralties.

I would remind the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs that last April there was a rumour in the French Press. One does not put too much weight on rumours in the French papers, but when a paper of the standing of "Le Temps" publishes anything, there is generally a good deal in it. At the beginning of

last May "Le Temps" published an article which suggested that the British naval authorities had arrived at an understanding in respect of the Mediterranean and the Baltic. That was at the beginning of these conversations before there was any suggestion of the Anglo-French Pact. I hope that whoever replies to this Debate will tell us what the instructions to the Admiralty are in all these negotiations, because very much bigger questions are involved.

I believe the decision to arrive at an understanding with the French Admiralty whereby the defence of the Mediterranean would be left to the small French submarines is part of the Singapore policy which was so rightly dropped by the Labour Government. I believe the Anglo-French Pact is a scheme to liberate our capital ships from home waters and Mediterranean waters, in order that they can go out to the Far East and be based onSingapore as a set-toff to the American Navy,which can come through the Panama Canal and compete with us in Far Eastern waters. I hope that whoever replies for the Government will tell us the exact position which the War Office staff and the Admiralty have taken up in this Pact with the French Government. This question, and all the discussions which have taken place upon it during the last few months, raise something very much more important and fundamental to the rights of the Members of this House, and that is the democratic control of foreign affairs. We are now right back to the position in which we were before the War.

I think the Members of this House in general, and perhaps the people outside, might very well consider whether the present control of our relations with foreign countries is properly supervised by the position which it occupies in the House of Commons. The time has come for us to consider wether some change is not necessary. In all other important countries in Europe there is some system whereby the Chambers and the different Parliaments are able on a common party basis to obtain some control over foreign relations and foreign affairs. In the United States they have the Foreign Relations Committee, and in France they have the Foreign Affairs and General Politics and Protectorates Committee. I am not sure whether if this question was gone into, with our system of questions to Ministers and our opportunities for moving the Adjournment, we could not evolve a system under which we could have our foreign policy more democratically controlled than in the case of the Parliaments I have enumerated. I think the time has come after these secret negotiations for this House to consider whether our system is the best. We ought to consider whether our Parliamentary system as it exists to-day, without a Foreign Affairs Committee or a Foreign Relations Committee, is the best method. In any case I think the least we can do is to insist and lay down categorically that no foreign arrangements

should be carried out without the approval of this House, and no foreign negotiations should be begun without our approval. No foreign negotiations should be begun without the approval of this House. Members of this House have struggled for years to obtain Parliamentary control over foreign affairs. As long ago as 1886 Mr. Richards moved a resolution stating :

"That in the opinion of this House it is not just or expedient to embark in war, or contract engagements involving great responsibility for the nation, without the approval of the House of Commons."

Similar resolutions have been before the House on many other occasions and I think the time has come, in view of these secret arrangements, to assert by resolution of this House that no diplomatic arrangement should be entered into with any foreign State involving, either or indirectly, national obligations without the consent of the House of Commons, No preparation or cooperation between the naval, military and air staffs of this country and the naval, military and air staffs of another country ought to be begun or undertaken in the most simple form between the two staffs without some general instructions from the House of Commons. What you are getting now in this Anglo-French arrangement is a secret arrangement on world-wide questions such as the question of the Mediterranean and Singapore, about which this House has never laid down any general instructions. I think the time has now come for the House of Commons to assert itself on this question.

Sir Alfred Hopkinson : It is a very good tradition of this country that foreign politics should be kept as far as possible distinct from party questions. It may be within the memory of some hon. Members that it has not always been possible to do that, for example, if we go back to the year 1876 we find that the foreign policy of the Government was then definitely opposed on grounds of principle by the Liberal party. Where the ultimate objects aimed at differ, foreign policy may become a party question. But now there is no clear line of division on the broad question of peace as the object of all of us. We may, if we try, keep our minds free from party prejudice, on the matters now under discussion. I say frankly that my inclination is to go with the party represented by the present Government, but I do not make a fetish of that, and if I find any point of foreign policy upon which I have a good reason for disagreement, I think it is my duty to say so, and it is a fair thing also to the Government of which I claim to be in general a supporter.

Having cleared the ground so far, I wish to speak perfectly frankly on one or two points. In the King's Speech now under consideration there are two things upon which stress was laid. One of them is the Kellogg Pact and the other is the eighth article of the Covenant with regard to disarmament. I hope that

on this question of disarmament we shall always remember the extra terms of that article of the Covenant. Those who entered into it agree to disarmament so far as consistent with national safety in each case.

The other question is the Kellogg Pact. Everyone, I think, rejoiced when that Pact was signed, but there are two or three points to which I should like to call specific attention. That Pact may become a mere expression of pious opinion. Do we mean to implement it by the necessary practical steps, or do we not ? The first thing to be noticed is what was said by the Prime Minister a very short time ago, namely, that the most important thing for us at present is to understand the American mentality on these matters. Until we do that we shall go hopelessly wrong. The Prime Minister laid stress on the importance of understanding the American Constitution. Within our memory there was, perhaps, but one man who always ventured to tell the Americans the truth, even when it was unpalatable to them, and that was the man who gave the most complete account of the American Constitution, Lord Bryce. He could always venture to tell them the truth without offending American sentiment, and I do not know that anyone else has been able to do that so well.

There are one or two points with regard to America that we are very much inclined to forget. The first, to which allusion has been made to-day, both on this side of the House and I think opposite, is, cannot we get America into the League ? The League can never be thoroughly effective, it cannot be all that it ought to be, unless America comes in. Why did America stand out ? I will not say, "I told you so," but, before the end of the War, I remember writing on the question of the establishment of the League of Nations, advocating it as strongly as I could, and pointing out that, notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Wilson had been an advocate of the Clauses to which I am going to allude, we knew that the American people would not like it. It was also indicated by Lord Bryce in the House of Lords that it would be dangerous if, in the League, the Nations, in order to prevent war, entered into a Covenant to go to war under conditions which could not be foreseen. That has been confirmed by everything that has taken place since. The Protocol, to which allusion has already been made, would have made the Clauses of the Covenant worse. There was one Clause even in the Treaty of Locarno, which in other respects we welcomed so heartily, which made the position worse. To clinch the matter by a definite statement by a most distinguished American who knew the facts, I may read one quotation from the "Life and Letters of Walter H. Page," in which he says, speaking of the Covenant of the League of Nations :

" Article X was Mr. Wilson's most important contribution to that highly contentious document. This was the Article

which pledged the League to respect and *preserve* as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of its members. It was this Article which more than any other made the League obnoxious to Americans, who interpreted it as an attempt to involve them perpetually in the quarrels of Europe ; and it was the one section of the Treaty of Versailles which was most responsible for the rejection of that document by the United States Senate."

What was foreseen even before the League of Nations came into being was borne out by that statement. We cannot expect America to join the League without getting rid of those fatal Clauses X and XVI, which might involve us or them in war for reasons of which we disapprove. It is, perhaps, not desirable to give possible cases, but let us take one that is far off, and will not cause offence. Suppose that Chile went to war with Bolivia. One may be regarded as an aggressor, though grievously provoked. Are we, under the Ligne Covenant to be called on to interfere ? The Americans would probably not stand by if we sent out a fleet in order to carry out our obligations under those fatal Clauses. Let us, therefore appreciate the American position, and let it be our policy to get rid of those Clauses as soon as we possibly can, without breaking through engagements into which we have entered, and which can only be got rid of by general consent.

There is another point with regard to the American position, and it is a very important, practical one at the present moment. Dr. Morrison, the author of a very effective work on " The Outlawry of War," in favour of the Kellogg Pact—it had a wide circulation in America, and I hope it may have also a wide circulation here—points out that, if we are going to have peace in the world by agreement or in any other way, if we are going to abolish war, we must have an effective substitute for war in duly constituted courts and tribunals. That is an absolutely vital point, and I am bound to say that we have seen signs that, even when treaties of peace have provided for the determination by a tribunal of questions in dispute, all parties in the League, even neutral parties, have not shown any very great earnestness to see that these tribunals are functioning properly. Cases have arisen which might become a source of unrest and produce some of the worst possible results in Eastern Europe. I think it would be most injurious at the present moment to say one word with regard to the most prominent of those disputes, and I am not even going to mention it, but it has been a bone of contention for years. We hear that there is the possibility that the parties to it may come together, and that something may be done which will take a great weight off the minds of those who would wish to see justice done, but to see it done by peaceful means.

There are other cases in which there is a risk that tribunals

will not function owing to reluctance to put pressure on the parties to see that they shall function, and I do beg that the Government will always take into consideration, as one of the most important things which is absolutely essential if we are to get rid of war, that all tribunals shall be so constituted that the action of neither party in a dispute may prevent a proper judicial decision on every kind of dispute which arises. These disputes must occur, but do let us have in all cases a tribunal, either in the form of a mixed arbitral tribunal established under treaty or a proper court at The Hague to which these questions should go at once. If they are dealt with in that way, and a judicial decision is obtained, I believe there is no case on record in which where a definite judicial decision has been given that decision has not been carried out. In the "Alabama" case, we fully carried out the award though most of us who read that decision carefully, thought it unjust. Again and again people will be only too glad even if they think that someone is taking an unfair advantage of them, to have the matter settled by any person or tribunal to whom the dispute can be referred. Most of us do not like to go to law and still less resort to fisticuffs if we can possibly avoid it. If anyone will give a decision, right or wrong, and we can with a decent face accept it, we shall be only too glad.

Now, after dealing with those two points, yet me say one or two words in regard to the question of the Pact. Here I deprecate very much any attempt to make use of the negotiations that took place with regard to that Pact for the purpose of trying to make out that we have done something that is offensive to other countries and disregard their rights. I defy anyone judicially to read through Lord Cushendun's last note on the point without feeling that, whether they made mistakes or not, one thing was perfectly clear from beginning to end, that our Government, along with the French Government, having found out what the points of difference were said : "We will try whether we can do something, by a quiet talk with ourselves to get over the difficulties and submit to the other the result of our talk." They talked it over, and reading what Lord Cushendun's note is after what we have heard to-day, can anyone say that was not a fair and honest, I would even say eager, attempt to bring about a settlement by agreement ?

But there are one or two things in the terms suggested which give very grave ground for consideration. First and foremost is that which was pointed out by the United States as open to the gravest objection. We have the American official note, which is courteously expressed, and does not show any sign of pique or annoyance. It is dated 28th September, 1928. There is no complaint about the mode of procedure, but they put their finger on what, to my mind, is a fatal defect in the suggested Pact which gives reason for rejoicing that we have heard the last of

it. It has been stated here to-day that the suggested arrangement has gone. It was so stated before, by Lord Salisbury in another place. I do not think we can do better than see what the American position is. The paragraph is so vitally important, and expresses the feeling of so many people in this country and in other countries, as well as in the United States, that I should like to read it :

" Much of what has been said above as to vessels in Class 3 of the Anglo-French agreement" —

I do not like that word "agreement."

"applies with equal or greater force to Class 4."

[*Interruption*.] These document are drawn up by very distinguished people. They do not always speak with that strict accuracy which characterises the English lawyer.

"The American Government cannot accet as a distinct class of submarines those of over 600 tons leaving unlimited all submarines or under, 600-ton submarines are formidable combatant vessels. They carry the same torpedoes as are carried by larger submarines and of equal destructive force within the radius of their operation. They can also be armed with guns of 5-inch calibre. The United States would gladly, in conjunction with all the nation of the world, abolish the submarine altogether, If, however, submarines must be continued as instruments of naval warfare, it is the belief of the American Government that they should be limited to a reasonable tonnage or number."

It is said that the suggeestion of unlimited submarines contained in these "prior communings" does no harm. It is perfectly true that at present, as far as specific limitation is concerned, any nation may build any number of submarines but the moment you say by agreement that you may bui, as many as you like, that makes it impossible to complaild on general ground. Of all cases for the limitation of armaments, the most important, not only from our point of view but from that of many other nations also, is the abolition of the submarine. Everyone who had to do with the question of our food supplies during the War was convinced that in a very short time the whole of our country might soon have been starving through submarine activity. Our excellent intelligences service and the fact that the bases from which German subm asines could start were so limited, helped to save us. Supposing instead of having Cuxhaven and perhaps one or two places near the Elbe as the only ports out of which submarines could go, there had been an almost unlimited number of bases, say in the Mediterranean, or in the Atlantic, and that unlimited power had been given of buildiug submarines, would any ship of ours, having passed through the Staits of Gibraltar to the East, have completed its voyage ?

To say you may have as many submarines as you like seems a most fatal policy. The submarine is a mode of warfare which

is peculiarly open to inhumane action. The submarine cannot take a ship which is suspected of carrying contraband into port. A small submarine is worse than a big one. Our policy ought to be to agree with the United States that submarines ought to be abolished. They are not wanted by us to keep our Empire together. They are not wanted by France to take troops or civilians across to Algiers or Tunis. They are only wanted to starve those countries which are dependent for their supplies on overseas. Let us make it clear that our policy, like that of the United States, is to get rid of them. It is not an impossible one. In a good many cases it is very difficult to see how you can enforce your regulations against armaments. That is not so with submarines. You cannot build a submarine in a day, still less can you train the crew in a day, and if we could once get agreement with all the nations that submarines should be abolished, we should take a vast step forward, no merely in preventing war, but also in doing what is almost, though not quite so important, putting an end to that enormous burden of expense on armaments which is crushing the countries of Europe.

I should like to say one or two words acout another question which. I think, has been rather unfairly dealt with. The Prime Minister referred to the case of our reserve forces in France. I think a citizen army of trained people in that sense of an army may be one of the greatest instruments of peace possible for any country. There is one country which in the midst of many enemies and all sorts of contending forces, a country—although weak in some senses—whose territory has never been violated. That is Switzerland. All through the War they preserved a strict neutrality. The Swisshelped our people who were in difficulties from time to time,and if anybody crossed the Swiss frontier they felt abolutely secure. The Swiss people held themselves together by this. Although they are different in race and in religion, they from one country, and every man in that country knows that he will go each summer to exercise and make himself fit, if need be, to defend his country. The result is, that Switzerland has been a peace ever since the days of the Napoleonic wars. Apply that to the other countries. All questions of agreement on this matter are sacred.

What you want to get in all the nations of the world above everything else is that they shall begin by loving their own country intensely. The best example is the man who loves his native country best. An enormous amount of good is being done by certain steps which are indicated in regard to a subject with which I have had to devote a considerable portion of my life. That is, that our boys and girls from the schools and the universities, and ourselves too, should be able to go into foreign countries, not to live at expensive hotels, but to see the people, the children, the peasants, the innkeepers I must confess I that have learned most from children and from the poorer peasants about

their native lands. We should get the spirit of understanding foreing nations inculcated into the minds of our young people in the schools not by mere teaching, but by letting them see what is abroad. As soon as our people learn to understand the point of view ot others, from having seen them and having known them, we shall have, not merely a peace on paper, but a peace which exists in the hearts of our country and of other countries.

Mr. Thurtle : I want to say a word or two on one aspect of this Debate. It is the question of the continued occupation of the Rhineland I have been disappointed with the attitude of tho Foreing Office in many respects, and I have been more disappointed by the way in which they have allowed themselves to be led by France in this matter of the continuance of the Rhineland occupation than I have been over anything else. The continuance of our troops on German territory at the present time constitutes a real blot upon our diplomacy. The House of Commons does not really realise what a tremendous irritation that continued occupation is. The Germany with which we are dealing now is not the Germany with whom we made peace. It is not the defeated and broken Germany against whom we had very bitter feelings. The Germany of to-day is a great friendly power. The Germany of to day is a member af the League of Nations. She is a partner with us in the Locarno Treaty, and she is a fellow signatory with us of the Kellogg Pact. Thus. there is further reason why we should treat Germany a s a friendly, equal partner in the comity of Nations.

What are we doing by means of this Rhineland occupation ? We have had our troops there for 10 years after the War has ended. What do these 9.0 p. m. troops do ? It is well that the British public should understand this, because then they will appreciate the irritation which they would feel if they were put into the same position in which the German people are to-day, The foreing troops on German soil carry out elaborate manoeuvres jointly and in all these cases the theoretical enemy of the allied troops is the German nation. They arrest. they imprison and they banish German citizens. They forbid, as we have heard recently, the playing of ordinary German music and the German National Anthem on German soil. They interfere to a very marked degree with the liberty of the Press in Germany, and, whal is more, they actually hold up the natural development of the country as far as the construction of railway lines and railway stations is concerned. They occupy houses which Germany badly needs for her own people. There is an acute housing shortage in Germany just as there is in this country, and yet the allied troops are occupying German rooms, German houses, German hotels and German barracks, and are thereby accentuating in the occupied territories very considerably the housing shortage. In submitting to things like this the German

people are bound to feel intense irritation, and that irritation, becomes almost unbearable when they realise that at the present time there is no legal justification for the continuance of the occupation.

This occupation is governed by two Clauses of the threaty of Peace-Clause 429 and Clause 431. Clause 429 provides that the troops shall be withdrawn in three stages if the conditions of the Treaty are faithfully carried out. The first stage came in 1925. After a good deal of argument, the troops were withdrawn from the first zone. The next stage is to come in 1930, and the final stage in 1935. That is according to Clause 429. There is another Clause in the Treaty, Clause 431, which says, in cleac specific language, that if before the 15 years have expired Germany complies with all the undertakings resultingfrom the Treaty, the occupying force will be withdrewn immediately. There is a difference in language, as the House will note.In one case reference is made to the "faithul caerying out of conditions," and in the other case to "complying with all the undertakings resulting from the Treaty." As I understand it, the French Government and the French Foreign Office, to which the British Foreign Office appears to have become subsidiary, bases its refusal to withdraw troops at the present time upon Clause 429, and ignores the existence ol Clause 431.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker (Mr. Dennis Herbert) : It will be interesting to see how the hon. Member relates this argument to the Amendment before the House. The Amendment, it is true, is wide, but I think the hon. Member had better look at the words of the Amendment.

Mr. Thurtle : I confess that you have raised a new point. I have not consulted very carefully the words of the Admendment but I have been in the House for a considerable time, and I have certainly heard references to the Rhineland occupation. It has been discussed at considerable length by the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) and other speakers, even by the Prime Minister. With such very respectable precedents quoted, I hope you will not insist upon your point of Order.

Mr. Deputy-Speaker : I put it very gently to the hon. Member. I asked how his remarks had reference to the Admendment.

Mr. Thurtle : I suggest that they have reference to the Government's policy as being a serious departure from the spirit and purpose of the League of Nations, and

" contrary to the spirit both of the Treaty of Versailles and of the Locarno Treaties." I think that if I base myself upon the spirit of the Treaty of Versailles I shall be on fairly solid foundations. I was about to explain that the French base their attitude upon Clause 429 and ignore Clause 431. That Clause would not have been put into the Treaty unless it was intended to

have some significance. In order that it should not be overlooked and that its meaning should not be confused, President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau went to the trouble, in June, 1919, to make a declaration regarding the meaning of Clause 431. According to that declaration, the allied and associated Powers did not insist on making the period of occupation last until the reparation Clauses were completely executed, because they assumed that Germany would be obliged to give every proof of her good will and every necessary guarantee before the end of the 15 years.

I submit that, as far as is humanly possible, Germany has given every proof of her good will, and every proof of her intention loyally to carry out the terms of the Treaty. The declaration to which I have referred deals specifically with Article 431 of the Treaty, and goes on to say, in order to make its meaning crystal clear :

" If Germany at an earlier date has given proofs of her good will, and satisfactory guarantees of her intention to fulfil all her obligations, the Allied and Associated Powers concerned will be ready to come to agreement between themselves for the earlier termination of occupation."

That declaration is signed by President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George and M. Clemenceau. It does seem to me that on that declaration and on that Clause of the Treaty, Germany is legitimately entitled to say that she has a case for the immediate evacuation of the Rhineland. If we are not going to stand by that Clause and that declaration we are doing exactly the kind of thing which we have been reprobating in other people—we are making of this Treaty of Versailles a scrap of paper. Our Foreign Office ought to have the courage of its convictions. We have heard from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Prime Minister that they would like to see the evacuation of the Rhineland carried out immediately, and the only reason why they are withholding their hand is because the French are not prepared to agree to that.

The attitude which the Foreign Office take up is, that if the French will not withdraw their troops it will be very hazardous for us to withdraw our troops. I think the Prime Minister said to-day that if we were to withdraw our troops and the French did not withdraw their troops, the position would be even worse than it is at the present time. I do not know what proof he has of that. There was a time about 18 months ago when the German view was that they would rather have the full occupation continued than have our troops withdrawn and the French troops remain. As I understand it now, Germany as a whole, if she cannot have both the French and British troops withdrawn, would prefer to have the British troops withdrawn. In these circumstances it seems to me that every consideration of British honour—I suppose we still want to

think that British honour ranks for something in the world—every consideration of justice to Germany, justice as set forth in the written word of the Treaty of Versailles, and every consideration which should lead us to want to pacify Europe at the earliest possible moment, ought to make our Foreign Office, with or without the approval and consent of the French Government, to withdraw our troops from the Rhineland, immediately.

Lieut.-Colonel Moore : I do not wish to endeavour in any way to answer the last speaker, because I am sure that the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs will do that very admirably ; but I do feel inclined to ponder why the Amendment was introduced by the Liberal Party. It is one of three things, it is either a marked tribute to the record of the Government during the past four years, or it shows that the Gracious Speech has been framed with great skill and adroitness, or it shows total adequacy and lack of ingenuity on the part of the Opposition that they could not find any horse to flog other than a dead one. The horse is dead ; the Liberal party knew it was dead before they framed their Amendment. The Prime Minister gave the finishing touch to it this afternoon. Apart from the fact that the Debate has afforded an opportunity for the expression of many pious aspirations on the part of Liberals and Socialists, the Debate has served no useful purpose, except one. It has given us one of the most powerful, sincere and eloquent speeches the Prime Minister has ever made in this House.

I do not pretend to be sorry that the Pact is dead. It might have given birth to some really constructive proposals but it has aroused so much suspicion, through the misrepresentations of the Liberal and Labour parties as well as in the Press, that it is better the Pact is dead rather than that any suspicion should continue to exist. At the same time I feel that I must acknowledge and admire the genuine spirit and motives which have actuated the Foreign Office in their handling of this question and their conduct of the whole field of foreign policy. They have pursued the genuine sound and sober policy initiated by the Foreign Secretary of endeavouring to remove every obstacle to peace, preserve the peace of Europe and develop to the greatest extent the wellbeing of the world. But there is one difficulty to that great scheme, to that great effort, and that is the general feeling of suspicion. To my mind, although the Prime Minister assured us that there is peace, we have only to look around to find that while there is surface peace there is underneath the surface peace of Europe a general feeling of danger. France still fears the recrudescence of Germany, and Germany, possibly by reason of her crimes, feels the animosity of the world. Italy and Yugo Slavia watch each other like terriers.

Wherever we look we see fear and suspicion. Hungary is sighing for her past power to win back the rights of her nationals so meanly filched from her by Rumania. Austria reminds me of the monkey in the great picture Chang, " Will no one help poor Bingo." I may be wrong, I hope I am, but I have travelled and I feel that there is a certain subterranean unconscious feeling on the part of the peoples of Europe and the only way it can be driven back is by reducing armaments. You must get the spirit for peace which the Prime Minister has advocated, that is essential, and reduce armaments afterwards. It is the strongly armed nation which is a danger to the world. The weakly armed nation does not want war. It is the strongly armed nation which wants war, and if we could get the spirit we could reduce armaments afterwards. Arbitration is no doubt very good, and is a suitable means of bringing about a settlement of Europe.

I hazard a suggestion ; it may be a crude proposal and subject to all sorts of criticisms and objections, but in spite of that I feel that it offers a basis of consideration. The difficulty is that the League of Nations has not got sufficient power. I do not mean armed power, I do not believe in that; but I think it should be equipped with moral powers far greater than those given in Article 8. I would give the League of Nations sufficient powers and let them lay down a certain number of years in which general disarmament should take place. They could lay down 10 years, 50 years, or 100 years. Let us say that they made it 10 years. The League of Nations would then say to every country who subscribed to the Covenant of the League : Every country will disarm by 10 per cent. each year : and that that 10 per cent. will be continued until the ninth year. By that time every country will have disarmed by 90 per cent. There are always marauders on the sea and on land who own no allegiance to any country and obey no laws. People must be protected from them. There are still places in the earth with disgruntled and barbarous people which must be policed, but immediately you reduce armaments by 90 per cent. you immediately destroy the desire for war ; you have created not only the spirit but the inability of the nations to wage war.

It may be asked, how is a law like this to be enforced and the delinquent nation adequately dealt with ? I admit that it is a drastic proposal, but everything to stop war must be drastic, and if a delinquent nation does not carry out the Covenant of the League it should be ostracised, isolated and treated as a pariah amongst the nations of the world. The right hon. Member for West Swansea (Mr. Runciman) being a financier will probably say that this is impossible. I am not a financier, but I would say, isolate any such nation, stop all financial transactions with her, stop all trains entering her territory and all ships going to her port, stop her letters, and everything that

makes for the amenities of life, and you would immediately have the people of that nation saying that the League of Nations Covenant must be observed.

Mr. Montague : A general strike.

Lieut. Colonel Moore : I throw it out as a suggestion. It may be idealistic, but I think it is a practical proposal if only the countries of the world would join together and say that it is a policy worth considering. In spite of all its imperfections, I think we should do well to consider any proposal which would in any way give a stimulus towards peace throughout the world,

Mr. Ponsonby : The hon. and gallant Member who has just sat down has thrown out some rather interesting suggestions, but I am not inclined to believe that a policy of trying to force nations to conform to some particular ratio or standard is likely to meet with any success. He has described the condition of Europe, and told us how France and Germany and Italy and Czecho Slovakia were behaving towards one another. I believe we have got to alter our language in this matter. We are always talking about nations as Governments or as pawns in a game, but we must visualise great masses of people in a nation who do not see as their Governments do on this matter. Until we realise that the great majority of these vast populations want to see an end put to war, we shall not meet with any success in dealing with this problem internationally.

I have felt some small reluctance in supporting this Amendment, not because of its terms, for I am in hearty agreement with them, but because the right hon. Gentleman who moved it and who is not now in his place—he sometimes stands in his place but very seldom sits in it—is, I think, almost the last Member in this House who is justified in censuring the Government on this occasion. Not only was he, as the Prime Minister has reminded us, the author of the Treaty of Versailles, out of which has sprung nine-tenths of the conflicts, jealousies, and suspicions existing to-day, but he was a member of the Government which was in power in 1914. Yet he comes down and taunts this Government with making secret arrangements with France ! Why, it was the secret arrangement with France that was denied by that Government before 1914 that was the prime cause of the European War. I do not think that the right hon. Gentleman is the right person to censure the Government on this occasion, but with the terms of the Amendment that his party has put down I agree in their entirety.

When the Foreign Secretary—for whose absence I am sorry, and I am very glad to hear he is on the road to recovery—referred in July to this arrangement with France, the phrase he used, and which was quoted by the Prime Minister, was so perfunctory that it never occurred to anybody to pin him down to giving further information. We all of us thought that some-

thing would immediately be published which we could see. A great deal has been said about this being a matter upon which other Governments were not informed, but what I am concerned about is why the people of this country were not informed, I think they are still very much mystified as to what took place. The Prime Minister has made a very interesting speech and he has been making several speeches with the themes of which all of us heartily agree. He has a smoother tongue—like the tongue of a bell, but that bell, which is his Government, is cracked. The bell does not respond to its tongue, and it does not ring true, that is the trouble. It is all very well having the Prime Minister holding forth and saying these admirable things, but when you carry them further you find it takes away from his authority not only in this country but in other countries.

The Prime Minister said this at the Albert Hall :

"You want the will to peace, and a permanent peace, and not only the machinery but the heart and mind and soul."

I am sure, so far as he is concerned, that is absolutely genuine, but let us think about the Government. I do not know about their will, and I know nothing about their heart. I am very doubtful about their mind, but what I am certain about is their actions. I want in the few minutes at my disposal just to survey their record on this question of disarmament, because now we have celebrated the tenth anniversary of the Armistice and the people of this country and of other countries are beginning to ask what is being done with regard to disarmament and peace. Ten years ago the Covenant of the League of Nations was put as part and parcel of the Treaty of Versailles. That was the only part of it that had any real use and hope, but the subsequent attempts that have been made to implement the Covenant have been a proof that the signatories of the Treaty regarded it as a very shadowy safeguard against future war.

Soon after that we had the Treaty of Mutual Assistance which fell to the ground. Then came the Protocol, with the idea of full security, which was supported by the Labour Government in 1924. Then the Conservative Government began their term of office, and the wet blanketing of proposals for peace and disarmament has been carried on from that time by His Majesty's Government with extraordinary persistence. They have become the great wet blanket in Europe for attempts at peace and disarmament. First of all the Protocol then came in 1925, and repeated in 1927 and 1928, attempts at all in arbitration which were always turned down by the Foreign Secretary or by Lord Cushendun. In the Washington Conference some slight advance was made. As I shall try to show a little later on, I did not believe any advance in that direction was likely to lead to the end we have in view. Locarno followed, and we all had very high hopes. I cannot say I ever indulged in those hopes

as much as other people, because I thought the responsibilities we had undertaken in the Locarno Treaty were very heavy, and I did not consider it was the right way by a partial agreement to come to any sort of universal decision on disarmament. But the spirit of Locarno, that was so much boasted of, has already rather disappeared owing to subsequent events. After the frontier between France and Germany has been permanently guaranteed by us, we find ourselves three years afterwards still with French and British troops in the Rhineland.

Then came the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, and that has, I think, served to show very clearly that it is impossible for the representatives of powers, especially if they be experts, to sit round a table and find a formula which would be applicable to all nations in all conditions, situated in very different geographical conditions and with entirely different responsibilities. They may go on sitting and be a Preparatory Commission till the Blue Moon, but they will never come to a decision. At any rate, during their sitting, there came the Soviet proposal for disarmament. The wet blanket came down again, and those proposals were laughed out of court. The Soviet Government had thought that it was a conference of Powers to talk about disarmament, and they made a suggestion which, however grotesque it may seem to some people, I believe they were perfectly sincere in, but it was laughed out of court and the chief wet blanketer at that time was Lord Cushendun. Then came the Three-Power Conference. I do not want to attribute more blame to His Majesty's Government than to the United States, for the failure of that Conference I only ask, does any sane man really suppose that if we had 6-inch guns instead of 8-inch. we should be any nearer to permanent peace ? It is folly to undertake these conferences with experts under the fond supposition that you are getting a solution of the problem, when you are only entangling yourself in intricate and very interesting arguments about different categories of armament.

Next came the Kellogg Pact. That Pact was foreshadowed for some months before, because it originated in M. Briand's suggestion, and was evolved by Mr. Kellogg and eventuated at last in an agreement. By this time His Majesty's Government began to think that their share in peace and disarmament was not a very creditable one. While they had been very ready to damp down everyone else's proposals, they thought they ought to get busy and do something. So they got into a corner with France and produced this present trouble. It really has been rather interesting to hear the Prime Minister and other speakers on the Government side deprecate the idea that the Opposition should make so much out of this. It is the Government's own doing from start to finish. Because of the extraordinarily clumsy way in which they have handled this matter, they must have known that an arrangement and conversation and agreement of

this sort must leak out sooner or later. One of the most discreditable things in this House is the deliberate way in which they have persistently avoided explaining why it was that they never told the other Governments anything about the French reserves. They tried to delude us, in an answer to my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy), and they never suggested that this was part of the bargain.

I believe that the First Lord of the Admiralty is to reply to the discussion to night. I should like to ask him one or two questions. This is really rather a serious moment. The Government are nearing the time when they have to secure the verdict of the electors at the poll. They have been very infortunate in this matter, because it has shown them up to the country as not only inept, but as actually capable of making arrangements which would estrange Great Britain in the opinion of her age-long ally, the United States. It has been said by one speaker that this agreement has not given the cause of disarmament a very large fillip. I disagree with him. I think it has given the cause of disarmament a very large fillip, but in the wrong direction. It has really stopped the efforts that were being made, and has made the people of the world very suspicious that we are not sincere in what we are doing.

The Kellogg Pact was signed with a great flourish of trumpets, with reservations by His Majesty's Government. But these reservations are simply the opinion of His Majesty's present advisers, and they are not the least binding on any other Government. One reservation was an enunciation of a new doctrine that is a British Monroe doctrine We cannot here discuss the American Monroe doctrine, but it is something entirely new that there should be a British Monroe doctrine. M. de Broqueville, the Belgian, said:

" There would appear to be no part of the habitable globe, outside the Americans, that is not menaced with British protection. "

That sums it up. I have not heard the Foreign Secretary say what is the precise extent of the British Monroe doctrine. The other reservation was the reservation that we should have the inalienable right to fight an aggressor, to defend ourselves against an aggressor. In all the wars that have been waged during the last 100 years—here I am sure I shall carry hon. Members opposite with me—we have never been the aggressors. Therefore it is quite easy for us to sign this Kellogg Agreement. We have never been the aggressors; other people have menaced us and we live in constant fear of other nations. The Admiralty view is that any nation that has a navy is a possible menace to the Empire, and that therefore we must arm. But every other country says precisely the same thing. No other country has

been the aggressor. Therefore I want to know what the precise implications of the Kellogg Pact are.

I believe that the First Lord of the Admiralty said in a speech that we were very glad to sign the Kellogg Pact. The right hon. Gentleman is in a very special position. I do not believe that we in this country are going to make very much progress on this question of disarmament in this generation, so long as we here and the country outside are dominated by the Services—the Navy, the Army and the Air. It is quite well known that the Board of Admiralty, for instance, when they are talking about their political chief, to whatever party he may belong, simply stamp and shout with laughter. So do the Army Council and the Air Force. That is well known. They know that their political chiefs are simply puppets of putty in their hands. I believe the only exception they would admit was Lord Haldane at the War Office about 15 years ago. [Hon. Members: "Oh!"] Hon. Members opposite know that I am saying what is perfectly true. They know the attitude of the Services to their political chiefs. It is just a huge joke. [Hon Members: "In your time!"] I do not care to what party the political chief belongs I say that the Services have the whip hand, and, as long as that system continues, you are not going to have much change as regards disarmament. They are going to see that their experts are not only called to these councils but that they have the deciding voice on these matters and on these preparatory commissions. They are going to take care that their view is put forward and that the political chief for the moment just voices their opinion. Until we have these Services put in a subordinate position under every Government, we are not going to see any change as regards disarmament.

I want to ask the First Lord precisely what he thought we had done by signing the Kellogg Pact. I want to ask him whether it was simply a denunciation of war, or whether he can visualise anything which really meant a renunciation of war by us. I want to know if he can give us an instance of any war, in which we should now feel restrained from participating, because of signing the Kellogg Pact; or whether he is still of opinion, like the Foreign Secretary, that we have never viewed war as an instrument of national policy, that, therefore, we can go on just as we always have done and that the Keltogg Pact is, so far as we are concerned, merely a pious opinion because we are only keeping our Navy, Army and Air Force, our submarines, our gas, our bombs and our tanks for defence. If the right hon. Gentleman really thinks so, it would be interesting to know from him what we have done in the way of renunciation in signing the Kellogg Pact. In the days when we were urging the Foreign Secretary to sign the Pact I said that the test of his sincerity would be what would follow.

We have seen nothing to encourage us since it was signed and

I want to know what the First Lord thinks is going to be done in the near future in order to demonstrate that we are earnest and sincere in signing that Pact, and that we are going to renounce something by way of showing that our signature was genuine. If it is mere words I think the people will get a little impatient and then I think the people are likely to show their impatience in a few months time. I do not think, if we look back on these ten years, we can find that this Government has brought any concrete proposals, any inventive power, any initiative, any encouragement, to this question of world disarmament. They have been critical. They have damped down others and their only contribution, this late abortive agreement with France, has led to very disastrous results. Finally, I would say to the Government, in a now famous sentence, used by the Prime Minister in the conclusion of his letter accepting Lord Birkenhead's resignation—altering only the name of the office :

" It is too early yet to estimate the value of your work at the Foreign Office, but I am confident that the historians of our time will do it justice. "

Mr. Crawfurd : The hon. Member who has just sat down, while subscribing as I gathered to the terms of the Amendment, raised some question as to the right of those who sit on these benches to move it.

Mr. Ponsonby : No. Quite a different thing—the right of the right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs.

Mr. Crawfurd : Anyhow, in the course of his remarks, the hon. Member took it upon himself to describe the *entente* which existed between this country and France in those years during which he was himself a member of the Government and derived such advantage from it, as being the primary cause of the War.

Mr. Ponsonby : I was never a Member of the Liberal Government.

Mr. Crafwurd : Well, the hon. Member was in an official position. He was a private secretary.

Mr. Ponsonby : I was private secretary to Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in 1906, but from 1908 to 1914 I was not only not an official Member, and not a private secretary, but I was one of the keenest critics of the Government.

Mr. Crafwurd : The hon. Member then was a supporter of what he describes now as being the prime cause of the War. I am going to say that criticism of that kind comes very ill, and with scarcely any appearance of sincerity, from one who, whatever his position before the War, was at any rate, after the War, a member of a Government which presented military estimates exceeding those of their predecessors and started a new naval race in building cruisers. [Hon. Members : "No."] Hon. Members may object but those are not my words. Those are the words of the hon. Member for North Aberdeen (Mr. Benn). I

leave hon. Members to arrange their dispute between themselves, and I turn for a moment to the hon. and gallant Member for Ayr Burghs (Lieut.-Colonel Moore) who began a very interesting speech by suggesting three or four reasons why we put this Amendment on the Paper. None of those reasons was right and I am going to ask the First Lord, when he comes to reply, to deal with the real reason. In spite of what has just been said, the real object of this Debate is not to discuss the Kellogg Pact but to discuss the so-called naval "pact," or, if you like, the recent naval conversations with France.

Before dealing with that matter, I must recall some observations made by the Prime Minister. The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister has followed the lead of the hon. and gallant Member for Chelmsford (Colonel Howard-Bury), who a few days ago attributed all the trouble, not to the Government, not to the acting Foreign Secretary, not even to the Foreign Office, but to Members of the Opposition writing and speaking, without any responsibility, and, as he said, stirring up trouble in Europe. To-day the Prime Minister has gone a step further, and he has made an attack on my right hon. Friend the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) in respect of statements which he is said to have written, but if it is wrong for a Member, whether he ba leader or a back bencher, in an Opposition party, without direct responsibility, to criticise a foreign country, then it is equally wrong for the supporters of the Government in this House to do as the hon. Member for the Ayr Burghs did just now—he drew attention to what he said were causes of friction in Europe—and equally wrong for members of the Government on those benches, by their speeches in the country, to queer our relations with Russia. The two things are on exactly the same plane.

The right hon. Gentleman the Prime Minister also drew a comparison between his own performances and those of the Leader of the Opposition and of the right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs in so far as they were successful in providing friendly relations with France. I am the last person in the world to detract form the credit due to the Leader of the Opposition for the relations he maintained with France, which were admirable, but when the Prime Minister takes credit to himself, I think it is within the recollection of everybody in this House that there were other members of the Coalition Government, who were members of the party opposite, and who did not get on very well with France. Let me remind the First Lord of the Admiralty, in the absence of the Prime Minister, that one of the qualities that make the Prime Minister acceptable to the masses of the people of this country—personally acceptable, not politically—is his interest in our national sports. He is a great follower of the game of cricket, and he knows that when you compare the scores made by two men, you ought to

have some regard to the bowling they have to bat against. The Leader of the Opposition will not deny that dealing with the Prime Minister of France who was in power in the Coalition days and dealing with the Prime Minister who was in power in 1924 were two very different things, and when you had to deal with M. Herriot it was a very different thing from dealing with M. Poincaré ; but if it is contended that those who, by their spoken or written words, may have aroused suspicion in foreign countries, it seems to me that it is still more the fault of the Government which was responsible and whose actions gave rise to those very suspicions.

I want to ask the right hon. Gentleman if it is not true that the methods adopted by the Government on this question has not itself given rise to suspicions as to their motives. The Prime Minister took great pains to say that all these suspicions were unfounded, as did the Government representative in another place the other day. I accept the statement that there was no intention of having any partial pact or any movement as against the United States, but those suspicions did exist, and the words of Lord Cushendun himself in the House of Lords give substance to the accusations I am making. He said that all the mischievous things that were said would have been quite as compatible with the actual text of the compromise as they were with the mere announcement that a compromise had been arrived at. I agree that when you saw the terms of the compromise arrived at there was every reason for suspicion being aroused in America and in Italy.

We may be asked why suspicion should be allowed at all, and perhaps, although just a Back Bench Member, for once I may be given the privilege of Front Bench Members and be allowed to refer to a previous speech of my own. At the end of last Session, when we were debating the Kellog Pact, I drew attention to a matter which has been the subject of discussion to-day, namely, the reservations made by the Foreign Secretary in giving his adherence to that Pact, and I used the phrase that it was these reservations that might be the rock on which the Pact would foundur—the reservations with regard to areas of the world which were the particular concern of this country. May I say, in passing, that the difference between the American Monroe doctrine and what has been called the new British Monroe doctrine is very simple. When you talk about the American Monroe doctrine, everybody knows exactly what you are talking about. [*Laughter.*] I am sorry if hon. Members opposite do not, as it has been laid down in perfectly significant language, and you know exactly to what areas of the world that doctrine applies ; but there has not been one word—and this was a particular criticism which I levelled against the Foreign Secretary on 30th July—to tell us what areas of the world are included in the reservations to the Kellogg Pact, and the accusations which

could be levelled against our Government for their treatment of that Pact in regard to reservations is that they were putting into what was to be a multilateral Pact between six great Powers reservations which concerned only their own partial interest.

At the conclusion of that Debate on the 30th July, the last question that I put to the Foreign Secretary was as to what was going to be done in the way of disarmament as a result of the Kellogg Pact, and in particular what was the position with regard to the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament The right hon. Gentleman. in his reply, said there had been naval conversations with France, and he used the phrase that those conversations had been suceessful as between ourselves and France. Exactly the same phrase was used the other day in another place by Lord Cushendun, who said that those negotiations as between ourselves and France had been successful. Of course negotiations between ourselves and France would always be successful if they only had concern for British and French interests. Our criticism of the handling of this matter is that, just as in the case of the Kellogg Pact we gave rise to suspicions in the United States that we were reserving some matters which concerned merely ourselves, so in the case of these naval conversations, suspicions have been aroused, because, in the compromise arrived at, it is perfectly clear that British and French interests have been considered to the exclusion of American interest.

The Prime Minister this afternoon assured the House and the country that there was no intention of getting at the United States at all, and Lord Cushendun said the same thing in his defence in the House of Lords. I am sure that everybody—certainly I do—acquits the Prime Minister and the Government of any such intention. He may ask, therefore, why this Amendment is moved and what the complaint is. The complaint was interpreted in another place by the Government representative by the word "imbecile". I will not use a word like that, but our complaint and our criticism of the Government is that they have erred in this matter because they do not approach these questions, which deal with the problems of peace and disarmament, in the only way in which they can be approached with any hope of success. Whatever may have been the reason in the pre-war period—it may have been an honest belief in the necessity for defence—which led people to look at these international matters from the point of view of one, two, three or more countries, who might conceive that they had interests in common, that method is fatal now. It is fatal to the hope of peace if we look at these questions from the point of view of one, two or three nations, and not always from the point of view of all nations.

At the very moment, on the 30th July last, when the Foreign Secretary was telling the House that the naval conversa-

tions between ourselves and France had been brought to a successful issue, he had sent a dispatch to our representative in Washington containing an outline of the arrangement, which had then the same germ of failure as was contained in his handling of the Kellogg Pact, that is to say, we and France in discussing these matters have been blind to what would be the obvious criticism and the obvious needs of the United States. The reply which the American Government made to our Government contained what ought to have been obvious, and our criticism of the Government is not of their intentions or of their good faith in the desire to reach a peaceful conclusion and to proceed with disarmament ; it is a criticism that they did not approach these matters—it is not for me to say that they did not approach them with intelligence, but it is for me to say that they did not approach them looking at them from an all-round point of view.

Let me give the Prime Minister another instance. There has been some criticism of the fact that there was what is called a certain amount of secrecy, and that the results of these conversations were not published. When Lord Cushenden replied to that criticism in the House of Lords, he said that he thought it was wiser not to issue a denial in the Press of certain statements that had appeared in the French Press, because he hoped that these things would be forgotten and pass away. He goes on to say that he was disappointed in that, but only about three minutes before the Noble Lord had said that, when these statements appeared in the French Press, it was not unnatural that a sort of misgiving was caused in Germany.

Our contention is that it is essential that, in all these discussions with regard to international relationships, the state of mind and the attitude of mind of the representative of this country should be as expressed in the last few words of our Amendment, namely, that he should approach the matter, not having in view the affairs of one country or another, or the mentality that existed in international relationships before the War, but always the basis which is contained in the Covenant of the League of Nations. I ask the right hon. Gentleman if he can tell the House whether this is finished, because the Prime Minister this afternoon said that it was, that we have failed, that we are sorry we have failed, but that it is done with. Lord Cushendun said the same thing ; but it is not done with, and nobody really believes that we are in the same position now as we were before the conversations began. I say again, as I suggested at the end of last Session, that in international relations, whatever you do counts ; either you go forward or you go backward, and there is no doubt that the failure of these conversations has given a set-back to the cause of disarmament. What is the Government going to do next ? We put that question in the Debate on the Kellogg Pact, and

we were told that these conversations were the next step. We want an assurance from the Government that, when this matter is taken up again, it will be taken up with the determination that no steps shall be taken that can give offence to any one of the great Powers concerned, and that we will look at these matters, not from the point of view of ourselves or any other one or two countries, but from the point of view of peace itself, and of the interests of all the nations which can possibly be considered.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN : Before taking what part I hope to take from the naval point of view in the general Debate, I ought, in view of the very courteous way in which the Leader of the Opposition put a few questions at the end of his speech, to begin by replying to them. The first question which he put was with regard to reserves. All through this Debate there has been a suggestion that our attitude with regard to reserves has been something quite new, and entirely due to our desire to make some agreement with the French. Our attitude is very much the same as it was when Lord Cecil on 11th April, 1927, expressed our opinion at Geneva. There, he said :

" We have felt, and I have stated it all along, that this question is a matter which, however strongly we may feel about it as a matter of principle, does affect other countries very much more than ourselves, and that if a limit can be arrived at which will not include any limitation of trained reserves among the other countries, then I do not think it will be at all likely that my Government will insist on its view in respect to that".

That was Lord Cecil's views in 1927, and that represents very much our attitude now. It means that, if there is a chance of getting an agreement about disarmament generally, we should not consider it to be right to wreck that chance by insisting too rigidly on the question of reserves. The right hon. Gentleman then asked, "Are we free to take any line with regard to it now ?" My answer to that is, "Yes". His next question was, "Is the Anglo-French Agreement now dead ?" It is perfectly clear from what we said when we asked the American Government to consider it, that if it were not acceptable to all the five naval Powers it would be impossible to go on, and in a despatch from the Foreign Office to Washington on 10th August whichs is quoted in the White Paper Lord Cushendun said :

"Unless it should lead to the signing of an agreed convention at Geneva, its purpose will not have been achieved, and it will be necessary to make further attemps to arrange a compromise if we are not to abandon all hope of a limitation of armaments by international agreement".

That, I think, answers the right hon. Gentleman's point. Not having succeeded in getting the agreement of all the five Powers we had to start afresh. His other question concerned M. Briand's remarks, which are quoted on page 25 of the

White Paper. It would be presumptuous for me to attempt to look into M. Briand's mind, but it does seem to me, as one who reads the sentence without the desire of introducing suspicion into everything concerned with this matter, that his meaning is very plain. It seems to me that any simple and well affected mind would read into that "If we"—that is France and ourselves—"have failed to provide a basis of discussion by the proposals we have just made, we must try some others in order that the Disarmament Conference may not be a failure". That seems to me to be the plain interpretation of M. Briand's remarks. I think it has already been said again and again that there is no exclusive secret agreement of any kind between this country and France.

With regard to the general Debate, I confess that I am a little bit surprised that those responsible for the Amendment have adopted the very mild words that they have, because they do not in any way justify the terrific outpouring of abuse and suspicion which our critics let loose, not after reading the White Paper but before it. They accuse us of causing suspicion. Surely those who, before knowing what had happened, before knowing what the exchange of views had been between us and France and the other countries, immediately suggested to the whole world that we were actuated by the vilest motives, are the ones who are responsible for this suspicion which has been aroused ? All those who have taken part in attempts to devise formulæ which would meet the requirements of different countries all of which have different conditions, will realise how simple and easy a task it is to cast suspicion upon any conceivable plan you can put forward as being suitable for every country in the world. That task is easy, but is it patriotic ?

There has been very little attempt on the part of those who support this Amendment to connect their words with the action of some of the members of their own party. As a matter of fact, they have spent most of their time in talking about the Kellogg Pact and the evacuation of the Rhineland instead of attempting to justify their own action. The right hon. Gentleman the Member for Carnarvon Boroughs (Mr. Lloyd George) begged the whole question from the first words he used. The right hon. Gentleman began by talking about the Pact. We deny that there has been any pact. What does a pact mean ? It means some sort of exclusive arrangement, and it means some arrangement arrived at behind the backs of everybody else, some official and exclusive agreement with France. All this has created a great deal of suspicion throughout the world. Those criticisms were made not after reading the White Paper which has been issued, but before reading it, and before any of our critics knew the contents of the White Paper. Hon. Members know what the Foreign Secretary said in this House on

the subject, and on that statement they cannot justify all these suspicions. The Foreign Secretary said :

« Conversations have been proceeding between ourselves and the French with the hope of reducing the difference between us — indeed in the hope of finding some compromise upon which we could both agree and which we might then submit to other Powers and perhaps by our proposals facilitate progress in the Committee ».

Not only have we been charged with entering into a pact, but the word « secret » has been added to it.

Captain Garro-Jones : What else was it ?

Mr. Bridgeman : The Foreign Secretary also added the following words to his statement :

« I am about to communicate with the other principal naval Powers the compromise at which we have arrived in the hope that it may be acceptable to them also » — [Official Report, 30th July, 1928 ; col. 1837, vol. 220].

On the very day when the Foreign Secretary made that statement, he communicated with the other foreign Powers. My contention is that there was no justification whatever for anybody who has read what the Foreign Secretary said in this House describing this thing as an exclusive Pact or a secret Pact. It was a tentative draft plan for a basis of discussion at the next Preparatory Commission. It was submitted to the other Powers. Lord Cushendun wrote to our representative at Washington saying that this plan was submitted to them, and we should be very glad to hear what observations or suggestions they had to make about it. Can anyone say that that was some private arrangement behind the scenes, by which we were bound, when it was to be submitted to all the other Powers concerned before anything could go further, when we were awaiting their observations and suggestions upon it, and, if they did not agree, there was an end of it? What possible justification can there be for all this insinuation and slander ? The Prime Minister dealt with the diplomatic history of this question, and I would like to say a word about the naval side of that history. It has been pointed out already that, on the advice of the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission and of Mr. Gibson, the American representative, we were invited to take part in conversations with a view to arriving at some basis for discussion Mr. Gibson said that he advocated direct negotiations between the various Governments and groups of Governments, to find the way, through mutual concessions, to eliminate existing divergencies.

Mr. Mac Donald : Only two Governments.

Mr. Bridgeman : Three of the five Governments there agreed to it. Nobody seems to remember that Japan agreed to it, making a majority of the whole five naval Powers.

Mr. Mac Donald : Why not four ?

Mr. Bridgeman: The more the merrier. It cannot be said, however, when you have three of the great naval Powers on one side, that the proposal is necessarily a very bad one and not worth considering. At any rate, you have the majority of the five. We proceeded on Mr. Gibson's advice to work on the principle of mutual concession. We made concessions, and the French made concessions. The French view was originally that we ought to make an agreement based simply on zonal tonnage, that is to say, one figure of tonnage for the whole of the Navy. Our view was, as expressed in the Amendment to-night, that we ought to proceed by limitation of categories. After a certain amount of conversation, and by mutual concession, we arrived at a plan which, at any rate, carried the Washington principle two steps further than it had been carried before. We, naturally, should have been glad to have got what we had always proposed before, but it was something, in our opinion, to get one or two steps further in advance.

It is contended that these proposals were such that it was useless to submit them to the United States, that they were even less acceptable to them than what we proposed at the Naval Conference at Geneva; but I do not think that these proposals can be properly understood if that view is entertained. The cause of the breakdown at Geneva was that we could not either of us find any formula which would express parity between the large cruisers which the Americans say they require and the number of small cruisers which we claim are necessary for us. Nobody will contend that that was not the reason why those negotiations broke down. There is this very plain difficulty. The fact is that there is no equation which can establish that x 8-inch gun cruisers are equal to y 6-inch gun cruisers. It was a genuine difficulty. We both expressed ourselves quite frankly. We both stated what our countries required, and we found it at that time impossible to find a form which would bring us together.

Now it is contended that what the Anglo-French plan proposed is even less acceptable to America than the plan which we put up at Geneva in 1927. I want the House to realise what was proposed then and what is proposed now. At that naval conference we proposed that America should build up to our existing total in 8-inch gun cruisers, and that we would mark time—in fact, we actually proposed to stop work on a vessel that was already begun—until they caught us up, if they on their part would agree with us that after we had built those ships no one in future would build cruisers with more than 6-inch guns. They raised two objections. One was that they would always require some 8-inch gun cruisers, and the other was that, owing to their need for going great distances at sea, they must have cruisers of a higher tonnage than the 7,000 which we proposed for the lighter 6-inch gun cruisers. The hon. and gallant Gentle-

man the Member for Uxbridge (Lieut.-Commander Burney) made some very pertinent remarks with regard to this argument of which I have nothing to complain. But I am out to show that the Anglo-French proposal made two very distinct efforts to meet the American difficulties. It does not seem to be understood on this side of the Atlantic, and it does not seem to have been understood on the other, and it is not likely to be understood if hon. and right hon. Gentlemen cast suspicions on the proposals we make.

This is the difference between the present proposal and those made at the Naval Conference in 1927. We wanted to meet them on the point that they were always to have some 8-inch gun cruisers, so we asked them to name a limit of 8-inch gun cruisers which they would always observe. That met them on the point that they ough to have a certain number of 8-inch gun cruisers. The other point they made was that they must have these very high-tonnage cruisers in order to get greater radius of action, and we tried to meet them on that by saying « All right. When you have limited the number of ships you are going to have with 8-inch guns, you can have as many of these 10,000-ton cruisers as you like if they have only 6-inch guns mounted on them ». There are two points which seem to have entirely escaped the attention of the right hon. Gentleman and others opposite.

Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy : Would the right hon. Gentleman tell me how many 8-inch gun ships they have ?

Mr. Bridgeman : I recall the speech that the hon. and gallant Gentleman made just now, and the upshot of it was—perhaps I might as well answer it now, as there is an interjection—as there was no chance of any war between us and America, therefore we were entirely wrong in not agreeing to everything that America proposed, and America was entirely wrong in disagreeing with everything that we proposed. There is another contention that we are trying to get the class which we particularly wanted, the smaller cruisers, unlimited. The Americans know perfectly well that we have always said that if we could only know how many of the heavily armed 8-inch gun cruisers there are to be, we are perfectly ready to put a limit on the number of the light cruisers that we want. But until we know that, it is not possible. They know that perfectly well. They were asked to make suggestions or observations. They said to us, « If you are asked to put a limit on your light cruisers, what would your attitude be ? » They know perfectly well that our answer would be that we would be perfectly ready to put a limit on the number of light cruisers if we knew what limit there was to be on their heavy cruisers.

Mr. Thurtle : Are we contemplating war with America ?

Mr. Bridgeman : I really think that it is not relevant to ask

questions like that. I migh ask also, Are the Americans contemplating war with us ?

Lieut.-Commander KENWORTHY : We are discussing it.

Mr. BRIDGEMAN : We are not discussing it in that sort of atmosphere at all. We are discussing it on the basis which hon. Gentlemen have talked about, namely, parity. We have to decide on some form of achieving that. The statement that we were determined to have an unlimited number of smaller cruisers is entirely falsified by our action at the Geneva Conference, and the Americans know perfectly well that we can agree to a limit of the smaller category as soon as we know what the larger one is to be. There is another point which, I think, has escaped observation, and that is that these Anglo-French proposals were intended to be carried out in two stages. In the second stage the different nations were to fix the actual amount of ships in the various categories that they wanted. I do not think there would have been very much difficulty in arriving at an agreement upon a building programme which was only to last for the period for which the Convention was to be signed. There was a chance of getting an agreement simply on the ground of everybody saying what maximum they would be likely to adopt, whether it be five or six years or whatever period of years they liked to name. We laid our cards on the table with regard to that matter. and I think that other countries might do the same. At any rate, that would have been possible under the Anglo-French plan.

It has been said that by this proposal we were reserving some great advantage to ourselves, because we had such a large number of merchantmen that could be armed in the event of war. I do not think it will be found that serious naval opinion, and in this I include the opinion, expressed this evening by the hon. and gallant Member for Central Hull (Lieut.-Commander Kenworthy), will say that any merchantman, armed with a 6-inch gun, would have the slightest chance against a cruiser armed with a 6-inch gun, or even with a gun of smaller calibre. An armed merchantman has no mechanical loading apparatus, she can only fire three or four guns as against six, eight, ten or more that can be discharged from an armed cruiser ; her pace is much less, her armour plating does not exist and her magazine and her engines are unprotected. Therefore, to say that a merchantman, armed with a 6-inch gun, cannot be dealt with perfectly easily by a warship armed with a 6-inch gun, is not borne out by any reliable naval authority. There is experience from the War in proof of this statement. There are two particular instances which I might quote in substantiation of my argument. At the Battle of Coronel, the "Otranto", a merchantman armed with 6-inch guns, was thought to be so inferior to a German armed cruiser, armed with 4. 1 guns, that she was left out of the battle. The Kaiser Wilhelm der

Grosse was destroyed in a very few minutes by a very old cruiser. Therefore, as far as experience goes it bears out my contention that an armed merchantman has not the slightest chance against a cruiser with the same or even with a smaller calibre of gun.

Taking into consideration what I have said about our attemps to meet two, at least, of the points on which we differed at the Geneva Conference and also the fact that we have never attempted a programme to show our superiority over the United States, I think that all fairminded people will say that in the Anglo-French gesture, while endeavouring to succeed to meet the wishes of the French, we have also gone some considerable distance towards meeting the wishes of the United States. On the other hand, if there is to be no limit to the largest type of cruisers, armed with the largest type of guns, how are you ever going to arrive at a reduction of the armaments of the world ? [*Interruption*]. If the hon. and gallant Member for Hackney South (Captain-Garro-Jones) interrupts, I wish he would do so in an articulate way, so that I can answer him.

Captain Garro-Jones : I have been extremely anxious to hear how it comes about that we who are so anxious to protect our trade routes from American cruisers, show no anxiety to protect them against the French submarines.

Mr. Bridgeman : The submarine question is perfectly relevant to the point I was making. Our policy has been entirely consistent throughout. It has been a policy to extend further the agreement we had reached at Washington, and we were proposing to extendit, although we could not get all we wanted, to the heavily armed cruisers and the large submarines. Everyone knows that we are perfectly ready to extend it to every category ; and with regard to submarines the hon, and gallant Member knows perfectly well that we have always said that we are quite ready to see submarines ruled out altogether. America is quite ready to do the same. The right hon. Member for Carnarvon Boroughs mentioned that America had said so at Washington, but in his excessive desire to criticise the Government he did not say that I also said it at Geneva.

Mr. Lloyd George : The right hon. Gentleman is amusing and inadequate. I did not say that the Americans proposed it at Washington. I said that Lord Balfour and Lord Lee proposed it at Washington, that the Americans expressed sympathy, but that afterwards they expressed dissent. The suggestion did not come from them ; it came from us.

Mr. Bridgeman : If I misunderstood the right hon. Gentleman, I apologise, but it really does not touch my point Lord Balfour and Lord Lee proposed it at Washington. Why should not the Government have the credit of proposing it at Geneva ?

Mr. Lloyd George : Why did you go back upon it ?

Mr. Bridgeman : We have never gone back upon it. We have said that if the smaller nations of the world who, in their poverty, regard submarines as their only weapon of defence would agree we should be perfectly ready to abolish it, and so are the United States of America. There is no difference between us. I therefore point out that our policy has been consistent throughout. Lord Grey of Fallodon who has been extremely fair in his criticisms on this subject, said that when we came back from the failure at Geneva we dropped two cruisers and that if we had offered them at the Geneva Conference there would have been no failure. As a matter of fact, I did offer them at Geneva. I offered to stop work on the large cruisers and give up the work already begun on the "Dorsetshire", but I did not succeed in convincing the Conference. In one direction, however, there has been great consistency and that is on the part of hon. Members opposite in trying to make as much party capital as they can out of every situation. Formerly we were blamed for not making enough concessions to the League of Nations, now we are blamed because we have made some concessions in order to get one or two steps further in this matter. After the Naval Conference at Geneva we were told by the right hon. Gentleman opposite and others that the reason we failed was because we did not have any private preliminary conversations. We are told that the reason for the failure is that we did not blurt out the whole of our policy. Now in the words of your Amendment you say :

"that the basis of naval discussion should be the extension of the successful Washington Treaties to all classes of combatant ships".

That is the only solid and serious part of the Amendment, but the odd part of it is the inconsistency of hon, and right hon. Gentlemen opposite, because when I did that at Geneva last year they moved a Vote of Censure on me—not because they disagreed with my policy, but because they disagreed with the people who did not accept it. Very often things which are not popular are justified in the judgment of posterity, but one does not often find that judgment coming so quickly within one year. The very party who voted a Vote of Censure upon me last year have now put down an Amendment which justifies everything which I then did. The compliment is put in such humorous terms and in such delicate language that it is one which even the most modest of men can accept without embarrassment.

I confess that it is disappointing that every well-meant effort to arrive at some solution of this very difficult problem is invariably met by most unreasonable criticism. Suspicion, of course, makes agreement impossible, but we shall not abandon our desire to reach agreement in any possible way that may

be presented to us. Perhaps it might be better if now some other country might make some concession, as we have been attempting to do from time to time, towards reaching agreement. If they will do that, they will find no one more ready to listen to them than this country and this Government. Our position is not a very simple one, and the right hon. Gentleman opposite knows it very well. If we only had to deal with the League of Nations, of which we are members, the course might be a simpler one, or if we only had to deal with the United States, the course might be a much simpler one. We are like a man living in a room with two windows, one of which looks West and the other South, and he is told to make a picture which will comprise these two views. It is not a very easy thing to do, and I think it is a matter worth consideration whether these attempts to arrive at very elaborate tables and formulae do not lead certainly to suspicion—they may lead to friction. I think that they may very likely lead to expense, for the reason that was mentioned by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Uxbridge (Lieut.-Commander Burney), who said that if you fix a maximum it is so apt to become the standard. So I think it may be possible that some agreement may be reached more easily if each nation is not tied down too precisely. The natural desire for economy in most nations will have its effect. The fact that there is a little latitude will relieve friction.

The right hon. Gentleman who spoke last from the Opposition Bench rather hinted at the same conclusion—that a little more latitude and a little less elaboration might assist to a future solution. At any rate we are bound to consider any measure that is possible for proceeding to a reduction of armaments. But at the end of his speech the right hon. Gentleman asked how we interpreted the Kellogg Pact, and held out the lugubrious prospect that if we did not give a proper answer to the question his party might possibly get in at the next election—a result which he seemed to contemplate with the greatest depression.

I for one, and I think the Government with me, believe that every nation which signed the Kellogg Pact meant what it signed. The signatories wish to proceed by specific means and not by war for attaining their ends. If they do mean that, I think that is a very great advantage gained. He said, what have we done to show our approval? We are ready to do our share when other nations do the same. Moreover, I would point out to him and to every one else who is studying this question, that if you have the intention and desire and the love for peace, it is not necessary to have such elaborate formulae, and if you have not, no mere proportional reduction in the armaments of the different countries is going to bring you peace. So I say that our policy is trust in the other nations, believing as

I do that they meant what they said when they signed the Kellogg Pact, and, as everyone in this country knows, we mean it, too.

Question put, " That those words be there added. "

The House divided: Ayes, 163; Noes, 326.

REDE DES DEUTSCHEN REICHSAUSSENMINISTERS DR. G. STRESEMANN BEI DEN BERATUNGEN IM REICHSTAG UEBER DIE RATIFIZIERUNG DES KELLOGGPAKTES, BERLIN, 1. FEBRUAR 1929.

(Vossische Zeitung vom 2. Februar 1929)

Vorgeschichte, Inhalt und Bedeutung des Paktes sind oft erörtert worden und so allgemein bekannt, dass es an sich wohl kaum nötig wäre, darüber noch besonders zu sprechen. Es liegt mir aber daran, jetzt, wo der Reichstag die endgültige und förmliche Entscheidung über die Annahme des Paktes durch Deutschland zu treffen hat, noch einmal diejenigen Gesichtspunkte kurz zusammenzufassen, die für die Haltung der Reichsregierung gegenüber diesem internationalen Akte massgebend waren und noch sind.

Von dem Augenblick an, als bekannt wurde, dass der ursprüngliche Gedanke eines französisch-amerikanischen Friedenspaktes durch den Entschluss der Regierung der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika sich umwandelte in den Gedanken eines allgemeinen Weltfriedenspaktes, ist sich die Reichsregierung der Tragweite dieses Vorganges bewusst gewesen.

Es war ein Ereignis, das in doppelter Richtung für Deutschland von grösster Bedeuting war. Das grosse Problem der Herstellung einer internationalen Friedensordnung, dessen Lösung seit dem Ende des Weltkrieges in den mannigfachsten Versuchen angestrebt worden ist, wurde hier in einer ganz neuen Form angefasst, einer Form, die von allen anderen Friedensversicherungen der letzen Jahre unabhängig war und für die Erreichung des Zieles eine elementare, umfassende Grundlage schaffte. Dazu kam die Tatsache, dass jetzt auch derjenige grosse und mächtige überseeische Staat aktiv in diese Dinge eingriff, der an den für Deutschland wichtigen früheren Friedensgarantien nicht beteiligt war und insbesondere dem Völkerbund nicht angehört.

Ueber die Stellung, die Deutschand zu diesem Vorgehen einzunehmen hatte, konnte kein Zweifel sein. Von den beiden

grossen Ideen des amerikanischen Paktentwurfs, die dahin gehen, die Möglichkeit kriegerischer Konflikte auszuschalten und den friedlichen Ausgleich der Gegensätze zwischen den Staaten zu gewährleisten, konnte mit vollem Recht und mit voller Aufrichtigkeit gesagt werden, dass sie die Grundsätze der deutschen Aussenpolitik sind. Und so hat die Reichsregierung nicht gezögert, den Entschluss zu fassen,als erste der beteiligten Regierungen dem amerikanischen Entwurf ohne Vorbehalt zuzustimmen.

Sie war dabei von der Ueberzeugung getragen, dass die Inkraftsetzung dieses Entwurfs mit den bereits bestehenden internationalen Abmachungen, vor allem mit der Völkerbundsatzung und mit dem Rheinpakt von Locarno nicht nur in keinem Widerspruch stehen, sondern vielmehr geignet sein würde, die Grundgedanken jener Abmachungen zu verstärken.

Ich glaube sagen zu dürfen, dass Deutschland durch diese schnelle und entschiedene Antwort und ebenso durch seine weitere Haltung zu der Entwicklung beigetragen hat, die am 27. August 1928 zu der feierlichen Unterzeichnung des Paktes in Paris führte. Die einzelnen Phasen dieser Entwicklung, die sich in den Dokumenten des Ihnen vorliegenden Weissbuches widerspiegeln und die sich für immer mit dem Namen und der Persönlichkeit des Staatssekretärs Kellogg verbinden werden, sind von grossem politischen Interesse.Ich kann und muss aber der Auffassung entgegentreten, wie sie wohl hier und da in der Oeffentlichkeit laut geworden ist, dass die der Unterzeichunng vorausgegangenen diplomatischen Verhandlungen dem Pakte von vornherein einen Teil seiner wirksamkeit genommen hätten. Die zum Teil schwierigen und verwickelten Erörterungen, um die es sich hierbei handelt, sind vielmenr Ietzten Endes nur ein Beweis dafür, dass die beteiligten Regierungen den amerikanischen Vorschlag nicht nur als eine Geste und Demonstration, sondern als einen folgereichen, bindenden Akt auffassen mussten.

Ich sollte meinen, dass es über alle diese Erorterungen hinaus und ebenso über alle subtilen Auslegungskünste hinaus nach dem klaren Vertragsinstrument doch unwidersprochen feststeht, welche Bedeutung es hat, wenn die in Paris vertretenen fünfzehn Regierungen, und ihnen folgend, aller Voraussicht nach auch die überwiegende Mehrzahl aller anderen Regierungen, sich feierlich und bindend verpflichten, auf den Krieg als Instrument der nationalen Politik zu verzichten.

Ich kann dieser Bedeutung nicht besser Ausdruck geben als mit den Worten, die der französische Herr Aussenminister bei dem Akt der Unterzeichnung sprach : « Zum ersten male und vor den Augen der Welt, so sagte Herr Briand, wird in einem feierlichen, die Ehre grosser Nationen verpflichtenden Akte der Krieg als Instrument der nationalen Politik ohne Vorbehalt

verworfen, d. h. der Krieg in seiner eigentlichsten und furchtbarsten Form, der zu egoistischen Zwecken gewollte Krieg.. Einem solchen Kriege,der früher göttlichen Rechtes war und in der internationalen Ethik als Vorrecht der Souveränität galt, wird jetzt in juristischer Form das genommen, was seine grösste Gefahr darstele : Seine Rechtmässigkeit. Als rechtswidrig gebrandmarkt, wird er für die Zukunft dem vertraglichen Regime einer wirklichen Aechtung unterworfen, ie den Vertragsbrüchigen der sicheren Missbilligung, der wahrscheinlichen Feindschaft aller Mitkontrahenten aussetzt ».

Deutschland hat keinen Anlass und kein Interesse, die Bedeutung des Paktes geringer einzuschätzen,als in diesen Worten des französischen Herrn Aussenministers geschehen ist Wir würden sonst nur etwaigen Strömungen Nahrung geben, die aus diesem oder jenem politischen Grunde an einer solchen Geringschätzung ein Interesse haben könnten.

Wenn die Oeffentlichkeit, die in den Jahren nach dem Kriege die Reihe der friedensbeteuernden Regierungen ständig sich hat vergrössern sehen, dem nicht immer mit steigendem Entusiasmus, sondern vielfach mit einer gewissen Skepsis gefolgt ist, so ist das vielleicht begreiflich. Soweit das deutsche Volk in Frage kommt, ist das aber nicht das Zeichen eines Mangels an Friedensbedürfnis und Friedenswillen. Es hat in Deutschland seinen Grund einfach darin, dass man diejenigen Folgen vermisst,die sich aus den so weitgehenden internationalen Erklärungen der Regierungen von selbst ergeben. Darin liegt in der Tat ein Punkt, der von entscheidender Bedeutung ist,und dessen Betonung alles andere als eine Herabwürdingng des Wertes des Paktes darstellt. Ist dieser Pakt durch den radikalen und unbedingten Verzicht auf den Krieg als Instrument der nationalen Politik der Abschluss einer völkerrechtlichen Entwicklung, so ist er in anderer Richting doch nur ein Versprechen und eine Grundlage für die weitere Ausgestaltung der rechtlichen Ordnung des Völkerlebens. In diesem Sinne hat schon die erste deutsche Note zu dem Paktentwurf dem Gedanken Ausdruck gegeben. dass das Zustandekommen des Paktes nicht verfehlen dürfte, alsbald seinen Einfluss auf die Gestaltung der internationalen Beziehungen geltend zu machen.

Nicht nur muss die neue Friedensgarantie der Durchführung der allgemeinen Abrüstung einen wirksamen Impuls geben,sondern es müssen als notwendiges Gegenstück des Verzichts auf den Krieg diejeningen Möglichkeiten gefunden werden, die geeignets ind, vorhandene und entstehende Gegensätze der Völkerinteressen auf friedliche,gerechte Weise zum Austrag zu bringen. Immer wieder wird die lebendige Entwicklung des Völkerlebens zu Gegensätzen führen, die nicht aus der Welt wegzudekretieren sind. Sie sind nur dann friedlich zu meistern, wenn die Gestaltung des Rechts dieser lebendigen Entwicklung folgt.

Darin liegt die Aufgabe, die der Kriegsächtungspakt aufs neue den Regierungen stellt und die gelöst werden muss, wenn der Pakt wirklich das werden soll, was er zu sein verdient : die Einleitung einer neuen Epoche.

DISCOURS DE M. JEAN PAUL-BONCOUR, PRESIDENT DE LA COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DANS LA CHAMBRE DES DEPUTES, M. MARGAINE, M. PAUL FAURE, M. ARISTIDE BRIAND, M. LE COLONEL FABRY ET AUTRES DEPUTES, SUR LA RATIFICATION DU PACTE KELLOGG PARIS, CHAMBRE DES DEPUTES, LES 1 ET 2 MARS 1929.

(Le Temps des 2 et 3 mars 1929)

M. Paul-Boncour, président de la commission des affaires étrangères, monte à la tribune, salué par les applaudissements de l'Assemblée. Il indique d'abord que la commission des affaires étrangères a estimé que la ratification du pacte devait être précédée d'explications fécondes exprimant la volonté réfléchie du Parlement et plaçant le pacte de Paris dans l'ensemble des actes internationaux qui se sont succédé depuis la victoire de la France. Elle a pensé aussi qu'elle devait assurer efficacement la continuité du contrôle parlementaire qui doit s'exercer dans l'organisation positive de la paix comme, naguère, pendant la période de la paix armée. C'est en vain qu'en août 1914 on a essayé de rejeter la responsabilité de l'impréparation sur les commissions et le Parlement (*Vifs applaudissements à l'extrême gauche et à gauche*). Mais quel cri de colère s'élèverait contre eux s'ils laissaient incorporer dans l'édifice qui s'élève des matériaux dont la solidité n'aurait pas été éprouvée !

La commission propose donc à la Chambre de ratifier le pacte, mais elle doit en marquer les limites. A l'origine de cet acte, il y a une grande pensée, digne en tous points de l'homme d'Etat qui l'a conçue (*Vifs applaudissements*). Il a voulu ramener la République américaine dans le rayonnement de l'organisation de la paix. L'espoir de la France fut très vif lorsque le sénateur Kopper proposa de refuser le concours économique des Etats-Unis au pays agresseur, car le blocus est la seule sanction pratique sur laquelle on puisse compter.

« *M. Paul-Boncour* — Nous n'en sommes pas encore au moment où l'on considérera les armées et les flottes comme des instruments d'ordre international, et non pas seulement de souveraineté nationale (*Vifs applaudissements*), mais il serait cruellement étrange de proclamer l'infamie de la guerre et en même temps de ravitailler celui qui s'en est rendu coupable

(*Nouveaux applaudissements sur un très grand nombre de bancs*) »

Pour l'orateur, ce qui manque au pacte de Paris c'est l'idée d'arbitrage et celle de sanction. Or, d'après l'article 15 du pacte de la Société des Nations les Etats, si l'unanimité n'est pas réalisée au sein du conseil, gardent leur liberté d'agir : ou bien le pacte Kellogg n'a pas de signification, ou bien il nous conduira à l'arbitrage obligatoire et généralisé.

Il ne suffit pas de réprouver la guerre, il faut la rendre inutile. Il serait puéril de soutenir que l'on fait la guerre pour son plaisir, et de parler d'armées de métier à une époque où les nations se jettent dans la lutte avec toutes leurs ressources parce qu'elles n'ont pas d'autre moyen de dénouer les conflits internationaux.

« *M. Paul-Boncour.* — Si on veut empêcher la guerre, il faut organiser une procédure pacifique, il faut un juge. Nous verrons tout à l'heure s'il ne faut pas aussi, à côté du juge, des agents d'exécution (*Applaudissements*). En tout cas, il faut l'arbitrage. Nous disions tout à l'heure que nous demeurions fidèles au protocole. Il ne s'agit pas d'une fidélité platonique.

« Le protocole n'est pas roulé dans « le linceul de pourpre où dorment les dieux morts ». J'ai ressuscité maintes fois ce nouveau Lazare que je tirais de son tombeau, je l'ai produit, tel un spectre de Banque, devant des chancelleries éprises de procédures qu'elles croient machiavéliques, alors qu'elles ne sont que puériles (*Vifs applaudissements*) ».

M. Paul-Boncour rappelle l'œuvre du comité d'arbitrage et de sécurité qui a élaboré un acte d'arbitrage général obligatoire, acte que l'on a oublié comme l'on oublie trop volontiers ce qui se fait à Genève. Si l'on veut renoncer à la diplomatie secrète en faveur d'une diplomatie qui se passe « sur la place publique », encore faut-il que la place publique ne soit pas vide (*Applaudissements*). C'est ainsi qu'on a oublié l'existence d'une convention sur le trafic des armes qui n'a été ratifiée que par la France et cinquante Etats. La France devra donc la première — et le gouvernement doit en donner l'assurance — signer l'acte d'arbitrage élaboré à Genève.

L'arbitrage donc est nécessaire. Mais il ne suffit pas : un arbitrage sans sanctions, c'est un jugement sans force exécutoire, c'est un magistrat sans gendarme (*Applaudissements*).

« *M. Paul-Boncour.* — Je comprends mal les esprits, souvent attachés à la paix, qui, sachant que les relations entre particuliers, bien que dominées par des siècles de morale individuelle et de justice nationale, ont besoin d'une force coercitive, s'imaginent que, pour les peuples qui, depuis des siècles, ne connaissent que la guerre, une parole de paix, si haute soit-elle, suffira à éviter la guerre (*Applaudissements*) ».

L'orateur rappelle que, récemment, M. Ramsay Mac Donald, raillant l'excès de logique de ceux qui veulent une sanction à

côté du juge, a dit : « Je suis venu à Paris sans revolver dans ma poche ». Il oubliait qu'il y a des sergents de ville (*Rires et vifs applaudissements*).

« *M. Paul-Boncour.* — Les désarmements locaux n'ont de valeur que par la création d'un armement général permettant de maintenir l'ordre universel. Les châteaux forts n'ont été abattus que lorsque la nation a été capable de faire régner l'ordre intérieur. Le désarmement ne sera une vérité que lorsqu'une armée internationale sera au service des sécurités nationales (*Applaudissements*).

« Thèse militariste ? Quelle hypocrisie ! C'est la seule manière, au contraire, de tuer le militarisme, que d'empêcher que, par peur de ce que fait le voisin, on ne tente d'assurer par les armes sa sécurité. Armée internationale ? C'était la vieille conception de Léon Bourgeois à l'hôtel Crillon, et ce fut celle du protocole (*Vifs applaudissements*).

« Donc, par un moyen ou un autre, restons obéissants à notre logique et soyons fiers d'elle : c'est la thèse de la France, la seule qui puisse conduire au désarmement ! »

Revenons donc aux principes du protocole rattaché lui-même aux traités d'assistance mutuelle. Cette politique doit s'exprimer ailleurs qu'à Genève :

« Il faut que les chuchotements plus discrets des postes diplomatiques s'exercent dans le même sens, que tous nos agents aient un peu la foi dans ce qui se passe à Genève, qu'ils sachent que c'est la volonté de la France, de notre Parlement, de nos commissions ou des gouvernements animés par eux et par elles, qui veulent qu'on substitue les préoccupations internationales au jeu périmé des alliances, aux combinaisons d'influences, restes d'une diplomatie attardée, et dont les peuples trop souvent sont l'enjeu (*Vifs applaudissements*). »

Telle est la condition de notre sécurité. La France a choisi : il est trop tard pour hésiter. M. Paul-Boncour rappelle que le colonel Picot, au moment de la discussion des accords de Locarno s'écriait : « La France a tendu sans cesse ses mains mutilées : qu'a-t-on mis dedans ? »

« *M. Paul-Boncour.* — C'est vrai ! La France a tendu la main, non seulement pour demander, mais pour offrir. Elle a offert les traités d'assurance mutuelle, elle a offert le protocole. Non seulement, elle a offert, mais elle a donné. Elle a donné sa garantie à la Pologne, à la Tchécoslovaquie, à la Yougoslavie, à la Roumanie. Et je suis de ceux qui pensent qu'elle a bien fait : il ne faut pas avoir proclamé devant le monde le droit des nationalités pour les laisser mourir quand on les a ressuscitées (*Applaudissements unanimes et prolongés*).

« Donc, la France est engagée. Il devient vital pour elle — vital ! — d'aboutir, par une propagande intense, et par la volonté imposée à tous les agents, sous peine d'être brisés, de soutenir cette politique-là ! (*Vifs applaudissements*) ».

Le président de la commission des affaires étrangères aborde la question du désarmement et déclare que l'on ne peut négliger le fait de la construction de nombreuses et puissantes unités navales aux Etats-Unis après la ratification du pacte Kellogg. Il faut donc nous hâter vers l'arbitrage international pour hâter ensuite la réduction des armements. Au point de vue du désarmement la France est « irréprochable », car c'est sa délégation qui, en 1925, a pris les premières initiatives. Elle estimait qu'à une sécurité partielle devait correspondre un désarmement partiel. Depuis, les travaux ont été poussés très loin : ils sont sortis de la « phase mystique » et même de la phase technique. L'heure des gouvernements est venue : pourquoi les pourparlers sont-ils ralentis ? C'est qu'il n'y a pas eu que Locarno. Tout le monde a dit que le pacte Kellogg n'était qu'un commencement et qu'il n'aurait de valeur que s'il était complété : mais n'avait-on pas dit la même chose des accords de Locarno ?

« *M. Paul-Boncour.* — A cette époque, la diplomatie française a fait son métier, mais, hélas ! pour tous ces autres points de friction que vous connaissez bien, pour cette carte de l'Europe que vous avez devant les yeux et qui a remplacé la carte au liséré vert du traité de Francfort, où sont donc les appareils de sécurité que l'on devait placer ? (*Applaudissements*)

« Les diplomaties sont retombées aux vieux errements, elles ont subi à nouveau les antiques influences et sont revenues aux traités d'alliance d'autrefois (*Applaudissements*).

« Cependant l'arbitrage, pour avoir de la valeur, doit être conclu entre nations qui peuvent connaître entre elles des difficultés, s'il est autre chose qu'un acte de politesse, qu'un simple coup de chapeau (*Vifs applaudissements*).

« Et peu à peu, on reconstruit la carte de l'Europe d'avant-guerre, et c'est pourquoi, après Jaurès, je vous supplie d'abandonner à tout jamais ce vieux jeu des alliances ! C'est la construction d'ensemble, c'est l'organisation de la paix qu'il faut envisager, et, pour arriver à ce but, il faut que la Société des Nations joue son rôle jusqu'au bout.

« Or, ce rôle n'est pas d'esquiver les difficultés, mais bien de les résoudre, fût-ce en parlant haut et fort et en se plaçant contre l'agresseur, avec l'attaqué, avec toutes ses flottes, ses armées, ses avions (*Applaudissements*).

« Si nous donnons à tous nos rouages militaires et diplomatiques l'ordre d'agir dans ce sens, de servir la cause de l'organisation de la paix, je ne doute pas qu'une grande puissance, qui a la triple auréole de sa souffrance, de son sacrifice et de sa victoire, ne finisse par l'emporter et qu'elle n'arrive à faire rentrer les garanties de sécurité unilatérales qu'elle a dû prendre dans le grand accord général d'un protocole reconstitué (*Vifs applaudissements*) ».

M. Paul-Boncour arrive à la conclusion de son éloquent discours :

« Messieurs, on a évoqué la commission préparatoire d'avril.

« Ne nous payons pas de trop d'illusions : elle est dominée par l'état incertain de la sécurité internationale, qui n'a pas fait de progrès suffisants depuis Locarno ; n'en attendons pas beaucoup. Mais qu'au moins, de ce débat, il sorte, avec une ratification prochaine de l'acte général d'arbitrage, la volonté de proclamer partout que ce n'est pas seulement la voix de nos délégués à Genève, pas même seulement celle du chef de notre diplomatie, mais la voix de la France qui dit : Principe du protocole ? Sécurité totale ! Pour l'assurer : désarmement total !

« Et s'il est vrai que le char du désarmement soit un peu embourbé, rappelons-nous cette parole d'Emerson : « Il faut atteler sa charrette à une étoile ».

« Je souhaite que le char un peu embourbé du désarmement se rattache à l'étoile rayonnante de la France immortelle (*Vifs applaudissements répétés. — Un grand nombre de députés se lèvent et acclament l'orateur*) ».

Après une suspension de séance, de 17 h. 45 à 18 heures. M. Margaine (radical socialiste, Marne) remarque que, par suite des réserves dont les Etats-Unis ont accompagné sa ratification, le pacte de Paris n'a une force exécutoire complète que pour l'Europe, qui vient d'éviter plusieurs graves conflits. L'orateur signale la gravité de « l'irrédentisme allemand ».

« *M. Margaine.* — L'Allemagne déclare sans se lasser et à toute occasion que jamais elle n'acceptera ses frontières orientales actuelles.

« J'ai à peine besoin de rappeler, comme grandes manifestations solennelles, le discours de M. Stresemann et celui de M. Hindenburg dans la Haute-Silésie.

« *M. Briand,* ministre des affaires étrangères. — Il convient d'ajouter qu'en même temps que ces paroles ont été prononcées l'Allemagne s'est engagée à ne jamais recourir à la force pour obtenir une modification de frontière ».

M. Margaine s'inquiète de certaines constructions allemandes qui ont été révélées par la presse. Il se demande si l'Allemagne ne nourrit pas quelques arrière-pensées lorsqu'elle s'institue la protectrice des minorités allemandes dans les autres pays. L'orateur étudie ensuite la question chinoise, puis l'impérialisme industriel des Etats-Unis qui risque d'entrer en conflit avec la politique japonaise en Extrême-Orient. Il termine en déclarant que l'on ne saurait négliger la Russie, « le plus puissant facteur potentiel de la paix ».

M. Paul Faure, mandaté par le groupe socialiste, déclare que son parti votera la ratification du pacte de Paris, se séparant nettement sur ce point du parti communiste qui, au Reichstag, s'est uni aux nationalistes contre le traité. Les socialistes estiment, en effet, qu'il était nécessaire que la guerre fût mise

hors la loi par un acte solennel dont ils reconnaissent toute la force morale. La guerre étant désormais considérée comme un crime, ceux qui en feront l'apologie devront tomber sous le coup des « lois scélérates » et les peuples, si les gouvernements ne font pas tout leur possible pour éviter l'emploi de la violence, devront au besoin s'y opposer par l'insurrection.

L'orateur revient sur les réserves qui ont été formulées par les Etats-Unis à l'occasion de la ratification du pacte qui, selon lui, ne servira qu'à masquer des intentions guerrières, si l'on ne se rallie pas ensuite aux principes du protocole de Genève et au contrôle de la fabrication des armements, et si l'on ne renonce pas aux accords particuliers entre nations.

Les socialistes réclament « la démocratisation » de la Société des nations, c'est-à-dire la représentation dans son sein des grands partis politiques de chaque pays. Ils pensent qu'il faut se hâter sur la voie de l'organisation de la paix, car la situation européenne est inquiétante : ils se prononcent en faveur de l'évacuation rapide des régions rhénanes et espèrent que seront bientôt réglées les questions du couloir de Dantzig, des frontières balkaniques, des minorités, de l'émancipation des peuples coloniaux, etc. Pour eux, la paix ne sera assurée que lorsque les peuples se seront emparés de toutes les sources de richesses : la victoire du monde du travail est proche (*Applaudissements à l'extrême gauche*).

DISCOURS DE M. ARISTIDE BRIAND

MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ÉTRANGÈRES

— Messieurs, je me félicite de l'ampleur qu'a prise ce débat. Ma tâche s'en trouve facilitée et réduite. Et si le cours d'un tel débat n'avait dépendu que de mes convenances, j'aurais aimé que la Chambre fût appelée, dès hier soir, à voter après le très éloquent et très noble discours que vous veniez d'entendre (*Applaudissements*).

Mon ami et — qu'il me permette de le lui dire avec quelque regret — mon ex-collaborateur, M. Paul-Boncour, en exposant la politique de paix qui est celle de mon gouvernement comme elle est la mienne, avait fait apparaître dans toute cette Assemblée une admirable communion de pensées. Je suis convaincu que, si la Chambre avait été appelée à voter aussitôt après ce discours, le pacte de Paris eût été bien près de réaliser l'unanimité (*Applaudissements*).

Messieurs, le débat s'est poursuivi, et je ne m'en plains pas, puisqu'il nous a permis d'entendre, en politique étrangère, la doctrine d'un grand parti qui tient dans cette Chambre une place importante.

Pour ma part, je me contenterai, dans cette discussion, d'appeler votre attention sur le caractère et la portée du pacte de Paris, tel qu'il est soumis à votre approbation.

Votre rapporteur, M. Pierre Cot, dans un discours aussi clair, aussi net, aussi éloquent...

M. Paul-Boncour, président de la commission. — Très bien !

Le ministre des affaires étrangères. — ... que nous le pouvions souhaiter, vous a mis à même de vous prononcer en connaissance de cause.

Je n'entrerai plus dans la discussion juridique du pacte, je ne reprendrai plus l'examen de certaines conditions dans lesquelles plusieurs orateurs eussent souhaité voir conclure ce pacte.

Je dois convenir ici, en toute humilité, que le pacte de Paris n'est pas parfait : n'étant qu'une œuvre humaine, réalisée à travers les difficultés d'une situation internationale des plus complexes, il participe à toutes les imperfections d'une œuvre humaine. Aussi bien, me faut-il l'avouer, depuis que j'ai l'honneur d'être à la tête du ministère des affaires étrangères, je n'ai jamais cru, dans toutes entreprises diplomatiques, pouvoir dégager autre chose que des moyennes. Mais il suffit qu'un effort aboutisse à un progrès pour que nous devions nous en féliciter. Et si je suis à cette tribune c'est surtout pour appeler votre attention sur ce fait, indiscutable, que le pacte de Paris est un progrès réalisé sur la route de la paix (*Applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs*).

J'entends bien qu'il y a des lacunes dans cet acte. A en juger par toutes les critiques formulées à cette tribune, ces lacunes seraient nombreuses. Mais si le gouvernement français et le gouvernement des Etats-Unis, dans la délicate entreprise que constituait la négociation d'un pareil contrat, avaient dû se placer à tous les points de vue auxquels ont pu se placer librement les orateurs qui se sont succédé ici, je puis vous affirmer qu'après de nombreuses tentatives les deux gouvernements eussent été obligés de reconnaître leur impuissance à rien réaliser. Il leur eût été impossible de mener à bon terme la conclusion d'un contrat aussi parfait que vous le pourriez souhaiter, contre la guerre, avec une organisation arbitrale et des sanctions. Si une pareille tentative, je le répète, avait été poursuivie par les deux gouvernements, elle aurait avorté.

Messieurs, lorsque j'ai eu l'honneur d'adresser au peuple américain — et ce fut, en quelque sorte, l'origine du pacte — un message, dans lequel j'ai formulé ce qui devait constituer la substance même de cet acte solennel, le peuple américain a montré aussitôt le plus libre et le plus vif enthousiasme pour la formule qui lui était proposée. De grands mouvements ont soulevé ce peuple ; et son gouvernement, assuré de la plus large approbation publique, n'a pas hésité à examiner avec nous la possibilité d'inscrire dans un contrat cette formule qu'il savait conforme au sentiment populaire.

Il est facile de prêter aux gouvernements des arrière-pensées que l'on puisse critiquer. A la vérité, les hommes qui, ayant

la charge et la responsabilité des intérêts nationaux d'un pays, se trouvent aux prises avec des problèmes internationaux d'une envergure aussi exceptionnelle que celui qui nous occupe, sont obligés de prendre en considération certaines préoccupations parfaitement honorables, de leur faire pleinement droit. Ils ont à tenir compte de la complexité, non pas seulement des intérêts, mais de toutes les tendances, politiques ou morales, de toutes les traditions ethniques, dont l'ensemble constitue le patrimoine d'une nation. C'est ce souci constant qui expose à tant de difficultés l'effort des hommes pour la réalisation de certains actes internationaux (*Très bien* ! *Très bien* !).

Ce qui serait pire que tout, ce serait le découragement en face de ces difficultés, ce serait l'abandon de l'effort à la première déception (*Applaudissements*).

On a, au cours de cette discussion, évoqué souvent le protocole de Genève comme un acte susceptible d'apporter aux peuples le maximum de garanties souhaitables.

S'il est un homme qui en est parfaitement convaincu, c'est bien celui qui se trouve devant vous à cette tribune (*Applaudissements*).

Je n'oublie pas, messieurs, qu'en 1924 mon collègue et ami M. Herriot voulut bien me faire l'honneur de me prier, non pas de remplacer un homme irremplaçable — je veux parler du grand Français et du grand républicain qu'était Léon Bourgeois (*Applaudissements à gauche et à l'extrême gauche*), — mais de prendre place, auprès de notre éminent compatriote, déjà malade, à la tête de la délégation française à la Société des nations.

J'ai accepté, non sans inquiétude, car c'était un devoir très lourd qu'on me demandait de remplir. Je suis allé à Genève. J'y étais, lorsque M. Herriot a prononcé le discours dans lequel il a affirmé la nécessité d'un protocole établi sur les trois principes : arbitrage, sécurité, désarmement, conformément du reste aux dispositions essentielles du pacte de la Société des nations.

Lorsque, ensuite, avec mes collaborateurs de la délégation française, dont je vois plusieurs ici, en face de moi, avec M. Paul-Boncour notamment, j'ai entrepris l'effort nécessaire pour la réalisation d'une œuvre internationale aussi complexe, j'ai le sentiment que nous avons bien fait tout ce qu'il était humainement possible de faire pour aboutir à un heureux résultat, et je n'oublie pas que j'ai eu l'honneur de monter le premier à la tribune de l'assemblée de Genève pour apporter le salut et l'adhésion de la France à cette œuvre que, pas un instant, elle n'a désertée (*Vifs applaudissements prolongés*).

Si le protocole avait pu devenir la charte des peuples, bien des problèmes, des plus ardus, seraient déjà résolus. Mais notre premier effort n'a pu rencontrer le succès.

C'est moi qui, au sein du conseil de la Société des nations —

et avec quelle tristesse ! — ai dû recueillir l'aveu de l'impossibilité où se trouvait la Grande-Bretagne de ratifier le protocole. La déception, pour moi, était assez rude, vous pouvez m'en croire. Je ne me suis pourtant pas laissé décourager.

Dans cette séance même, j'ai repris la défense du protocole. J'ai affirmé qu'il ne disparaissait pas, qu'il ne périssait pas, qu'il ne perdait rien de notre sollicitude et que le moyen se trouverait bien de le faire revivre.

Et Locarno, messieurs, qu'est-ce donc, sinon déjà le protocole en partie ressuscité ?

Et depuis, chaque fois qu'une possibilité s'est présentée à nous de ramener les esprits vers cet acte international, nous n'y avons pas manqué (*Très bien ! Très bien !*)

Messieurs, j'ai entendu parfois exprimer, au cours de ce débat, des appréciations qui m'ont paru témoigner de trop de pessimisme envers la Société des nations, et contre lesquelles il convient de s'élever, si l'on ne veut pas laisser s'égarer le sentiment des peuples à l'égard de cette institution.

Pour faire apparaître toute la force de la Société des nations et l'efficacité de son action, il faut la montrer aux peuples telle qu'elle est et non pas telle que certains pourraient désirer qu'elle fût.

Oui, messieurs, la Société des nations est soumise à de dures critiques. Elle a suscité des ironies faciles, et l'on s'est parfois employé à semer des difficultés sous ses pas, alors qu'elle était déjà appelée à rencontrer de si nombreux obstacles naturels.

Le fait même que la Société des nations ait pu durer, qu'elle existe encore, qu'elle ait pu réaliser tout ce qu'elle a réalisé, c'est une chose à peine croyable (*Applaudissements*).

Voilà ce qu'il faut dire aux peuples, parce que c'est la vérité.

Je ne me lasserai point de vous le rappeler, la Société des Nations n'est pas une assemblée délibérante comme tout autre, mais sa constitution même est absolument exceptionnelle, car elle exige pour ses conclusions, dans l'examen des problèmes les plus délicats, le vote à l'unanimité.

Concevez-vous, dans de telles conditions, les efforts inouïs de prudence, de conciliation et de persuasion qui deviennent nécessaires pour éviter toute réaction, tout froissement de susceptibilité pouvant amener, de la part d'un seul délibérant, le vote fatal, le « non » décisif et tant redouté ?

Au surplus, réfléchissez que l'assemblée comprend, non pas 52 individus désignés par des organisations politiques, mais 52 nations directement représentées par des délégués officiels, ayant charge gouvernementale, c'est-à-dire conscients des responsabilités qui accablent, à notre époque, les hommes de gouvernement, et obligés de tenir compte des exigences propres à la nation qu'ils représentent.

Avec mon ami M. Paul-Boncour, j'ai traversé parfois des

moments angoissants. Permettez-moi d'évoquer une de ces minutes.

Péniblement, laborieusement, nous avions, dans un esprit de réconciliation générale et de paix véritable, préparé l'entrée de l'Allemagne à la Société des nations, demandant en sa faveur l'admission permanente au conseil. Depuis quinze jours que l'assemblée était réunie, les efforts se multipliaient pour assurer le vote favorable, indispensable à la continuation de l'œuvre entreprise pour l'organisation de la paix. Les représentants de l'Allemagne, appelés par le conseil, attendaient leur admission. Et voici que, dans le défilé des délégués des nations, alors que la presque unanimité était déjà réalisée, un « non » s'élève, un seul ! et c'est l'impossibilité absolue de faire entrer les délégués de l'Allemagne, c'est-à-dire la nécessité de reprendre à pied d'œuvre toute l'entreprise, si difficile, qui venait d'avorter aux portes mêmes du succès.

Un tel échec pouvait être décourageant. Nous avons repris notre effort, nous y avons persisté, et nous avons bien fait.

Quelques mois plus tard, le résultat qui nous avait échappé était atteint dans un enthousiasme permettant désormais d'orienter les peuples vers une œuvre de paix plus efficace (*Applaudissements*).

Sur les conditions du travail à Genève et sur l'esprit dans lequel s'y poursuit la collaboration des délégations étrangères, j'ai entendu quelques appréciations — formulées, hélas ! avec trop d'éloquence — que j'aurais préféré ne pas entendre. D'aucuns sont allés jusqu'à parler d'hypocrisie, de mauvaise volonté. Depuis que j'ai l'honneur d'être à Genève, je dois le dire en toute sincérité. Je n'ai jamais rencontré un tel état d'esprit. Je me suis heurté à des difficultés, mais elles trouvaient toujours leur explication dans les préoccupations dont s'inspiraient les représentants étrangers.

Et puisqu'on a parlé du protocole, je veux évoquer ici un souvenir qui nous est commun, à M. Paul-Boncour et à moi. Je suis sûr, en le faisant, de réveiller en lui l'émotion qu'il a partagée alors avec moi.

Lorsque, devant cette assemblée de Genève, dont le spectacle est si émouvant, on a vu monter à la tribune le représentant de cette très grande nation qu'est, dans le passé, dans le présent et l'avenir, la Grande-Bretagne, pour faire courageusement et loyalement, dans une sorte de confession publique devant l'assemblée des nations, l'aveu des difficultés auxquelles il s'était heurté, à ce moment-là nous avons senti, tous mes collègues de la délégation française et moi-même, une véritable émotion s'emparer de nous et nous avons trouvé magnifique, nous avons trouvé incomparablement noble le spectacle de cette puissante nation qui, par la voix d'un de ses représentants les plus hautement qualifiés et dont il ne viendrait à l'idée de personne de suspecter la bonne foi, venait dire tout haut : Voilà les difficul-

tés avec lesquelles je suis aux prises, que j'ai essayé de vaincre ; je n'y suis pas parvenu.

Troublante situation devant laquelle il fallait bien s'incliner avec respect, car le fait est là, qu'avant de pouvoir apporter la contribution à l'œuvre collective de la Société des nations, chaque gouvernement a dû, au préalable, dégager, dans son propre pays, l'opinion collective qu'il exprimera lui-même à Genève au nom de la nation tout entière qu'il représente. Et quand le gouvernement de Grande-Bretagne parle au nom de la nation britannique, il ne lui suffit pas d'exprimer le sentiment de l'Angleterre, il lui faut encore exprimer celui de tout l'empire britannique, après avoir réalisé l'accord entre les différentes parties qui le composent.

Ce n'est là qu'un exemple des difficultés auxquelles se heurte couramment l'effort des hommes de bonne volonté qui ont la charge de représenter leur pays à Genève.

Du moins ai-je le droit et la satisfaction de dire à cette tribune, sans crainte d'être démenti par M. le président de la commission des affaires étrangères, que les membres de la délégation française ont toujours travaillé dans une communauté étroite de sentiments, non seulement entre eux, mais avec les gouvernements successifs, dont ils tenaient leur mandat.

Tous les matins, dans la confiance et dans l'intimité, notre petite famille se réunissait pour délibérer méthodiquement ; puis, sa tâche assignée, chacun de nous allait, à la commission où il avait à représenter spécialement son pays, s'efforcer de faire triompher le point de vue français. Voilà les conditions dans lesquelles nous avons toujours solidairement travaillé.

On a bien essayé d'insinuer que des désaccords s'étaient fait jour entre certains délégués et leur gouvernement. Ce n'est pas exact. Mon ami M. Paul-Boncour pourra vous dire que, lorsqu'il représentait spécialement la délégation française au sein de la commission du désarmement, à aucun moment le gouvernement n'a entravé ses efforts, à aucun moment on n'a fait la moindre tentative pour le détourner de sa tâche. C'est en pleine indépendance d'esprit, sur un programme nettement tracé et approuvé par le gouvernement, qu'il a fait porter son effort.

Et, puisque j'en viens à parler de cette question du désarmement, j'ai le devoir de réfuter certaines affirmations que je n'ai jamais entendues qu'avec une profonde tristesse.

Sur ce terrain encore, pourrait-on trouver en rien la France en arrière d'aucune autre nation ? Ne s'est-elle pas plutôt tenue constamment à l'avant-garde ? N'a-t-elle pas toujours, en toutes circonstances, fait les propositions les plus courageuses et les plus hardies ? Peut-on dire qu'elle se soit renfermée dans le *statu quo* favorable que lui avait créé la guerre, alors qu'au contraire elle luttait pour faire aboutir ces propositions ? (*Très bien ! Très bien !*)

Non. Pendant que ses délégués s'efforçaient, au sein des com-

missions et des assemblées de la Société des nations, de réaliser les promesses sacrées de l'article 8 du pacte, le gouvernement, de son côté, opérait des réductions successives dans les effectifs de notre armée. Voyez ce qu'était celle-ci avant la guerre. Voyez ce qu'elle est aujourd'hui. Nos réductions ne portent pas seulement sur les effectifs, mais aussi sur la durée du service militaire, puisque nous en sommes arrivés à la loi d'un an (*Très bien ! Très bien !*)

Bientôt, la commission du désarmement va se réunir à nouveau pour rechercher les bases d'une conférence du désarmement. La France en sera-t elle absente ? S'est-elle refusée à fixer une date pour examiner ce délicat problème ? Non, messieurs. Elle a été des nations qui ont proposé cette réunion et, au mois d'avril, soyez sûrs qu'elle ne faillira pas à sa tâche, fidèle à des promesses qu'elle considère comme sacrées.

C'est véritablement, messieurs, une chose pitoyable que d'entendre toujours représenter la France comme opposant le plus de résistance dès qu'il s'agit de faire un effort dans la voie de la réduction des armements (*Applaudissements*).

Alors que, dans toutes les circonstances, elle s'est montrée la plus favorable à cette orientation, comment peut-on oser la dénoncer comme essayant d'esquiver un devoir qu'elle a librement et loyalement assumé le jour où elle a signé le pacte de la Société des nations (*Applaudissements*).

Suffit-il, pour encourir la suspicion, de mesurer, avec toutes les autres nations intéressées, les difficultés rencontrées sur un pareil terrain ?

Je n'entends pas, messieurs, vous énumérer toutes ces difficultés. Ce serait trop m'écarter de l'objet de ce débat. Je veux seulement, avant d'y revenir, répondre à certaines allégations qui avaient presque le caractère d'une interpellation, et qui appellent en tout cas quelques affirmations de ma part.

Lorsque nous avons envisagé la possibilité d'une conférence devant aboutir, sinon à une réduction d'armements du moins à l'arrêt des dépenses militaires, soyez certains que c'est en pleine conformité de vues entre le gouvernement français et les délégués de la France à la Société des Nations.

M. Pierre Renaudel. — Nous sommes heureux de l'apprendre.

Le Ministre des affaires étrangères. — Jamais, à aucun moment, il n'y a eu la moindre divergence sur ce point, et je vois avec plaisir que mon collègue M. Paul-Boncour confirme cette déclaration.

Le Président de la Commission, — Complètement (*Applaudissements*).

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères. — Messieurs, nous n'avons eu que trop occasion, au cours de ce débat, d'évoquer les difficultés avec lesquelles la Société des nations se trouve aux prises. Est-ce à dire qu'il faille désespérer ?

L'honorable M. Margaine, hier à cette tribune, vous a énu-

méré toutes ces difficultés, mais il a très justement ajouté qu'autrefois, quand la Société des nations n'existait pas, chacune d'elles eût constitué un danger réel de guerre. Or la Société des Nations, vaille que vaille, jour après jour, session après session, a affronté et réglé toutes ces difficultés rencontrées sur sa route.

Rappelez-vous avec quel scepticisme on accueillait ses efforts lorsqu'il s'est agi de la Haute-Silésie. On criait à l'impasse. L'affaire pourtant a été réglée, et la paix maintenue. Même scepticisme lorsque a surgi le conflit lithuano-polonais. Avec quelle ironie ne voyait-on pas le conseil de la Société des nations aborder ce problème ! Et, dans cette affaire encore, la Société des nations a réussi à maintenir la paix, l'état de guerre qui existait entre les deux pays s'est résorbé. Des contacts ont été établis et le conseil de la Société des nations, par ses organes techniques, va s'efforcer, si les deux pays ne peuvent y réussir directement, de les aider à trouver une solution satisfaisante.

Et quand a éclaté la querelle des optants, entre Roumains et Hongrois, que n'a-t-on pas dit de l'impuissance congénitale de la Société des Nations ? Le problème est venu une fois, deux fois, trois fois devant le conseil qui l'a examiné avec patience, avec ténacité. A force de mettre les intéressés en contact, de les appeler à s'expliquer en public, la Société des nations a fini par les amener à une délibération commune. Déjà, d'importants éléments d'entente ont été réunis et j'ai l'espoir de voir bientôt cette opération réglée, sans que la paix ait été troublée.

La Société des nations a fait plus, vous le savez : elle a arrêté des guerres commencées. Qu'on cherche dans le passé, qu'on cherche dans l'histoire de toutes institutions humaines des exemples d'une intervention aussi décisive entre des belligérants déjà aux prises !

Ce sont là, malgré tout, des états de service qu'on n'a pas le droit de négliger, et quand une institution apporte aux peuples un tel bilan de paix, de telles espérances de paix, on n'a pas le droit de douter d'elle, on doit lui faire confiance (*Vifs applaudissements*) et, par cette confiance même, la renforcer. Car comment pourrait-elle poursuivre sa tâche si la confiance des peuples venait à lui manquer ?

Pour avoir la paix, il faut avoir foi dans la paix ! (*Applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs*). Pour avoir la paix, il faut avoir confiance dans la paix ! Non pas la foi, non pas la confiance qui se limite à un discours, mais celle-là, toujours active et militante, qui se maintient en dépit des inquiétudes et des déceptions, dans la persévérance et dans l'obstination de la victoire chaque jour remportée sur les obstacles chaque jour renouvelés.

Il ne suffit pas d'avoir horreur de la guerre. Il faut savoir organiser contre elle les éléments de défense indispensables

L'élément de défense le plus fort, celui que ne peut égaler aucune organisation de frontière, c'est la conscience et la confiance des peuples (*Applaudissements*).

Ce sont les peuples eux-mêmes qui nous apporteront la plus grande garantie de paix et puisque dans ce débat, il s'agit du pacte de Paris, permettez-moi de vous dire que ma pensée directrice dans la négociation de ce pacte, en accord complet avec tous mes collègues du gouvernement, a été de remettre entre les mains des peuples, comme un dépôt, la garantie de paix que constitue un tel contrat international. (*Applaudissements à l'extrême gauche et sur divers bancs*).

Oh ! je sais bien, c'est entendu, il n'y a pas de sanctions dans ce pacte. J'en conviens, moi aussi, s'il faut considérer que seules comptent entre les hommes les sanctions matérielles, si l'on veut répudier l'existence de sanctions morales, si l'on veut s'abandonner enfin à je ne sais quel fatalisme dont M. Cachin — non sans souffrir, j'en suis sûr, pendant qu'il prononçait son discours — s'est fait l'écho à cette tribune. Mais, messieurs, s'il est vrai que l'humanité soit soumise à un fatalisme matérialiste auquel il lui est impossible d'échapper, alors, il faut désespérer de tout, et la guerre est là ! (*Vifs applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs*).

Heureusement pour les peuples, heureusement pour l'humanité, cela n'est pas vrai. Cela ne répond même pas à la thèse marxiste, car Marx, à la fin de sa vie, étudiant de très près, passionnément, les phénomènes de l'existence des peuples, n'hésitant pas à redresser lui-même — sans le moindre amour-propre — certains points de sa doctrine, avait fini par découvrir à travers le matérialisme de l'histoire certains éléments qu'on ne peut discerner qu'à la condition de s'appliquer sincèrement à leur recherche.

Il les appelait des « agents idéologiques ».

Ces agents idéologiques, bien loin de s'affaiblir dans la conscience des peuples, se sont heureusement développés, et aujourd'hui j'ai le droit de dire qu'il est impossible aux gouvernements, même aux plus forts, de ne pas compter avec eux. (*Vifs applaudissements sur tous les bancs*).

M. Paul Faure. — Karl Marx a été applaudi (*Sourires*).

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères. — Comment ! messieurs, c'est dans les heures que nous vivons depuis la guerre qu'on pourrait nier l'influence de ces forces morales ! Mais voyez donc : vous assistez à un drame extraordinairement tragique. Ne voyez-vous pas depuis la guerre un peuple dont la responsabilité n'est que civile et sur lequel pèsent les responsabilités criminelles de dirigeants aveugles, ne voyez-vous pas ce peuple, à tout instant, crier au monde entier : Je ne suis pas coupable de cette chose atroce devant l'humanité ! Je ne suis pas coupable de cette catastrophe abominable qui s'est abattue sur le monde ! C'est une voix douloureuse qui éveille tous les échos

de la conscience humaine (*Applaudissements prolongés*), et lorsqu'on l'a entendue, on sent bien que, désormais, aucun peuple au monde n'accepterait bénévolement d'encourir de telles responsabilités morales (*Applaudissements*).

Devant cette conscience internationale, que signifie le pacte de Paris ?

Et d'abord, messieurs, il faut bien observer que, dans l'ordre politique, il ne défait rien. La difficulté de sa négociation a résidé précisément en ceci qu'il a fallu concilier l'extrême liberté dont pouvaient se prévaloir les Etats-Unis avec les obligations conventionnelles antérieurement contractées par la France et qu'elle entendait pleinement sauvegarder : obligations sacrées à l'égard de ses cosignataires du pacte de la Société des nations, de ses cosignataires des accords de Locarno et de certains pays bénéficiant d'un statut international de neutralité. Par-dessus tout, la France ne voulait pas qu'on pût voir, dans le nouvel édifice international, un rival possible de la Société des nations.

Il importait donc de prendre toutes précautions utiles ; c'était une nécessité absolue, un devoir de loyauté, et aussi une obligation de sécurité.

A quelle formule est-on arrivé ?

Eh bien, messieurs, on est arrivé à combler une terrible lacune du pacte de la Société des Nations, lacune que ses négociateurs n'ont pas pu éviter, à leur âme défendante, lacune qui a toujours douloureusement préoccupé les membres de la Société des Nations : celle de l'article 15 du pacte, d'après lequel le conseil, constatant que ses efforts de conciliation n'ont pas abouti, s'en remet, en quelque sorte, comme le disait si éloquemment votre rapporteur, à l'ancien jugement de Dieu et finit par dire aux parties : « Vous pouvez aller en champ clos ». Certes, ce n'est pas une invitation ; ce n'en est pas moins une autorisation.

N'est-ce pas vraiment une chose étonnante, une chose incroyable qu'après tous les progrès réalisés par la civilisation et dont l'humanité se montre si fière, la guerre, l'effroyable guerre soit restée une chose licite, une chose juridiquement permise, une chose qu'on puisse encore envisager comme normale ?

Eh bien, messieurs, l'idée qui a inspiré mon message au peuple américain, c'est l'idée simple et claire, un peu mystique peut-être, de prendre la guerre au collet et de la présenter aux peuples comme une criminelle (*Vifs applaudissements unanimes*).

Voilà ce qu'est le pacte de Paris.

Il met la guerre hors la loi. Il dit aux peuples : La guerre n'est pas licite, c'est un crime La nation qui attaque une autre nation, la nation qui déclenche ou déclare la guerre est une criminelle.

N'est-ce rien là qu'une parole ? C'est, en tout cas, messieurs,

une parole importante. Les peuples ont apposé leur signature au bas de ce pacte, et, solennellement, ils sont venus dire : « Oui, la guerre est un crime ; nous y renonçons et, dans tous les cas, nous nous interdisons d'y recourir ».

Certes, ils peuvent passer outre à un engagement aussi solennel, et j'entends bien qu'en Amérique il s'est trouvé des orateurs pour dire — avec raison, juridiquement — que le pacte ne comportait aucune obligation précise en cas de violation par un des signataires. Oui, c'est vrai, comme il est vrai aussi que, si une nation, reniant ses engagements, s'est jetée sur une autre, et couvre à nouveau ses champs de bataille de sang humain, rien n'oblige les autres nations à lui refuser certains concours. Tout cela est bien vrai, messieurs, mais seulement théoriquement, juridiquement.

Permettez-moi de prendre un cas concret.

Voici les Etats-Unis, cette grande nation, ce peuple si puissamment idéaliste en même temps que si profondément pratique, dont le gouvernement a répondu à l'appel venu de France. Ils ont fait leur notre projet de pacte. Dans un geste de sympathie à notre égard, dont nous leur sommes hautement reconnaissants, ils sont venus le signer à Paris. Puis, remportant chez eux l'instrument même du contrat, ils ont sollicité l'adhésion des autres nations à ce pacte qui tend à l'universalité. Et, demain, tous les pays auront donné cette adhésion.

Ainsi, le texte même du traité est aux mains du peuple américain, de son gouvernement, qui en est le dépositaire.

Supposez qu'un jour, brusquement, une des nations signataires en attaque une autre. La guerre est déchaînée, un pays a renié sa signature et, de ce fait, le pacte est anéanti.

Qu'advient-il ?

Tout d'abord, la Société des nations ne reste pas inactive. Sans doute, le pacte de la Société des nations n'a pas créé cette armée internationale, cette gendarmerie internationale dont il est regrettable que la Société des nations n'ait pas la disposition ; mais la première partie de l'article 16 va jouer aux termes duquel les signataires du pacte doivent rompre immédiatement toutes relations commerciales et financières, rompre tous rapports, de quelque nature qu'ils soient, avec la nation provocatrice.

Et maintenant, croyez-vous, messieurs, que, dans un tel cas, le peuple des Etats-Unis admettrait la possibilité pour son gouvernement de procurer à la nation parjure les moyens de perpétrer son crime et d'en tirer bénéfice ? Qui pourrait, sincèrement, concevoir une telle pensée ?

Pour moi, je ne fais pas au grand pays ami l'injure de croire un seul instant qu'une telle chose soit possible (*Applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs*).

J'y vois une impossibilité morale au regard de la conscience nationale du libre peuple américain.

M. Alexandre Varenne. — C'est évident.

Le Ministre des Affaires étrangères. — Il y a autre chose à envisager. Lorsqu'on déclare la guerre, lorsqu'un pays se lance dans une aventure de cette importance, c'est avec l'espoir d'en tirer profit, c'est avec la volonté de sortir victorieux de la lutte. Comment un pareil espoir pourrait-il encore rester à des gouvernants, maintenant qu'ils doivent affronter l'opinion publique forte d'un engagement qui dénonce le crime international de la guerre ? (*Mouvements divers*).

Je ne le conçois pas. Je pense, au contraire, que cet engagement, confié à la vigilance de tous les peuples, est une garantie sérieuse contre la guerre (*Vifs applaudissements à gauche et à l'extrême gauche*), à la condition qu'on n'en détourne pas leur confiance par des critiques desséchantes, à la condition qu'on ne vienne pas leur dire : « Ce n'est là qu'une formule sans valeur contre les dangers de guerre », à la condition, enfin, qu'au lieu de l'affaiblir, on s'emploie sincèrement à le renforcer (*Applaudissements*).

Messieurs, je vous le dis bien haut, il y a dans le pacte de Paris une force morale qui constitue un nouvel obstacle à la guerre, et j'estime que cela n'est pas négligeable.

Mais je serais bien léger, je serais bien peu digne de ma charge, si je me faisais l'illusion de croire qu'il suffit de s'en tenir au pacte de la Société des nations tel qu'il est, sans le protocole, ou au pacte de Paris, pour pouvoir désormais se croiser les bras.

Le jour même de la signature du pacte de Paris, ayant la bonne fortune et le grand honneur de prononcer le discours d'ouverture de cette cérémonie, voici comment j'ai cru devoir m'exprimer :

« Messieurs, dans un instant, le télégraphe annoncera au monde l'éveil d'une grande espérance. Ce sera pour nous un devoir sacré de faire désormais tout ce qui sera possible et nécessaire pour que cette espérance ne soit pas déçue.

« La paix proclamée, c'est bien, c'est beaucoup ; mais il faudra l'organiser. Aux solutions de force, il faudra substituer des solutions juridiques. Messieurs, c'est l'œuvre de demain ».

Dès le mois de septembre — le pacte est du 27 août — à l'assemblée générale de Genève, nos délégués participaient à la rédaction de l'acte général d'arbitrage, puis à son adoption et, dès mon retour à Paris, rendant compte à mon gouvernement des travaux de cette assemblée, j'indiquais qu'aussitôt après l'approbation du pacte par la Chambre, il conviendrait de déposer un projet de loi autorisant le gouvernement à adhérer à l'acte général d'arbitrage (*Applaudissements*).

Messieurs, vous le voyez, par avance nous avons agi d'une manière logique, en conséquence même du pacte.

Nous nous étions préoccupés de réaliser ce que, de toute façon, il faudra bien réaliser un jour ; des conditions d'arbi-

trage à substituer aux solutions de force désormais reconnues et déclarées criminelles.

Ainsi vous allez, immédiatement, être appelés à délibérer sur l'adhésion de la France à l'acte général d'arbitrage. Vous ne trouverez, dans notre projet de loi, d'autres réserves que dans les cas prévus à l'article 39 de l'acte général et la faculté que nous entendons sauvegarder de recourir à l'action conciliatrice du conseil de la Société des nations, soucieux que nous sommes de n'affaiblir en rien l'autorité de cette institution (*Très bien ! Très bien ! à gauche et à l'extrême gauche*).

Par conséquent, vous le voyez, nous avons fait tous les efforts possibles pour réaliser ce que nous impose la logique même après l'adoption du pacte de Paris.

Maintenant, c'est à vous d'accomplir votre devoir.

Le pacte de Paris doit également entraîner d'autres conséquences. Il doit faciliter la réduction des armements et la diminution des dépenses militaires.

Vous pouvez être sûrs que, sur ce terrain, comme sur tous les autres, la France ne se soustraira pas à son devoir (*Très bien ! Très bien !*) Elle ne sera pas à la remorque des autres nations, elle tiendra à demeurer à leur tête, sans cesser de tenir compte de certaines considérations que vous a fait valoir, du reste, avec beaucoup d'éloquence, l'honorable M. Paul-Boncour.

Il ne faut pas croire que, dans cet ordre d'idées, on puisse toujours agir conformément à des conceptions idéales. Les gouvernements qui ne garderaient pas certaines préoccupations, qui n'auraient pas le souci d'assurer la sécurité de leur pays, bien loin de servir la cause de la paix ne feraient qu'ouvrir des portes plus larges aux dangers de guerre (*Applaudissements*).

Il ne faut pas que les peuples généreux soient victimes de leur générosité (*Applaudissements au centre, à droite et sur divers bancs*). Il n'y a pas, hélas ! que des volontés favorables à la paix ; il y a aussi certains sujets de préoccupation dont nous n'avons pas le droit de nous désintéresser. Des forces se manifestent sur certains points de l'Europe, qui, pour ne pas être orientées vers la guerre telle que l'histoire nous a habitués à la concevoir, n'en pourraient pas moins, sous prétexte de propagande au service d'idées nouvelles, exercer leur activité sur des territoires où elles ne seraient nullement les bienvenues (*Applaudissements*).

Il est donc nécessaire de combiner toutes ces précautions avec la volonté d'accomplir la promesse sacrée de l'article 8 du pacte. Nous n'y manquerons pas (*Très bien ! Très bien !*)

Messieurs, permettez-moi de vous le dire, — était-ce naïveté de ma part ? — j'espérais que cette discussion pourrait aboutir à un vote unanime. Puisque les représentants de ce pays, à quelque parti qu'ils appartiennent, se réclament tous de l'amour de la paix et du désir de la consolider, je croyais qu'il serait

possible, sur un terrain aussi particulier, de réaliser l'unanimité. J'espérais même — voyez jusqu'où allait ma naïveté! (*Sourires*) — que la fraction de l'Assemblée qui s'avancerait la plus souriante vers la ratification du pacte de Paris serait précisément celle qui se réclame des idées chères à certain gouvernement ; celui qui a tenu, en fait, à profiter le plus vite du pacte de Paris (*Applaudissements*).

N'est-il pas remarquable, en effet, que ce pacte de Paris, sorti des entrailles de l'impérialisme bourgeois (*Sourires*), tout imprégné d'arrière-pensées et si lourd de menaces pour les peuples que ce pacte de paix, où il ne faudrait voir, en réalité, qu'un pacte de guerre, ait été, dès sa signature, approprié aux vues du gouvernement des Soviets ? Avant même qu'ait été recueilli le nombre de signatures requis pour la mise en vigueur de ce pacte, le gouvernement des Soviets le faisait sien, déclarant à tous les autres signataires : « Vous êtes beaucoup trop lents dans votre procédure de ratification du pacte de paix. Nous voulons le faire vivre tout de suite dans nos relations de voisinage et nous invitons les pays qui sont sur notre frontière à venir, avant la ratification générale, le signer avec nous. » Et les pays ainsi conviés ont répondu à l'appel du gouvernement des Soviets, qui s'en est félicité publiquement.

Lui ferait-on l'injure de penser qu'il a commis un acte d'hypocrisie ? (*Sourires*). Je ne le crois pas. J'ai suivi les négociations qu'il a engagées en vue d'obtenir les signatures de ses voisins et je constate qu'il en a poursuivi la recherche avec une âpre ténacité.

Depuis plusieurs années, le gouvernement des Soviets, que n'embarrassaient pourtant pas des arrière-pensées d'impérialisme bourgeois, qui disposait de la pleine liberté de ses évolutions pacifiques, essayait en vain de mettre sur pied, avec ses voisins, un pacte de non-agression, et, tous les trois mois, alors qu'on pouvait espérer voir aboutir de si nobles efforts, un obstacle se dressait qui faisait échouer la tentative. On pouvait craindre que l'entreprise ne fût abandonnée, quand, par bonheur, le pacte des nations impérialistes et bourgeoises est venu s'offrir au gouvernement des Soviets (*Applaudissements et rires au centre, à gauche et à droite*).

Avec un esprit pratique incomparable, un sens de l'actualité digne des gouvernements les plus bourgeois (*Sourires*), le gouvernement des Soviets a pensé : « Voilà un instrument diplomatique qui n'a pas été négocié par nous, dont nous n'avons pas facilité la création, mais qui existe en fin de compte ; servons-nous-en ».

Il s'est adressé à ses voisins et leur a dit : « Ce que nous n'avons pu réussir hier est maintenant possible. Signons cet acte, qui nous vient des Etats-Unis et de la France. Quelle que soit son origine, il condamne la guerre ; il la met hors la loi. Ses signataires renoncent solennellement à la guerre en tant

qu'instrument de leur politique nationale. C'est un fait que nous ne pouvons négliger. Puisque nous sommes orientés vers la paix, notre intérêt commun est d'appliquer cet acte immédiatement entre nous. »

M. Doriot. — En même temps, les Soviets ont proposé le désarmement.

M. Grumbach. — En maintenant leur armée (*Rires et applaudissements à l'extrême gauche et à gauche*).

Le Ministre des affaires étrangères. — A chaque jour suffit sa peine.

Pas plus le pacte de Paris qu'aucun autre pacte, que vous auriez négocié vous-mêmes, n'est de nature à vous donner complète satisfaction. Vous êtes condamné à l'insatisfaction.

En écoutant M. Cachin développer sa doctrine à la tribune, je le plaignais. M. Cachin est un homme éloquent. Il a des sentiments généreux. Il est certainement ami de la paix. Il la désire... j'en suis sûr, de la façon la plus sincère, et je pense qu'il devait souffrir, emprisonné dans une doctrine de fatalisme implacable qui l'obligeait à dire du haut de cette tribune à tous les peuples du monde : « Quoi que vous fassiez, quelque effort que vous tentiez, vous n'éviterez pas la guerre ». C'était une sorte de glas funèbre qui tombait sur les peuples et qui les vouait fatalement à la guerre.

En l'écoutant, je me disais : Que pensera-t-on en Russie d'un tel discours ? (*Rires*). Et à quels dangers notre honorable collègue ne sera-t-il pas exposé demain ? Que lui dira M. Litvinof, qui peut trouver pour lui-même, dans ce discours comme un reproche d'hypocrisie, car, désormais, M. Litvinof est, qu'il le veuille ou non, le complice de notre hypocrisie ; il en a pris sa part, je dirai même qu'il a eu le courage d'y participer le premier et le plus vite (*Applaudissements*).

Comment, dès lors, sur un acte qui condamne aussi formellement la guerre, qui la dénonce comme un crime, les représentants du peuple français ne seraient-ils pas en situation de réaliser l'unanimité ? (*Applaudissements. — Mouvements divers*).

Messieurs, quel beau geste ferait la France, qui a eu une si large part dans la négociation de cet acte, si demain elle pouvait présenter au monde une ratification votée par l'unanimité des représentants du pays !

Exprimer un tel désir, c'est évidemment conserver encore quelques illusions. J'espère pourtant qu'à défaut de l'unanimité le nombre de vos votes sera du moins assez imposant pour faire oublier, peut-être, certaines défections absolument incompréhensibles (*Vifs applaudissements sur un grand nombre de bancs*).

M. Aristide Briand descend de la tribune au milieu des acclamations et regagne le banc des ministres ; M. Raymond Poincaré, président du Conseil, les autres membres du gouvernement, qui assistent à la séance, et de nombreux députés le félicitent

longuement. Le succès du ministre des affaires étrangères est très grand.

Après une suspension de séance, *M. Jean Fabry* (Action démocratique et sociale, Seine) apporte l'adhésion de son parti au pacte de Parti. Il approuve également le discours de M. Paul-Boncour qui s'oppose, dans sa sagesse, à « l'ardeur juvénile » du discours de M. Montigny.

C'est la signature des Etats-Unis qui donne au pacte toute sa valeur. Certes leurs réserves, comme celles de l'Angleterre, sont inquiétantes, mais il faut espérer que sera bientôt définie avec précision la guerre de légitime défense.

L'orateur proteste ensuite contre le reproche que l'on a adressé à la France de ne pas mettre sa politique militaire en accord avec sa politique de paix.

M. Fabry. — M. Montigny a réclamé la diminution de nos charges militaires. Il a dit que notre organisation défensive était la plus coûteuse du monde.

Elle est au contraire la moins dispendieuse. Il est vrai que notre défense nationale nous coûte 10 milliards 300 millions, que ce chiffre est écrasant et que 10 ans après la guerre, il est paradoxal. Mais sommes-nous seuls dans ce cas ? Le problème de la limitation des armements peut-il se résoudre par la volonté d'un seul ? Quand nous parlons à cette tribune du chiffre de nos dépenses militaires, mettons en regard les charges des autres pays. En premier lieu viennent les Etats-Unis.

Savez-vous combien ils dépensent? 19 millliards 500 millions de notre monnaie, et pour l'entretien d'une armée de 200.000 hommes à peine. Mais il y a la flotte. L'Angleterre, elle, dépense plus de 5 milliards de francs pour une armée de 150.000 hommes, et l'Allemagne, qui n'a que des effectifs très réduits, dépense 4 milliards 303 millions.

Aussi aurions-nous bien mauvaise grâce à laisser peser sur notre pays ce soupçon qu'il se place au premier rang de ceux qui dépensent le plus pour leur défense nationale.

Le *colonel Fabry* conclut sur ce point que la France ne peut s'engager qu'avec une extrême prudence dans la voie du désarmement sous peine d'être entraînée trop loin par l'opinion. Comment définira-t-on la guerre d'agression ? L'Angleterre et les Etats-Unis prétendent que les gouvernements doivent être juges du cas de légitime défense : mais à quel moment et à quels signes reconnaîtra-t-on l'état de légitime défense ?

M. Paul-Boncour, président de la Commission. — Mais le traité de Locarno a prévu la zone démilitarisée du Rhin. C'est la cuirasse. Le moindre acte, sur cette zone, constitue l'agression injustifiée.

Pour *M. Fabry*, la guerre ne pourra être décidée par un peuple ou un Parlement, mais par un homme, un criminel résolu à mettre brulalement le monde devant le fait accompli, après avoir, au besoin, prétendu qu'il lui fallait attaquer le premier

pour mieux se défendre. La « guerre préventive » doit donc être interdite elle aussi et l'arbitrage obligatoire doit être imposé et accompagné de sanctions. Telle est la thèse française : l'orateur espère qu'elle finira par triompher. C'est pourquoi il votera la ratification du pacte (*Vifs applaudissements au centre et à droite*).

M. Paul Simon, au nom du parti démocrate populaire, déclare qu'il votera la ratification du pacte Kellogg, sans excès d'optimisme comme sans pessimisme, approuvant en outre sans réserve les idées si éloquemment développées la veille par M. Paul-Boncour. Il éprouva un sentiment de fierté à la pensée que cet acte capital est dû à l'initiative de la France qui une fois de plus, a montré la route aux autres nations (*Applaudissements*).

La discussion générale est close et l'on passe aux explications de vote.

Le colonel Picot (républicain de gauche, Gironde) exprime le vœu, formulé par tous les anciens combattants, que la Chambre se prononce à l'unanimité en faveur de la ratification du pacte, prouvant ainsi sa foi dans la paix que les peuples doivent imposer à leurs gouvernements et faire régner sur le monde (*Vifs applaudissements*).

M. Xavier Vallat (indépendant, Ardèche) ne peut se rallier au pacte Kellogg, car il n'est pas dupe de phrases par lesquelles on veut faire croire aux foules qu'il n'y aura plus de guerre, thèse qui était celle des partis de gauche avant 1914.

M. Doriot (communiste, Seine) prétend que M. Briand n'a nullement prouvé qu'il y avait contradiction entre l'attitude des Soviets et celle du parti communiste français. Pour lui, le pacte Kellogg n'est qu'une duperie, puisque l'on continue les armements, les expéditions coloniales et que l'on emprisonne les antimilitaristes. Par la guerre civile les communistes s'opposeront à la guerre entre nations.

M. Louis Dumat (Union républicaine, Seine) votera la ratification du pacte tout en estimant qu'étant donné les armements des autres puissances, il ne peut être question de diminuer nos forces militaires.

M. Bergery (radical socialiste, (Seine-et-Oise) remarque que les partis qui ont adressé autrefois les plus vives critiques à la politique de Londres et de Locarno approuvent à présent le pacte de Paris qui en est la conséquence logique.

Le marquis de La Ferronnays (indépendant, Loire-Inférieure), sans partager l'enthousiasme de certains de ses collègues, apporte sa collaboration et celle de ses amis aux efforts sincères tentés par la France pour éviter les conflits futurs.

M Duval-Arnould déclare que l'Union démocratique républicaine votera la ratification du pacte, qui est tout à l'honneur de la France.

Le chanoine Desgranges (indépendant, Morbihan), explique qu'il

est frappé de la similitude qu'il constate entre les discours prononcés dans cette Assemblée et la doctrine des papes, depuis l'arbitrage de Léon XIII dans l'affaire des Carolines jusqu'à la dernière encyclique de Pie XI. Il votera donc en faveur de la ratification du pacte Kellogg « accomplissant autant son devoir de prêtre catholique que son devoir de représentant du peuple » (*Applaudissements sur tous les bancs*).

VOTE DU PROJET DE LOI

Le Président met aux voix par scrutin l'article unique du projet de loi ainsi conçu :

Le président de la République est autorisé à ratifier et, s'il y a lieu, à faire exécuter le pacte de renonciation à la guerre signé à Paris le 27 août 1928.

Un exemplaire authentique demeura annexé à la présente loi.

Par 561 voix contre 12, le projet de loi est adopté (*Vifs applaudissements*).

L'acte général d'arbitrage

M. Aristide Briand, ministre des affaires étrangères, dépose sur le bureau de la Chambre un projet de loi « tendant à autoriser le gouvernement à adhérer à l'acte général d'arbitrage approuvé par la neuvième assemblée de la Société des nations le 26 septembre 1928 » (*Vifs applaudissements prolongés*).

Le projet de loi est renvoyé à la Commission des affaires étrangères.

VORSCHLAEGE ZUR LOESUNG DER EUROPAEISCHEN STREITFRAGEN, VORTRAG GEHALTEN IN DER ACADEMIE DIPLOMATIQUE INTERNATIONALE, VOM KGL. UNGARISCHEN MINISTERRESIDENTEN UND STAENDIGEN DELEGIERTEN BEIM VOELKERBUNDE PAUL VON HEVESY, PARIS, 15. MAERZ 1929.

Gestatten Sie mir, Ihnen vor allem anderen meinen wärmsten Dank für die Ehre auszusprechen, die Sie mir dadurch erwiesen haben, dass Sie mich zum Mitglied dieser hohen Akademie wählten. Ich werde mich bemühen, an Ihren Arbeiten in der loyalsten Gesinnung und mit meinen besten Kräften teilzunehmen, und versuchen, es dabei auch in keiner Weise an jener Aufrichtigkeit fehlen zu lassen, die man so oft den Diplomaten abspricht. Denn ich habe während der zwanzig Jahre, die ich in diplomatischen Diensten stehe, mehr als einmal diesen Vorwurf hören müssen, den man, ein wenig gewohnheitsmässig, den Diplomaten macht. Man pflegt in ihnen Leute zusehen, de-

ren ganze Weisheit darin besteht, ein vorsichtiges Schweigen zu bewahren, oder sich in Wendungen auszudrücken, die jedem eindeutigen Urteil ausweichen. Wenn sich die Diplomaten wirklich darauf beschränken würden, in ihrem Verkehr mit den Vertretern anderer Länder nur höflich zu sein, ohne den Mut aufzubringen, den Aspirationen ihres Landes in leidenschaftsloser Weise Ausdruck zu geben, so würden sie in der Tat alle diese Vorwürfe verdienen, die ihnen ein grosser Teil der öffentlichen Meinung macht. Wie Sie sich gleich überzeugen werden, meine Herren, wird demjenigen, der heute die Ehre hat, in Ihrem Kreise über europäische Probleme und den Völkerbund zu sprechen, schwerlich Mangel an Aufrichtigkeit vorgeworfen werden können. Ich muss dabei allerdings feststellen und unterstreichen, dass ich hier weder als Diplomat noch als Völkerbundsdelegierter stehe, sondern dass ich ausschliesslich in der Eigenschaft eines Mitglieds dieser Akademie meine rein persönlichen Gedanken Ihnen zu entwickeln im Begriffe bin.

* * *

Wäre der Weltkrieg, wenn der Völkerbund im Jahre 1914 schon bestanden hätte, zu vermeiden gewesen ?

Diese Frage wird sehr häufig aufgeworfen, und viele Staatsmänner beantworten sie bejahend. Aber es scheint, dass sich niemand mit einer anderen Frage beschäftigt, die sich uns im gleichen Atem aufdrängt, das ist die folgende : Wenn der Völkerbun im Jahre 1914 bestanden hätte und der Krieg vermieden worden wäre, auf welche Weise hätte man dann die grossen europäischen Probleme gelöst, die durch den Krieg gelöst wurden, wie die polnische Frage, die Frage Elsass-Lothringens, des Trento, der Baltischen Staaten und viele andere Fragen ? Man wird mir darauf nicht antworten, hoffe ich, dass diese Probleme, ohne den Krieg, jedoch trotz dem Bestande des Völkerbundes, nicht hätten gelöst werden können. Oder sollte wirklich jemand den Mut aufbringen, im Nachhinein zu sagen, dass es vor dem Jahre 1914, — immer vorausgesetzt, dass der Völkerbund zu jener Zeit schon bestanden hätte —, ein Verbrechen gegen die Menschheit gewesen wäre, wenn man z.B, von einer Revision des durch die Teilungen Polens geschaffenen Zustandes gesprochen haben würde ? Nun sind aber noch keineswegs alle politischen Fragen, die Europa vor dem Kriege entzweiten, durch den Krieg und die Friedensverträge gelöst worden und, leider Gottes, sind ja, darüber können wir uns die Augen nicht verschliessen, neue Probleme zu den alten hinzugekommen. Wir sind daher gezwungen, uns die Frage vorzulegen : *In welcher Weise können diese Probleme, die in Europa heute noch bestehen, einer Lösung entgegengeführt werden ?*

Kürzlich habe ich einer hochgestellten Persönlichkeit gegenüber, die ich aus Diskretion hier nicht nennen kann, die Ansicht

entwickelt, es müssten früher oder später die Besitztitel der durch die Friedensverträge neu geschaffenen Staaten einer Bestätigung durch Volksabstimmungen unterzogen werden. Darauf erhielt ich folgende Antwort : „Was hätte man in Ihrem Lande vor dem Kriege dazu gesagt, wenn jemand auf den Gedanken gekommen wäre, Volksabstimmungen in dem einen oder dem anderen Teile Ihres Königreiches anzuregen, damit der Bevölkerung die Gelegenheit geboten würde, sich darüber auszusprechen, ob sie im Rahmen ihres Staates verbleiben wollte oder nicht ? "

„Vor allem anderen ", erwiderte ich, „hätte in diesem Falle das Plebiszit nach einem politischen Besitzzustand von zehn Jahrhunderten und nicht nach einem solchen von zehn Jahren stattgefunden. Ueberdies aber muss ich noch eine andere Einwenduug machen, die mir viel wichtiger scheint, und das ist diese : *Leben wir denn nicht in einer neuen Epoche, in der das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker feierlich anerkannt ist ? Ist denn die Uebereinstimmung zwischen der politischen Gesinnung irgenddeiner Bevolkerung und dem staatlichen Hoheitsverhätnis heute nicht die Grundlage der europäischen Staaten, zum mindesten der neugegründeten, wennschon nicht der ältern Staaten ?* "

Es liegt mir die Absicht vollkommen fern, hier etwa in eine Kritik der Friedensverträge eingehen zu wollen. Aber ich glaube trotzdem, mich nicht zu weit vorzuwagen, wenn ich die Bemerkung mache, dass diese Verträge, wie heute alle Welt weiss, in grösster Eile und vielfach ohne genügende Kenntnis der realen Verhältnisse ausgearbeitet worden sind. Es warr, verzeihen Sie mir den Ausdruck, eine Frühgeburt, und das Kind trägt alle Zeichen derselben am Leibe. Ich bin darauf gefasst, dass man mir einwerfen wird : Jetzt, da das Kind einmal da ist, bleibt nichts anderes übrig, als es am Leben zu erhalten, und es kann nicht die Rede davon sein, es vom Tarpeischen Felsen herabzustürzen.

Meine Herren, Sie stimmen mir wohl darin zu, dass selbst die schlechtesten Grenzen heurt nur auf zwei Wegen geändert werden könnten : entweder durch einen Krieg oder durch ein grosses Mass von Weisheit.

Schliessen wir vor allem sofort die Möglichkeit jeder kriegerischen Lösung aus. Wenn heute oder morgen in Europa ein neuer Krieg ausbräche, so würde unser Kontinent ohne Zweifel einer vollkommenen Anarchie verfallen. Aber können wir unsere Hoffnungen auf politische Klugheit, Einsicht und Mässigung setzen ? Wie die Dinge heute liegen, glaube ich, dass wir noch lange auf den Sieg dieser Stimmen verzichten müssen.

Was ist also zu tun, da der eine wie der andere der beiden Wege ungangbar ist?

Man müsste vor allem eines erreichen, und das unverzüglich : dass eine politische Grenze keineswegs ein Hindernis für die Erhal-

tung kultureller Verhältnisse sein darf, die vor der neuen Besitzteilung bestanden haben.

Der erste Schritt in dieser Richtung wäre die Anerkennung des Rechtes der nationalen Minderheiten auf den Gebrauch ihrer Sprache und auf die Pflege ihrer Zivilisation und ihrer Ueberlieferung Es ist weder loyal noch intelligent, einer derartigen Forderung die Behauptung entgegenzuhalten, es hätten vor dem Kriege nicht alle Staaten solche Grundsätze beobachtet. Selbst wenn die besonderen Verträge zum Schutze der 40 Millionen Menschen nicht bestünden, die heute in Europa innerhalb der Grenzen von Staaten leben, die nicht ihre eigentliche Heimat ist, müsste schon die gewöhnliche Vernunft die Regierungen dahin bringen, allen diesen Menschen die Möglichkeit zu lassen, ihr kulturelles Leben fortzusetzen, innerhalb dessen jede Nation, auch die kleinste, im Laufe der Zeit Kräfte entwickelt hat, die nicht nur für den Staat, sondern auch für die Menschheit im allgemeinen lebendige Werte bedeuten. Es wäre im Interesse aller Regierungen, diese Kräfte dem Staatsgedanken nutzbar zu machen. Man irrt, wenn man glaubt, die verschiedenen nationalen Zivilisationen bekämpften einander. Ueberall ist genug Raum für das selbständige Leben jeder derselben. Nicht der Druck, der allenfalls von der natürlichen Expansion der Nationalitäten ausgeht, ist das politisch Gefährliche, sondern der Druck, der *gegen* diese natürliche Expansion ausgeübt wird.

Wen dieser Gedankengang noch nicht überzeugt, der muss jedenfalls zugeben, *dass mit der Befriedigung der Minoritäten eine Hauptquelle der Spannungen in Europa verschlossen, ja dass damit unvermeidlichen Konflikten in der Zukunft vorgebeugt würde. Aufrichtige Friedensliebe muss daher notwendigerweise zur Verteidigung der Rechte der Minderheiten führen, die im übrigen nichts anderes sind, als eine Erweiterung der Menschenrechte.*

Neben dieser Frage der Minderheiten erfordert unter den heutigen Verhältnissen das Problem der wirtschaftlichen Annäherung und das der Abrüstung eine erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit.

Was die Abrüstung betrifft, so besteht für sie wenig Aussicht, solange über Europa eine schwere Wolke von Misstimmung lastet. *Der Grund dieser Misstimmung liegt darin, dass es in Europa Staaten gibt, die, weil sie sich moralisch nicht sicher fühlen, übermenschliche Anstrengungen machen, um sich durch militärische Rüstungen eine materielle Sicherheit zu verschaffen. Es sind Staaten, die sich moralisch deshalb nicht sicher fühlen, weil ihre Besitztitel ohne Befragung der betreffenden Völkerschaften erworben wurden und daher mit der politischen Moral der Gegenwart nicht übereinstimmen.*

Im Laufe der Jahrhunderte haben alle Staaten Eroberungen gemacht und Gebiete durch Gewalt erworben und mit Gewalt verteidigt, aber, wie Sie wissen, hat sich in Europa seit Beginn

des 19. Jahrhunderts eine neue politische Moral entwickelt, welche die Bildung oder die Auflösung von Staaten durch Gewalt verurteilt.

Ein früher Vorläufer dieser Auffassung war Erasmus von Rotterdam, der im Jahre 1517 in seiner Schrift *Adagiorum Chiliades* als erster das Eroberungsrecht einer scharfen Kritik unterzogen hat. Nach seiner Meinung würden die Völker durch das System der Eroberungen auf die Stufe von Tieren herabgesetzt, denen man ihre Ställe ohne ihre Zustimmung anweist. Als Franz I. im Jahre 1527 die Abtretung des Herzogtums Burgund rückgängig machen wollte, das er im Frieden von Madrid Karl V. überlassen hatte, nahm er Zuflucht zu einer Volksbefragung. Das gleiche Mittel wandte Heinrich II. an, um Toul, Metz und Verdun zu annektieren. Eines der frühesten Plebiszite, das wir kennen, ist jenes, durch das die Abtretung von Genf an den Herzog von Savoyen, die die Regierung von Bern im Frieden von Nyon bestätigt hatte, annulliert worden ist. Im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert haben Grotius und Puffendorf, sowie nach ihnen Vattel in ihren Schriften das Prinzip der Volksbefragung den Politikern empfohlen. Indessen ist bis tief in das 19. Jahrhundert hinein der Wille der Bewohner eines Gebietes für die Frage der Grenzbestimmungen in den diplomatischen Verträgen im allgemeinen ohne Bedeutung geblieben. Heiraten, Erbschaften, einverständliche Gebietswechsel oder Eroberungen waren die ausschliesslichen Momente, welche die Landkarte und die Schicksale der Völker bestimmten. Zur Zeit Napoleons und auf dem Wiener Kongresse hat man über Völker verfügt, wie über Möbel oder über Herden. Erst gegen die Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts begann sich der Gedanke der Volksbefragung in der öffentlichen Meinung durchzusetzen. Man vergisst viel zu oft, dass man das Plebiszit bereits vor dem Kriege in einer ganzen Reihe politischer Fragen zur Anwendung gebracht hat. Es seien hier nur nebenbei die Plebiszite von Avignon, Savoyen und Nizza zur Zeit der französischen Revolution, die Plebiszite in der Lombardei, in Venezien, Parma und Piacenza im Jahre 1848, das Schleswig'sche Plebiszit im gleichen Jahre, dann das von der russischen Regierung angeregte Plebiszit in den Fürstentümern der Moldau und Walachei im Jahre 1856, das Plebiszit auf den Lonischen Inseln 1864, das auf den Dänischen Antillen 1867, auf St. Barthélémy 1877 und schliesslich jenes Plebiszit erwähnt, das im Jahre 1905 die Trennung Norwegens von Schweden aussprach.

Das System der Volksabstimmung kann natürlich, wie jedes System, gut und schlecht angewendet werden. Es gibt Fälle, in denen seine Anwendung ohne Zweifel unzureichend war. Aber kann dies ein Argument sein, um dieses System überhaupt nicht anzuwenden? Handelt es sich nicht darum, zwischen zwei Uebeln das kleinere zu wählen? Liegt nicht in der einen Wagschale das Plebiszit und in der anderen die Gewalt? Aller-

dings ist man, wenn es sich um gewaltsame Besitzergreifungen handelt, niemals wegen eines Vorwandes verlegen. Bald sind es politische, bald strategische, bald geographische Gründe, die man anruft, um ein Land zu zerstückeln, über die man jedoch hinweggeht, wenn man neue Staaten errichtet.

Als am Ende des Krieges der Gedanke der Volksabstimmung wie ein neuer moralischer Grundsatz verkündet wurde, erweckte er überall die grösste Begeisterung. Durch das Plebiszit und nur durch das Plebiszit, hiess es, sollten künftighin alle territorialen Streitfragen geregelt werden. Die Botschaft kam von jenseits des Ozeans, und 400 Jahre nach Erasmus hat sie der amerikanische Staatsmann fast mit den gleichen Worten ausgesprochen, wie einst der grosse Humanist : In Zukunft sollten Völker nicht mehr wie das Vieh verteilt und ausgetauscht werden koennen. Eine tiefe Bewegung bemächtigte sich der Welt, denn der wahre Frieden erschien am Horizont, ein Frieden, der auf dem Grundsatz beruhen sollte, dass keine Aenderung in der Souveränität ohne die Zustimmung der betreffenden Bevölkerung möglich sein sollte.

Allein sehr bald kam die Enttäuschung. Das der Welt wie ein Heil verkündete Prinzip der Selbstbestimmung der Völker wurde — mit Ausnahme der wenigen Fälle der Plebiszite in Schleswig, Oberchlesien, Klagenfurt und Sopron — vollkommen ausser Acht gelassen. Warum ? Den boesen Geist, der den guten vernichtet hat, finde ich in jenen Geheimverträgen, durch die sich die Alliierten noch während des Krieges die Hände gebunden hatten. Wohl waren diese Geheimverträge in Stunden höchster politischer Sorge entstanden, aber gewisse Verpflichtungen, die sie enthielten, hatten nicht das geringste mit den Grundsätzen der Demokratie oder mit jenen anderen Grundsätzen zu tun, *um deren Triumphes willen die Heere der Alliierten zu kämpfen glaubten.*

Es gibt *eine* Frage, auf die jedermann in Europa sofort eine bestimmte und überzeugte Antwort geben kann, das ist die Frage nach dem Vaterland, dem er angehören will. Solange man nicht zugibt, dass diese klare Frage in dieser einfachen Form gestellt werde, sind alle Abstimmungen, die man zur Beantwortung von Fragen minderer Bedeutung veranstaltet, nichts anderes als Täuschung und eine vorgespiegelte Demokratie.

Der territoriale Zustand vieler europäischer Staaten datiert seit Jahrhunderten, und niemandem wird es einfallen, ihre Souveränitätstitel in Diskussion zu ziehen. Dagegen gibt es andere Staaten, die erst vor kurzem entstanden oder in wesentlicher Weise umgebildet worden sind. Die Grundlagen dieser sind vielfach umstritten, und wenn sie auch auf Verträgen beruhen, so ist die Entstehung und das Alter dieser Verträge gewiss kein Hindernis dafür, dass eine Ueberprüfung der Besitztitel dieser Staaten durch Volksabstimmungen früher oder

später als unvermeidlich erkannt werde. *In der Zwischenzeit muss aber unbedingt, und sogleich, durch Einführung gewisser konservierender Massnahmen, einer Politik vorgebeugt werden, deren eingestandenes oder uneingestandenes Ziel es ist, auf künstliche Weise den Ausgang künftiger Volksabstimmungen vorweg zu beeinflussen.*

Wenn ich mich hier bemühe, zu beweisen, wie dringend notwendig es ist, die neuen Grenzen unverzüglich erträglicher zu gestalten, so tue ich das nicht in der Ueberzeugung, dass solche Massregeln genügen würden, die Gemüter dauernd zu beruhigen. Sie hätten vielmehr nur den Zweck, eine vorläufige Entspannung herbeizuführen, *damit in Frieden und Wohlfahrt der Tag abgewartet werden könne, an dem die politische Einsicht allseits soweit gereift sein wird, um zuzugeben, dass die Legitimität der vorhin bezeichneten Besitztitel von den betroffenen Bevölkerungen nachgeprüft werde.*

Bei dem Studium der Hindernisse, die heute einer dauernden Befriedung Europas im Wege stehen, kommt man immer wieder auf das Problem der Abrüstung. Wir kennen alle das Schlagwort : "Zuerst Sicherheit, dann Abrüstung". Wenn man aber nicht abrüsten kann, ohne vorher Sicherheit zu besitzen, und wenn man andererseits sich weigert, diese Sicherheit durch das allein taugliche Mittel zu erwerben, nämlich durch eine unparteiische Prüfung der Legitimität der Besitztitel, auf denen die aus dem Kriege entstandenen Staaten aufgebaut sind, so bewegt man sich eben in einem *Circulus viciosus.*

Da ich nun die Ehre habe, mein Land seit einigen Jahren beim Völkerbunde zu vertreten, so werden Sie mir — wenn ich auch, wie ich schon sagte, hier nur als Privatmann und als Mitglied der Internationalen Diplomatischen Akademie spreche — nach allem, was ich Ihnen soeben ausgeführt habe, wohl die Frage stellen : "Erfüllt denn der Völkerbund auf den erwähnten Gebieten der Minderheiten, der wirtschaftlichen Annäherung und der Abrüstung seine Pflichten ?"

Was die Frage der Minderheiten betrifft, so hat der Völkerbund sich bisher einige Mühe gegeben, ohne sich indes — wenigstens bisher — nennenswerter Erfolge rühmen zu können. Es ist Ihnen wohl bekannt, dass man Dreierkomitees innerhalb des Völkerbundrates geschaffen hat, denen die Prüfung aller Minderheitsfragen anvertraut ist. Diese Dreierkomitees sind gezwungen ihre Beratungen in der grössten Eile abzuhalten. Die Sessionen des Völkerbundrates dauern gewöhnlich nur eine knappe Woche, der zu bewältigende Stoff ist immer sehr umfangreich, und die erwähnten Komitees arbeiten nur während der Ratstagung. Wie sollte man ihnen zumuten, dass sie sich gerade während dieser wenigen Tage der Untersuchung schwerer, oft unendlich komplizierter Minoritätsprobleme mit der notwendigen Gründlichkeit widmen. Es wird auf die Dauer kaum zu vermeiden sein, dass man zur Behandlung der Mino-

ritätenfragen ein standiges Komitee einsetze, das in der Lage wäre, sich mit diesen Problemen in voller Ruhe und, was ebenso wünschenswert wäre, im Lichte der Oeffentlichkeit zu beschäftigen. Das Geheimnis, mit dem bisher die flüchtigen Arbeiten der erwähnten Dreierkomitees umgeben werden, ruft eine täglich zunehmende Kritik hervor, und kann kaum länger als System aufrechterhalten werden.

In der Frage der Abrüstung ist der Völkerbund, wie man weiss, bisher noch nicht zu greifbaren Resultaten durchgedrungen. Dagegen hat er auf wirtschaftlichem und finanziellem Gebiete ohne Zweifel schon manche Erfolge erzielt.

Es ist ein weitverbreiteter Irrtum, zu glauben, dass der Völkerbund sich auf Genf beschränkt. Tatsächlich befindet er sich in allen Ländern, die seine Mitglieder sind und ihn bilden. Die Ausübung seiner Funktionen liegt, wie Sie wissen, teils in den Händen des Rates, der aus 14 Mitgliedern besteht und im Prinzipe viermal im Jahre tagt, teils in der Vollversammlung, die jährlich einmal zusammentritt.Es ist allerdings richtig, dass das ständige Organ des Völkerbundes, das Sekretariat, seinen Sitz in Genf hat. Aber das Sekretariat ist eigentlich nur ein Werkzeug des Rates und der Vollversammlung. So gross auch der tatsächliche Einfluss des Sekretariates in gewissen Augenblicken sein mag, so beschränkt sich formell seine Aufgabe darauf,die Instruktionen auszuführen,die es vom Rate oder von der Vollversammlung erhält. Im übrigen ist das Sekretariat als Mittelpunkt einer umfassenden Dokumentation wunderbar organisiert.

Wenn der Völkerbund auf verschiedenen Gebieten seiner bedeutenden Aufgabe bisher noch nicht gerecht wurde, so liegt die Schuld daran sicherlich nicht am Sekretariat. Die überwiegende Mehrzahl der Beamten desselben sind durchwegs auf der Höge ihrer Obliegenheiten, ganz hervorragende Beamte, durch Fleiss, Kenntnisse und guten Willen in gleicher Weise ausgezeichnet. Die Arbeit, die sie leisten, könnte nicht besser sein, und ihre geistigen und moralischen Qualitäten sind über jedes Lob erhaben. Das Sekretariat besteht heute aus ungefähr 400 Beamten, die aus etwa 25.000 Gesuchstellern ausgewählt sind. Man hatte also reichlich Gelegenheit, die besten Kräfte zu wählen.

Die Staaten,die Mitglieder des Völkerbundrates sind, werden, wie Sie wissen, in manchen Fällen durch ihre Minister des Aeussern selbst, in anderen durch Botschafter und Gesandte vertreten. Aber ein Minister des Aeussern ist heutzutage durch die Verpflichtungen seines Portefeuilles dermassen überlastet, dass es ihm ganz unmöglich ist, sich nebenbei auch noch mit den vielfältigen Fragen zu beschäftigen, die vor den Völkerbundrat gelangen. Wir sehen mit Bewunderung, wie sich Briand, Chamberlain, Stresemann und andere Mitglieder des Rates einer wahrlich übermenschlichen Arbeit widmen, und

wir wissen, dass sie ihre Gesundheit, ja fast ihr Leben aufs Spiel setzen, um dieser doppelten Verpflichtung gerecht zu werden. Die Probleme jedoch,die an den Völkerbund herantreren, nehmen ständig derart an Umfang zu, und ihre Natur ist so vielgestaltig, dass die Versehung dieser Agenden gleichsam im Nebenberuf, immer mehr ein Ding der Unmöglichkeit wird.

Man müsste daher in allen Staaten ein besonderes Minister-Portefeuille für den Völkerbund schaffen. Dem Inhaber dieses Portefeuilles müsste ein Stab permanenter Mitarbeiter zur Seite stehen, ein kleines Ministerium, das sich mit dem Studium aller Angelegenheiten zu befassen hätte, die dem Völkerbunde vorliegen oder an den Völkerbund gelangen könnten. Dies versteht sich in erster Linie für jene Staaten, die Mitglieder des Völkerbundrates sind. Für andere Staaten wäre dies jedoch ebenfalls wünschenswert. — Es wäre wirklich unbillig, wollte man sich nicht vor der ans Unglaubliche streifenden Arbeitsleistung einzelner Mitglieder des Rates verbeugen. Dennoch kann ich Ihnen nicht verheimlichen, dass ich auch Ratsmitgliedern begegnet bin, die bei ihrer Ankunft in Genf über wichtige Punkte der Tagesordnung des Rates nur flüchtig oder überhaupt nich unterrichtet waren.

Die Teilnahme einer Anzahl von leitenden Ministern des Aeussern an den Arbeiten des Völkerbundes verleiht diesem ohne Zweifel einen grossen Glanz. Trotzdem darf man nicht übersehen,dass es dieselben Minister sind, welche die Allianzen schtiessen und die unter Umständen sogar Kriege entfesseln könnten.Man sollte also das Portefeuille eines „ Ministers für den Völkerbund " solchen Staatsmännern übertragen, die über das Mass der Minister des Aeusseren womöglich noch um ein Zoll hinausragen,und die Aufgabe hätten,die grossen politischen Probleme ohne das Mittel der Allianzen und ohne die Rechnung auf die Möglichkeit gewaltsamer Auseinandersetzungen zu behandeln und einer Lösung zuzuführen.Man könnte heute schon darauf gespannt sein, wem schliesslich die grössere Rolle zufallen würde, dem Völkerbundsminister oder dem Aussenmnister. Die Kämpfe, welche diese beiden Minister voraussichtlich im Schosse ihrer Regierungen zu bestehen hätten, wären übrigens ausserordentlich heilsam für die politische Entwicklung der betreffenden Länder. Denn eine moderne Regierung müsste Mittel und Wege finden,um nationale Ansprüche mit internationalen Auffassungen in Uebereinstimmung zu bringen, wenn nicht anders, auch auf Kosten einzelner Parzellen ihrer Souveränität.

Es entsteht auch die Frage, ob es eigentlich in Ordnung sei, dass Botschafter und Gesandte ihre Regierungen im Völkerbunddrat vertreten, während sie gleichzeitig diplomatische Posten innehahen. Ganz abgesehen davon, dass ihnen in den meisten Fällen die Zeit mangeln wird, sich mit den Genfer Problemen in hinreichender Weise zu beschäftigen, liegt hier, meines

Ermessens, offenbar eine Inkompatibilität zwischen der Ausübung einer bestimmten diplomatischen Funktion und der Tätigkeit im Völkerbunde vor. Nehmen wir zum Beispiel an, die Republick von Andorra hätte einen Botschafter bei dem Prinzen von Monako und dieser Botschafter würde gleichzeitig sein Land im Völkerbundrat vertreten. Als Botschafter hätte er doch sicherlich zunächst die Pflicht für möglichst gute Beziehungen zwischen Andorra und Monako Sorge zu tragen. Wenn er aber im Schosse des Völkerbundrates in die Lage käme, gegen den Vertreter von Monako Stellung zu nehmen, würden darunter notwendigerweise die Beziehungen zwischen Andorra und Monako leide Nun ist es seine erste Pflicht, *diese* Beziehungen zu pflegen, und er wird sich daher entschliessen müssen, jene Interessen, die er vor dem Völkerbundrat wahrzunehmen hat, an zweite Stelle zu setzen.

Zum Schlusse möchte ich noch einen Punkt berühren, der mir von grundsaetzlicher Bedeutung zu sein scheint.

Von dem Augenblicke an, da der Völkerbund ins Leben trat, hätte man das System, politische Allianzen zu schliessen, konsequenterweise eigentlich aufgeben müssen.

Die Methode, neben dem Völkerbunde auch noch Bündnisse zu schliessen, erinnert mich an die Geschichte von Géza, dem Vater des ersten Königs von Ungarn. Dieser war ursprünglich Heide und pflegte nach Sonnenuntergang in den Wäldern seinem Feuergott einen weissen Hengst zu opfern. Nachdem er getauft worden war, setzte er diese Gewohnheit fort, denn er sagte sich, dass es vielleicht gut sei, zwei Göttern zugleich zu dienen. Aber der Papst, der davon erfuhr, liess ihm bedeuten, dass dies so nicht weiterginge, und dass er jetzt zu wählen hätte.

Nun, ebenso muss zwischen dem Völkerbunde und den Allianzen gewählt werden. Denn ein Völkerbund, innerhalb dessen die zur Behandlung stehenden Fragen nicht ausschliesslich nach Recht, Billigkeit und den Gesetzen der politischen Moral, sondern vielfach nach den Interessen einer Allianzpolitik beurteilt werden, wäre in Wirklichkeit kein Völkerbund mehr. So habe ich selbst ein Mitglied des Rates sagen hören : „Der Staat X. hat zwar in dieser Angelegenheit dem Staate Y. gegenüber Recht, aber, was wollen Sie, der Staat Y. ist unser Alliierter". Das, was dieses Ratsmitglied so freimütig ausgesprochen hat, denken sich gewiss auch andere, ohne es zu sagen.

Es besteht kein Zweifel darüber, dass das politische Leben in Europa durch das System der Allianzen vergiftet und das Wesen des Völkerbundes dadurch verfälscht ist.

Es wäre übrigens an der Zeit mit dem Worte „Alliierter" gänzlich aufzuräumen, denn es hat eigentlich keinen Sinn mehr. Sind wir denn nicht alle Alliierte aller im Interesse der friedlichen Entwicklung Europas und der Welt? Wer heute

noch von Verbündeten spricht, gibt damit gleichsam zu, dass er andere als seine Gegner betrachtet.

Vergessen wir nicht, dass der Verzicht auf das Allianzsystem nicht nur die Atmosphäre des Völkerbundes reinigen, sondern dass er wahrscheinlich der Genfer Institution eine grosse überseeische Macht näher rücken würde, auf deren Mithilfe man auf die Dauer nicht wird verzichten hönnen, wenn man die Universalität des Völkerbundes erreichen und seine internationale Wirksamkeit vertiefen will. *Erinnern wir uns, dass diese grosse Macht eine erklärte und unversöhnliche Feindin jeglicher Allianzsysteme ist.*

Ein Völkerbund mit einem Rate, dessen Delegierte zum Teil durch andere Geschäfte überlastet sind, zum Teil Funktionen ausüben, die mit ihrem Genfer Mandat unvereinbar sind, — ein Völkerbund, unter dessen Mitgliedern die einen bis an die Zähne bewaffnet, die andern vollkommen wehrlos sind, — ein Völkerbund, innerhalb dessen es verschiedene Allianzgruppen gibt, — läuft Gefahr, nicht ganz das zu sein, was wir von ihm erwarten und was die Welt von ihm erhofft.

Das Gewissen der Völker muss aufgerüttelt werden, damit es mit Ernst und Strenge über allem wache, was den Völkerbund betrifft, der nur auf diese Weise zu einem wahren Bunde der Völker werden kann. Aus dem furchtbarsten aller Kriege erwuchs ein Gefühl der Verbrüderung. Lassen wir nicht zu, dass dieses erhabene Gefühl, für dessen Geburt Millionen von Menschen ihr Leben gelassen haben, wieder in politischen Geschäften untergehe.

Mein Herren, ich habe mir erlaubt, in einfachen Worten das Ergebnis von Ueberlegungen und Erfrhrungen auseinanderzusetzen, die ich einer mehrjährigen Tätigkeit in Genf, dem Mittelpunkte des internationalen Lebens in Europa, verdanke.

Sie haben sich wahrscheinlich darüber Rechenschaft gegeben, dass meine Ideen zunächst, was ganz natürlich ist, von der Sorge getragen sind, die mir die Lage meines eigenen Landes einflösst, aber ich möchte Sie überzeugt haben, dass die Lösungen, die ich Ihrer Beurteilung zu unterbreiten die Ehre hatte, aus einem Geiste wahrer Sympathie und vollen Verständnisses gegenüber allen Völkern und ihren legitimen Aspirationen geschöpft sind. Und wenn mir jemand vielleicht den Vorwurf machen wollte, dass ich ein Utopist, ein Idealist oder ein Sentimentaler sei, so möchte ich ihm antworten : Trotz dem scheinbaren Materialismus unserer Epoche bemächtigt sich unserer Jugend von Tag zu Tag mehr ein unwiderstehlicher Zug zu einer im höchsten Masse idealen Weltanschauung. Wir müssen unser volles Vertrauen in den Enthusiasmus, den Edelmut und die Klugheit dieser Jugend setzen.

QUELQUES HOMMES D'ETAT A GENEVE, CAUSERIE FAITES PAR M. JEAN FRANCOIS LAYA, CORRESPONDANT DU TEMPS AUPRES DE LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS, POUR LES AUDITEURS DE RADIO-GENEVE, LES 30 OCTOBRE ET 5 DECEMBRE 1928.

(Le Genèvois des 31 octobre, 1er novembre et 6 décembre 1928.)

Je ne sais plus quel orateur comparait, en septembre dernier, la Société des Nations à une fleur fragile, qu'il fallait entourer de soins et arroser avec... la confiance publique. Si cette image jardinière a quelque chose d'astucieux, surtout en ce qui regarde l'arrosage, elle tentait tout au moins de fixer une idée juste.

En effet, la Société des Nations, comme toutes les entreprises humaines, n'est pas parfaite. Les gouvernements, pressés par une anarchie menaçante, ont obéi, en la créant, à des mobiles généreux mais ils n'ont point voulu se laisser déborder. La Société des Nations s'appuie sur l'opinion publique, sa seule efficacité dépend de la confience que les peuples mettent en elle : sa faiblesse est donc grande.

Est-ce à dire qu'un bon esprit doive accueillir, sans autre, les critiques véhémentes dressées — notamment par les apôtres de la lutte des classes — contre la jeune Institution internationale de Genève ? Je ne le crois pas. Il faut se souvenir qu'au long des milliers d'années de l'aventure humaine nos instincts se sont cuirassés contre l'enthousiasme. L'abandon de soi. cette magnifique vertu d'enfance, combien de nous la conservent ? Sans doute les religions, flammes vacillantes, ont éclairé la marche de notre race et pourtant, à l'heure actuelle ne vivons-nous pas l'âge de l'acier, l'époque de la grande confusion.

Oubliant qu'il y a tantôt deux mille années, Jésus de Nazareth prêchait déjà dans le désert, nous voyons aujourd'hui des gens qui vont dodelinant de la tête, et qui disent :

« Eh ! Cette Société des Nations, que fait-elle ? Depuis dix ans, elle nous promet la paix ? Voyez ses piètres bénéfices. »

Ce que Confucius recommandait aux hommes alors que les fondations de la Rome antique était à peine creusées, ces gens-là voudraient l'exiger, en deux fois cinq années d'une organisation politique à laquelle ses créateurs ont refusé toute initiative personnelle.

Non, il y a dans une telle argutie, une audacieuse injustice, et le vieil instinct parle trop fort... Il faut le museler, cet instinct, pour se pencher sur l'œuvre continue, efficace, de la Société des Nations, de cette Société dont le budget annuel s'élève à la moitié du prix d'un de ces croiseurs de 10.000 tonnes qu'une puissance démocrative entend construire, de l'autre côté de l'Océan, par série de vingt-cinq unités. Il nous faut regarder, avec des yeux critiques, le désordre économique d'une Europe quasi épuisée, l'injustice sociale qui éclate autour de nous et penser, qu'à Genève. des hommes courageux tentent

quelque chose d'unique. Il faut convenir que du temps est nécessaire et qu'il importe, avant de recueillir tous les bienfaits d'une Société des Nations, de s'efforcer à préparer une mentalité nouvelle. Il faut. comme disait M. Briand, ne jamais se lasser de répéter, de crier, de hurler, même, ces deux mots : « la paix ». Eh bien, si vous me permettez cette comparaison la Société des Nations n'est pas autre chose qu'un immense haut parleur qui sans relâche lance sur le monde : « paix, paix, faites la paix... ». Si un jour s'ancre dans les esprits le dégoût des tueries inutiles, si les hommes comprennent que leurs divergences peuvent se régler autrement que par la guerre, alors ce jour-là, on pourra retirer la fiche de contact... laisser se taire la voix du haut parleur.

La Société des Nations aura accompli sa tâche primordiale, le reste sera chose facile.

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Je ne suis pas ici pour vous parler de la Société des Nations et ce que j'en dis, c'est en manière d'introduction. Je me propose, en effet, de vous entretenir de trois hommes d'Etat, habitués de Genève, et qui, ministres responsables, servent une cause commune. Certes, vous êtes déjà familiarisés avec ces ténors de la politique internationale. Vous voyez, comme moi, l'œil vif, la moustache un peu désabusée de M. Aristide Briand, vous voyez le monocle et la boutonnière fleurie de sir Austen Chamberlain, et vous connaissez aussi la raideur du Dr Gustav Stresemann. Et cependant, je voudrais essayer de vous familiariser davantage avec eux, de vous en laisser un souvenir plus précis et plus vivant.

Toutefois, il m'est difficile de vous aider à mieux comprendre ces hommes d'Etat si, par quelques dates seulement, je ne retrace point les étapes de cette politique, baptisée rapprochement franco-allemand, mais qui se trouve être bien plus encore, comme une tentative de régénérer notre civilisation meurtrie par la guerre, comme un acheminement vers les Etats-Unis d'Europe.

1924, l'Assemblée de Genève élabore le Protocole de Genève, afin d'assurer, par l'arbitrage obligatoire, la sécurité des Etats, Février 1925. M. Stresemann propose de négocier une garantie des frontières franco-allemandes. Mars 1925, la Grande-Bretagne repousse le Protocole de Genève. Sir Austen Chamberlain suggère de conclure « des accords spéciaux pour répondre à des nécessités spéciales ». C'est la première amorce de Locarno. Septembre 1925, l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations ne renonce pas au Protocole de Genève déjà signé par la France, mais, conduite par M. Paul-Boncour, elle s'engage sur d'autres voies. Octobre 1925, Locarno... Pour la première fois depuis longtemps, un homme d'Etat allemand, et un homme d'Etat

français, causent librement. Ils sont assis, sous une tonnelle, à Ascona, devant les eaux immobiles du lac Majeur. Entre eux, un panier de raisins : de temps à autre, le chancelier allemand Luther, pique un grain ; M. Briand fume et caresse, sur ses genoux, un petit chat. Quelques jours passent, et aux fenêtres de l'Hôtel de justice de Locarno, des hommes acclamés : le chancelier Luther, impassible, M. Stresemann que raidit sa timidité, M. Vanderwelde, grave, sir Austen Chamberlain dont c'est l'anniversaire de naissance et qui a des larmes pleins les yeux, M. Mussolini, glacial et enfin, derrière une cigarette, le sourire de M. Briand. La paix définitive entre les puissances alliées de la grande guerre et le Reich allemand vient d'être paraphée ; les frontières du Rhin seront garanties par la Grande-Bretagne et l'Italie.

Mais voici des journées pénibles. Mars 1926. Assemblée extraordinaire de la Société des Nations pour accueillir l'Allemagne qui ne peut être accueillie à cause d'un conflit juridique entre l'Assemblée, le Brésil et l'Espagne. M. Briand, lentement, monte à la tribune ; tourné vers un banc vide, il dépose une résolution proclamant l'adoption morale par la Société des Nations d'une nouvelle grande puissance. Septembre 1926, l'Allemagne est admise et bientôt, à Toiry, MM. Briand et Stresemann déjeunent en tête à tête. Les deux hommes d'Etat posent les bases d'une politique poursuivie dès lors sans défaillance, en dépit des lenteurs, des arrêts même, que leur impose l'opinion publique de leur pays, moins clairvoyante qu'eux. Tout récemment à Genève, septembre 1928 négociations pour mobiliser la dette allemande, pour l'évacuation anticipée de la Rhénanie, bref, liquidation commencée des derniers grands problèmes de la guerre.

Voici l'œuvre de ces hommes : on en attend le salut de l'Europe. Elle se réalise dans le cadre de la Société des Nations. Ses protagonistes se rencontrent à date fixe. En vérité, si la Société des Nations n'existait pas il faudrait l'inventer ne serait-ce que pour faciliter ces conversations directes qui permettent, enfin, de jeter aux vieilles ferrailles tout l'appareil dangereux de l'ancienne diplomatie.

M. Aristide Briand

Je n'ai pas à dire ici la carrière d'homme d'Etat de M. Briand. Tout le monde connaît son esprit de décision, la souplesse de son caractère, sa fougue oratoire, la persévérance de son idéal politique. Dans le monde entier, M. Briand n'a-t-il pas battu tous les records de responsabilité gouvernementale : il a été dix fois Président du Conseil et seize fois ministre.

Ce que vous ignorez peut-être c'est comme cet homme, appelé à rendre tant de services à son pays et à l'humanité, n'est pas devenu, simplement, une lumière du barreau de Nantes. Il était, à cette époque déjà lointaine, avocat des rudes paysans

d'une plaine marécageuse, la Brière. Passant par la capitale, il flânait devant le café Brébant : on l'appelle. Ce sont de joyeux garçons, des journalistes :

— Eh bien, Briand, que faites-vous ?

— Moi, mais je rentre à Nantes...

— Quelle blague, un type comme vous, restez à Paris, et... faites du journalisme.

M. Briand entre à la « Petite République ». Elu bientôt député de la Loire, il commence alors cette vertigineuse fortune politique, couronnée par son œuvre au sein de la Société des Nations.

L'influence de M. Briand à Genève, où un autre grand Français, Léon Bourgeois, lui a demandé d'être son continuateur, est inimaginable. Cette influence, je dirais même cette confiance, est telle, qu'un jour de crise, j'ai entendu un célèbre journaliste allemand dire : « Si Briand ne nous sort pas de là, tout est fichu ».

Autre exemple : lors des récentes négociations de Genève, dans le hall d'un grand hôtel, un jeune Français d'opinion ultra-nationaliste, venait de pester contre ce qu'il appelait une politique de concessions. Les négociateurs descendaient l'escalier : le premier, car tout le monde ici lui cède le pas, M. Briand... Le délégué de la France, ne pouvant rien nous dire, s'en tirait par des blagues :

— « Eh, Messieurs, disait-il, une grande nouvelle : nous sommes tous vivants ».

Comme il sortait, entouré d'un respect unanime, je me sentis saisir par le bras et une voix émue me dit à l'oreille :

— « Il est extraordinaire... Oui, vous aviez raison, c'est bien comme cela que nous devions faire de la politique internationale ». C'était mon jeune confrère. Une fois de plus, le prestige de M. Briand à Genève venait d'épater un nouveau venu.

Le caractère de cet homme d'Etat est dominé par une vertu, source, d'ailleurs, au cours des siècles, de la vitalité française. Cette vertu, c'est le bon sens, ce bon sens dont Bergson a dit « qu'il est dans la vie pratique ce que le génie est dans les sciences et les lettres ». Que l'on se trouve embourbé dans une discussion, M. Briand lance une phrase : sa logique apaise l'orage. Qu'une négociation s'éternise, qu'un compromis subtil, trop subtil, apparaisse comme la seule porte de sortie, M. Briand suggère une solution et c'est le bon sens qui l'emporte.

Si, avec le bon sens, la ténacité, la séduction patente, le franc parler, une vue nette des difficultés, sont bien des qualités paysannes, M. Briand les concentre toutes en lui. Cela explique le grand amour que lui portent les humbles. Jamais, en effet, je ne retourne vers le haut pays savoyard, d'où les miens sont descendus, sans entendre la même question. Les vieux du pays qui dans l'enfant saluent toujours le père, disent :

— « Tiens, voilà le fils à Jean-Marie » — et poussant un verre

de leur cidre âpre à la gorge comme un vieil alcool — ils ajoutent :

— Eh bien garçon, que fait M'sieu Briand ?

Cette affection, simple et confiante, M. Briand la leur rend bien à ces hommes de la terre, car je le sais, sa passion cachée c'est la nature. M. Briand aime la nature comme d'autres l'exercice du pouvoir, la gastronomie ou les femmes. Il se plonge en elle, y retrempe ses forces, et lui demande des inspirations immédiates. Vous le savez, M. Briand se réfugie, toutes les fois qu'il le peut, en sa ferme de Cocherel ; durant de longues heures reposantes, il discute alors, avec un voisin, l'achat d'une prairie ou l'élevage des moutons. Eh bien, à Genève, M. Briand fait, souventes fois, de même. Ici, son refuge préféré c'est le creux de Genthod. une anse au bord du lac, face au Mont-Blanc. Breton, M. Briand est un solitaire. Sur un banc, il fume — méditation immobile — en écoutant le clapotis des vagues. Derrière lui, quelques intimes silencieux ; l'ami, le confident des bons et des mauvais jours. M. Gilbert Peycelon, son plus précieux collaborateur, ou encore M. Amé Leroy qui n'a quitté Léon Bourgeois que pour suivre Briand. Quelques cigarettes... La nature parle à qui sait l'entendre, aussi le ministre français, posément, discute avec elle. Puis il regagne son automobile, et rapporte une solution, la bonne solution.

Vous désirez savoir comment travaille M. Briand? C'est simple, c'est original, mais ça n'est pas donné à tout le monde. M. Briand a la phobie du porte-plume ; il n'écrit jamais, au grand jamais. Son instrument de travail, vous l'avez deviné, c'est la cigarette... Il se promène, fume, établit son plan, rumine son affaire, pèse ses arguments sans s'occuper de la forme. On en a fait un pêcheur à la ligne ; c'est faux, car il ne pêche qu'en mer, en douce mer bretonne. On dit de lui qu'il improvise ; c'est encore faux et rien n'est mieux préparé qu'une intervention Briand.

Maître de la parole, M. Briand monte à la tribune sans une note. Il parle, se répète volontiers comme pour renforcer une idée centrale, cherche à persuader ; il veut, avant tout, accrocher son auditoire, le convaincre, lui faire partager ses vues. Son exposé, dans l'envolée d'une forme magistrale, se déroule au gré des réactions, imperceptibles pour tout autre que lui, de ses auditeurs, et alors, c'est un beau spectacle. M. Briand a la main très belle, il en joue à ravir, son visage s'anime, ses yeux parlent eux aussi ; il marche, s'arrête, hausse les épaules, tend les bras et sa voix, cette voix tour à tour nuancée et puissante, reflète les sentiments qui l'animent depuis la résignation mélancolique, la révolte, la désinvolture ou l'enthousiasme.

A Genève M. Briand se lève vers 6 heures. Avec sa première cigarette, il prend connaissance, ou plutôt M. Peycelon lui en fait lecture, des résumés de presse que lui transmet Paris, 8 heures, ses intimes arrivent ; à 9 h. 1/2, toute la délégation

française réunie, examine, avec lui, le travail du jour. Il se rend à l'Assemblée et là, auditeur assidu, son attention n'est jamais en défaut. Il déjeune, toujours à la campagne, en compagnie de quelques collaborateurs directs et commence ensuite son action personnelle, conservations privées avec ses collègues du Conseil de la Société des Nations, entretiens avec des ministres étrangers. Le soir, M. Briand ne voit personne sinon un fidèle serviteur. Il prend une tasse de chocolat et à 9 heures il est au lit.

Sir Austen Chamberlain

Sir Austen Chamberlain, ministre des affaires étrangères de l'Empire britannique, a une année de moins que M. Briand ; il est né en 1863. Toute son éducation a été dirigée pour faire de lui un homme d'Etat. Fils de Joe Chamberlain, sir Austen — il a été promu chevalier après Locarno — entra au Parlement à 29 ans : 3 ans après, il est membre du même gouvernement que son père.

Les Chamberlain n'appartiennent pas à une famille de tradition politique, comme les Cecil, par exemple. Joseph Chamberlain était un industriel de Birmingham ; parlementaire d'un rare talent, orateur caustique, cet homme d'Etat a développé avec impétuosité le concept de l'Empire britannique, grande communauté de nations. Il y a néanmoins une injustice, pour le fils, à le trop comparer à son père. Certes, le faciès identique de ces deux hommes, le monocle et la boutonnière fleurie, ont prêté, tout d'abord, à bien des plaisanteries. Sir Austen a pourtant témoigné d'une activité constructive encore supérieure à celle de Joe Chamberlain. Il a eu l'énergie, comme membre conservateur du gouvernement de coalition, de signer le Home Rule d'Irlande dont son père était un tenace adversaire ; dans sa politique en Chine et son action, si persévérante, pour la réorganisation pacifique de l'Europe, sir Austen Chamberlain, conservateur, a eu derrière lui tous les peuples de l'Empire britannique. Son éloquence manque peut-être d'envolée mais sa force persuasive est grande, l'expression lucide de pensée convainct et ceux qui le connaissent proclament la fermeté de son caractère.

Sir Austen Chamberlain est normand : son nom à peine anglicisé. Chambrelan chez le vieux chroniqueur Frossard, Chambrelan, aujourd'hui — l'identique de même que son attirance vers des Celtes comme Lloyd George et Aristide Briand. Le ministre britannique subit toute la séduction de son collègue français et l'amitié entre ces deux hommes est profonde ; ils se comprennent et l'on peut même dire qu'ils s'aiment. Si M. Briand, avec sa bonhommie coutumière dit : mon ami Chamberlain — prononciation française — sir Austen dit : M. le président Briand : dans les deux cas, leurs voix ont la même nuance affectueuse.

Enfermé dans l'armature de l'impassibilité britannique, sir Austen Chamberlain est un peu solennel. En séance publique du Conseil, il siège avec rigidité. Les impertinents — il y en a rarement mais il y en a — doivent toujours s'attendre à un rappel de sir Austen et, ma foi, dans de telles circonstances, cet homme devient dur comme un roc : MM. Voldemaras, Lithuanie, et Apponyi, Hongrie, en savent quelque chose. N'allez pas croire cependant que sous cette cuirasse batte un cœur endurci : non pas, au contraire, sir Austen est un être délicieusement doué. Entre autres traditions, il a conservé celle du Home anglais, de la vie de famille et unie. Lady Chamberlain se trouve toujours à ses côtés et elle est, pour le ministre, une compagnie et une collaboratrice morale de toutes les heures.

Pour résumer, en quelques lignes, son caractère, il faudrait dire que si les qualités imaginatives ne sont pas aussi brillantes chez sir Austen Chamberlain que chez d'autres, il personnifie l'homme d'Etat complet, consciencieux, acharné à sa tâche. Sa loyauté est au-dessus de tout reproche ; incapable d'une action mesquine, esprit chevaleresque, il ne refuse aucune responsabilité, aussi lourde soit-elle. On dit qu'il est un peu sensible aux critiques de la presse ! N'est-ce pas là un petit défaut et combien d'hommes d'Etat le partagent avec lui ?

Mais, sir Austen Chamberlain a lui aussi, son violon d'Ingres : c'est sa passion pour les fleurs. Un jour que prenait fin une session du Conseil, un de mes confrères lui dit :

— Et bien, sir Austen, vivent les vacances : on prétend que vous allez vous reposer sur les montagnes suisses.

— Vous êtes bien renseigné, répondit le ministre, en effet, je vais filer — et se reprenant avec un tendre regard pour lady Chamberlain — nous allons filer vers les fleurs alpestres.

— Ah, Excellence, cela va confirmer ce que disent des gens, à savoir que vous préférez la botanique à la politique étrangère.

— Oh, oh, vous allez fort — et faisant un signe amical pour prendre congé — tout ce que l'on peut dire, c'est que ceci repose de cela.

Enfin, sir Austen Chamberlain adore la cigarette. A Locarno, il nous a confié que si les hommes viennent au monde pour manger et boire, son grand-père prétendait déjà que les Chamberlain naissent pour fumer.

Gustav Stresemann

Il ne faudrait pas essayer de se faire une idée de la psychologie du Dr Gustav Stresemann par le truchement du reportage photographique. Il y a un abîme entre les images que l'on publie de lui et sa véritable personnalité. Vous l'avez souvent vu, carrant les épaules devant l'objectif, raide comme un sous-officier, dédaigneux et renfrogné. Que voulez-vous ? Le ministre

allemand est impressionnable et il déteste les photographes. Par contre, si vous l'approchez, vous aurez vite l'impression d'un homme d'une réelle jovialité, aux goûts simples, qui n'aime rien autant qu'une bonne histoire. Intelligent, plein de finesse, de roublardise même, M. Stresemann a le mot facile ; il aime les longues conversations familières, les libres propos autour d'une table desservie et, tout comme il dédaigne les fausses habiletés diplomatiques, il a, dans la vie privée, le mépris du qu'en dira-t-on. Cela fait le désespoir de ses hauts fonctionnaires, encore très ancien régime. Mais l'homme est ainsi, et il n'y a rien à faire.

Tout récemment, à Baden-Baden, où le ministre vient de subir une longue cure, deux journalistes allemands de Genève, s'arrêtent à la Potinière du pays. Cette arrivée, en un endroit sélect, ne passe pas inaperçue, car ils sont en casquette d'automobile et leur toilette est plus utilitaire qu'élégante. Les deux intrus allaient s'enfuir quand, à l'ébahissement général, quelqu'un traverse le jardin pour les rejoindre. C'est M. Stresemann qui s'installe, allume un gros cigare, bavarde, se fait raconter la dernière session du Conseil de la Société des Nations, tandis que trois ou quatre directeurs ministériels, scandalisés, ne comprennent rien à cette fugue et s'impatientent, en voyant leur chef se commettre avec deux individus d'une classe indéfinissable.

M. Stresemann a beaucoup de tempérament ; impulsif, il se laisse parfois entraîner par son caractère, mais il a des conceptions hardies et, dans les grandes et les petites choses, c'est un être courageux. Lors de son arrivée à Locarno, les journaux parlant d'un complot contre sa vie, on lui demande donc de descendre du train à Bellinzone. C'est en automobile qu'il gagne les rives du lac Majeur. Or, le soir même — et c'est là où je l'ai vu pour la première fois — il était attablé devant un verre de bière, à la terrasse d'un café, aussi paisible que s'il n'était pas entouré d'une centaine d'inconnus.

Les nationalistes allemands reprochent à M. Stresemann d'être un politicien opportuniste et d'avoir gardé un silence prudent pendant l'occupation de la Rhur alors qu'entré très jeune au Reichstag, il jouait déjà son rôle avant et pendant la guerre. C'est possible, encore que tout homme d'Etat sache attendre son heure. Ne fallait-il pas, cependant, une certaine audace civique pour accepter, en août 1923, au moment où l'inflation décomposait l'Allemagne, un poste dont personne ne voulait prendre les responsabilités, celui de chancelier du Reich ? Depuis, ministre des affaires étrangères, tenant tête à des adversaires qui l'accusent de haute trahison, M. Stresemann n'en a pas moins préconisé et poursuivi le rapprochement franco-allemand. Comme il en avait pris l'engagement à Locarno, en dépit des dangers semés sur sa route, il a conduit l'Allemagne à Genève ; par la Société des Nations, il lui a rendu les prérogatives d'une grande puissance. Orateur remarquable dans un pays dénué d'orateurs,

M. Stresemann sait parler à la jeunesse. Son influence grandit chaque jour et il est certain qu'il rêve d'asseoir la prospérité de sa patrie sur les bases d'une Europe réconciliée et unie. Converti aux idées de la Société des Nations, à ses méthodes de compromis et d'arbitrage, M. Stresemann reste son plus ferme soutien en Allemagne. Il fait reposer toute sa politique sur l'Institution internationale de Genève et, récemment, il a écrit qu'il ne venait pas à Genève pour défendre les intérêts d'un groupe mais bien pour faire progresser une idée.

M. Stresemann a 50 ans ; excellent père de famille — il a deux fils — il vient de fêter ses noces d'argent. Fin lettré, bibliophile, poète même, M. Stresemann a pour livre de chevet « Faust ». Je crois d'ailleurs que ses compatriotes peuvent se répéter, en songeant à lui, la parole de Gœthe : « L'homme se grandit lui-même en poursuivant des buts élevés ».

J'ai dû restreindre mon ambition et ne vous parler que de trois hommes d'Etat alors que la Société des Nations en réunit beaucoup d'autres à Genève. Sa dernière assemblée plénière comptait six présidents du Conseil et dix-huit ministres des affaires étrangères. C'est vous dire que mon répertoire d'historiettes n'est pas épuisé.

Ma dernière causerie devant le microphone m'a valu quelques compliments et pas mal d'honnêtes critiques. Les compliments, je les passe ; ils ne servent jamais de rien qu'à troubler l'entendement. Les critiques, par contre, je les retiens et j'en veux faire mon profit et le vôtre.

Un vieil homme, pour lequel je professe une réelle estime, un préhistorien de bonne marque qui manipule en ce moment une récolte d'ossements de l'ours des cavernes, vilaine grosse bête disparue depuis cent mille ans et plus, m'a dit : « Je vous ai entendu chez mon fils ! Pas mal, vos portraits psychologiques de Briand, Chamberlain et Stresemann, mais croyez-vous vraiment les intéresser, ces messieurs et ces belles dames, en discourant sur la politique ? J'ai idée, a continué mon vieil ami, que vous feriez mieux de classer votre collection lacustre ou, si vous y tenez, de raconter des gaudrioles, dans ces haut-parleurs... »

Il me faut bien, après cela, vous avouer que mon violon d'Ingres, mon dada si vous préférez, c'est en effet, ces antiques outils de pierre polie, pêchés par des hommes persévérants, dans les vases profondes du lac de Genève. Mais quoi, je ne puis cependant pas, après vous avoir annoncé des notes sur quelques-uns des hommes politiques appelés ici par la Société des Nations, me lancer à corps perdu, en une défense de Glozel, du Dr Morlet et de M. Salomon Reinach, quitte à causer une peine, même légère, à mon éminent ami. M. le Pr Bégouen. Ce que je puis faire, c'est ne point parler politique.

Quelqu'un m'a dit : « Un peu long... » Puis, un autre : « Epatantes, les anecdotes... » Dans leur brièveté, ces critiques-là

m'ont finalement édifié. Elles rejoignent d'ailleurs assez bien la judicieuse remarque de mon amateur d'ossements d'avant les dernières périodes glaciaires. Je vais donc, comme nous disons dans notre jargon de journalistes, faire court. Vous vous en trouverez bien.

Néanmoins, voyez cette fois ma modestie en matière politique, deux phrases, deux seulement, d'introduction. Vous n'ignorez pas que les petites nations sont à l'honneur ici et que les trois grands personnages dont je vous ai déjà parlé ne font jamais rien qui les puissent défriser car elles sont susceptibles. C'est l'esprit de la Société des Nations ; il est excellent et je vais en suivre la tradition, m'en prenant, tout d'abord, aux délégués les plus modestes dans l'ordre, bien entendu, de la grandeur territoriale des pays qu'ils représentent auprès de l'Institution internationale de Genève.

Joseph Motta

M. Joseph Motta occupe les fonctions de ministre des Affaires étrangères de la Confédération helvétique. Je dis bien, chers auditeurs du doux pays de France, occupe les fonctions, car en Suisse nous n'avons pas de ministres mais seulement des conseillers. Voilà pourquoi, ne pouvant tout de même avoir des « crises conseillères », nous ne connaissons jamais de crises ministérielles. M. Motta est Tessinois. Petit de taille, l'air affable, l'abord facile, il a les cheveux blancs déjà pour cinquante ans d'âge. Son livre préféré — d'aucuns disent même son bréviaire, car M. Motta se donne comme une apparence ecclésiastique — c'est la *Divine Comédie*. Chaque fois que le premier délégué suisse grimpe allégrement les marches de la tribune internationale de la Société des Nations, nous savons à quoi nous en tenir : tout à l'heure vont fuser, étincelants, quelques-uns des plus rares tercets du père de la poésie italienne. Personne ne s'en plaint. M. Motta, en italien, en français et en allemand, les trois langues nationales suisses — ce qui fait parfois trois opinions publiques en une seule Confédération — est un parfait orateur. Son goût si sûr pour le Dante dénonce assez bien la vraie personnalité de M. Motta, homme d'une sensibilité jamais émoussée, d'une bonté de cœur proverbiable en son pays, et qui se laisse guider, dans tous les actes d'un homme d'État, par une passion de la démocratie. Simple d'allure, plein de dignité, président d'une des Assemblées annuelles de la Société des Nations, ce rigide magistrat républicain commande la sympathie ; sa voix est toujours écoutée, religieusement, car il ne plaide que de justes causes.

Un soir, assis à dîner auprès d'un Maharadja, M. Motta emballe littéralement ce potentat asiatique. A brûle-pourpoint, l'Indou lui lance :

— Eh ! Monsieur le Président, venez me voir aux Indes. Je

veux vous faire chasser le tigre. Et puis, vous savez, enmenez votre famille, j'ai de la place ».

L'austère M. Motta, qui travaille de 8 h. du matin à 8 h. du soir et donne de l'Excellence aux autres tout en s'indignant si on la lui inflige, sourit pourtant, et non sans quelque fierté :

— Ma famille, Excellence, mais j'ai dix enfants...

— Dix enfants, susurre le Maharadja. Moi, j'en ai quarante et je viens d'apprendre que pendant la session de Genève mes femmes m'en ont donné d'autres...

Paul Hymans

Si nous aimons beaucoup à Genève M. Paul Hymans, lui aussi ministre des Affaires étrangères, mais de Belgique, nous avons nos raisons. Il est descendu de la tribune de la presse pour entrer dans l'hémicycle parlementaire. Fils d'un journaliste, M. Paul Hymans a tâté de notre dur métier. Il nous a raconté sa première interview. Jeune reporter, il fut envoyé chez un homme politique afin de l'interroger sur on ne sait plus quelle affaire : le futur homme d'Etat ne réussit qu'à se faire mettre à la porte. Rentré, tête basse, son rédacteur en chef lui dit :

— Eh bien, Hymans...

— Eh bien.... eh bien voilà.

— Oh ! oh ! rétorque l'autre, délicieux : faites en deux colonnes, mon garçon...

Dans son pays et ailleurs, M. Paul Hymans a goûté depuis tous les honneurs, aussi ne conte-t-il jamais cette aventure sans lâcher un de ses petits rires stridents, indice, chez lui, de la meilleure humeur du monde.

Au demeurant, M. Paul Hymans est une des personnalités les plus en vue de la Société des Nations dont il a aidé à élaborer le Pacte en 1919 et présidé, en 1920, la première Assemblée plénière. C'est un négociateur prudent, défenseur habile des droits des petites puissances, un homme en qui se mêlent les plus vives qualités d'énergie et de bon sens, et qui porte très haut le prestige de sa patrie. Les journalistes savent qu'ils ont en lui un ami courtois aussi en ont-ils fait un président d'honneur souvent sur la brèche.

Des gens soutiennent qu'il est un peu nerveux. Il est juste de dire qu'on lui en donne occasion, parfois. Je me souviens d'un délégué belge, brave homme, mais un tantinet grotesque, qui avait escaladé la tribune de l'Assemblée pour supplier la Société des Nations d'adopter l'espéranto, sorte de baragouin international, et pour lui suggérer aussi de répartir entre tous les Etats membres, les dettes provoquées par la guerre mondiale. Il fallait voir, à son banc, M. Paul Hymans. Nerveux, ma foi oui ! De ses mains fines, il tambourinait une marche sur un rythme qui n'avait rien de triomphal pour son malencontreux collègue.

La Hollande, pince-sans-rire

Plus au nord, la Hollande. et pour nous, ce soir, M. Colijn. Il a débuté dans la vie en qualité de simple soldat. Depuis, cette ancienne recrue de Java a fait son petit bonhomme de chemin. Il est, comme qui dirait le Raymond Poincaré des Pays-Bas ; en un an, il a sauvé, non pas le franc hollandais, mais le florin. C'est un économiste doublé d'un impérieux. Il faut, avec lui, que les choses marchent rondement. Au rebours de nombre de gens, il ne s'embarrasse point dans des phrases : sa pensée revêt des formes concises. M. Colijn, ancien premier ministre des Pays-Bas, a tenu son rôle essentiel à Genève lors de la Conférence économique mondiale. Il en a présidé les délibérations commerciales et ses méthodes sont restées légendaires.

A la fin d'une grosse journée de besogne, il s'écrie :

— Messieurs, l'heure est tardive. Nous n'avons plus qu'un seul amendement, belge, je pense. J'apprends que cet amendement est retiré..

A sa place, l'expert anversois, bondit :

— Pas du tout...

— Ah ! déclare M. Colijn, il y a erreur. On m'assure pourtant que la délégation belge va retirer son amendement !

— Je n'en fais rien, proteste Anvers.

Alors, d'un impassible coup de marteau, le président Colijn termine le débat, disant :

— Messieurs, l'amendement est retiré.

Une autre fois, ce pince-sans-rire a fait s'esclaffer tout ce que l'univers — sauf la Russie — compte de sommités commerciales. Il s'agissait de l'Union des Républiques soviétistes socialistes, représentées par un ex-prince élevé à la dignité de directeur de statistiques. On dit communément, vous le savez, l'U. R. S. S. ; c'est une formule, courte et bonne, et ce qui pourrait être aussi, ne trouvez-vous pas, la devise de ces Messieurs de Moscou. Bref, M. Colijn a-t-il le dégoût des initiales ou l'ex-prince lui avait-il donné sur les nerfs réputés sensibles, je n'en sais rien. Toujours est-il qu'ayant à prononcer ces diablesses de quatre lettres, le voilà qui s'embrouille : l'U. S. R... l'R. S. S. U... Ah ! zut, dit-il enfin, je n'entends goutte à ce galimatias...

Vous pouvez vous imaginer quel formidable éclat de rire accueillit cette boutade.

Le Dr Nansen

Un Norvégien célèbre : voici le Dr Nansen. Cet explorateur polaire, vrai géant, vient souvent à Genève ; son dada, à lui, ce sont les réfugiés, qu'ils arrivent de Russie, d'Arménie ou de Grèce. Ce bel athlète humanitaire bourru mais bon comme le pain, a rendu des services de premier ordre, aux réfugiés,

pauvres bougres trop abandonnés après de trop belles promesses. M. Nansen s'exprime en un anglais passable ; au milieu de grands gestes — tout est grand chez lui — sa voix roule sur l'Assemblée en ondes sourdes. Et, croyez-moi, il ne mâche pas ses mots.

Au temps déjà lointain où le Conseil de la Société des Nations ne craignait point les rhumes de cerveau et consentait à siéger, en décembre, à Genève, M. Nansen passait un pont sur le Rhône. La bise du nord — une compatriote — soufflait dru ; le délégué norvégien, son large feutre enfoncé sur le front n'avait pour s'en protéger qu'un veston de toile. Quelqu'un crut devoir lui en faire la remarque.

— Bah, dit Nansen, au Pôle, j'en ai vu bien d'autres...

M. Unden avait raison

La participation féconde de M. Unden, socialiste suédois, aux populaires travaux en vue du désarmement est trop appréciée, un peu partout, pour que je m'y arrête. Ce jeune homme d'Etat vaut d'être observé. Sans faire de discours, il se lève, lit un bout de papier rapidement crayonné, et tout le monde a compris. S'il est vrai que M. Paul-Boncour ressemble aux rares portraits d'un élégant Conventionnel français, M. Unden me fait encore davantage songer à Robespierre. Tout comme le maigre député d'Arras, le socialiste suédois est froid, implacable, incorruptible.

Il l'a montré, siégeant au Conseil, alors qu'il était question d'accorder à l'Espagne le privilège d'un siège permanent et d'éviter à la Société des Nations ce que M. Briand appelait une crise de croissance. Sans M. Unden, on aurait pu s'arranger. Sir Austen Chamberlain était déjà convaincu, au point que des journaux anglais publiaient en manchette: « M. Unden, la Grande-Bretagne attend que vous fassiez votre devoir ». Est-ce pour cela que M. Unden n'a pas bronché ? Avouez avec moi combien la chose est douteuse. Le fait est, néanmoins, qu'il a tenu bon. Il était prêt à se désister de son siège électif en faveur de Madrid, mais pour un siège permanent, bernique. A toutes les sollicitations des puissants de ce monde M. Unden — il n'a rien d'un orateur — s'est borné à répondre: « Non, non, non ».

Ce « non » de M. Unden a fait quelque bruit de par le monde. Tout s'est calmé depuis et l'histoire dira que M. Unden avait raison.

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REDE DES AUSSENMINISTERS DR. ED. BENES, PRAG, AUSSENAUSSCHUSS DES TSCHECHOSLOWAKISCHEN PARLAMENTS, 4. OKTOBER 1928.

(Prager Presse, vom 5. october 1928)

Geehrte Herren, gestatten Sie mir, dem geschätzen Auschuss ein kurzes Exposé über die Ereignisse zu erstatten, die unseren Staat und unsere Aussenpolitik betreffen und sich in der internationalen Politik seit meinem letzten Exposé im Aussenauschuss ereignet haben. Im allgemeinen gibt es nicht viel neues. Ich werde mich vielleicht kürzer als sonst fassen können.

1. Im letzten Exposé befasste ich mich ausführlieh mit den Aktionen zur Stärkung des Weltfriedens, mit dem sogenannten Briand-Kellogg-Pakt, und allem, was mit diesen Aktionen zusammenhing. Ich sprach über die Arbeit im Völkerbund und über die Vorbereitungen zur Lösung von drei wichtigen aktuellen Fragen der europäischen Politik, das ist der Revision des Dawesplanes, der Evakuierung des linken Rheinufers und der Konferenz über die Einschränkung der Rüstungen. Damals sagte ich, dass diese Dinge eng mit den Verhandlungen über Kelloggs Friedens-Pakt zusammenhängen. Ich sprach damals die Ueberzeugung aus, dass es zur Unterschrift des Paktes kommen wird und dass wir gleich darauf vor die Lösung der übrigen Fragen gestellt sein werden.

Wie heute ersichtlich, haben sich die Dinge tatsächlich so entwickelt. Der Kelloggpakt wurde am 27. August in Paris unterfertigt, von der ganzen Welt sympatisch begrüsst und in Genf auch von der Völkerbundsversammlung angemessen gewürdigt. Als er von den ersten Signataren unterfertigt war, meldeten sich zur Unterschrift noch ganze Dekaden anderer Staaten, darunter Sowjetrussland, so dass der Pakt wirklich ein allgemeiner, ein Weltpakt sein wird. Ich werde nicht auf die Würdigung seiner Bedeutung für uns und die übrige Welt zurückgreifen. Ich habe schon alles in meinem letzten Exposé gesagt und die Ereignisse zeigen, dass ich den Pakt richtig eingeschätzt habe. Damals referierte ich nicht über die Aktion, die während meiner Reise in Frankreich, England und Deutschland eingesetzt und darauf abgeziehlt hat, dass die Grossmächte unsere besondere Position als einer Locarnomacht anerkennen und daher auch unsere Forderungen anerkennen, mit unter den ursprünglichen Signataren des Friedenspaktes zu sein. Wir wollten, dass unsere besondere Position anerkennt werde, das ist die Position eines Staates, der speziell an den Fragen der europäischen Sicherheit interessiert ist und deshalb

das Recht hat, sich direkt an Aktionen ähnlichen Charakters zu beteiligen. Unsere Aktion hatte, wie ersichtlich, vollen Erfolg. Jetzt allerdings wird es sich darum handeln, dass der Kellogg-Pakt vor allem in den Vereinigten Staaten ratifiziert werde. Seine Nichtratifizierung hätte sehr ungünstige Folgen. Wie zu erwarten war, meldeten sich nach der Unterschrift des Kelloggpaktes sofort die übrigen, bereits angeführten Fragen der europäischen Politik. Dies geschah in Genf bei Gelegenheit der Völkerbundsversammlung, was mich dazu führt, davon in einigen Worten zu sprechen.

2. *Reparationen und Rheinlandräumung.* — Die Verhandlungen, die sich in Genf zwischen Deutschland und den andern Mächten angesponnen haben, zählen zu den wichtigsten Nachkriegsverhandlungen überhaupt. In Genf wurde allerdings nur der Anfang gemacht, der verhältnissmässig sehr bald fortgestzt werden soll, und wenn diese Verhandlungen zu einem Resultat führen sollten — ich verhehle mir die Schwirigkeiten dieser Handlungen durchaus nicht — dann würde dies den Abschluss der politischen Nachkriegsperiode bedeuten, die man dann Kriegsliquidation wird nenen können.

Es handelt sich nämlich in Wahrheit entweder um die Lösung der letzten grossen Probleme der europäischen Nachkriegspolitik oder, noch besser gesagt, um die Kulmination jener politischen Linie, die mit Locarno begonnen hat und jetzt sich in der Revision des Dawesplanes fortsetzen soll, das ist durch Feststellung der definitiven Summe der deutschen Reparationen mit der Bestimmung der definitiven Anuitäten. Die Lösung der Reparationsfrage würde die Evakuierung des linken Rheinufers herbeiführen, und diese ganze politische Periode würde in der Rüstungseinschränkungskonferenz ihren Abschluss finden, die, wenn sie Erfolg haben wird, in der Unterschrift einer internationalen Konvention gipfeln wird, wo für eine Reihe von Jahren jedem Staat sein Höchstgrad der möglichen Rüstungen festgesetzt wird. Diese Perspektive ist gewiss verlockend. Sie würde die Behebung der letzten grossen Hindernisse wenigstens zum äusseren Ausgleich der beiden ehemaligen Kriegslager und zur formalen Liquidation der Kriegsperiode bedeuten. Damit wären alle übrigen Fragen der europäischen Politik, die bisher mehr oder weniger strittig sind, weitin den Hintergrund gedrängt, und mit der Durchführung der Rüstungseinschränkungskonferenz wäre wenigstens für einige Zeit eine grosse prinzipielle politische Frage erledigt, die Gegenstand eines grossen Streites ist und noch sein wird, abgesehen davon, dass man dadurch eine neue Grundlage für die grosse Beruhigung Europas gewinnen würde. Das, was noch von der Nachkriegsnervosität übrig bleibt, würde entweder ganz oder zum grössten Teil verschwinden.

Europa und die Welt würde tüchtig aufatmen und würde anheben, sich neuen Problemen zu widmen, wirtschaftlichen

Problemen und jenen der Reorganisation Europas, über die ich noch sprrechen werde. Die bisherigen Verhandlungen über diese Fragen schlossen in Genf, wie Sie wissen, mit einer Verständigung, dass zwei Kommissionen bestimmt werden, die Kommission für das Reparations problem, und die Kommission für die Evakuierungsfrage, Kommissionen die wahrscheinlich bald ihre Arbeiten aufnehmen werden und die, wie ich hoffe, diese Arbeiten erfolgreich abschliessen werden. Die Sache ist nicht leicht. Vorzeitig wäre es auch, hier über Einzelheiten dieser Arbeit zu sprechen, und darzulegen, wie die Dinge die eine oder die andere Seite auffasst. Ueber eine Frage deren delikater Charakter ein so grosses Mass erreicht, kann vorläufig in diesem Verhandlungsstadium nich öffentlich diskutiert werden, soll nicht überhaupt das Verhandlungsergebnis bedroht werden, das für beide Seiten wünschenswert ist. Ueber den späteren Verhandlungsfortschritt werde ich gewiss Gelegenheit haben, dem hohen Ausschuss zu referieren.

3. *Europa für die Rüstungsbeschränkung reif.* — Letzte internationale Aktualität der jüngsten Zeit und direkter Gegenstand der letzten Verhandlungen der Völkerbundversammlung war die Rüstungseinschränkungsfrage. Soweit ich die Sachlage beurteilen kann, gehaupte ich, trotz aller Kundgebungen der Unzufriedenheit und des Pressimismus, trotz aller Kritik, aller Vorwürfe und Angriffe, mögen sie nun gegen den Völkerbuud, mögen sie gegen einzelne Mächte gerichtet sein, dass dieses Problem dem Wesen nach heute für Europa reif geworden ist, dass es sich sehr rasch seiner Lösung nähert und dass jeder weitere Aufschub in jedem Fall nur vorübergehend ist und sein wird und anderer Natur ist, als jeder bisherige Aufschub. Deshalb vertrete ich den Standpunkt, dass wir die Dinge sehr sorgfältig verfolgen müssen, dass wir schon heute zu den Verhandlungen vorbereitet sein müssen und unsere eigenen technischen Vorbereitungen, die unseren technischen und politischen Standpunkt zum Ausdruck bringen, parat haben müssen. Ich kann hier erklären. dass unsere zuständigen Ministerien ihre Vorbereitungen schon dieses Jahr im Frühjahr abgeschlossen haben, dass ich selbst als Delegat in der Abrüstungsvorbereitungskommission mit dem Heeres-und Fachministerium die Dinge durchberaten habe, und dass wir also, soweit es an uns liegen wird, vorbereitet wären, jederzeit zu verhandeln, eventuell sofort. Jeder bisherige Aufschub ist, entweder durch das Fehlen wirklicher sachlicher Vorbereitungen zu erklären, das bis vor Kurzem zu verzeichnen war, oder durch Unkenntnis des Problems selbst vom allgemeinen Standpunkt, durch Unklarheit der politischen Pläne zur Rüstungsbeschränkung bei den einzelnen Staaten und durch Unklarheit der Vorstellungen in der Richtung, wie die Welteinschränkung der Rüstungen durchgeführt werden soll und wie sich durchführen lässt.

Darüber braucht man sich garnicht bei dem kolossalen Umfang der Kompliziertheit und Neuheit dieses Problems zu wundern. Die zweite Gruppe der aufschiebenden Ursachen war einfach die internationale Situation der Grossmächte, die an dieser Frage bisher meist interessiert waren. Alle waren bisher beschäftigt, ja absorbiert durch die Liquidation aller übrigen Fragen der Nachkriegspolitik, ihre wirtschaftliche und finanzielle Rekonstruktion, ihre innerpolitischen Probleme, dass sie vor der Möglichkeit zurückschraken, ihre kolossalen Schwierigkeiten durch ein neues Problem zu komplizieren, dessen politische, wirtschaftliche, soziale und moralische Tragweite so gross ist, dass erst der erste Versuch, der naturgemäss nur ein vorsichtiger sein muss und sozusagen die erste Etappe aller dieser Staaten sein wird,imstande ist, auf das tiefste in die ganze Stuktur aller dieser Staaten und Nationen eingreifen und deshalb in einem Moment erfolgen muss, wo die Staaten und Nationen auf-ihn politisch und moralisch vorbereitet sein werden. Die Lösung des Rüstungseinschränkungsproblems, ein bisher in der Geschichte der Menschheit beispielloser Versuch, soll und muss eine grosse konstruktive Tat sein, und die Dauer solcher konstruktiver Taten wird nur dann garantiert sein, wenn sie nach Möglichkeit in möglichst normalen Zeiten erfolgen und auf soweit als möglich normalen Wegen.

Bedenken wir nur die Tragweite dieses Grundprincips, das hier Tatsache werden soll : Die Entscheidung über die Höhe, Form, Art des Heeres, und der Rüstungen, die bisher ausschliesslich von den nationalen Parlamenten und der Innenpolitik überhaupt abging, soll in Hinkunft in die internationale Vertragsphäre übertragen werden und nicht mehr vorbehaltlose Domäne der ausschliesslich inneren Souveränität des Staates sein. Die Rüstungseinschränkung würde durch eine internationale Konvention realisiert werden, die das Ergebnis internationaler Verhandlungen sein wird und stets nach einer bestimmten Periode revidiert und erneuert werden wird.

In gewissem Sinne ist das eine Revolution in den bisherigen Ansichten über diese Frage. Vom Standpunkt der europäischen und internationalen Politik überhaupt wäre es deshalb geeignet und richtig, die Rüstungseinschränkungskonferenz sofort nach Erledigung der Reparationsfrage und der Evakuierung des linken Rheinufers aufzunehmen. Damit wäre die politische Vorbereitung Europas zu dieser bedeutsamen Aktion abgeschlossen. Auch die technische Vorbereitung ist sozusagen fertig. Seit dem Jahre 1922, wo sich in Genf zum ersten Mal die Völkerbundsversammlung mit dieser Frage zu befassen begann, wurde soviel Material angehäuft, wurden soviel Vorbereitungen getroffen und soviel Studien durchgeführt, dass man auch von diesem Gesichtspunkt aus heute zu konkreten Schritten schreiten könnte.

4. *Abrüstung und Sicherheit.*— Wie bekannt, basiert rechtlich

das ganze Abrüstungsproblem auf Artikel 8 des Völkerbundpaktes, worin sich jeder Staat als Mitglied des Bundes verpflichtet, seine früheren Kriegsrüstungen zu reduzieren — es handelt sich um den Stand aus dem Jahre 1919 — auf einen Stand, der mit der Staats-und nationalen Sicherheit vereinbarlich ist. Von Seiten der Staaten, die zur Rüstungseinschränkung auf Grundlage der Friedensverträge von Versailles, St. Germain, Trianon und Neuilly gezwungen worden sind, wird zuweilen auch als Verpflichtung die Einleitung zum militärischen Teil dieser Verträge angeführt, wo es sich eben um ihre Abrüstungspflichten handelt. Als rechtlicher Ausgangspunkt für die Lösung der Abrüstungsfrage ist nur Artikel 8 des Völkerbundpaktes anzufassen. In den Verträgen gibt es nur den Hinwels darauf, dass die besiegten Staaten abzurüsten verpflichtet sind, damit die Vorbereitung der allgemeinen Rüstungseinschränkung aller Nationen möglich werde. Wie bereits angeführt, befasst sich der Völkerbund mit der Sache seit dem Jahre 1922 und geht genau vom Wortlaut des Artikel 8 aus, wo die Grundlage für die künftige Rüstungseinschränkung festgesetzt ist. Jedes Völkerbundmitglied nämlich, das nicht durch andere Bestimmungen zu anderen Massnahmen gebunden ist, hat die Rüstungen auf ein Mass einzuschreïnken und zu redupieren, das mit seiner staatlichen und nationalen Sicherheit vereinbarlich ist.

Aus diesen Voraussetzungen entstand die bekannte lange Diskussion über das Sicherheitsproblem, das ist über das Verhältnis der Sicherheit zur Rüstungseinschränkung. Aus diesen Erwägungen entstand im Bund der Kampf um die Garantierung der Sicherheit jenen Staaten gegenüber, die sich nicht genug sicher fühlen. Aus diesen Kämpfen kam es im Jahre 1923 zur Formulierung des bekannten Vertrages über die gegenseitige Hilfe, ein Jahr darauf dann zur Formulierung des Genfer Protokolls. Der Kampf hatte schliesslich Erfolg wenigsten darin, dass es im Jahre 1925 zu den Locarnoverträgen gekommen ist. Der Abschluss der Locarnoverträge wird heute vom Gesichtspunkt der Sicherheit aus als ein gewisser Meilenstein aufgefasst. Seit jenem Moment wurde die Rüstungseinschränkungskonferenz aktuelles Problem, obwohl man allgemein den Grundsatz angenommen hat, dass Locarno nur einzelnen Staaten Sicherheit bietet, dass eine Reihe anderer Staaten von diesen Verpflichtungen ausgenommen ist, — wie zum Beispiel einige Staaten in Zentral-und Süosteuropa und dass daher, wenn es zur Abrüstungskonferenz kommt, sie strikt auf der Basis des Artikels 8 durchgeführt wird, das heisst, jeder Staat wird seine Einschränkung in dem Masse durchführen, bis zu welchem sie mit seinem heutigen Sicherheitszustand vereinbarlich ist.

Trotz diesem Zustande wurden seit dem Jahre 1926 für die Konferenz recht intensive Vorbereitungen getroffen, Auf

Grundlage der Arbitageverträge von Locarno bildete sich eine starke Arbitagebewegung, die zu einer Reihe von neuen Verträgen und Verpflichtugen zwischen zahlreichen Staaten geführt hat, durch welche unstreitig viel Spannung gemildert und eine Reihe von Staaten einigermassen beruhigt worden sind. Diese Entwicklung schreitet fort und man muss diese Bewegung richtig in dem Sinne würdigen, dass sie wirklich eine neue Basis und neue Faktoren der Staatssicherheit schafft.

Wir selbst haben in diesem Sinne gearbeiteit. Unser Staat ist, wie bekannt, durch Arbitrageverträge, mit Deutschland, Oesterreich, Polen, Schweden und Dänemark verbunden. Vereinbart ist bereits der Vertrag mit der Schweiz und Spanien und in der nächsten Zeit wird unser Ministerium Verhandlungen in demselben Sinne ungefähr mit 6 oder siehen weiteren Staaten anknüpfen. Gleichzeitig wird die Frage der Unterschrift der Fakultativklausel des Statutsdes Internationalen Gerichtes im Haag studiert, die dann für uns die Bildung eines Arbitragevertragsverhältinisses für Konflikte rechtlicher Natur mit allen Staaten bedeuten würde, die die Klausel schon unterschrieben haben oder noch unterschreiben werden. Die Vorbereitungen für die Abrüstungskonferenz fanden jedoch noch in konkreterem Sinne statt. Im Jahre 1926 wurde über Antrag der französichen Delegation ein weiterer Schritt getan : In Genf wurde im Völkerbunde eine Vorbereitungskommission für die Rüstungs einschränkungskonferenz geschaffen, welche die Aufgahe hatte in allen Einzelheiten alle Vorarbeiten für die Einberufung der Endkonferenz vorzubereiten. die Vorbereitungskommission wurde schon einige Male einberufen und sie ist nach sehr schwierigen Verhandlungen bis zur Formulierung des Textes einer besonderen internationalen Konvention für die Rüstungseinschänkung gediehen.

Diese Verhandlungen kamen, wie bekannt, dieses Frühjahr ins Stocken, bei den Streitigkeiten Frankreichs, Englands und Amerikas über die Basis, auf der zwischen den Grossmächten die Seerüstungseinschränkung durchzuführen wäre. Das letzte Stadium dieser Ereignisse spielte sich unlängst ab. Ueber Aufforderung des Vorsitzenden der Vorbereitungskommission für die Rüstungseinschränkung, die interessierten Grossmächte möchten durch direkte diplomatische Verhandlungen ihre Gegensätze beilegen und so die letzten Vorbereitungen zur Konferenz schliessen, kam es in diesem Sommer zwischen Frankreich und England zu einen Abkommen, welches zwar die strittigen Punkte zwischen diesen beiden Staaten behoben hat, die Konflikte aber zwischen England und Amerika in vollem Umfange offen lies, wie aus den Noten bekannt ist, die zwischen den angeführten Grossmächten in den letzen Tagen ausgetauscht worden sind.

Gleichzeitig mit diesen Ereignissen wurde im sogenannten Sicherheitskomite gearbeitet, dessen Vorsitzender ich gewesen

bin, und zwar an dem Ausbau weiterer vertraglicher Sicherheitsvoraussetzungen durch neue Arbitrage-und Sicherheitsverträge, deren Texte das Komitee ausgearbeitet hat und die jetzt von der Völkerbundsversammlung angenommen und als neues Mittel zur Sicherung und Beruhigung der Lage in jenen Gebieten Europas anerkannt worden sind, wo bisher die Konflikte andauern und auf die sich die Locarnoabkommen nicht beziehen. Durch all das wurden einerseits die technischen, andererseits die politischen und Sicherheitsvorbereitungen zur Rüstungsbeschränkungskonferenz in einen Ausmasse durchgeführt, dass die Konferenz heute tatsächlich zusammentreten könnte und die erste internationale allgemeine Konvention über die Rüstungseinschränkung auf der genau eingehaltenen Basis des heutigen Standes der Sicherheit schaffen könnte. Die Staaten würden, wie ich bereits ausführte, darüber übereinkommen, auf welchen Stand sich ihre Rüstungen im Verhältnis zum bisherigen Sicherheitsstadium reduzieren könnten und vertraglich würde dann dieser Stand für eine bestimmt Reihe von Jahren stabilisiert werden.

Zugleich würde mit einer andern internationalen Konvention die Produktion und der Handel mit Waffen und Kriegsmaterial überhaupt geregelt werden. Nach Ablauf der festgesetzten Periode käme es zur zweiten Abrüstungsetappe. Die Arbeit zur Entfaltung weiterer Sicherheitsgarantien würde inzwischen auch fortsetzen, so dass die zweite, nach einer Reihe von Jahren einberufene Konferenz weitere bedeutsame Schritte in der Einschränkung und Reduktion der Rüstungen vollziehen würde. Das gesamte Abrüstungsproblem wäre infolgedessen nach Etappen gelöst mit einer fortschreitenden Pazifizierung des Nachkriegseuropa und der Welt. In dem Sinne sind übrigens alle Abrüstungebestrebungen zu verstehen. Schon früher hatte ich Gelegenheit zu betonen, dass das Abrüstungsproblem ein Problem mit Dauercharakter ist, dass es sich nicht durch irgend ein internationales Dekret und ein für allemal lösen lässt. Der heutige Stand der Produktion, fortwährende neue Erfindungen, die mögliche Ausnützung fast jeder Sache zur Kriegsführung, gestattet nicht, diese Frage anders aufzufassen, es versteht sich von selbst, dass sich diese Lösung schliesslich auch eine dauernde internationale Kontrolle über alle Staaten in der Abrüstungsache erzwingen wird.

5. Das ist ungefähr in allgemeinen Zügen der heutige politische und technische Stand des sogenannten Rüstungseinschränkungsproblems und des Sicherheitsproblems. Wir wissen das der Fortgang der Arbeiten, die bereits einigemal vertagte Einberufung der Vorbereitungskommission, ja auch die ganze hier auseinandergesetzte Konzeption dieser schwierigen und verantwortungsvollen Arbeit sehr entschieden kritisiert wird und kritisiert worden ist. Ich weiss, dass man sogar von einer absichtlichen Sabotage der eigentlichen Abrüstungsarbeiten spricht.

Es gibst Politiker, die glauben, oder zu glauben vorschützen, es würde einfach genügen,eine radikale Abrüstung aller und überall zu dekretieren und es würde in der ganzen Welt mit einem Male der Zustand paradiesischen Friedens eintreten.

Das ist eine unmögliche Vereinfachung der Fragen, die kompliziert sind,eine naive Auffassung in Dingen, die Naivität nicht vertragen und es könnte das auch Leichtsinn in blutigernsten Sachen sein. Ich akzeptiere nicht diesen Standpunkt. Der Abrüstungssache würde das nicht frommen, sie im Gegenteil schädigen. Von den Völkerbundsmitgliedern nimmt sie niemand ernst. Weil aber die ganze Abrüstungsidee richtig und gesund ist, weil ich glaube, dass sich diese Idee durch vorsichtiges Vorgehen in grossem Masse realisieren lässt, arbeite ich in diesen Dingen so, dass es sachlich ist, vernünftig, real und unserem Staate vorteilhaft. Ich stimme daher diesen Kritiken insoweit zu, soweit es sich um einen überflüssigen Aufschub in der Lösung von Fragen handeln würde, die bereits reif sind. Da ich aber weiss, was alles in dieser Sache schon geleistet worden ist und dass namentlich im Bund gewaltige Arbeit für das Endergebnis geleistet worden ist, lehne ich unsachliche Kritik ab, namentlich auch eine Kritik, die durch überstützte Hast entweder ein Scheitern der ersten Abrüstungsetappe verursachen würde oder direkt bewusst bewirken möchte, aus dem Chaos der Zersetzung und allgemeinen Erregung würden dann nur zersetzende Elemente von rechts und links Kapital schlagen. Ich gehöre nämlich zu jenen, die behaupten, dass verantwortliche Staatsmänner auf eine ernste internationale Konferenz erst dann gehen können, wenn sie durch Vorbereitung, detaillierte Arbeit hinter den Kulissen den Erfolg der Konferenz gesichert haben.Für eine Abrüstungskonferenz gilt dieser Grundsatz doppelt, denn ein Misserfolg der Abrüstungskonferenz würde fatal zu einem neuen wahnsinnigen Wettrüsten in allen gefährlichen politischen Wirkungen dieses Faktums führen.

All diese Sachen wurden in der Spetembersession des Völkerbundes durchgenommen und diskutiert. Man sparte nicht mit Kritiken und die Erwiderungen von beiden Seiten wurden in Genf vielleicht bisher noch niemals so aufrichtig und offen vorgebracht, wie im heurigen Jahre. Ich werde mich nicht mit den Einzelheiten dieser Diskussion befassen. Sie kennen Sie alle und wir haben sie auch schon hier in früheren Sitzungen gehört. Ich selbst wiederhole hier, was ich als Referent der dritten Kommission nach beiden Seiten hin gesagt habe, als ich im Plenum der Völkerbundsversammlung meinen Bericht über die Abrüstungsarbeiten erstattete : Ich erachte heute die Frage für technisch vorbereitet, international politisch reif,,die Situation als taktisch vom Standpunkte unseres Staates und unserer Freunde für geeignet zur Durchführung der ersten Etappe. Ich wünsche daher, dass die Vorbereitungskommission

so bal als möglich zu ihrer letzten Sitzung einberufen werde, um zu bestimmen, wann die erste Konferenz für die Beschränkung der Rüstungen einberufen werden kann. Ich stimme aber jenen zu, die verlangen, dass vor allem die gennanten drei Grossmächte sich durch direkte Verhandlungen untereinander über die Fragen der Seeabrüstung einigen, weil ohne diese Einigung die Konferenz scheitern müsste, ebenso wie die im vorigen Jahre nach Genf einberufene Konferenz gescheitert ist.

Da nun der gegenwärtige strittige Zustand der Frage zwischen den drei erwähnten Grossmächten nicht ohne ernste Gefahr verlängert werden kann, hoffe ich, dass sie in kurzer Zeit wiederum zu verhandeln beginnen und sich einigen werden. Die letzten Noten der Vereinigten Staaten an Frankreich und England rechnen übrigens damit. Aus diesen Gründen beurteile ich—wenn auch manche den gegenwärtigen Stand der Dinge kritisieren können— die internationale Situation nach dieser Richtung hin ruhig, wobei ich anerkenne, dass, wenn diese Situation noch einige Jahre andauern würde, sie auch uns viele Schwierigkeiten verursachen würde, obwohl sie uns nur indirekt tangiert und obwohl unsere Politik kein Vorwurf treffen kann, denn diese kann sich auch auf diesem Gebiete der Arbeit für internationale Pazifierung und den Frieden nur mit einem grossen Aktivum ausweisen.

6. *Beginn des Normalstadiums des Völkerbundes.* Sonst hatte die letzte Tagung der Völkerbundversammlung bereits ihre eigene Physiognomie aufzuweisen gehabt. Es bereitet sich die Zeit vor, wo der Völlkerbund, um sich so auszudrücken, in das normale Stadium seiner Arbeit eintreten wird. Bis die erwähnten drei grossen Probleme gelöst sein werden, wird es im Völkerbund keine grossen internationalen sensationellen Fragen mehr geben und dann wird keine einzige Verhandlung des Rates und der Völkerbundversammlung sensationelle oder aufregende Ereignisse von internationaler Tragweite aufweisen. Die Liquidierung des Krieges wird bis auf Dinge untergeordneter Natur beendigt sein. Grössere Dinge werden in den Völkerbund nur ausnahmsweise oder selten gelangen. Der Völkerbund wird sich allmählich, ohne seine grosse Weltbedeutung zu verlieren, auf seine administrative Tagesagenda beschränken, auf die Kontrolle der Angelegenheiten, die ihm anvertraut sind, und auf den Ausbau jener Gebiete, die bisher wegen der Notwendigkeit der Liquidierung der grossen Nachkriegsprobleme noch nicht in Angriff genommen werden konnten. Gelegentliche und zeitweilige Konflikte zwischen den Staaten bleiben ihm freilich immer vorbehalten. Ich denke jedoch namentlich an Probleme wirtschaftlicher und finanzieller Art.

Es ist kein Zweifel, dass in der kurzen Zeit von einem oder zwei Jahren, bis die erwähnten politischen Fragen aus den ständigen direkten oder indirekten Verhandlungen des Völkerbundes verschwinden werden, die Tätigkeit der Genfer Insti-

tution sich in vollem Masse auf dem Gebiet wirtschaftlicher Aktionen entwickeln wird. Das Problem der neuen und definitiven wirtschaftlichen Reorganisation Europas nach dem Kriege wird in einer sehr frappanten Form vor uns erstehen. Die ungeheure wirtschaftliche Entfaltung Amerikas, dessen Prosperität durch Bezahlung der europäischen Schulden, durch das ungeheure Territorium mit seinem gegenüber Europa ungemein hohen Standard of life und durch seine unleughares organisatorisches Uebergewicht über Europa ständig wächst, wird sicherlich mindestens auch in den folgenden 20 bis 30 Jahren in dem bisherigen Masse fortschreiten.

Die Bestimmung der denitiven Summe und die Zahlung der Reparationen wird Deutschland vor die Notwendigkeit einer ungeheuren wirtschaftlichen Kraftentfaltung stellen, die sicherlich das Problem der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit Europas ebenso sicher voru ns stellen wir wie das drehenden wirtschaftliche Uebergewicht Amerikas. Die grosse und bis zu den Grundlagen der ganzen Struktur der englischen Gesellschaft reichende Umwandlung sämtlicher wirtschaftlicher Bedingungen in Grossbritanien, die im ganzen englichen Imperium durch den Weltkrieg herbeigeführt wurde, verstärkt noch diese Notwendigkeit und Tendenz nach Reorganisation der wirtschaftlichen europäischen Zusammenarbeit im Zusammenhang mit den Verhältnissen in Deutschland und Amerika. Hierbei müssen die wirtschartlichen Notwendigkeiten in Zentraleuropa und in kurzem sicherlich auch in Sowjetrussland hervorgehoben werden. Dies alles zeigt uns, welche Aufgaben bald dem Völkerbund und uns allen gestellt sein werden. Unser Staat als Export- und Industriestaat wird von diesen grossen Wirtschafts-Veränderungen, die eine der tiefgreifendsten Konsequenzen des Weltkrieges sind, sehr tief berührt und seine Wirtschafts-nud Handelspolitik muss dafür sehr gründlich vorbereitet sein. Die Gefahren die da für uns entstehen können sind gross. Ich mache daher auf sie aufmerksam und betone, dass wir rechtzeitig an sie denken und unsere Vorbereitungen für die künftigen Kämpfe in diesen Dingen treffen müssen.

TENTH ANNIVERSARY MEETING OF THE BRITISH LEAGUE OF NATIONS UNION, LONDON, OCTOBER 26, 1928. SPEECH OF THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MR. STANLEY BALDWIN.

(The Times, October 27, 1928).

The Prime Minister was the principal speaker at the tenth anniversary meeting of the League of Nations Union, which was held in the Albert Hall last night. Lord Grey of Fallodon

presided, and among those on the platform were Lord Cecil of Chelwood and Mr. J. R. Clynes, M. P.

The Prime Minister read the following message from the King, addressed to Lord Grey:

I am gratified to receive the message of greeting you have sent me from an assembly so representative of all parties and sections in this country celebrating to-day the tenth anniversary of the League of Nations Union, and I sincerely thank you for your assurances. During these years I have followed with interest the work of the Union, and appreciate the efforts of its members to educate public opinion in support of the League, in which lies our chief hope for the future peace of the world. I offer you my best wishes for the continued strength and prosperity of the League of Nations Union.

The President of the Council of the League of Nations, M. Procopé (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland), sent the following greeting to the meeting: — "If we look cooly and objectively at the present achievements of the League, and consider that the very fact of the existence of the League of Nations as such is already a step of progress of which mankind hardly dared to dream a generation ago, we can calmly go on with our work without despondency or false expectations. The League of Nations Associations in different countries have a great task, always to keep the ideals of the League as a guiding light for general opinion. This will be an incentive for practical work, and will also hinder despondency from gaining hold of men's minds. Above all else, they have a decisive task in strengthening the basis for the work of the League. This basis I see in a spirit of solidarity, mutual understanding, and mutual responsibility among the nations. The deepening and strengthening of this spirit is the moral disarmament on which all that work should be based".

The Chairman said that, although some people might have thought that the progress made by the League of Nations had been slow, yet, as they looked at the progress which the League had made during the last ten years, since it was founded, they had every reason to be satisfied and optimistic. (Cheers). In estimating the progress of such an institution the proper standard of comparison was not some ideal which, might not accord with any promises of human life; it was not even what they themselves wished for and desired. The proper standard of comparison was what they thought they had a right to expect of it. At the foundation of the League there was enthusiasm and conviction behind it; but in the public opinion of the world at large there was a great deal of doubt and hesitation. Many people were asking themselves whether, after all, it would be a mere expression of pious aspiration without real influence on human affairs, just as many schemes of the same kind had proved before. It was not then considered that the

League of Nations was necessarily so important that Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs and Prime Ministers should attend it.

The League received a great blow, and some people thought a fatal blow, when the United States of America, whose President had so much to do with the founding of it, decided not to join. But, in spite of all that, it was not a fatal blow. In spite of all that happened at the start, the League had grown in the last few years until it had passed out of the stage of being something experimental and had come to be indispensable to the councils of the nations. It had become a matter of course that the most prominent men who held the threads of the foreign policy of Europe in their hands attended the meetings of the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, and it had grown in importance and prestige every year. It had become more and more recognized as an established institution through which international affairs could be conducted. More than one war, although they would not necessarily have been very important wars, had been averted by the League of Nations, and they knew how small wars became big wars. It had done a great deal to concentrate and bring together international effort for international welfare on all sorts of subjects. For the first time in the history of the world a nation which needel financial assistance could now get it through the League of Nations, without any idea that it was sacrificing polittical independence. (Cheers).

Besides all that, it had been something which perhaps was not foreseen even by its authors when the League was founded. It had provided a place where, every year, and even more than once a year, the chief Foreign Secretaries of Europe could meet on neutral ground. Formerly they could only meet in each other's Callands, and each meeting of the kind was looked upon with jealous curiosity and suspicion. That had all been cleared away by the League of Nations. They were now able to discuss things frankly without exciting suspicion, and the League of Nations, by providing such a meetiug-place, had done a great deal to prevent the growth again in Europe of the condition of things which led to war in 1914.

Referring to the position of the United States, the Chairman said that, just as sometimes they heard of evil things being infections and spreading in a climate which was unfortunately favourable to them, so the converse sometimes happened, and there were moral states of atmosphere in the world which seemed to be specially favourable to the growth of good influences. The League of Nations had grown to what it was because the public opinion of the world was so impressed by the last War that it was determined to have an instrument which would prevent war in the future.

"That determination," Lord Grey proceeded, "has not only existed among the members of the League of Nations; it has

also found expression, and particular expression recently, in the United States of America. The United States has shown no inclination to join the League of Nations; so far as we can judge, they are as far away from that as ever; but they have shown a desire to take parallel action in the world in the same direction as the League of Nations. The fact that the United States should have taken the initiative in parallel action to that of the League of Nations in establishing a new barrier, additional to the Covenant of the League, against agressive war, is, I believe, more favourable to the cause of peace than even if the United States had joined the League of Nations as a reluctant and hesitating member. That does show that there is a sort of influence in the world which seems to be working generally to make the League's influence, and I hope it will work equally to make the Pact for the Renunciation of War, vital things as instruments to be used to prevent future wars."

MR. BALDWIN'S SPEECH

The Prime Minister, who was received with prolonged cheers said : —

To-night, in reviewing the ten years so full of history, there is no one who would not desire to pay tribute to those whose work began in the darkest days of the War and who laid the foundations of this great organization. So far back as 13 years ago a movement started in England, in France, and in the United States of America putting forth those ideals which are the ideals of the League of Nations Union. Let us never forget the work done in the past by those who founded the League of Nations. A year before the League of Nations Union took its present form a very remarkable platform gathered together in Westminster under the chairmanship of that great Radical democrat, Lord Bryce. There spoke that day with him the Archbishop of Canterbury, General Smuts, Mr. Massey of New Zealand, Lord Hugh Cecil, and Lord Buckmaster.

Let us never forget one thing of which many people are in ignorance, that during those years when the whole mind of the nation was devoted to war, there was working in our Foreign Office, against which we have heard many foolish things said, a committee appointed by Lord Cecil under the chairmanship of Lord Phillimore, with such tried friends of our country and of peace as Sire Eyre Crowe, Sir William Tyrrell, and Sir Cecil Hurst. It was their task to try to reduce into practical form which might be of value of the future the ideals promulgated by those to whom I have already alluded. They produced a report for the consideration of the War Cabinet which became the foundation of the League's constitution. I have thought it only right to remind you of these things that you might take fresh pride in the work done by your own people.

You have alluded, Mr. Chairman, to the scepticism of certain people with regard to the League of Nations' work. Let us review swiftly what the League of Nations has done during the decade, because it is a good thing that these things should be nailed firmly down. Eight years ago, in the earliest days ot the League, a dispute arose between Sweden and Finland over the Aaland Islands. His Majesty's Government of the day brought it before the Council of the League, and it resulted in a satisfactory decision. There is an international dispute of some gravity to-day between Poland and Lithuania, mainly due to the claim made by Lithuania to the city of Vilna and certain areas around that city now forming part of Poland. That matter is now on the agenda of the Council of the League. That it has got there without bloodshep is a tribute to the slowly increasing feeling among the peoples of Europe that there is some higher authority in these matters even than their own, and there is a reluctance today, which did not exist before the War, to proceed in the light of day and before all the nations to extremities without seeking recourse for help in some other quarters.

There was a dispute between Germany and Poland upon the Upper Silesian frontier. The Council of the League examined that question by means of a specially appointed committee. The result of that was that, on the recommendation adopted by the Council, a new frontier was based so far as possible on a plebiscite. That plebiscite had been previously held, and detailed measures were framed preserving the amity of the districts. Similar disputes between Serbia and Greece and Albania respecting the latter's boundaries have been before the League and been settled, and a similar dispute between Poland and Czechoslovakia. In January, 1923, the Lithuanian troops seized Memel, and the Allied Forces were withdrawn to save bloodshed. This was a most difficult problem, and it was referred to the Council. A commission appointed by the Council framed a convention, which was eventually accepted by the parties concerned.

We ourselves had a difference with Turkey in regard to the frontiers of Iraq. We agreed to place this matter in the hands of the Council. A decision was given, accepted, and on that decision and certain recommendations in it we had negotiations with the Turkish Government which by the summer of 1926 were brought to a successful conclusion (Cheers). In October, 1925, there occurred a graver incident. Any one of the incidents I have mentioned might have led to war. This one certainly would have. An affray of a serious nature broke out on the Greek and Bulgarian frontiers. The Council of the League was summoned in haste. They requested both sides to retire to their own territory and to send representatives to lay their case before the Council.

Have you considered what an enormous advance in the pressure of world public opinion that means, that the two

nations, proud, independent, should have acted according to the desires of the Council of the League? The incident was successfully settled, and the manner in which this dispute was handled showed that the League can prevent affrays of this kind resulting necessarily in war and that an international jurisprudence is being built up, and will be built up, to which the strongest nations in time will have to conform.

There is a most important body affiliated to the League, the Permanent Court of International Justice. This Court has exceeded the hopes which were originally entertained about it. It is not quite seven years since its first meeting. It has in that time delivered 17 awards and 16 advisory opinions. Four of these awards related to cases in which we were a party. In three of the advisory opinions we were directly concerned. It is impossible to do justice to the work that they have done in the short time at my disposal, but there is no doubt that in many international disputes of a legal nature they have been settled, they are out of the way, whereas when my friend Lord Grey was Foreign Secretary they would probably have remained festering sores embittering the relations of the nations. How great was the service of the League in handling the question of the Greek refugees from Asia Minor! They helped to float the loan that made the financial part of that most difficult work comparatively easy. The International Economic Conference and the Economic Committee have been doing good work, as have the organization for communications and transit and the health organizations, which latter, I hope and believe, have made the spread of epidemics far more difficult.

Some of the most valuable work has been connected with the graver social problems. Had it not been for the League The Hague Opium Convention of 1912 might easily have remained a dead letter. The Convention of 1925 would never have been concluded. At the initiative of the British Government the International Slavery Convention was signed at Geneva two years ago and has now secured general acceptance. Conventions for the suppression of obscene publications and the abolition of the traffic in women and children have been concluded under the auspices of the League. That work is not done yet. A special body of experts have carried out a thorough investigation of that bestial trade, and they have made recommendations with a view to securing its complete and swift eradication. I have hopes of the child welfare work of the League. I do not like the title, yet I am sure the intentions of the Committee on Intellectual Co-operation are beyond all praise.

This is a great record (cheers), and I am proud of the part that my country, under successive Governments, has played in effecting it. We are not a vindictive or rancorous people by nature. I doubt if any people have subdued the war spirit more than we have. (Cheers). While we have maintained, and indeed

improved, our close and long-continued relations with France, we have reestablished completely friendly relations with the most powerful of our former enemies (cheers), and we can justly claim that we have played some small part in the better relations which now exist between France in Germany.

I must contradict the idea that has gained currency in some quarters, but for which there is no shadow of foundation, that we have to some extent abandoned our position of impartiality and conciliation which we assumed at the time of the Locarno Pact.

That is not so. We have made no new engagements; there is no change in the orientation of our policy. Our interests and our inclinations alike prompt us to preserve and even strengthen the cordiality of our relations with Germany as well as with France. With Italy we have been on the most friendly terms for generations, and nothing has occurred or will occur, to interrupt that friendship (Cheers).

May I illustrate what I may almost call the political sporting instincts of our people? I point to the case of Bulgaria, Austria, and Hungary, because here is involved a solid material performance and contribution on the part of the League of Nations. Austria, after three years of hopeless entanglements from which she was unable to extricate herself, was drifting into bankruptcy and chaos. The ex-Allied Governments forgoing for a term of years their claims for reparations, the League was able to re-establish Austria and her finances on such a sound basis that her currency has been one of the most stable in Europe; this was followed two years later by a similar financial reconstruction of Hungary, likewise involving the postponement of reparations even to the ex-Allies. Quite recently the League has intervened to solve the financial problems of Bulgaria due to the influx of refugees after the War, and we may claim with all fairness that our country has taken a leading part in this great work.

Although those financial problems are settled, there still remain various problems affecting their political relations with their neighbours which require solution. It is not my purpose to deal with those to-night, and I will confine myself to saying that the polycy of his Majesty's Government is to render such assistance as may be possible in order to establish those political relations on a normal footing and to help and complete the great post-War task of eliminating mutual rivalries and suspicion. (Cheers). I should like to pay a tribute to the three statesmen who are directing the foreign policy of these countries, and pay a tribute to the moderation and courage which they have shown in directing the foreign policy of their countries, surrounded as they are with difficulty. We sympathize with the efforts made by Bulgaria to restore stability to her institutions. Austria and Hungary are peoples for whom Englishmen have had a liking,

and both of them have had to pay heavy penalties and face grave obstacles in creating what really amounts to new States out of the wreckage of the old Monarchy. They are succeeding, but their struggle has been hard. We are proud of the share we have had through the League in furthering these efforts. In that spirit we shall continue our work.

I wish to turn from the practical achievements of the League, achievements of which no man could have dreamed ten years ago, to make some observations which have been in my mind. In this audience I suppose are gathered together as representative a body of Englishmen and Englishwomen as is to be found in this country, who are pursuing ideals of peace with heart and soul and who would consider themselves typical of our people. I want you to throw back your minds 13 years, and be honest with yourselves, as I am trying to be. Do you remember the shock that ran through England when the news first came that the Germans employed poison gas ? Can you remember how long it was before we were on our knees praying for a west wind to drive our gas over the German lines ? Do you remember what our feelings were when the first open town was bombed, and how many of us were longing for the day when the big bombers would get over Berlin ? I remind you of that because nothing could show more clearly the fatal and catastrophic fall the characters of the best suffer under the influence of war. It shows us there is something very near the surface against which we have to be on guard. It shows us that our descent is not only from the ape ; it is from the tiger.

It is true that mankind, in the infinite process of the ages, has learned that, unless the tiger be eliminated in family relations, no family relations are possible, and for long it has not been customary for family quarrels to culminate in murder. It is to be apprehended that, if the State is to survive, the tiger must be eliminated. The ape in us has been fought largely through history with spiritual powers: The tiger has not. That is a difference worth remembering. The tiger instincts which are still there, as we all showed 13 years ago, are ready to be summoned from their hidden lair in a moment, and there are not two bodies of persons more potent to summon these ancient impulses than the politicians and the Press.

So it is that the gravest responsibility today which rests on any individual or any class for the future of this world rests upon the politicians and on the Press. Let them try from tonight to realize their responsibilities, and remember that it is your duty to try and make them realize them. The fact is that we have paid much too little attention in the past to these tigrine impulses that lie along the age, impulses deep down in human nature. If you think you are going to beat the things that culminate in hatred and in war without a spiritual fight, you are foredoomed to failure. To make a vow with your lips

is not enough. To sign a covenant with your pen is not enough. It savours of crying "Lord, Lord." Such of you who are listening to me who, as myself, were baptized, made a vow of a peculiarly solemn nature through your proxies, and you renewed it, if you were ever confirmed, to renounce "the world, the flesh, and the devil." I wonder how many of us have done it? I know myself I have not. I have tried often. I fall down again and again, and I know that, if this vow of renunciation is to be kept, it means a daily struggle until you fall into the grave. It is exactly the same in these old tiger instincts of human nature. You can only save yourself and the world by a constant daily fighting against these old impulses, and in time you will win. You may feel that I ought to bid you go and wash in the rivers of Syria, whereas I am merely directing you to the Jordan.

But if you want to do something perfectly simple and easy that would really help, let me submit that from to-night onwards no member of the League of Nations Union shall add one drop to the fœtid stream of insinuation and suspicion and the attribution of low motives to statesmen of your own country or other countries who are engaged on pacificatory work in this world. In my view the statesman who makes an observation doubting the good faith of, or makes insinuations against the *bona fides* of, a foreign country for the sake of obtaining a cheer, the newspaper which puts in such paragraphs to make news—they are both of them doing the devil's work—(cheers) — and making it infinitely harder. Suspicion very quickly becomes hate, and hate very quickly becomes war.

You in this League are missionaries, or you ought to be, and as missionaries you should conduct yourselves. I dislike intensely the word propaganda. It has had a bad connotation since the War. Be careful with your propaganda. Unless propaganda comes from a pure heart and a single mind it is a boomerang. A friend of mine was staying with me last week-end. She went recently to see a propaganda film—a War film which was being shown to instil into those who saw it a hatred of war and a desire for peace. Immediately behind her were sitting a young married couple, too young to have taken any active part in the War. Before the show half over was she heard the woman say to her husband: "My dear, this shows us we have got to bring up our children to hate the Germans." (Laughter.) I mention that as a warning, and you may draw the lesson.

You may think that I have spoken much more during the time I have been in office about peace at home than peace abroad. That is true, but I have done it largely because I believe that unless a country is at peace with itself the weight of that country's voice and influence is diminished in the councils of the world, and I think so much of the spirit and of the voice of our great country that I want it to be heard, recognised, and acknowledged. No country that is not at peace in itself

can work effectively for peace outside its borders. (Cheers).

I regret profoundly the temporary failure to come to agreement with America on naval matters. The only negotiations that I have taken part in with America were the negotiations concerning the Debt 5 1/2 years ago. During the whole of those negotiations, on a somewhat difficult subject, nothing could have exceeded the frankness displayed on both sides. There was no suspicion of any kind in the minds of the Americans with whom I negotiated, and a settlement was reached which has been regarded, and rightly so, as a perfectly fair and honourable settlement to both sides. I say that because I must add, to my profound regret, that such speeches as I have been able to read from America and such articles in their publications lead me to believe that on most subjects, far different from my experience, there is a deep suspicion where this country is concerned and where the actions of this country are concerned.

There is no echo in this country of that. (Cheers.) Our policy in naval building is, and has been for the last few years, to go slow. We have no intention of building in competition with the United States of America. (Cheers.) We came to that decision, and we built slowly long before we were asked to sign the Kellogg Pact, but I would like to express the pleasure which I feel that that Pact has been signed at this time. We have deliberately turned our backs on war as an instrument that has been used from the beginning of time. We are grateful to Mr. Kellogg for bringing that treaty with him to Europe. It gives us all what in our private spiritual life we should be so grateful for—the opportunity of a fresh start.

We have most solemnly given this undertaking in each other's presence. The conception is so vast that I doubt if people yet have realized the full import of it. It means nothing less than this : that every man and woman in every civilized country of the world must work without ceasing to bring the common conscience of mankind up to the level demanded by the obligations of that treaty. War is the oldest industry in the world. It has been fought for plunder, power, religion, honour —and for peace.

This last War, in which practically the whole civilized world took part, was of so awful a nature that there is no statesman to-day, no thoughtful citizen, who does not know that another war would not only further weaken civilization, it would destroy it. Very naturally at the conclusion of the War there was a desire and a longing for peace, and perpetual peace, and among none was that desire stronger than among our own people and our workpeople. But desire, though it is a good thing, is not everything. You want the will to peace and to permanent peace ; not only the machinery, but the heart and mind and soul. It is to further that desire, to will it, that the League of

Nations was established, that the Locarno Treaties were signed, and that the Kellogg Pact was signed. One more word on what that Pact means. It means that we are trying to regulate and govern primeval instincts which are older than the nations who are trying themselves to govern them ; it means that we are trying to change the whole current of political history ; it means that we are trying to find some moral equivalent to war.

It is a hard road and a steep path, but that is all the more reason why we should brace our will and gird our loins for the task before us. (Cheers). We must neglect nothing which will make us more fit lor this ascent ; the controlling of our passions and, what is perhaps more difficult, the curbing of our own tongues. But we are making headway. Peace depends on the common conscience of mankind. I was interested to see that Dr. Benesh in a book has put more bluntly than I have some of the difficulties before us. But he confesses himself to be an optimist. So am I. (Loud cheers). Absolutism in monarchies is dead, and absolutism in States is going. The moral boundaries of countries no longer march necessarily with their political and physical boundaries. They overnow and all forms of international cooperation are springing up to-day in the most unexpected places. The great peace treaties which have been signed in the last ten years are not treaties for the aggrandissement of the British Empire. They are instruments to be used by the community of civilized nations, for the furtherance of world peace. (Cheers). I welcome public vigilance to watch our words and actions. It is for you to supply that vigilance, but it is for you to see that that vigilance is enlightened and educated.

The League of Nations must be all-embracing. It must be no preserve of what are vulgarly called pacifists on the one hand on equally vulgarly called " jingoes " on the other. No man is too good a patriot to be : member of the League of Nations Union, but the moment you lose sight of your high ideal and allow the use of your propaganda in such a way that it may be interpreted as political propaganda—the people ares very jealous—it will be far harder for you to bring about that which your souls so much desired. The League of Nations has a great future before it. It has to fight scepticism. Scepticism in its place, for the examination of questions is a very good thing. But when you have task before you such as we have, we want more than scepticism ; we want faith. Faith alone can remove mountains. Faith alone can set the goal that lies before it, and in faith along can we carry on the drudgery of the day-to-daywork amidst the din and dust and turmoil on this world's affairs ; and buoyed an alone be faith, we hope that in time we or those who come after us will one day plant our feel firmly in the everlasting paths of peace (Cheers).

Mr. Clynes, M. P., moved a vote of tank to the Prime Minis-

ter, who, he said, has addressed the meeting in terms of the deepest conviction and sincerity. Wat Mr. Baldwin had said would enormously strengthen the cause of peace and further increase power of the League of Nations Union. The League of Nations was hampered by some rather timid unbelievers, although in recent years it influence and power afforded the brightes hopes for a very great future. The League was beset by two kinds of opponents—reaction aries on the one side and revolutionaries one the other. All who believed in world peace should resolve to have the work of the League of Nations carried on by determined and earnest statesmen who had learned from the past and who fervently believed that peace could not be maintained by merely preparing for war. To the revolutionaries he would say that, if they did not sufficiently trust capitalist Governments to keep the peace, that was all the more reason why they should be inside the League to restrain any evil tendency arising from any quarter. In capitalism, or in any other condition of life that was fixed for the time being, there was upon all of them the greater obligation to frustate any warlike purpose by using the machinery of the League to make peace a certainty. He was inclined to share the Prime Ministeris conviction that peace ait home must be taken into account in assessing the value of this country's action in relation to peace abroad. But, if they could not secure absolutely a continuous state of internal peace before they secured international peace he was consoled by the conclusion that, given world peace, such a condition of international relations would have a very valuable effect indeed upon internal and industrial peace at home.

Lord Cecil, who seconded, remarked that the Prime Minister had voiced, as he so often did, the fundamental beliefs and tenets of his fellow countrymen. It was the British spirit whicb had been speaking to them that night, and that was why it was so supremely important, so vitally necessary, that the British should always play, if not a leading part, a permanent part in giving guidance to the League itself. They were convinced that M. Baldwin's reason accepted the League, and that he was temperamentally a good Leaguer. The Government had established two precedents—one that the Foreign Secretary regularly attended the meetings of the League and the other that the Prime Minister had come on to the platform of the League of Nations Union.

SPEECH OF THE BRITISH UNDER SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS LORD CUSHENDEN, DARTFORD, OCTOBER 31, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, November 2, 1928).

Lord Cushendun, the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, speaking at a meeting at Dartford on Wednesday, explained the passage in his recent speech at Blackpool upon the Anglo-French compromise which caused some misunderstanding.

"Some surprise has been expressed", he said, "over my statement in Lancashire that there was no new entente with France for the simple reason that the old entente had never been dissolved. The reason why that criticism has been made has been that people have forgotten the history of that entente, and have misunderstood its meaning. It used to be almost a commonplace that France and England were natural ennemies, the people in both countries got together and asked why that should be so, and eventually the two people agreed that they should enter into an entente—a drawing together in friendship. That was not a military alliance. But in 1914 we did have a military alliance with France over and above the established entente. When the war was finished the military alliance had done its work, and came to an end. We have no military alliance with France ; we have entered into no fresh engagement with France, but the old friendship still continues, and, I hope, will still continue.

But what has happened since the war has been that by the great pact of Locarno the entente was extended so as to include Germany as well as France. When I say we have still an entente with France I should add that we also have an entente with Germany. We are anxious to maintain relations of cordiality and friendship with both those great nations as well as with Italy. Above all, we desire, and are determined to maintain, a thorough understanding and a friendly relationship with the United States. If we succeed, as we shall, in that aim, then the peace of the world, which is the greatest interest of mankind, is certainly assured.

A great deal of nonsense, Lord Cushendun continued, had been written and said about what was called the Anglo-French compromise. It was a very curious thing that while people said that we should settle all disputes between nations by friendly means the present Government had been roundly denounced because in a matter of dispute of some importance, but not of first importance, they amicably came to an arrangement with France. They had been denounced as if they had been secret conspirators, and the idea seemed to have been put about that it was almost impossible to be friendly to one nation without thereby being hostile to some other nation. That was an absurd

idea. The policy on the Government was friendship all round. It was monstrous to have it suggested that because the Government was friendly with one nation therefore it was the enemy of others. No one had more bitterly attacked the Government than Mr. Lloyd George, who thought that Great Britain was too friendly with France, and had put forward the absurd suggestion that because of that this country was showing the old animosity towards Germany. The British people were not a rancorous people, and were only too ready to shake hands with an old enemy.

SPEECHES OF LORD THOMSON, LORD CUSHENDUN, LORD GHEY OF FALLODON AND LORD CECIL OF CHELWOOD, LONDON, HOUSE OF LORDS, NOVEMBER 7, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, November 8, 1928).

Lord THOMSON moved

That the negotiations disclosed in the White Paper regarding limitation of naval armaments constitute a grave setback to the cause of disarmament.

The Government, he said, had, in his belief, drifted in all innocence into their deal with France, and it was that very feature of the transaction which filled him with dismay. In recognising that the French trained reserves should be outside any scheme of disarmament the Government gave away a great deal and got very little in return, while exciting suspicions in the United States and in Italy. The effect of the deal would have been not to decrease armaments but to increase them all round.

He accepted Lord Salisbury's statement that the naval compromise was dead. but invited the Government, to state plainly what had become of the commitments made to the French Government during the negotiations.

After Lord Thomson had sat down there was a pause, during which Lord Cushendun (Acting Secretary for Foreign Aflairs) looked round the Chamber, but as no other noble lord rose Lord Cushendum himself stepped to the table.

Lord CUSHENDUN said that there had been a great amount of misunderstandiug and, he was afraid, a great amount of misrepresentation with reference to the matter the noble lord had brought before their lordships. The various charges made against the Government, might be divided under several heads, and he found some difficulty in precisely knowing what the actual charge against the Government was.

It is true that Lord Thomson has given a general belabouring of the Government, as many people outside have done in the last few weeks. He referred to the charge of secrety, but was kind enough to say he did not charge me personally with any secret diplomacy. He went on to show that he fully endorsed the very strong observations that have been made in the press and on the platform with regard to the concealment or attempted concealmenf of these communications. I will maintain absolutely that there has been from first to last no sort of secrety or attempted secrecy with regard to this transaction. First of all a voluntary arrangement was reached, ant it was announced publicly that conversations were going on with a view to arriving at an agreement on a subject that was perfectly well known by those who had been engaged at Geneva. Suggestions had beeu made that the best way to arrive at an agreement was to have private conversations between the Governments concerned. That was publicly announced. The compromise was reached on July 28. Two days later terms of it were telegraphed to the Japanese, Italian, and United States Governments. On the same day (July 30) the Foreign Secretary announced what had been done in the House of Commons. Lord Cushendun quoted from that speech. and said anyone who heard it or read it must have seen the purpose of it. A compromise had been reached in the hope that it might be acceptable to the other Governments also and a great obstacle to progress removed.

You will see (he said) it was simply for the purpose of removing differences that had arisen betwen ourselves and the French Government with regard to the Draft Convention for prescribing the principle upon which naval disarmament should proceed. Of course, Sir Austen Chamberlain did not give in the House of Commons the actual terms of the compromise, and I am quite free to admit that if it had been possible for him or anyone else to foresee at that time the extraordinary and, in many cases I am afraid, malicious innuendoes—(Ministerial cheers)—that sprang up in a very short time there is very little doubt that my right hon. friend would have published the terms of compromise and would have explained to the foreign Governments that this departure from the ordinary courtesy of international intercourse was for a good reason, which it would have been possible to make them understand. But no one could possibly have foreseen that. And supposing he had at that time published the exact terms of the compromise, it would not in any way have silenced the innuendoes, because most of them would have been quite as compatible with the actual text of the compromise as they were with the announcement he did make.

" As for as I can trace it ", added Lord Cushendun, " the mischief began when perfectly unauthentic statements were

made in certain French newspapers in the month of August. Those statements in the French press, resting on absolutely no foundation, were none the less believed in a widespread way. They represented that the compromise which had been spoken of by the British Foreign Secretary really covered very much more than it pretented to do. No doubt this suited the particular political movement to which they owed allegiance ".

Lord Cushendun pointed out that the French newspapers stated that this was a secret alliance and that it contained an arrangement for pooling the navies of the two countries. It was not understood that statements of that sort would cause misgiving in Germany, Italy, and the United States.

" It is very difficult to decide at what particular moment it is wise to contradict wild rumours in the press, and especially in the press of a foreign country, and I must say that when I first became aware of the sort of things that were being said in the foreign press it appeared to me that they were so utterly wild—there was no shadow of foundation for them—that I could not believe that they would not very quickly be forgotten and pass away. I thought it wiser not to issue a denial in the press. I found that this tale of mis-representation and innuendo was growing, and consequently, although I was extremely occupied at the moment, it was only when I got to Geneva that I came to the conclusion that I ought to do something to stop the false reports that were being spread.

" Thereupon I made the statement on August 30 at Geneva which gave all the circumstances as I was able to do at that time with regard to the negotiations that had been going on ".

Lord Cushendun added that he did not think his statement had the effect for which he had hoped.

Turning to Viscount Cecil, he continued : If I may say so, even my noble friend was not quite ready to accept my word in that regard ".

Viscount Cecil immediately rose in protest, and Lord Cushendun, in reply, quoted from an interview given by Lord Cecil to the " Daily Telegraph " on October 27.

Lord Cecil assurred Lord Cushendun that be made no suggestion of disbelief in that interview.

Lord Cushendum : I am very glad indeed to have that assurance.

" I want to find out what the charge is (he continued), because we are constantly being exhorted to proceed with disarmament, although I may say that we do not require any exhortation. No one is more anxions than his Majesty's Government to proceed with, to encourage and push on with, the policy of disarmament in every way that may be practicable. How does anyone suggest, except by talking together, except by consultation, except by give-and-take, it was possibte to arrive at an arrangement. I want to know by what conceivable method we

could carry that out. You cannot at one and the same time exhort us to base international relations upon agreement and in the same breath denounce us when we adopt the only method for arriving at agreement ".

Referring to " pernicious and mischievous " suggestions which had been made that because Great Britain arrived at an agreement with one nation hostility to another nation must be implied, Lord Cushendun continued : It has been said that this agreement is an Anglo-French combination against Germany, against America, or against Italy. Of course, there is not the slightest shadow of foundation or of evidence to support such an innuendo.

After pointing out that in allowing the French unlimited small cruisers and small submarines the agreement only continued the present position, Lord Cushendun said that as regard cruisers it had been urged by Lord Grey that they were proposing to arrange something that the United States had already rejected. This was not stricly accurate seing that the compromise proposed to limit large cruisers not by their tonnage but by the size of their guns. But even if it were so it could hardly be described as imbecility to suggest in negotiations something which had been rejected on a former occasion by one of the parties.

Both we and the French Government (he continued) are making large concessions from the attitude we had previously adopted. If everyone having once stated their view is to take up an immovable attitude what is the good of going to Geneva at all ?

He entirely denied that the negotiations had been a set-back to disarmament. We were back in exactly the same position as if the proposal for a compromise had not been made. There were no commitments to the French and never had been.

Lord THOMSON : No commitments on the principle of the acceptance of trained reserves ?

Lord CUSHENDUN : I say definitely there are no commitments of any sort or kind. As to the last paragraph of the concluding French Note, no reply has been sent, and for very good reasons. It seems to us that it might give a suggestion of something in the nature of closer political union rather than the friendly attitude between the two countries which I calt " entente ". We do not like to repel that advance, and we think our silence will be perfectly understood. We have not been asked for any further elucidation of our views about that, and I do not think our silence has done anything to disturb the warm and friendly feelings which I hope we all entertain towards France.

He did not believe there was any use in going to Geneva at all unless they were prepared to sink the one point of view and consent to give as well as to take. His Majesty's Government was absolutely convinced of the supreme importance of promo-

ting disarmament. but unless there was some measure of agreement it would be impossible to do anything.

Viscount GREY said the point he made in a recent speech, which he emphasised now, was that the Government ought to have known that the proposal regarding cruisers would not be acceptable to the United States. It seemed so to him, because the proposals in the Anglo-French compromise were concerned with the very point on which the three-Power conference broke down and upon which the United States felt very strongly. It was so stated in the reply by the United States Government. (Oppositions cheers). The viev he took now was that the more untoward the consequences of this failure the more care and the more urgent we should be in trying to get over the consequences.

He hoped that the statement that the compromise was dead would be corroborated in Paris. He suggested that the French and British Governments might agree each to send a communication to the United States and to Italy and Japan saying what they had said in the House of Lords that the compromise would no longer be put forward as a basis of discussion. He thought it was only logical for us not to keep the compromise alive by continuing to discuss it in this country. He wanted foreign Governments to regard the state as being clean, and whatever they had felt about the compromise they ought to recognise that there was really no intention except that of promoting general agreement and that there was not intended to be any secrecy.

" It is even more incumbent upon the Italian and American Governments ", he added, " knowing the views of the British and French Governments, to do what they can to make us acquainted with what possible things they can say which will produce general agreement ".

These isolated blunders are becoming rather too frequent, declared Viscount CECIL. He referred to the dispute which ended in his resignation as Great Britain's representative at Geneva, and added that he could not help feeling that subsequent events revealed that there were very serious grounds of dispute between him and the Government, and that he was not so wrong as the Government thought at the time.

Of course, the Government is in favour of disarmament (he continued), but are they in favour of it to the extent that they will do what is necessary to secure it ? They could not have military disarmament without naval disarmament, and they could not have naval disarmament except among the great naval Powers like Japan and the United States of America.

SPEECH OF THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MR. STANLEY BALDWIN, LONDON, GUILDHALL, NOVEMBER 9, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, november 10, 1928).

Mr. Baldwin, said ; To-night is the sixt occasion on which I have been privileged to respond to this toast, and it is four years ago to-night since the present Goverment, now entering on its last year, had just taken office. The history of those four years in Europe has been a history of stabilisation and reconstruction, a polisy based upon and rendered possible by two outstanding events. First the London Agreement, for which great credit was due to my predecessor, placed the reparations problem on a workable commercial basis and removed it out of the cockpit of political controversy and animosities. Second the Treaty of Locarno, which terminated once and for all the war period and reintroduced Germany into the comity of nations. It is true that since then there have been no sensational or spectacular achievements as those were, but the contrast now and four years ago is a real one. Enmities in Europe have disappeared or are disappearing. The world has healed or his healing. Currencies have been stabilised, and though there may be grave economic problems still to be solved, their solution is being approached in a new spirit of goodwill.

There is more and more throughout Europe and throughout the world to-day that feeling of the necessity of the nations getting closer and closer together. We were divided four years ago into two camps, the victors and the vanquished. That distinction exists no longer. I hope those words will be forgotten. We have all learned the lesson of conciliation and co-operation and goodwill, without which progress in the world is impossible. We have learnt our lesson, all of us, in a hard school, but I believe we have learned in such a way that we shall not forget it.

With France we have sought the closest co-operation, and a progressive improvement has taken place during the last five or six years in our relations, which had been marked by certain vicissitudes after the war. But now all that is a far behind, for we understand each other perhaps better than we have ever done before. And the fact that this improvement which has come with the years in our relations has been followed by a striking change in the internal condition of Germany as well as in her relations with France is the best proof, if proot were needed, that close co-operation between London and Paris does not, cannot, and shall not react to the detriment of Germany or of any other Power. On the contrary the expansion of that co-operation into the vider co-operation of Locarno still forms

the keystone of the European arch, and still constitutes the policy of his Majesty's Government.

Peace means not less co-operation but more, and the fact that his Majesty's Government so often begin by seeking co-operation with their nearest neighbour does not mean that they are in the slightest degree less eager to co-operate with others.

Before I pass from France I wish to pay a tribute to a remarkable Power and the efforts of the whole French people in repairing the devastations of the war, in re-equipping their industries, and restoring stability to a currency which at one time it seemed that nothing could save from collapse.

We find the same spirit of reconstruction in Belgium among the people whose suffering during the war might have left the crushed for all time. Belgium and Great Britain are the most highly industrialised and thickly populated countries in Europe, and have many problems and interests in common. Above all the interests of peace is an essential basis for that trade by which they live.

Then look to-day at Germany. Four years ago she had just emerged from the abyss of financial, political, and economic collapse. She has more than re-established her position as a great industrial country. She is on the high road to recovery to that wealth and prosperity which four years ago she seemed to have irretrievably lost. I have mentioned that she has re-entered into the Councils of Europe. Since then the Military Commission of Control has been withdrawn from Germany, and commercial treaties have been concluded between Germany and this country and Germany and France. Her relations with her former enemies are, in fact, restored to a position of mutual frankness and understanding. She stands to-day as a great country among her equals, and the owes that largely to the genius ot Dr. Stresemann, to whom every one in this room will whish a speedy recovery to health.

Now there are a few words I should like to say in conclusion. Mention has been made by the Spanish Ambassador, and mention has been made during my speech to the League of Nations. The League of Nations is helping in ways not always obvious to that peace which we all desire. Peace is to be made in effect by statesmen, and statesmen are fallible instruments, but nothing but good comes from those constant meetings of statesmen in the League of Nations. They learn there exactly what regard has to be paid to the peculiarities of individual personalities, and they can realise there what all people want to realise—that is, to have the vision to apprehend the effect of environment and tradition on the men who come from countries other than their own.

Nothing but good can come from this intercourse, and I believe nothing but good can come from the intercourse bet

ween those who under the auspices of the League of Nations are working in Europe to-day to improve labour conditions in all the countries of Europe.

The more the industries of Europe can get together both employers and labour to thrash out their problems together, to alleviate together the conditions of the people the more would the nations understand each other and by that understanding the less likely would they be to fight. The whole world to-day under the influence of the development of transport and applied science is contracting. The land is shrinking and the oceans are drying up and the peoples of the world are jostling each other elbow to elbow.

Though that might have a tendency to make some nervous people more quarrelsome, it would help them to realise in a way they had never realised before that they all belonged to the one human family.

"There are two things to-day that I believe will help materially to peace. I came down one Sunday morning at Chequers and went to the wireless set to try all round Europe to see if there was anything coming through at 9 a. m. By chance I struck some excellent music in Berlin and heard the singing of a hymn I thought immediately that when the day comes when nearly every cottage in this country can switch on to any station in Europe and hear the peoples of Europe at their music and dancing and hymn-singing and prayer, what a bond that will be throughout the world.

"Look back on your own childhood and the people in the country you used to talk to. We in England regarded everyone who lived across the seas as savages and pagans. We knew nothing about them ; we were not interested in them. They were "those foreigners". When the mass of the people realise that the people in every country in Europe are human beings like themselves, with a family, a wireless set, service on Sunday, dancing in the evening, and lectures, that presents a very different aspect, and I believe that wireless is going to be one of the greatest bonds between the common people of the whole world, and it is the common people in the long run who will decide whether there will be war or not".

Mr. Baldwin went on to refer to the Kellogg Pact. He said, "I wish Mr. Houghton were here to-night. In the absence of the American Ambassador I would say I believe that the time may come when in the histories of this period there will be no greater act credited to the United States than that in this year. She had the highest honour of voicing the aspirations of mankind in presenting the pact for signature.

Let us remember what it is we have signed. It is so tremendous a thing that few of us realise it. The result of that signature will mean nothing unless the nations, realising to what they are committed, make up their minds that that signature

shall be honoured to the end of time. For a nation that has signed that pact has to keep before its mind whenever it examines its own armaments and prepares its estimates what the implications of that pact are. When so much of the world as has signed that pact realises and believes the implications of it, then for the first time will the nations be able to talk disarmament in a way that will lead us into that path.

Believe me, the alternative before us in Europe is very simple and the choice should be easy. We either keep faith with the spirit of the pact we have signed or in time we go down the steep places together like the Gadarene swine and perish eternally. There are representatives of many great nations here tonight. Let us grasp this opportunity which has been given us for a new start with both hands and go forward with a new faith and a new hope. (Cheers).

DISCOURS DE CLOTURE DE LA CONFERENCE DE KOENIGSBERG ENTRE LA POLOGNE ET LA LITHUANIE, PRONONCE PAR M. ZALESKI, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES POLONAIS, KOENIGSBERG, LE 7 NOVEMBRE 1928.

(Le Messager Polonais du 8 novembre 1928).

Il y aura bientôt un an qu'à la session du Conseil de la Société des Nations à Genève Votre Excellence déclara solennellement au nom du Gouvernement lithuanien que la Lithuanie ne se considère pas en état de guerre avec la Pologne, et de mon côté je déclarai alors au nom de mon Gouvernement que « la République polonaise reconnaît et qu'elle respectera complètement l'indépendance politique et l'intégrité territoriale de la République lithuanienne ».

Ces deux déclarations solennelles permettaient d'espérer que les rapports entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie allaient enfin entrer dans une phase plus favorable et que le passé récent et triste pourrait être graduellement effacé.

Le Conseil de la Société des Nations exprima, lui aussi, la même conviction, en affirmant dans sa résolution déjà célèbre du 10 décembre 1927 qu'il « recommande aux deux Gouvernements d'entamer aussitôt que possible des négociations directes, afin d'arriver à l'établissement des relations de nature à assurer aux deux Etats voisins la bonne entente... dont la paix dépend ».

Il y a donc presque un an que la résolution en question a été prise. J'ose affirmer, et je crois que personne ne me contredira, que l'unanimité de l'opinion publique polonaise accueillit avec joie cette résolution qui semblait annoncer une nouvelle

ère dans les rapports entre les deux pays. La Nation polonaise, toujours sincèrement pacifique, désire entretenir des rapports d'amitié avec tous ses voisins et plus particulièrement avec le peuple lithuanien, avec qui elle est liée par le souvenir d'un grand passé commun.

La politique profondément pacifique du Gouvernement polonais se heurte cependant au malheureux différend qui, depuis dix ans, divise nos deux nations. Le conflit polono-lithuanien constitue, non seulement une menace constante pour le développement normal des deux Etats, mais il porte un préjudice sérieux aux intérêts économiques des Etats tiers. Il crée en cette partie de l'Europe une atmosphère malsaine d'inquiétude et de malaise.

Le gouvernement polonais faisait tout son possible pour réaliser les recommandations du Conseil de la Société des Nations. Il le faisait avec diligence et loyauté entière.

Conformément aux principes constants de sa politique extérieure, le gouvernement polonais a toujours manifesté le désir de nouer au plus vite avec le gouvernement lithuanien des relations diplomatiques et économiques normales, dans un esprit de paix et de sincère amitié.

En tenant compte d'un passé qui a laissé des traces profondes dans la mentalité de la nation lithuanienne, le Gouvernement polonais ne s'opposa pas à l'assertion dans la résolution du Conseil de la Société des Nations du 10 décembre 1927 du passage qui proclame que cette résolution, n'affecte en rien les questions, sur lesquelles les deux Gouvernements ont des vues divergeantes ». Il s'appliquait ensuite à exécuter cette résolution en toute loyauté, en respectant aussi bien la lettre que l'esprit.

C'est pourquoi, désirant ménager les sentiments et les susceptibilités lithuaniennes, le Gouvernement polonais est arrivé à la Conférence de Kœnigsberg seulement avec des projets de Conventions concernant le trafic local et des communications directes postale, télégraphique et ferroviaire entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie. Malgré que le Gouvernement polonais n'ait pas modifié, et ne saurait jamais modifier son attitude vis-à-vis de la question qui les sépare, il n'en considérait pas moins qu'en donnant son consentement à l'établissement de relations partielles entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie, il laissait à celle-ci la possibilité de conserver son point de vue sur la même question.

Même l'établissement de certains rapports entre les deux pays aurait certainement contribué à rendre plus normales les relations politiques et économiques en Europe Orientale. Il aurait encore permis d'éviter à certains Etats tiers des dommages matériels considérables.

Au cours de ces négociations, la Délégation polonaise a donné maintes preuves de ses tendances les plus conciliatrices.

Lorsque la Délégation lithuanienne souleva la question de la sécurité de l'Etat lithuanien, je m'empressai de déclarer au nom

de mon Gouvernement que j'étais prêt à conclure avec la Lithuanie un pacte de non-agression. Peu de temps après, nous avons remis à Kowno un projet de pacte de non-agression et une Convention de conciliation et d'arbitrage, basée sur l'un des projets élaborés par le Comité de sécurité de la Société des Nations.

Quand la Délégation lithuanienne formula des demandes de réparations pour l'action du Général Zeligowski, la Délégation polonaise se déclara prête à examiner aussi cette question à condition toutefois d'un examen simultané des contre-propositions polonaises. Enfin, quoique nos pourparlers concernant le règlement des échanges commerciaux n'aient abouti à aucun résultat, le gouvernement polonais n'a pas grevé de taxes supplémentaires les marchandises lithuaniennes.

L'aperçu très sommaire que je viens de faire des travaux de notre Conférence, ainsi que de ces commissions, nous montre que malgré des efforts continus du Gouvernement Polonais, nous ne sommes arrivés à aucun, ou presque aucun, résultat positif, à l'exception d'une Convention concernant le trafic local, à portée extrêmement limitée, nous n'aurons rien à présenter au Conseil de la Société des Nations au mois de décembre prochain. Je ne puis qu'en exprimer mes plus profonds regrets.

Je ne sais pas quelle opinion émettra le Conseil de la Société des Nations sur nos travaux. Je sais seulement que la délégation polonaise se présentera devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations profondément convaincue qu'elle a toujours agi conformément à la lettre et à l'esprit de la résolution du Conseil du 10 décembre 1927.

En constatant l'insuccès de la Conférence de Kœnisgberg, je suis loin de penser que cet échec signifie que nos relations avec la Lithuanie devaient rester indéfiniment anormales. Je crois, au contraire, que le peuple lithuanien se convaincra de plus en plus que la Pologne désire sincèrement son indépendance et sa prospérité, qu'elle est animée envers lui d'un esprit de vrai et profonde amitié.

Je crois aussi que le Gouvernement lithuanien appréciera enfin, à sa juste valeur, la politique polonaise, animée de l'esprit de conciliation, poussée jusqu'aux dernières limites, et s'il manifeste le désir de reprendre les pourparlers avec la Pologne sur une base autorisant l'espoir d'un résultat positf, je vous prie de croire, Monsieur le Président, que ni le gouvernement polonais ni moi, nous ne nous y déroberons pas, malgré tant de déceptions, à une nouvelle tentative d'établir enfin des relations normales entre nos deux Etats. Il s'agit là aussi bien de l'intérêt de la Pologne que de celui de la Lithuanie. Il s'agit là aussi de l'intérêt de toutes les nations qui désirent sincèrement la pacification de l'Europe.

SPEECH DELIVERED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MR. COOLIDGE, WASHINGTON, UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE AMERICAN LEGION, NOVEMBER 11, 1928.

(The Times November, 12, 1928).

Viewed from its economic results, war is the most destructive agency that ever afflicts the earth. Yet it is the dead here and abroad who are gone for ever. While our own losses were thus very large, the losses of others required a somewhat greater proportionate outlay, but they are to be reduced by the territorial acquisitions and by reparations. While we shall receive some further credits on the accounts I have stated as our costs our outlay will be much greater than that of any other country. Whatever may be thought or said of us, we know, and every informed person should know, that we reaped no selfish benefit from the War. No citizen of the United States needs to make any apology to anybody anywhere for not having done our duty in defence of the cause of world liberty.

Such benefits as came to our country from our War experience were not represented by material values, but by spiritual values. The whole standard of our existence was raised; the conscience and the faith of the nation were quickened with new life. The people awoke to the drum-beats of a new destiny.

In common with most of the Great Powers, we are paying the cost of that terrible tragedy. On the whole, the War has made possible a great advance in self government in Europe; yet in some quarters society was so near disintegration that it submitted to new forms of absolutism to prevent anarchy. The whole essence of war is destruction. It is the negation and the antithesis of human progress. No good thing ever came out of war that could not better have been secured by reason and conscience.

Every dictate of humanity constantly cries aloud that we do not want any more war. We ought to take every precaution and make every honourable sacrifice, however great, to prevent it. Still, the first law of progress requires the world to face facts, and it is equally plain that reason and conscience are as yet by no means supreme in human affairs. The inherited instinct of selfishness is very far from being eliminated; the forces of evil ore exceedingly powerful.

The eternal questions before the nations are how to prevent war and how to defend themselves if it comes. There are those who see no answer except military preparation. But this remedy has never proved sufficient. We do not know of any nation which has ever been able to provide arms enough so as always to be at peace. Fifteen years ago the most thoroughly equipped

peoples of Europe were Germany and France. We saw what happened. While Rome maintained a general peace for many generations, it was not without a running conflict on the borders which finally engulfed the Empire. But there is a wide distinction between absolute prevention and frequent recurrence, and peace is of little value if it is constantly accompanied by the threatened or the actual violation of national rights.

If the European countries had neglected their defences, it is probable that war would have come much sooner. All human experience seems to demonstrate that a country which makes reasonable preparation for defence is less likely to be subject to a hostile attack and less likely to suffer a violation of its rights which might lead to war. This is the prevailing attitude of the United States and one which I believe should constantly determine its actions. To be ready for defence is not to be guilty of aggression. We can have military preparation without assuming a military spirit. It is our duty to ourselves and to the cause of civilization, to the preservation of domestic tranquillity to our orderly and lawful relations with foreign peoples, to maintain an adequate Army and Navy.

We do not need a large land force. The present size of our regular Army is entirely adequate, but it should continue to be supplemented by a National Guard and Reserves, and especially with the equipment and organization in our industries for furnishing supplies. When we turn to the sea the situation is different. We have not only a long coast line, distant outlying possession, a foreign commerce unsurpassed in importance, and foreign investments unsurpassed in amount, the number of our people and value of our treasure to be protected, but we are also bound by international treaty to defend the Panama Canal. Having few fuelling stations, we require ships of large tonnage, and, having scarcely any merchant vessels capable of mounting five-or six-inch guns, it is obvious that, based on positions, we are entitled to a larger number of warships than a nation having these advantages.

Important, however, as we have believed adequate national defence to be for preserving order and peace in the world, we have not considered it to be the only element. We have most urgently, and to some degree successfully, advocated the principle of the limitation of armaments. We think this should apply both to land and to sea forces, but, as the limitation of armies is very largely a European question, we have wished the countries most interested to take the lead in deciding this among themselves. For the purpose of naval limitation we called the Washington Conference, and secured an agreement as to capital ships and aeroplane carriers, and also as to the maximum unit tonnage and maximum calibre of guns and cruisers. But the number of cruisers, lesser craft, and submarines has no limit.

It no doubt has some significance that foreign Governments made agreements limiting that class of combatant vessels in which we were superior, but refused limitation in the class in which they were superior. We made altogether the heaviest sacrifice in scrapping work which was already in existence. That should for ever remain not only a satisfaction to ourselves but a demonstration to others of our good faith in advocating the principle of limitation. At that time we had 23 cruisers and ten more nearly completed. One of these has since been lost and 22 are nearly obsolete. To replace these we have started building eight. The British have since begun and completed seven, are building eight, and have five more autorized. When their present legislation is carried out they will have 68 cruisers. When ours is carried out we shall have 40. It is obvious that, eliminating all competition, world standards of defence require us to have more cruisers.

This was the situation when I requested another Conference, which the British and Japanese attended, but to which Italy and France did not come. The United States there proposed a limitation of cruiser tonnage of 250.000 to 300.000 tons. As near as we could figure out their proposal, the British asked for from 425.000 to 600.000 tons. As it appeared to us that to agree to so large a tonnage constituted not a limitation but an extension of war fleets, no agreement was made.

Since that time no progress seems to have been made. In fact, the movements have been discouraging. During last summer France and England made a tentative offer which would limit the kinds of cruisers and submarines adapted to the use of the United States, but left without limit the kind adapted to their use. The United States, of course, refused to accept this offer. Had we not done so, the French Army and the British Navy would be so near unlimited that the principle of limitation would be virtually abandoned. The nations have already accomplished much in the way of limitation, and we hope may accomplish more when the Preliminary Conference called by the League of Nations is reconvened.

Meantime the United States and other nations have been successfully engaged in undertaking to establish additional safeguards and securities to the peace of the world by another method. Troughout all history war has been occurring until it has come to be recognised by custom and practice as having a certain legal standing. It has been regarded as the last resort, and has too frequently been the first. When it was proposed that this traditional attitude should be modified between the United States and France, we replied that it should be modified among all nations. As a result, representatives of 15 Powers have met in Paris and signed a treaty which condemns recourse to war, renounces it as a national policy, and pledges them not to seek to resolve their differences except by preaceful action.

While this leaves the questions of national defence and limitation of armaments practically where they were as the negative supports of peace, it discards all threat of force and approaches the subject on its positive side. For the first time in the world the leading Powers bind themselves to adjust disputes without recourse to force. While recognizing to the fullest extent the duty of self defence, an not undertaking, as no human ingenuity could undertake, an absolute guarantee against war, it is the most complete and will be the most effective instrument for peace that was ever devised.

So long a promises can be broken and treaties can be violated we can have no positive assurances, yet every one knows they are additional safeguards. We can only say that this is the best that mortal man can do. It is beside the mark to argue that we should not put faith in it. The whole scheme of human society, the whole progress of civilization, requires that we should have faith in men and in nations. There is no other positive power on which we could rely. All the values that have ever been created, all the progress that has ever been made, declare that our faith is justified.

For the cause of peace the United States is adopting the only practical principles that have ever been proposed, of preparation, limitation, and renunciation. The progress that the world has made in this direction in the last ten years surpasses all the progress ever before made. Recent developments have brought to us not only a new economic, but a new political relationship to the rest of the world. We have been constantly debating what our attitude ought to be towards the European nations. Much of our position is already revealed by the record. It can truthfully be characterized as one of patience, consideration, restraint, and assistance. We have accepted settlement of obligations, not in accordance with what was due, but in accordance with the merciful principle of what our debtors could pay. We have given of our counsel when asked, and of our ressources for constructive purposes, but we have carefully refraided from all intervention which was unsought or which we believed would be ineffective, and we have not wished to contribute to the support of armaments. Whatever assistance we may have given to finishing the War, we feel free from any responsibility for beginning it. We do not wish to finance preparation for a future war.

We have heard an impressive amount of discussion concerning our duty to Europe. Our own people have supplied considerable quantities of it. Europe itself has expressed very definite ideas on this subject. We do have such duties. We have acknowledged them and tried to meet them. They are not all on one side, however. They are mutual. We have sometimes been reproached for lecturing Europe, but ours are not the only people who sometimes engage in gratuitous criticism and

advice. We have also been charged with pursuing a policy of isolation. We are not the only people either who desire to give their attention to their own affairs. It is quite evident that both of those claims cannot be true. I think no informed person at home or abroad would blame us for not intervening in affairs which are peculiarly the concern of others to adjust, or, when we are asked for help, for stating clearly the terms on which we are willing to respond.

Immediately following the War we went to the rescue of friend and for alike in Europe on the grounds of humanity. Later our experts joined with their experts in making a temporary adjustment of German reparations, and securing the evacuation of the Ruhr. Our people lent £110,000,000 to Germany to put that plan into immediate effect. Since 1924 Germany has paid on reparations about £1,300,000,000, and our people have lent to national, State, and municipal Governments and to corporations in Germany a little over £1.100,000,000. It could not be claimed that this money is the entire source from which reparations have been directly paid, but it must have been a large factor in rendering Germany able to pay. We also lent large sums to the Governments and corporations in other countries, to aid in their financial rehabilitation.

I have several times stated that such ought to be our policy. But there is little reason for sending capital abroad while rates for money in London and Paris are at 4 or 5 per cent. and ours are much higher. England is placing very considerable loans abroad : France has had large credits abroad, some of which have been called home. Both are making very large outlays for military purposes. Europe, on the whole, has arrived at a state of financial stability and prosperity where it cannot be said we are called on to help or act much beyond a strict business basis. The needs of our own people require that any further advances by us must have most careful consideration.

For the United States not to wish Europe to prosper would be not only a selfish, but an entirely unenlightened, view. We want the investment of life and money which we have made there to be to their benefit. We should like to have our Government debts all settled, although it is probable that we could better afford to lose them than our debtors could afford not to pay them. Divergent standards of living among nations involve many difficult problems. We intend to preserve our high standards of living, and we should like to see all other countries on the same level. With a whole-hearted acceptance of Republican institutions, with the opening of opportunity to individual initiative, they are certain to make much progress in that direction.

It is always plain that Europe and the United States are lacking in mutual understanding. We ere prone to think they can do as we can do. We are not interested in their age-old animosities ; we have not suffered from centuries of violent hostili-

ties. We do not see how difficult it is for them to displace distruct in each other with faith in each other. On the other hand, they appear to think that we are going to do exactly what they would do if they had our chance. If they would give a little more attention to our history and judge us a little more closely by our own record, and especially find out in what directions we believe our real interests to lie, much which they now appear to find obscure would be quite apparent.

We want peace, not only for the same reason that every other nation wants it, because we believe it to be right, but because war would interiere with our progress. Our interests all over the earth are such that a conflict anywhere would be enormously to our disadvantage. If we had not been in the world War, in spite of some profit we made in exports, whichever side had won in the end, our losses would have been very great. We are against aggression and imperialism, not only because we believe in local self-government, but because we do not want more territory inhabited by foreign people. Our exclusion of emigration should make that plain. Our outlying possessions, with the exception of the Panama Canal Zone, are not a help to us, but a hindrance. We hold them, not as a profit, but as a duty. We want limitation of armaments for the welfare of humanity. We are not merely seeking our advantage in this, as we do not need it, or attempting to avoid expense, as we can bear it better than anyone else.

If we could secure a more complete reciprocity in good will, the final liquidation of the balance of our foreign debts, and such further limitation of armaments as would be commensurate with the treaty renouncing war, our confidence in the effectiveness of any additional efforts on our part to assist in the further progress of Europe would be greatly increased.

As we contemplate the past ten years there is every reason to be encouraged. It has been a period in which human freedom has been greatly extended; in which the right of self-government has come to be more widely recognized. Strong foundations have been laid for the support of these principles. We should by no means be discouraged, because practice lags behind principle. We make progress slowly, and over a course which can tolerate no open spaces. It is a long distance from a world that walks by force to a world that walks by faith. The United States has been so placed that it coult advance with little interruption along the road of freedom and faith. It is befitting that we should pursue our course without exultation, with due humility, ant with due gratitude for the important contributions of the more ancient nations which have helped to make possible our present progress and our future hope. The greatest responsabilities that can come to a people in this world have come to us. We must not fail to meet them in accordance with the requirements of conscience and righteousness.

SPEECH OF MR. KELEOGG, SECRETARY OF STATE OF THE UNITED STADES OF AMERICA, NEW YORK, NOVEMBER 11, 1928.

(The Times, November 12, 1928).

Mr. Kellogg. the U. S. Secretary of State, addressed a meeting of the World Alliance for International Friendship at the Metropolitan Opera House, New York, yesterday.

In the course of his address Mr. Kellogg said that the best way to abolish war as a means of settling international disputes was to extend the field of arbitration and conciliation, and to renounce war as an instrument of international policy. Thus the illegality of war might be established as a principle of international law.

One other means which could be take by Governmental authorities and also by private organizations was to inculcate into the minds of the people a peaceful attitude. « If the people are minded that there shall be no war there will not be ». Mr. Kellogg then outlined the steps taken by the United States in the direction of arbitration and conciliation,and declared that there was a great forward peace movement all over the world mentioning the Locarno Treaties and many others negotiated in Europe as well as in Central and South America. Probably no part of the world had made such progress in arbitration as Central and South America. National jealousies and ambitions and racial animosities often were the causes of ware ; these causes could be eliminated through education, through the development of tolerance,and through the creation of an effective desire for peace.

Dealing with the multilateral anti-war treaty lately signed in Paris, Mr. Kellogg recalled that the original suggestion of this movement came from M. Briand, who proposed to the United States to enter into a bilateral treaty with France to abjure war as a means of settling disputes between them. The united States Government believed that this grand conception should be extended to all the nations of the world. The treaty, negotiated in the blazing light of full publicity, came from visualized expression of the desolated battlefields, from ruined homes, and brokem men, and stirred the great beating heart of Humanity. He could say without the slightest doubt that the treaty met the matured judgment of the people of the United States. The treaty was a simple and plain declaration and agreement, not cumbered with reservations and conditions stipulating when a nation might be justified in going to war. It would not, in his view, in any way conflict with the obligations of the Locarno Treaties, the League of Nations, or other treaties guaranteeing

neutrality. Up to the present time 58 nations had either signed the treaty as original parties or had adhered to it, or had notified the State Department at Washington of their intention to adhere to it. In his belief all the nations of the world would adhere to the treaty and make it one of the principles of their national policy. " There are ", Mr. Kellogg added, " no collateral reservations or amendments made to the treaty as finally agreed upon. During the negotiation of this treaty, as in the case of other treaties, questions were raised by various Governments and discussed, and in many of my Notes I explained the legal effect or construction of the treaty. There is nothing in any of these Notes, or in my speeches sent to the signatory Powers during the negociations, which is inconsistent with, or changes the meaning of, the treaty as finally signed. Finally the countries were satisfied that no modification of the treaty was necessary to meet their views ". A nation claiming to act in self-defence must justify itself before the bar of world opinion as well as before the signatories of the treaty. The mere claim of self defence was not going to justify a nation before the world. As to a world tribunal or super-state to decide when a nation had violated its agreement not to go to war or by force to maintain peace and to punish the offender, he did not believe that all the independant nations had yet arrived at the advanced stage of thought which would permit such a tribunal to be established. " I do not believe the United States or many nations in the world would be willing to submit to any tribunal to the decide the question of whether a nation had violated this treaty, or irrevocably pledge themselves to military or other action to enforce it. . . . In any event, it is not at all pratical for the United States to enter into such an obligation ".

It could not be said that the treaty entangles the United States in the affairs of Europe. It no more entangled them in the political affairs of foreign countries than any other treaties which the United States had made. He knew of no moral obligation to agree to apply sanctions or to punish a treatybreaking State unless there was some promise to do so and no one could claim that there was such a promise in the multilateral treaty. The United States was anxious for the peace, prosperity and happiness of the people of Europe as well as of the rest of the world. " Because we did not approve of the Treaty of Versailles and the League of Nations in all respects, it has been assumed by some that we no longer take any interest in Europe and world affairs. I for one do not accept this as a just estimate of our national character and vision ".

France and the United States had pointed out to other nations a hopeful pathway to world peace, and other nations had gladly agreed to follow that path. " Whether or not we reach our common goal depends not so much upon Governments as upon

the peoples from whom their powers flow. I believe in the people. I have confidence in mankind and I am happy that I have been privileged to participate in the conclusion of a treaty which should make it easier for men and women to realize their long-cherished ideal of peace on earth ".

SPEECHES OF LORD PARMOOR, LORD CUSHENDUN AND LORD CECIL OF CHELWOOD, LONDON, HOUSE OF LORDS, NOVEMBER 15, 1928.

(The Times, November 16, 1928).

Lord Parmoor called attention to the recent meeting of the Assembly of the League of Nations at Geneva, and mowed : —

That this House regrets that the British delegation to the Ninth Assembly at Geneva did not give effective support to further the policy of disarmament and all-inclusive arbitration.

He said the Government had overlooked the fact that, to get rid of the fear of aggression, which was a cause of war, it was necessary to have a universal means of settling disputes, and until that was done real disarmament was not likely to be achieved. The Protocol was an attempt to introduce a system of general settlement of disputes without recourse to war and, since it was overthrown by the British Government, no successful attempt had been made to obtain a basis on which a Disarmament Conference could be properly summoned. The League of Nations had assented to the proposition that it was possible to settle international disputes under the auspices of the League by pacific methods. Was it possible to come to a true international policy of conciliation and peace unless we paid due attention to the opinions expressed in that great Parliament of the nations of the world ? Speaking in September, M. Paul-Boncour, the French representative, said that two attempts—the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Protocol—had been made to achieve the complete security which would enable complete disarmament to be carried into effect in accordance with the hope of nations. He said that there could be no reason to reproach those who had constantly inspired those great efforts to achieve general security and who had at first affixed their signatures to the Protocol, which he had no intention of repudiating. Whatever might be the changes in the political majority of France, the signature which he had affixed to the Protocol would always remain valid. It was for others to revive the Protocol if it seemed good to them to do so ; France was always ready. That meant, said Lord Parmoor, that France

was always ready to accept the great principles between all nations of conciliation, judicial decision, and, all-round, universal arbitration. That was a better basis for a thorough understanding with France, America, and other countries than any negotiation, even if it succeeded, much more if it ended in misunderstanding and disappointment. Why could we not deal with this question on the new view of promoting international understanding ; why did we still cling to the old views of diplomatic procedure which still kept alive the competitive spirit between countries ?

Lord Cushendun, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, thanked Lord Parmoor for his kindness to him personally in postponing the motion from last Tuesday. Lord Parmoor, he said, had practically confined his speech to slight variations on the Protocol and the Optional Clause, Looking through the Official Report recently, he found that in February, when he had only been in the House a very short time, he made the comment in reply to Lord Parmoor that that was the fourth time on which he had replied to his observations about the Protocol and the Optional Clause. He was not quite certain whether, since February he had had three or four occasions of replying to the same speech in the same observations. Therefore, he did not think he could make a more effective reply to Lord Parmoor than to give him the pages of the Official Report, where he would see his answer to his case.

Lord Parmoor.—Of course, the point of what I said is the Ninth Assembly, which has never been discussed before in this House and never could have been.

Lord Cushendun said that he did not suggest that Lord Pamoor had not a perfect right to make the speech that he had made.

Lord Parmoor.—It is a new matter.

Lord Cushendun said that the noble lord had made his present speech in regard to what happened at the Assembly ; the last time it was on what happened at the Council ; and he believed that the time before it was on what had happened at the Preparatory Commission, but the subject was the same on all occasions.

For reasons which they could all appreciate, Lord Parmoor was under the amiable delusion that 1924 was the golden age, that 1924 was actually the zenith of all that made for peace and prosperity in the world ; and that there had been a sad decline ever since. The noble lord had told the House that day, for the fifth or sixth time since he (Lord Cushendun) had been there, that if only the Protocol had been accepted everything else would have successfully followed. The noble lord quoted an expression of opinion from M. Paul-Boncour, who took the same view as Lord Parmoor ; and it was not very suprising, if one knew all the circumstances, that he did so. He (Lord Cu-

shendun) took a totally different view. Lord Parmoor had referred to what he called the international atmosphere, and seemed to think that at Geneva, not only M. Boncour but almost everybody except the representative of the British Government, was sighing for the lost Protocol. That was not his experience. His opinion was that if the Protocol, by any misfortune, had been carried, so far from helping disarmament, we should have had to be increasing both our Army and our Navy at present, for unless we were not in a very strong naval and military position we should not really have been in a position to make good the undertakings which our liabilities under that instrument would have put on us. He agreed that without security it was almost hopeless to get disarmament ; but the problem upon which they were constantly engaged at Geneva was how to devise a system which would give a sufficient sense of security. It was for the very purpose of enabling the Preparatory Commission to get on with its work that the Government came to an arrangement with France, for which they had been belaboured and denounced ever since. At the present moment the prospects with regard to the Preparatory Commission did not seem to be very hopeful ; but he did not understand why Lord Parmoor should try to bring home the responsibility for that to the British Government ; so far from having failed to give effective support in furtherance of disarmament, they had taken every possible step to further it. They had made concessions to others ; they had given up positions which they were advised were of very great importance to this country ; and they had given every possible demonstration of their desire to go to the farthest possible length to bring about agreement for the purpose of disarmament. He entirely repudiated the idea that the backward position with regard to disarmament was due to any action or omission on the part of his Majesty's Government. They agreed that machinery for ensuring the peaceful settlement of international disputes was essential ; but the whole difference arose as to what were the best, the most effective, and the most feasible methods of peaceful settlement.

Viscount Cecil of Chelwood, referring to the question of arbitration in international disputes, said section 2 of the Kellogg Pact deserved careful consideration. It was true that the signatories did not bind themselves to settle disputes by peaceful means, but they bound themselves not to settle disputes by any other means. The policy of not settling disputes could not be a good one. That was an additional reason for considering once again if there was not some practical method by which they could settle international disputes by conciliatory means. He asked Lord Cushendun to look again into that question. He was intensely gratified to hear the Prime Minister's eloquent eulogy of and expression of confidence in the Court of International Justice in his speech at the Albert Hall, and it seemed to

him perhaps an encouragement to hope that at some not very distant date his noble friend might be able to consider more favourably how that Court could best be used. The second method of approaching this question would be by calling another meeting of the Preparatory Commission, which had not met since Easter last year. No doubt the failure of the three Powers conference last year, and of the Anglo-French compromise this year, were both circumstances which militated against the probability of a successful meeting now of the Commission ; but even so, he found it difficult to believe that it would not be possible to find some solution of the difficulties which met the Commission last year.

It was very easy to exaggerate the differences between the British and the French Governments on the naval question ; they were not very profound. He agreed that it was not much use for the Disarmament Commission to meet again unless there was some prospect of a solution ; the Government must be the judge of whether a meeting could usefully be called. There was one further avenue by which this question could be approached—that was, by a Naval agreement with the United States. That was wery delicate ground upon which to touch, particularly at the present time, yet there, too, there seemed to be a very considerable measure of agreement. He recognized that the Government might not desire to commit themselves by a public statement, but he hoped that they would allow no tradition or prejudice to prevent an advance in that direction. In all human probability there was a comparatively short time before them in which they could erect barriers against war ; it would not last very long (cheers), and no means he could think of would be as effective as a general agreement on the reduction of armaments.

The motion was rejected by 33 votes to 10—majority, 23.

REDE DES DEUTSCHEN AUSSENMINISTERS DR. GUSTAV STRESEMANN, BERLIN, REICHSTAG, 19. NOVEMBER 1928

(Frankfurter Zeitung vom 20. November 1928).

Nach längerem erzwungenem Fernsein habe ich zum ersten Mal wieder die Ehre, vor Ihnen über die aktuellen Fragen der deutschen Aussenpolitik zu sprechen. Den für uns wichtigen Verhandlungen der September-Völkerbundstagung konnte ich nicht beiwohnen. Um so mehr fühle ich mich verpflichtet, meinen Dank dem Herrn Reichkanzler auszusprechen, der, als mir die Teilnahme an dieser Vollversammlung des Völkerbundes unmöglich wurde, ohne Zögern meine Bitte erfüllt hat,

en meiner Stelle an die Spitze der Delegation in Genf zu treten. Mit meinem Dank an ihn möchte ich die Erklärung verbinden, dass ich für alle Schritte, die von Deutschland in den letzten Monaten auf aussenpolitischem Gebiete getan worden sind, meinerseits die volle Verantwortung mitübernehme, und zwar nicht nur nach der formalen Seite, sondern auch auf Grund der Uebereinstimmung der Anschauungen. Lassen sie mich drei Fragen in den Mittelpunkt meiner Erklärung stellen : die Frage der Räumung, der Abrüstung und vor allem die Lösung der Raparationsfrage. Die deutsche Reichsregierung hat vor der diesjährigen Vollversmammlung des Völkerbundes die beteiligten Regierungen auf diplomatischem Wege davon in Kenntnis gesetzt, dass sie beabsichtige, in Genf, die Räumungsfrage offiziell aufzuwerfen. Die Kritik diese Schrittes, die sich darauf stützt, dass man einen Misserfolg hätte voraussehen müssen, kann ich nicht als berechtigt anerkennen. Wir können diese Frage nicht aus den Gesichtspunkten der Taktik und Opportunität behandeln.

Der Zeitpunkt war gekommen, die Räumungsfrage aus der Sphäre inoffizieller und vertraulicher Besprechnungen herauszubringen und unseren Anspruch den Besatzungsmächten gegenüber in aller Form geltend zu machen. Nicht nur Deutschland,sondern auch weiteste Kreise des Auslandes empfinden die heute noch fortdauernde Anwesenheit fremder Truppen auf deutschem Gebiet als einen krassen Gegenstatz zu der Entwicklung der internationalen Politik in den letzten Jahren. Wenn wir von unserem rechtlichen, moralischem und politischem Anspruch auf alsbaldige Räumung überzeugt sind, musste dieser Anspruch nicht nur in einseitigen Erklärungen im deutschen Parlament, sondern auch in offizieller internationaler Form der Gegenseite gegenüber zum Ausdruck gebracht werden. Wir brauchten und brauchen auch heute nicht zu befürchten, dass auch eine negative Klärung der Lage für die internationale Stellung Deutschlands irgendwie von Nachteil sein könnte. Auf den Verlauf der Genfer Verhandlungen in dieser Frage brauche ich nicht näher einzugehen. Es war für das deutsche Volk eine tiefe Enttäuschung, dass wir mit unserem Anspruch in Genf nicht durchgedrungen sind. Unsere Verhandlungsgegner haben eine Auffassung vertreten, die wir rechtlich nicht anerkennen können und die politisch im Gegensatz zu einer Förderung der gemeinsamen Interessen der beteiligten Völker ist.

Deutschland wird dabei verharren, dass es einen Anspruch auf alsbaldige Räumung des gesamten besetzten Gebietes hat und dass dieser Anspruch weder von der Lösung anderer Probleme noch von sonstigen Bedingungen irgendwelcher Art abhängt. Deutschland wird in seinem Rechte verletzt, solange dieser Anspruch nicht erfüllt wird. Es kann deshalb für uns nicht in Betracht kommen, für die Räumung politische Bela-

stungen, deren Wirkung sich über die Dauer der vertragsmässigen Besatzungsfristen erstrecken würde, in irgendwelcher Art auf uns zu nehmen. Ebensowenig besteht für uns die Möglichkeit die Räumung mit Gegenleistungen fiananzieller Art zu erkaufen. Ich stelle mit Genugtuung fest, dass noch vor wenigen Tagen auch von massgehender britischer Seite grundsätzlich anerkannt worden ist, dass es sich bei der Räumung der besetzten Gebiete und bei der Regelung der Reparationsfrage um zwei völlig getrennte Dinge handelt. Wir müssen erwarten, dass dieser Standpunkt sich nun auch praktisch auswirkt und dazu führt, Deutschland endlich von den fremden Truppen zu befreien. In den Augen des deutschen Volkes ohne Unterschied der Parteien erscheint der bisherige Verlauf der Räumungsverhandlungen als ein Rückschlag, der das Vertrauen auf den guten Willen der Gegenseite ernstlich beeinträchtigen muss. Das gilt auch für diejenigen Länder, die es als ihre grundsätzliche Auffassung bezeichnen, dass sie kein Interesse an der weiteren Aufrechterhaltung der Besatzung hätten. die aber ihre grundsätzliche Auffassung bisher in die Wirklichkeit nicht umgesetzt haben.

Ein freundschaftliches Zusammenwirken Deutschlands mit fremden Ländern kann moralisch nicht fundiert werden, solange diese Freundschaft dem deutschen Volke durch die Waffen fremder Besatzungen versinnbildlicht wird. Ich muss zu meinem Bedauern feststellen, dass auch der Geist der Besatzung in den Rheinlanden einen Rückschlag erfahren hat, der natürlich auch auf die deutsche Bevölkerung des besetzten Gebietes gewirkt hat. An den Verlauf der Genfer-Verhandlungen sind in der Oeffentlichkeit Betrachtungen geknüpft worden, die in ihrer schärfsten Formulierung auf die Behauptung hinauslaufen, dass die in den letzten Jahren verfolgte deutsche Aussenpolitik sich nun entgültig als verfehlt erwiesen habe. Obwohl ich selbst soeben einen Rückschlag dieser Politik habe feststellen müssen, halte ich es für notwendig, für ihre Grundlinie und deren konsequente Fortsetzung hier in voller Oeffentlichkeit einzutreten. Man sieht in unserer Politik Rücksichtnahme und wünscht sie zu ersetzen durch eine Politik nüchterner Wahrung deutschen Rechtes und deutscher Interessen. Man hat hinzugefügt, dass es für uns darauf ankomme, uns in freier Wahl die Unterstützung dazu zu suchen, wo sie zu finden sei.

Ist unsere Politik nicht eine Realität gegenüber dem Phantom, zu glauben, dass die uns fehlende Grossmachtstellung sich mit negativen Protesten und Kraftworten erreichen liesse? Ist unsere Politik nicht die Grundlage für alle Forderungen, die wir im Interesse unseres Landes stellen müssen? Ich kenne keine festen Bindungen an einzelne Grossmächte, die gelöst werden müssten, um uns die notwendige Bewegungsfreiheit zur friedlichen Verständigung mit anderen Mächten zu verschaffen.

Ich kann auch nicht zugeben, dass eine ängstliche Rücksichtnahme uns an der nüchternen Wahrung der deutschen Rechte und Interessen gehindert hätte. Ich sehe keine Unterstützung, die uns irgendwie in der Weise gewährt würde, dass sie uns an Stelle des angeblichen Phantoms einst Grossmachtstellung die tatsächliche politische Machtstellung gäbe. Ich möchte im Gegenteil davor warnen, Möglichkeiten vorzutäuschen, die in Wahrheit nicht gegeben sind. Selbst wenn sich die Auffassung als richtig erweisen würde, von der die Kritik ausgeht, nämlich die Auffassung, dass auch künftig, der erforderliche gute Wille fehlen würde, den berechtigten Ansprüchen Deutschlands jetzt nachzugeben, so würde sich die Politik um so mehr als notwendig erweisen, die wir durch die vertragsmässige erfolgte Sicherung unserer Westgrenzen durchgeführt haben und die angesichts unserer völligen mitlitärischen Machtlosikeit allein für uns in Betracht kommen kann.

Eine Politik der friedlichen Verständigung und des Versuchs der Wiederherstellung freundschaftlicher Beziehungen auch zu unseren früheren Gegnern ist eine absolute Notwendigkeit für die deutsche Politik, denn jeder Aussenminister und jede Regierungskoalition würde durch den Zwang der realen Erwägungen gezwungen sein, dieselbe Einstellung zu nehmen, wenn sie sich nicht an der Existenz des Reiches versündigen wollte. Nun sind gegen die Wirkung der Verträge, die der Sicherung des Rheinlandes galten, in letzter Zeit vielfach Bedenken laut geworden, die im Zusammenhang mit den Verhandlungen stehen, die zwischen Partnern des Rheinpaktes von Locarno stattgefunden haben. Was die sachliche Seite des Abrüstungsproblemes anbelangt, so ist der Standpunkt Deutschlands in Genf öffentlich dargelegt worden. Wir werden an diesem Standpunkte auch künftig festzuhalten haben. Das erwähnte Flottenkompromiss mit seinen Nebenabreden ist nach den Tatsachen, die letzhin bekannt worden sind, als erledigt anzusehen. Sonderbesprechungen zwischen einzelnen Regierungen werden, so selbstverständlich es andererseits ist, nicht darauf hinauslaufen, den daran Beteiligten die Erhaltung derjenigen Rüstungsfaktoren zu garantieren, an denen ihnen jeweils am meisten gelegen ist. In diesen Hinsicht möchte ich namentlich in der Frage der ausgebildeten Reserven darauf hinweisen, dass nach der eigenen Auffassung der britischen Regierung eine Nichtberücksichtigung des Rüstungsfaktors, bei der allgemeinen Abrüstung einen wesentlichen Mangel darstellen würde. Wichtiger sind die politischen Bedenken. Wenn zwei Mächte, denen nach der Konstruktion des Locarnopaktes eine wesentlich verschiedene Rolle zufällt, auf militärischem Gebiete tatsächlich weitreichende Vereinbarungen getroffen hätten, so würde das auch an die Grundlagen des Rheinpaktes von Locarno rühren.

Als Garant eines Paktes weitgehende militärische Vereinba-

rungen mit einer der beiden beteiligten Mächte zu treffen, würde Grundlage und Bestehen eines derartigen Paktes widersprechen. Ich halte es aber für meine Pflicht festzustellen, dass derartigen Bedenken der Boden entzogen worden ist durch die Erklärungen, die von den verantwortlichen Vertretern der Mächte zu wiederholten Malen abgegeben worden sind. Die wichtigeste Aufgabe, die der deutschen Aussenpolitik und auch der deutschen Finanzpolitik gegenwärtig obliegt, ist die Reparatinsfrage. Wenn das Sachverständigengremium seinen Zweck erfüllen soll, muss es sich frei wissen von einseitigen politischen Gesichtspunkten und muss sich leiten lassen, von dem allgemeinen Interesse am Aufbau der Weltwirtschaft, und an der Sicherheit der internationalen Handels und Kreditbeziehungen. Die Freiheit der Entschliessung den Vorschlägen der Sachverständigenkommission gegenüber bleibt den Regierungen selbstverständlich gewahrt.

Der Augenblick für internationale Verhandlungen über den Inhalt der Endregelung und für die von den Regierungen zu treffenden politischen Entschliessungen wird erst dann gekommen sein, wenn das Ergebnis der Arbeiten der Sachverständigenkommission ihnen vorliegt. Die Reichsregierung kann sich einstweilen auf die Betonung eines allgemeinen Grundsatzes beschränken, dass von einer wirklichen Lösung der Reparationsfrage nur dann gesprochen werden kann, wenn sie die wirtschaftliche Leistungs-fähigkeit Deutschlands nicht übersteigt, d. h. wenn sie uns die Erfüllung unserer Verpflichtungen dauernd aus eigener Wirtschaftskraft und ohne Gefährdung der Lebenshaltung unseres Volkes ermöglichst. Solange eine der wirtschaftlichen Möglichkeiten entsprechende Lösung fehlt, besteht eine gefährliche Unsicherheit für Wirtschaft und Finanzen. Eine solche Unsicherheit muss die Rückkehr zu normalen Beziehungeb im internationalen Handel und im Kreditwesen aufs schwerste behindern. Gelingt es, eine Endlösung zu finden, die von allen Beteiligten in freier Entschliessung als wirtschaftlich vernünftig anerkannt und angenommen werden kann, dann ist der wichtigste Schritt zur Liquidierung der unmittelbaren wirtschaftlichen Folgen des Weltkrieges getan. Ich möchte meine Ausführungen nicht schliessen, ohne noch des Kellogg-Paktes zu gedenken. Der Kelogg Pakt bedeutet das, was die Regierungen und die Völker selbst aus ihm machen. Deutschland hat alles Interesse daran, dass die grossen Gedanken, die dem Pakt zugrunde liegen immer mehr lebendige Wirklicheit werden.

DISCOURS DU MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES POLONAIS M. ZALESKI ET REPONSE DU SECRETAIRE GENERAL DE LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS SIR ERIC DRUMMOND, VARSOVIE, LE 21 NOVEMBRE 1928.

(Le Messager Polonais du 22 novembre 1928.)

Discours de M. Zaleski.

En vous souhaitant la bienvenue au nom du Gouvernement polonais, je tiens à vous exprimer toute la joie que nous éprouvons de vous avoir parmi nous. C'est pour la seconde fois que vous venez en Pologne. Grâce à cette circonstance vous pourrez vous convaincre des progrès que nous avons réalisés aussi bien dans la voie du relèvement et de la consolidation de notre vie nationale que dans le domaine de la coopération internationale sous les auspices de la Société des Nations. La grande idée que cette institution représente, cette idée que les relations entre les peuples doivent être basées sur la justice et l'égalité rencontre chez nous les adeptes toujours plus nombreux. Nous nous rendons parfaitement compte que nous sommes encore loin du règne de cet idéal. Pourtant cela ne nous décourage pas car nous savons que la réalisation de toute grande idée exige non seulement de longs efforts mais aussi de grands sacrifices. Si cependant nous constatons que près de deux mille ans se sont écoulés depuis que la Fraternité entre les hommes a été proclaclamée et que néanmoins les relations entre les individus ne reflètent que très imparfaitement les principes de l'Evangile, nous serions mal venus de nous étonner que la Société des Nations n'a pu en l'espace de dix ans réaliser son idéal. Mais de même que nous ne pouvons douter du perfectionnement lent mais constant des individus nous ne devons non plus désespérer des efforts tendant au triomphe de la fraternité entre les peuples. Il est de notre devoir de croire que ces efforts ne seront pas voués à l'insuccès. Nous Polonais nous souvenant des vicissitudes de notre histoire nous avons une foi inébranlable en la victoire finale de l'idéal.

En vous, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, nous saluons l'ouvrier infatigable et le champion de ces grandes idées. Nous savons dans quelles conditions difficiles vous travaillez, et combien de peine, d'endurance, de réflexion et de patience il vous faut pour faire progresser votre tâche. Nous savons comme il est malaisé de distinguer les choses essentielles de celles qui ne le sont pas et comme il est souvent difficile, quand on tend vers un but élevé mais éloigné de se résoudre à des compromis dans des questions plus immédiates et de moindre importance. C'est pourtant parfois un sacrifice indispensable pour le bien du but final poursuivi.

Accomplissant tous les trois mois depuis plus de deux ans le

voyage de Genève pour prendre part aux sessions du Conseil de la Société des Nations et de l'Assemblée, j'ai souvent eu l'occasion d'apprécier votre activité et je vous prie de me permettre de vous en rendre le plus sincère hommage.

Mais ce n'est pas seulement depuis que je prends part aux travaux de Genève, que j'ai l'occasion de me rencontrer avec vous dans la vie publique. Permettez-moi, Monsieur le Secrétaire Général, de vous rappeler nos relations du temps de la guerre lorsque j'avais l'honneur de me rencontrer avec vous au Foreign Office, alors que je m'efforçais de propager en Angleterre l'idée de l'indépendance de la Pologne. Déjà alors les appels à la justice ne vous laissaient pas indifférent. Quand j'y songe, c'est avec une joie d'autant plus vive que je vous salue ici, dans la capitale de la Pologne indépendante.

Qu'il me soit également permis de souhaiter la bienvenue à Lady Drummond et de la remercier d'avoir bien voulu vous accompagner dans ce voyage.

Permettez-moi, enfin, de saluer aussi votre collaborateur le plus proche Monsieur Sugimura, sous-secrétaire général et directeur de la Section politique du Secrétariat de la Société des Nations. Par le fait qu'il appartient à une nation si lointaine, nation qui jouit chez nous d'une profonde admiration et d'une grande sympathie, Monsieur Sugimura est comme preuve vivante de l'universalité de l'institution genévoise. Depuis bientôt trois ans il dirige avec un grand succès la plus difficile peut-être des sections du Secrétariat. J'ai eu plusieurs fois l'occasion de me rendre compte avec quel tact et quel sentiment élevé de sa responsibilité il aborde tant de problèmes difficiles et complexes.

Je puis vous assurer, Monsieur le Directeur, que vos efforts et votre sentiment de justice trouvent un écho profond dans l'opinion publique polonaise.

Je bois à la prospérité et au bonheur de nos hôtes.

La réponse de Sir Eric Drummond.

En réponse au discours de M. Zaleski, Sir Eric Drummond a prononcé, en anglais, le discours suivant :

« Monsieur le ministre ! Votre discours me rappelle notre première rencontre en Angleterre. Qui aurait pu songer, alors que nous nous rencontrerons 15 ans plus tard à Varsovie, capitale de la Pologne indépendante, vous, en qualité de ministre des Affaires étrangères, et moi en qualité de secrétaire général de la S. d. N. Si une telle prédiction nous avait été faite, alors, on n'aurait fait qu'en rire. Notre précédente rencontre revêt une importance particulière, dont j'ai l'intention et dont j'espère profiter ce soir, avec permission, en m'exprimant dans ma langue maternelle.

Nous nous rendons bien compte de ce que la réception qui

nous a été faite en Pologne et cette hospitalité si cordiale qu'on nous y a témoignée, et pour laquelle je tiens, dès à présent à exprimer ici nos remerciements, est un hommage rendu moins personnellement à nous qu'elle est l'expression de la confiance dans les travaux et l'idéal de la S. d. N. que nous avons l'honneur de représenter. En tant que serviteurs de la S. d. N. et, partant, serviteurs de tous les membres groupés autour d'elle, nous sommes d'autant plus sensibles aux sentiments qui nous ont été témoignés.

Il y a quelques années l'Assemblée de la S. d. N. nous a recommandé, en tant qu'un devoir — je dirai un plaisir, s'il s'agit de ce cas — que le Secrétaire général se rende, de temps à autre, dans divers pays afin de maintenir le contact avec les autorités compétentes de ces Etats. C'est donnant suite à cette recommandation que le gouvernement Polonais m'a invité, il y a cinq ans, à venir à Varsovie que j'ai visité avec un vif plaisir. L'invitation qui m'a été dernièrement adressée par Votre Excellence m'a fourni une nouvelle occasion de visiter la capitale de votre pays avec un intérêt d'autant plus vif. Je ne puis, à cette occasion, qu'exprimer ma plus profonde satisfaction d'autant plus qu'au cours de cette période un progrès extraordinaire s'est accompli en Pologne, ce que confirment tous ceux qui ont séjourné dernièrement dans ce pays, et avec lesquels j'ai eu l'occasion de m'entretenir et qui, en tant que témoins oculaires, relèvent que le progrès accompli a dépassé toute attente. Qu'il me soit permis, à cette occasion, de féliciter, avec toute la modestie qu'il convient, mais le plus chaleureusement, toute la nation polonaise et, en particulier, le gouvernement polonais, d'aussi brillants résultats obtenus. Je dois reconnaître que les efforts employés en ce sens ont dû être énormes. Mais le succès est venu couronner ces efforts. Je reconnais qu'aucun pays et aucun gouvernement n'aurait pu faire plus. C'est là un gage très précieux pour l'avenir.

Monsieur le ministre ! Je considère comme un rare privilège l'occasion qui m'est offerte de rencontrer à cette soirée d'aussi nombreux amis de la S. d. N. et de revoir ici bon nombre de personnalités qui, à diverses reprises, ont été à Genève et avec lesquelles, précédemment déjà, il m'a été donné de contracter des liens d'amitié. S'il est permis de juger d'une organisation d'après la valeur de ceux qui la servent, et je crois qu'un tel jugement est plausible, sous ce rapport la S. d. N. doit être considérée comme une des premières institutions du monde.

Non seulement en Pologne, mais dans tous les pays, membres de la S. d. N. les personnalités les plus marquantes sont prêtes à sacrifier leur temps et tous leurs efforts pour l'organisation de Genève, travaillant pour le bien de la paix et une collaboration plus étroite entre nations.

Monsieur le ministre ! Il est convenu, à l'occasion de la S. d. N., de parler de l'atmosphère de Genève. Je crois que ceci est dû

à ce que, sur le terrain de Genève, il est impossible d'éviter de heurter l'opinion des autres. Le heurt avec ces opinions n'implique pas la nécessité de leur acceptation. S'il est vrai toutefois que : « tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner », nous conviendrons que comprendre une partie de l'incompréhensible c'est pardonner autant et, par ailleurs, comprendre et pardonner sont là les conditions essentielles de la conciliation. Je me permettrai d'ajouter, à cette occasion que, pour ce qui est du maintien de cette atmosphère qui fait triompher à un degré supérieur les idées de conciliation et de paix, personne n'a rendu plus de services que vous, Monsieur le ministre. Au cours des dernières cinq années nous avons observé à Genève non seulement l'immense progrès de la Pologne dans le domaine social, financier économique, mais aussi le fait de l'élection de la Pologne, sous votre conduite, Monsieur le ministre, en qualité de membre de la S. d. N. avec attribution de droit de rééligibilité, ce qui n'est guère chose facile à obtenir.

C'est pourquoi il me semble que le désir exprimé par le Président de la République de Pologne, en juin 1926, s'est réalisé en grande partie. Monsieur le Président de la République a dit alors : « Puisse la nation polonaise se placer au premier rang des nations qui fondent l'avenir de l'humanité sur la collaboration harmonieuse des peuples. C'est dans ces conditions et avec une joie toute particulière que je profite de l'occasion, pour, en ma qualité de secrétaire général de la S. d. N., exprimer à la nation polonaise et à son gouvernement et en particulier à vous, Monsieur le Ministre, les vœux de prospérité sans cesse accrue et de succès ».

REDE DES UNGARISCHEN ERSTEN DELEGIERTEN IN DER VOELKERBUNDSVERSAMMLUNG GRAF ALBERT APPONYI, BERLIN, KOMITEE FUER INTERNATIONALE AUSSPRACHE, 24. NOVEMBER 1928.

(Pester LLoyd wom 25. November 1928).

Das Streben den Frieden durch internationale Institutionen zu sichern, hat eine Geschichte, die so alt ist wie die zivilisierten Menschen. Doch will ich für die Vorbemerkungen historischer Natur, die ich zur Erläuterung meines Gegenstandes brauche, nicht in die entfernte Vergangenheit zurückgreifen, sondern an die Haager-Konferenzen der Jahre 1899 und 1907 anknüpfen, weil diese den ersten Versuch darstellen, das Problem unter den Lebenbedingungen der modernen Staaten zu lösen. Das Ergebnis dieser Konferenzen war ein sehr mageres. Es wurde eigentlich bloss eine Liste von Persönlichkeiten aller

Länder aufgestellt, zur bequemeren Auswahl des Schiedsrichters für die Staaten, die willens waren, einen Streitfall durch richterliche Entscheidung lösen zu lassen. Allerdings wurde der Abschluss von Schiedsgerichts verträgen empfohlen und eine gewisse Zahl solcher kam auch zustande, aber durch die berühmte Klausel, die nationale Lebensinteressen und nationale Ehre berührende Gegenstände von der Verpflichtung, den richterlichen Weg zu betreten, ausschloss, blieb gerade für einschneidende Konflickte alles so ziemlich beim alten. Ebensowenig durchgreifend waren die Vorschläge, die die freundschaftliche Vermittlung betrafen. Da endlich ein ganzer Kodex des Kriegsrechts beigefügt wurde, war es klar, dass der Gedanke einer vollständigen Abstellung des Krieges gar nicht gefasst worden war, sondern nur Milderungen sowohl der Kriegsgefahr als der Krisgtführung beabsichtigt wurden, was ja immerhin etwas bedeutete, wenn es sich ja auch tatsächlich nicht bewährt hat.

Als nächste Schritt zum Ziele der Friedenssicherung erscheint der Völkerbund, der zugleich mit den Pariser Friedensschlüssen 1919/20 geschaffen wurde, dessen Statut, einen integrierenden Teil dieser Friedensschlüsse bildet, wenngleich die neutralen Staaten zum Eintritt in den Bund eingeladen waren. Das Völkerbund-Statut trägt in vieler Beziehung den Stempel seiner Konzeption durch die Siegermächte im Weltkriege : der darin ausgesprochene Friedenswille ist unverkennbar auf die Erhaltung gerade jenes Friedens gerichtet, der ihre Vorherrschaft begründet. Doch kann nicht geleugnet werden, dass es Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten in der Richtung geringerer Einseitigkeit enthält, dass diese Entwicklung auch schon in Sicht ist, ja dass Artikel 19 sogar dem Revisionsgedanken eine — allerdings schwer zu öffnende — Türe gewährt. Allein es ist heute nicht mein Zweck, das Völkerbundstatut vom Standpunkte dieser Mängel, die sich ja aus den gegebenen Verhältnissen beinahe naturnotwendig ergeben mussten, zu kritisieren ; ich habe hier den Fortschritt festzustellen, den es in der Richtung der Kriegsvermeidung darstellt, und dieser Fortschritt ist in der Tat namhaft. Durch die Schaffung eines den Anordnungen richterlicher Unabhängigkeit und Unbefangenheit in Theorie und Praxis völlig entsprechenden Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshofes, durch die Aufforderung, Rechtsfragen dorthin zu leiten, durch die Konstruktion eines so ansehnlichen Vermittlingsforums, wie es der Völkerbund ist, durch Festsetzung der absoluten Pflicht, jeden Streit vor eine dieser Instanzen zu bringen, ehe zu Gewaltmassregeln geschritten wird, und auch nach den vom Rat empfangenen Empfehlungen (denen der streng obligatorische Charakter richterlicher Entscheidung nicht zugesprochen ist), eine längere Frist verstreichen zu lassen, während welcher Friede gehalten werden muss, ist die Gefahr eines Kriegsausbruches wesentlich verringert. Aber

ausgeschlossen ist sie nicht. Auch der Völkerbundpakt kennt noch die Möglichkeit eines völkerrechtlich zulässigen Krieges ; auch er empfiehlt blos den Rekurs an das richterliche Forum in allen Rechtsstreitigkeiten, wagt es aber nicht, ihn obligatorisch auszusprechen ; obligatorisch ist stets nur die Alternative : Gerichtshof oder Völkerbundsrat, was zur Folge hat, dass auch Rechtsfragen vor den Völkerbundrat kommen können, wo sie, teils wegen der offenbaren Nichteignung dieser illustren Körperschaft zu richterlichen Funktionen, teils wegen juristisch unverbindlichen Charakters ihrer Entscheidungen keine wirkliche Erledigung finden. Der Krieg ist in allen Fällen aufgeschoben, aber in vielen nicht ausgeschlossen.

Die Unvollkommenheit des mit der Gründung des Völkerbundes erreichten Resultats wurde auch in seinen führenden Kreisen, sei es aus idealen, sei es aus realpolitischen Motiven, lebhaft empfunden. Und im Jahre 1924 kam in Gestalt des bekannten Genfer Protokolls ein hochinteressanter, auch nach seinen Fehlschlägen denkwürdiger Versuch zustande, den Krieg als völkerrechtlich zulässige Art der Erledigung von internationalen Konflikten gänzlich auszumerzen. Eine Analyse dieses Protokolls würde für sich einen ganzen Vortrag oder noch mehr als einen ausfüllen. Er ist übrigens infolge der Ablehnung von Seiten der Konservativen britischen Regierung nicht mehr aktuell, wenn auch vieles von seinem Gedankeninhalt in die folgenden Aktionen hinüber gerettet wurde. Vom Standpunkte meines Vortrages ist die neue Zielsetzung das Bedeutsame, absolute Ausschaltung des Krieges aus dem Völkerrecht, und dies als Zielsetzung nicht von Theoretikern und Utopisten, sondern von praktischen Politikern, von führenden Staatsmännern aller Länder. Dass darin ein ungeheurer Fortschritt liegt, möglicherweise die Ankündigung einer neuen Aera der Menschheitsgeschichte, dass kann auch der verbohrteste Pessimist nicht verkennen.

Von den im Protokoll zur Erreichung dieses Zieles vorgeschlagenen Mitteln will ich nur den Gedanken hervorheben, in dem er kulminierte, und dies ist die Erklärung des Angriffkrieges zum internationalen Verbrechen, das demnach alle dem Protokoll beitretenden Staaten zu gemeinsamer Abwehr verpflichtet hätte. Die Idee war offenbar die, dass man durch ein so überwältigendes Angebot der Abwehr vom Angriffskrieg abschrekken könne. wäre aber der Angriffskrieg abgetan, dann käme es überhaupt zu keine Kriege. Dieser optimistischen Annahme gegenüber werfen sich aber zwei Fragen sozusagen von selbst auf : erstens, wird der Abwehrapparat, wie ihn das Protokoll kontempliert, immer tatsächlich in Wirklichkeit treten ? Wird nicht viel mehr die Interessenpolitik der verschiedenen Staaten in manchen Fällen die schön ausgedachte Solidarität sprengen und sogar mitunter dem Angreifer Hilfe zuführen. Zweiten was ist Angriffskrieg ? Auf die erste dieser Fragen wurde eine

Antwort nicht einmal versucht : es gibt auch keine, ausser in der Hoffnung auf eine Entwicklung des öffentlichen Empfindens, von der wir heute noch weit entfernt sind. Das ist überhaupt der grosse Riss. Der Mangel einer zuverlässigen Exekutive, durch den sich die schönsten pazifistischen Pläne, so fern sie sich ausschliesslich auf dem Gebiete internationalen Prozessrechts bewegen, stets zu verflüchtigen drohen. Auf die zweite Frage, jene nach dem Begriffe des Angriffkrieges wurde mit dem ganzen Aufgebot juristischen Wissens und Scharfsinns eine approximative zureichende Antwort gegeben, in deren Kritik ich mich nicht einlassen kann, die aber die weitere Frage offen liess, in welcher Weise in einem gegebenen Falle entschieden werden soll, ob die Kriterien des Angriffkrieges tatsächlich vorhanden sind. Es hiess zwar im Ausschussbericht, dass die im Protokoll aufgestellte Definition eine automatische Feststellung dieser Kriterien enthalte : da aber noch kein Apparat erfunden worden ist, der in den vorgesehenen Fällen irgendeinen Zeiger mit der Aufschrift : « Angriff » aufspringen lässt, und da der Angreifer stets leugnen und für sein Leugnen Argumente finden wird, muss jemand da sein, der die Rolle des fehlenden Automaten übernimmt. Dieser Jemand sollte der Völkerbundrat sein, und zwar : für gewisse vorbereitende Massregeln mit Zweidrittel-Majorität, für die Entscheidung selbst einstimmig beschliessen. Es fragt sich aber : bietet die Zweidrittelmehrheit des Rates jene unerlässlichen Garantien der Unparteilichkeit, die die freiwillige Unterwerfung aller Staaten sichert ? Und was geschieht, wenn für die meritorische Entscheidung Einstimmigkeit im Rate nicht zu erreichen ist ? Für diesen durchaus nicht unwahrscheinlichen Fall ist kein Auskunftsmittel vorgesehen ; ich wüsste auch nicht, dass es eines gäbe.

Nur andeuten will ich hier meine Ueberzeugung, dass die ganze Angriffskriegstheorie des Protokolls an dem Grundfehler leidet, das Problem zu eng zu fassen. Der Angriff im allgemeinen sollte als internationales Verbrechen gebrandmark werden, d. h. jedes Ueberschreiten der Grenze, jenseits welcher die Gerechtsame der anderen liegt. Das kann aber auch in anderer Weise als durch Krieg geschehen, es kann selbst die Form von aufgezwungenen Verträgen. von Völkerknechtung durch formal unanfechtbare Rechtsnormen bewahren. Ist denn der Befreiungskrieg, der solche Ketten bricht, ein internationales Verbrechen ? Nach dem Genfer Protokol wäre er es ; wird aber das Gewissen der Menschheit solches Urteil bestätigen ? Wird es nicht vielmehr sagen : Der Angriff, das Verbrechen lag in jenen Rechtsnormen ? Mit dieser Feststellung verschieben sich allerdings alle Lösungen, allein, wie ich in der weiteren Folge dieser Ausführungen darzutun hoffe, vermehren sich ihre Schwierigkeiten nicht.

Indes, das Protokoll ist heute nur mehr ein überwundener Versuch. Was aber bleibt— und darin liegt das unvergängliche

Verdienst der Initiative von 1924—, das ist die grosse und radikale Zielsetzung, von der nicht mehr abgegangen werden kann, die jede weitere Aktion in zwingender Weise inspiriert.

Aus dieser psychologischen Quelle entsprang wohl der Vorschlag des amerikanischen Staatssekretärs Kellogg, der, mit gewissen Modifikationen von den meisten Staaten angenommen, zum Kellogg-Pakt geworden ist, und der das Problem mit einer verblüffenden, fast möchte ich sagen: naturburschenhaften Einfachheit auffasste. Weg mit dem vielen Kopfzerbrechen über Definitionen und Instanzen, die ja doch zu keinem befriedigenden Resultat führen, sondern dasjenige definieren wollen, was wir ohne Definition viel besser verstehen; sagen wir ganz einfach: Wir wollen keinen Krieg, wir lassen keinen zu; der Krieg wird aus der Liste der völkerrechtlich zulässigen Mittel der Erledigung internationaler Konflikte gestrichen, und damit Punktum. So scheint der Kelloggpakt zu sprechen, und es ist gewiss etwas Gewinnendes in dieser pazifistischen Draufgängerei, sowie auch eine gewisse Wahrheit in der unausgesprochenen Annahme, dass der gerade, gesunde Menschenverstand manches viel klarer sieht, ehe man versucht, es ihm wissenschaftlich klar zu machen. Aber so einfach lässt sich das Problem denn doch nicht abtun; denn die Frage bleibt offen, wie denn internationale Konflikte friedlich auszutragen sind? Und solange man darauf keine befriedigende Antwort weiss, oder, was noch besser ist, und was— ich will es gleich sagen— den Schwerpunkt meiner Ausführungen bilden soll: solange man nicht der Entstehung von Konflikten vorzubeugen weiss, wächst der Krieg unvermeidlich aus ihnen heraus, trotz aller wohlmeinenden Beteuerungen. Ueberdies enthält der Kellogg-Pakt noch den ausdrücklichen Hinweis auf die Zulässigkeit des Verteidigungskrieges mit der offiziösen Erläuterung, dass es das souveräne Recht eines jeden Staates sei, selbst zu bestimmen, wann es sich als angegriffen betrachtet, demnach: wann er das Recht hat, Krieg zu führen. Ich kann mich daher dem Einrruck nicht verschliessen, dass die Bedeutung dieses Paktes nicht viel über die Ausserung eines lobenswerten Willens hinüberreicht und keinen wesentlichen Fortschritt nach der praktischen Seite des Problems hin bedeutet.

Beinahe gleichzeitig erfolgte aber innerhalb der Völkerbundtätigkeit ein bedeutsamer Vorstoss nach der gleichen Richtung, freilich im Zusammenhange mit dem Problem allgemeiner Abrüstung, oder, soll ich sagen: mit den bewussten oder unbewussten Bemühungen, die Lösung des Problems unter dem Schlagworte seines Zusammenhanges mit der Sicherheit, die vorerst geschaffen werden müsste, auf die lange Bank zu schieben. Ich will nun von diesem angeblichen Zusammenhang, den ja auch die Vertreter Deutschlands am Völkerbunde ausdrücklich abgelehnt haben, gänzlich absehen. Im Rahmen dieses Vortrages interessieren uns die Vorschläge, die das «Komitee

für Sicherheit und Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit » in der Septembertagung des Völkerbundes unterbreitet hat, bloss vom Standpunkte des Fortschrittes, den sie für die Zielsetzung der absoluten Kriegsvermeidung bedeuten. Ich setze als bekannt voraus, dass sie Vertragsschemen für obligatorische Schiedgerichtsbarkeit in allen Rechtsfragen und Vermittlung in den übrigen, ferner Vertragsentwürfe gegenseitiger Unterstützung im Angriffsfalle enthalten. Gern gebe ich zu, dass dieser ihr Inhalt und dessen ausgezeichnete juristische Formulierung einen wesentlichen Forschritt bedeuten. Darin, dass sie weit mehr als alles Bisherige den Charakter der Unparteilichkeit tragen, drückt sich wohl der Einfluss deutscher Mitarbeit aus. Auch die konsequent durchgeführte Scheidung zwischen Streitigkeiten juristischer und politischer Natur und demnach der richterlichen oder konziliatorischen Kompetenz ist weit vollkommener, als es die des Protokolls gewesen war. Hier hätten wir endlich für alle Staaten, die der vorgeschlagenen Konvention beipflichten, das obligatorische Schiedsgericht, die obligatorische richterliche Entscheidung aller Rechtsstreitigkeiten; ja, wir hätten sie, wenn nicht die Möglichkeit von Vorbehalten offen gelassen wäre, d.h. das Recht jedes Staates, bei Unterzeichnung der Konvention die Kategorien von Fragen zu bezeichnen, auf die er diese Verpflichtung nicht ausgedehnt wissen will. Durch diese offengelassene Spalte verflüchtigt sich die Bedeutung der neuen Errungenschaft, denn es ist zehn gegen eins zu wetten, dass der Vorbehalt zumeist geradge jene Fragen von der obligatorischen richterlichen Entscheidung ausnehmen wird, bei denen diese am notwendigsten gewesen wäre. Nehmen wir z.B. an, was gar nicht unwahrscheinlich ist, dass die Nachbarstaaten Ungarns in ihrem Vorbehalte alle Fragen, die sich auf Auslegung der Friedensverträge beziehen, aus der Verpflichtung, sie vor den Richter zu bringen, ausschliessen, so hat damit ihr Beitritt zur Konvention für uns, aber nicht für uns allein, sondern überhaupt für die Wahrung des Friedens, so gut wie jede Bedeutung verloren; denn gerade Fragen dieser Kategorie dürften wohl in absehbarer Zeit am häufigsten aufgeworfen werden, und gerade diese enthalten am meisten Zündstoff. Die Zulassung von Vorbehalten drückt dem ganzen Werke einen Stempel von Schwäche auf, denn es ist eigentlich Zulassung bewusster Täuschung und Hypokritie. Man gibt sich den Anschein, die Verpflichtung richterlicher Entscheidung eingegangen zu sein, kann aber dabei alles ausnehmen, was wirklich ins Leben greift. Im Grunde genommen, bleibt demnach alles beim alten; die Tür, durch die man dem Richter entschlüpfen kann, bleibt offen, Wir, Deutsche und Ungarn, können mit Genugtuung sagen, dass wir sie, was uns betrifft, zugeschlagen haben, denn Deutschland hat im Vorjahre und Ungarn heuer das Protokoll unterzeitchnet, worin die Staaten sich verpflichten alle Differenzen, die sich auf Rechtsfragen beziehen, richterlicher Entscheidung zu unterwer-

fen, und zwar haben wir es ohne Vorbehalt getan. Von den Grossmächten hat dies, ausser Deutschland, noch keine getan, und auch von unseren Nachbarstaaten, ausser Oesterreich keiner.

Aus dieser übersichtlichen Darstellung der bisherigen Initiative zur völligen Beseitigung des Krieges, in der ich nichts Wesentliches übergangen zu haben glaube, können wir zweierlei feststellen: dass man nicht dazu gelangt ist, die richterliche Entscheidung von Rechtstreitigketten obligatorisch zu machen, obwohl die Instanz dazu vorhanden ist; von einer zuverlässigen Entscheidung politischer Konflickte gar nicht zu reden, wo auch die anerkannt unparteiische Instanz fehlt und noch zu suchen ist; denn, so gross das Ansehen der Völkerbundrates auch sein mag, stellt seine Zusammensetzung aus Staatemännern, die pflicht-und naturgemäss vor allem die Interessen ihres eigenen Staates und seiner Freunde zu wahren haben, die erforderliche Garantie der Unparteilichkeit denn doch nicht vor. Der zweite Mangel, der in die Augen springt, ist, dass es keine Sicherheit für die wirkliche Durchführung selbst juristisch bindender Entscheidungen gibt; denn die im Völkerbundpakt vorgesehenen Sanktionen: wirtschaftlicher Boykott usw. sind den Kleinen gegenüber gewiss wirksam oder können es doch sein, dürften aber versagen, wenn es sich um die Grossen handelt; man stelle sich Columbia vor als die Vereinigten Staaten boykottierend.

Fragt man mich nun, ob sich diese Mängel abstellen lassen, so möchte ich bezüglich der ersten Kategorie, jener der obligatorischen richterlichen Entscheidung von Rechtsfragen, bejahend antworten; das ist zu erreichen, und für diese Entscheidung möchte ich auch die wirkliche Durchführung als beinahe gesichert annehmen, da der moralische Zwang in solchen Fällen auf jedem Staat, auch den grössten, lasten würde. Aber für die Sicherheit friedlicher Beilegung von Interessenkonflikten nichtjuristischer Natur sehe ich weder die allgemein bindende Instanz noch die überwältigend wirkende moralische Kraft der Entscheidungen, die auf diesem Gebiete gefällt werden, wenigstens in absehbarer Zeit nicht. Nun soll man gewiss fortfahren in dem Bestreben, diesen Mängeln abzuhelfen; ich bin wahrhaftig der letzte, der in diesen Beziehungen Lässigkeit oder Entmutigung predigen möchte. Die deutsche Oeffentlichkeit hat mit die Ehre erwiesen, meiner bescheidenen— vielleicht mitunter auch unbescheidenen— Tätigkeit am Völkerbunde eine gewisse Aufmerksamkeit zu widmen, daher ich dem Verdachte, die Bedeutung insbesondere der internationalen Gerichtsbarkeit und ihrer Unantastbarkeit zu unterschätzen, hier kaum ausgesetzt bin. Allein es drängt sich den her berührten Unzulänglichkeiten gegenüber die Frage auf: ob denn die bisherigen Aktionen für absolute Sicherung den richtigen Weg eingeschlagen, ob sie das Problem an seinem Wesensinhalt, an seinem Kern, an seinen

tiefsten Grundlagen erfasst haben ? Auf diese Fragen suche ich die Antwort, und sollte sie negativ lauten, eine Andeutung des Weges, der einzuschlagen wäre.

„Meine Antwort lautet allerdings negativ; aber, wie sich ja aus dem Vorhergehenden klar ergibt, nicht in dem Sinne, als ob diese Aktion an sich unrichtig wäre ; sie ist im Gegenteil in energischer Weise fortzusetzen, aber sie bedarf einer Ergänzung; das, was hinzukommen muss, ist nach meiner Ansicht wesentlicher, als das, womit man sich bisher ausschliesslich befasst hat.

Das gemeinsame Merkmal aller bisherigen Friedensaktionen ist nämlich dies, dass sie sich darauf beschränken, eine friedliche Beilegung bereits entstandener Konflikte zu suchen, und das Problem, wie das Entstehen von Konflikten verhindert werden könnte, fast ganz ausseracht lassen. Es ist ein Vorgehen, ähnlich dem, das die öffentliche Gesundheitspflege ausschliesslich auf eine wirksame Organisation der Heilungstätigkeit beschränken und die hygienische Prophylaxis ausseracht lassen würde : oder, um auf juristischem Gebiet zu bleiben, ähnlich jenem, das den Uebeln, die den Fehlern des bestehenden materiellen Rechtes, etwa aus einem veralteten Zivil-oder Strafkodex, entspringen lediglich durch Reformen in der Prozessordnung abhelfen möchte. Die letztern sind gewiss auch notwendig, aber jenen tiefer liegenden Uebeln helfen sie nicht ab. Denn sie können ja nur das geltende Recht in Anwendung bringen ; ist dieses selbst eine Quelle von Uebeln, so hilft seine noch so präzise Geltendmachung nichts. Gerade so ist es mit den Institutionen zur Schlichtung internationaler Konflikte bestellt.

Auch diese können nur auf Grund des geltenden materiellen, internationalen Rechtes vorgehen, soweit es in Verträgen kodifiziert oder aus eignen sonstigen Quellen festzustellen ist. Also selbst angenommen, dass ihnen die vorhin angeführten Mängel nicht anhaften würden, angenommen, dass die internationale Gerichtsbarkeit bezüglich aller Rechtsstreitigkeiten allgemein als obligatorisch anerkannt wäre, und auch die Ausführung ihrer Entscheidungen ebenso ausser Frage stünde, wie es bei jenen der innerstaatlichen Gerichte der Fall ist ; angnommen ferner, dass die Mediation auf das beste organitiert und am wirksamsten tätig wäre : so könnte damit auch der konkrete Konfliktfall nur als formal erledigt betrachtet werden, und die daraus entstehenden weiteren Komplikationen wären in keiner Weise ausgeschlossen, wenn die Rechtsnorm, die angewendet werden müsste, als ungerecht oder als naturwidrig d. h. den Gesetzen organischer Entwicklung im Leben der Völker widersprechend empfunden würde. Ja, es werden sogar (wie im innern Rechtsleben der Völker) die judiziellem Institutionen diskreditiert, die in wiederholten Fällen genötigt sind, ein Recht wirksam zu machen, das im öffentlichen Bewusstsein kein Recht

ist. Man vermeidet es lieber, mit ihnen in Berührung zu kommen, und bei vielen Staaten ist die Abneigung gegen Bindung an obligatorische Schiedgerichtsbarkeit auf ihren starken Antagonismus gegen gewisse Bestandteile des geltenden materiellen Völkerrechts zurückzuführen. Auch mir wurde, als ich, für meine Person, in einer für meine Regierung nicht verbindlichen Form dem 1924er Genfer Protokoll beistimmte, in meinem Vaterlande vielfach vergeworfen, dass ich damit für die Friedensverträge gearbeitet hätte, die wir nie als gerecht anerkennen werden. Ich will mich hier weder gegen diesen Vorwurf verteidigen noch ihn als berechtigt anerkennen ; für meine Ausführungen ist die Tatsache wichtig, dass er mir gemacht wurde und überhaupt, dass ernste Männer gegen das Genfer Protokoll Stellung nahmen, weil es die Durchführung eines Rechtssystems fördere, das sie als ungerecht empfinden.

Man mag nun hierüber denken, wie man will, die allgemeine Wahrheit wird wohl niemand bestreiten, dass der grosse Zweck der absoluten Friedenssicherung sich unter Beschränkung auf den denkbar vollkommensten Ausbau der Institutionen zur Vollziehung bestehenden Rechtes nicht erreichen lässt, sondern, dass die unbefangene Prüfung dieses Rechtes, gemessen am Masstab der Gerechtigkeit und höchster Zweckmässigkeit, eine ebenso notwendige Voraussetzung des grossen Zieles bildet. Denn in der Uebereinstimmung des positiven Rechtes mit diesen beiden Grundprinzipien, deren Formulierung und deren Schutz seine Aufgabe, besser gesagt, sein Wesen ausmachen, liegt die tiefste, die unentbehrlichste, die einzig tragfähige Grundlage des Friedens im innern Leben der Völker sowohl als in ihren Beziehungen zueinander. Gerät das positive Recht in Widerspruch mit dem, was als gerecht empfunden oder als organisches Daseinsbedürfnis gefühlt wird, bezieht sich dieser Gegensatz auf etwas, das in der Tiefe liegt, das ins Leben eingreift, und wird ihm nicht rechtzeitig abgeholfen, so gerät die Form in Zwiespalt mit dem Inhalt, und dann zerbricht früher oder später der Inhalt die Form, was im innern Leben der Völker die Revolution, in ihren äusseren Beziehungen Krieg heisst. Beides ist sozusagen Naturselbsthilfe im Volks-und Völkerorganismus, gleichwie es Krampf-und Fiebererscheinungen im körperlichen Leben des einzelnen sind ; allerdings Selbsthilfe gefährlichster Art und durchaus irrationeller Natur, weil daraus ebenso gut Verschlimmerung als Linderung des Uebels hervorgehen kann.

Denn es besteht kein Zusammenhang zwischen den Bedingungen des Sieges und der Gerechtigkeit ; die gerechte Sache wird unterliegen, wenn auf der Gegenseite bessere militärische Vorbereitung und genialere Führung zur Geltung kommen. Siegt sie aber, so geht der Sieger in seinen Forderungen meistens über das Gebiet seines Rechtes hinaus und stellt eine neue Ungerechtigkeit an Stelle der frühern, welche neue Ungerech-

tigkeit den Keim neuer Konflikte in sich birgt. So wird Fangball gespielt mit Recht und Unrecht, und ist der Krieg in den seltensten Fällen ein Abschluss, sondern wesentlich ein circulus vitiosus, in dem den Totentanz weiterzuführen in jedem Sinn unmenschlich ist.

Und dennoch muss es früher oder später dazu kommen, wenn das juristisch formulierte und geschützte Unrecht allzu hart drückt und allzu lang andauert, oder wenn der naturgesetzlich notwendigen Entwicklung der Lebensinteressen eines Volkes unberechtigte Hindernisse in den Weg gelegt, die natürlichen Gesetze politischer Konstruktion willkürlich über den Haufen geworfen werden. Denn es ist nach den elementarsten Gesetzen der Völkerpsychologie, die ebenso zwingend wirken wie die physikalischen Gesetze in der materiellen Welt, einfach unmöglich, dass ein Volk, ausser es wäre vollständig ohnmächtig, sich solches gefallen lasse ; kein Philosophieren und kein Predigen hilft darüber hinaus, sondern nur die Abstellung jenes Unrechtes oder jener Hemmung, die ja auch ein Unrecht ist, auf dem Wege der Evolution des positiven Rechtes in naturgemässer Anschmiegung an den Gcrechtigkeit und hössten Zweckmässigkeitsbegriff. Jede konservative und jede Friedenspolitik muss notwendig eine evolutionistische Beimischung haben.

Es ist demnach, so will mir scheinen, eine unanfechtbare, ich möchte fast sagen : eine Binsenwahreit, dass sobald ernsthaft die Frage entsteht, ob denn nicht die bestehenden positiven völkerrechtlichen Einrichtungen Quellen ernster, dauernder Beunruhigung oder gar Erbitterung enthalten, die zu Konflikten, eventuell zu verzweifelten Entschlüssen führen können, eine gründliche Prüfung dieser Sachlage, eventuell eine Reform jener Einrichtungen der wesentlichste und notwendigste Schritt zur Sicherung des Friedens ist, dem sich dann jenes, das bis jetzt allein angestrebt wurde : die Durchführung der positiven Rechtssatzungen ganz gewiss anschliessen muss.

Der Wahrheit gemäss muss konstatiert werden, dass der Völkerbundpakt diesem Bedürfnis prinzipiell Rechnung trägt, indem Artikel 19 dieses Paktes die Intervention des Völkerbundes in Aussicht stellt, un die Mitglieder des Bundes aufzufordern, unanwendbar gewordene Verträge ebenso wie völkerrechtliche Situationen, die den Weltfrieden gefährden können, einen neuen Prüfung zu unterziehen. Aber es besteht kein Zweifel, dass heute dieses prinzipielle Zugeständnis in den Augen jener Faktoren. die den Völkerbund tatsächlich beherrschen, eine bloss theoretische Bedeutung hat, und dass die Beschränkung der Aktion auf Fragen der Prozedur einen wesentlichen Punkt ihrer Systematik bildet.

Diese Einseitigkeit stammt aus der, meines Erachtens unrichtigen Problemstellung, auf die ich schon einleitend hinwies,

nach der es sich für jene massgebenden Faktoren nicht so sehr um die Sicherung des Friedens, als um die Sicherung dieses Friedens handelt, desjenigen nämlich, der aus den Pariser Verträgen der Jahre 1918 und 1920 hervorgegangen ist. Es geschieht diese Verwechslung zweier, durchaus nicht hidentischer Begriffe vielfach im guten Glauben, mit einer fast naiv zu nennenden Zuversicht, dass man damals die beste aller Welten geschaffen habe, an der zu rütteln Sünde und Verderben wäre. Ich bin da freilich diametral entgegengesetzter Ansicht, und ich glaube, nahe an hundert Millionen Europäer sind es mit mir ; ich glaube, dass in vielen Bestimmungen dieser Verträge mehr Zündstoff aufgehäuft ist, als in irgendeiner der schlimmsten Epochen der Geschichte. Allein dies darzulegen, auf eine Kritik der Friedensverträge einzugehen, ist nicht Aufgabe dieses Vortrages, wo ich bestrebt bin, ganz im allegemeinen, sozusagen die algebraische Formel einer vollständigen Aktion zur Friedenssicherung zu geben. Nur das Unberechtigte jeder Selbstzuversicht, jeder a priori Ablehnung, jedes Zweifels an der Vollkommenheit des Pariser Werkes vom Standpunkte der Gerechtigkeit sowohl als der organischen, politischen Konstruktionsgesetze möchte ich hier beleuchten ; nur bis dahin möchte ich gelangen, dass es sich doch der Mühe lohnt, die Sache etwas näher anzusehen, und zu dieser Erkenntnis führt schon die blosse Betrachtung der Genesis jener Verträge, die als ganz abnorm bezeichnet werden müssen und daher auch abnorme Folgen zeitigen.

Einmal sind diese sogenannten Verträge nur der Form nach Verträge, im wesentlichen sind es einseitige Diktate der Siegermächte, ein Umstand, der ihre juristisch verpflichtende Natur zwar nicht berührt — denn das Völkerrecht kennt den Einwand erzwungener Zustimmung nicht, — wohl aber ihr moralisches Gewicht bei denjenigen, denen sie in solcher Weise auferlegt worden sind, bedeutend herabsetzt, was gewiss ein mangelndes Element der Sicherheit bedeutet. Warum ist Locarno, von diesem Standpunkt der Sicherheit aus gesehen, so vielbedeutend ? Einfach, weil es einen Teil der Versailler Friedensbestimmungen die bisher mangelnde moralische Kraft freier Zustimmung aller Kompaziszenten brachte. Schliesslich beruht die Sicherheit, die das Recht gewährt, doch in letzter Linie auf seiner ethischen Grundlage. Darauf, dass, wer sich dagegen vergeht, das Gefühl hat, damit eine schlechte oder unehrenhafte Handlung zu begehen. Wo dieses Gefühl fehlt, da hat das formale Recht keinen andern Schutz als den, der sonst nur ausnahmsweise zur Anwendung kommt und nur in Reserve gehalten wird : den der materiellen Gewalt.

Hiezu kommt noch, dass dieses einseitige Diktat der Siegermächte auf Grund einseitiger Information ausgeübt wurde. Ihre leitenden Staatsmänner fassten Beschlüsse über Verhältnisse, zogen neue politische Grenzen auf Gebieten, bezüglich

deren ihre Unwissenheit sich oft in einer ans Komische grenzenden Weise äusserte. Ihre Informatoren waren ausschliesslich die länderbegierigen Allierten, was ja die Erforschung der Wahrheit vollständig ausschliesst. Das Prinzip der Neukonstruktion lässt sich durch die Summe von zwei Worten ausdrükken : Unkenntnis-Begehrlichkeit.

Aber das ausschlaggebende Moment zur Charakterisierung des Pariser Friedenswerkes ist die absolute, schier grenzenlose Machtvollkommenheit, über die die Siegerstaaten im Zeitpunkte dieser Friedensschlüsse verfügten. Die Waffenstillstandsbedingungen hatten den letzten Rest von militärischer Widerstandsfähigkeit der Zentralmächte vernichtet ; diese waren auf solche Bedingungen eingegangen, weil als Grundlage die bekannten 14 Wilsonschen Punkte angenommen wurde, was später in Vergessenheit geriet. Die Siegermächte hatten also mit keiner Möglichkeit eines fernern Widerstandes zu rechnen ; sie konnten dekretieren und für den Moment durchführen, was ihnen beliebte. Das ist aber mehr Macht, als der beschränkte Menschengeist, nach den Lehren der Geschichte selbst jener der grössten, geschweige denn der Massen, die den Durchschnitt darstellen, ertragen kann, ohne in Cäsarenwahnsinn zu verfallen, d. h. die Unterscheidungsgabe zwischen dem Möglichen und dem Unmöglichen einzubüssen. Nun stelle man sich dioese Machtlage und diesen Machtrausch vor in der Atmosphäre von Erbitterung eines unter unsäglichen Leiden und Opfern geführten vierjährigen Krieges ; ist es denkbar, dass da etwas entstehe, was nicht diesem Rausche, sondern den permanenten Gesetzen der Gerechtigkeit und organischer politischer Konstruktion entspricht ? Und ist es denkbar, dass selbst die klügsten Staatsmänner einer Volksströmung von so elementarer Gewalt widerstehen.

Was ich hier sage, ist für diese Staatsmänner selbst ein schwer ins Gewicht fallender Milderungsgrund vor dem Richterstuhl der Geschichte. Aber zugleich die a priori einleuchtende Feststellung dessen, dass die Pariser Friedensverträge, so wie sie sind, keine geeignete völkerechtliche Grundlage für dauerhaften Friedem bilden können ; dass daher das Betreben, diesen Frieden festzuhalten, nicht identisch ist mit der grossen Zielsetzung, der wir uns mit Begeisterung hingeben, den Frieden zu sichern. Ich habe mich hier nicht mit der Frage beschäftigt, in welchem Zeitpunkt es möglich sein wird, diesem dem höheren und dem tieferem Bestandteil des Problems dauernder Friedenssicherung mit praktischer Wirksamheit näher zu treten. Zwei Dinge aber weiss ich : erstens, dass jede noch so verdienstvolle und an sich notwendige Aktion auf dem Gebiete dessen, was ich internationales Prozessualrecht nennen möchte, nur Flickwerk ist, und im besten, auch von uns erwünschten Falle nur Aufschübe gewähren kann, solange jene Seite des Problems, die Prüfung der bestehenden mate-

riellen völkerrechtlichen Satzungen und der in ihnen liegenden Konfliktkeime, nicht in die Arbeit einbezogen wird. Zweitens dass, wenn dies auch keine Frage von heute oder morgen ist, mit der friedlichen Lösung dieses Teiles des ganzen Problems nicht allzu lange gezaudert werden darf, weil es sonst leicht geschehen könnte, dass man damit zu spät kommt, denn die psychologischen Faktoren der Gährung und der Erbitterung schwächen sich mit dem Verlaufe der Jahre nicht ab, Sie verstärken sich.

Ich weiss wohl, dass im tiefsten Grunde-und das wird mir vielleicht entgegengehalten werden-die Sicherheit des Friedens auf dem konstanten Friedenswillen der Völker ruht, auf der innerlichen Abwendung der Geister vom Kriege und ihrer Zuwendung zum Segen des Friedens. Dahin sollen wir, sagt man uns, denen einiger Einfluss auf die öffentliche Gesinnung in ihrem Lande zuerkannt wird, wirken, für die Verbreitung und Vertiefung dieser Gefühlswelt sollen wir arbeiten. Ja, ganz gewiss,sollen wir es und wollen wir es auch. Aber es muss uns möglich gemacht werden. Denn auch die intransigente Friedensgesinnung—zumal die erst entstehen oder doch sich verbreiten und stärken muss—ist von gewissen Voraussetzungen abhängig ; sie kann nicht entstehen, ja nicht einmal dort, wo sie etwa schon vorhanden wäre, fortbestehen, wenn sie stets mit der innern Empörug zu kämpfen hat, die das Empfinden beständigen Unrechts und unausgesetzten Angriffs auf seine Lebensinteressen in einem Volke hervorrufen muss. Der Einzelne mag solches hinnehmen, aber dieser nur, wenn er ein Heiliger oder ein Schwächling ist ; es gibt aber kein Volk von Heiligen, und ein Volk von Schwächlingen soll es nicht geben : für die Menschheit ist es wertlos. Friede und Gerechtigkeit sind korrelate Begriffe ; jeder Versuch, sie begrifflich oder ethisch zu trennen, kann nur zu hohlen Friedensdeklarationen führen ; der wirkliche Frieden kann ebensowenig auf Unwahrhaftigkeit als auf Unrecht, von dem der eine leidet, der andere Vorteil zieht, aufgebaut werden. Je mehr wir daher von der neuen Zielsetzung, die auf absolute Kriegsächtung hinausgeht, durchdrungen sind, je grössere Begeisterung uns das nunmehr zu einem Problem praktischer Politik gewordene Ideal eines für immer gesicherten Friedens einflösst, eine desto klarere Einsicht müssen wir in die realen Vorbedingungen seiner Verwirklichung zu gewinnen trachten, mit desto grösserer Energie müssen wir auf die Durchführung dieser Bedingungen hinarbeiten, eben, weil wir es nicht mehr mit einem schönen Traum, mit einer edlen Schwärmerei, sondern mit einer Wirklichkeitsaufgabe zu tun haben. Als das göttliche Wort Fleisch wurde, nahm es die Lebensbedingungen des Fleisches an ; soll die Idee zur Tatsache werden, muss sie sich den Gesetzen des Tatsächligen fügen.

Dies ins klare Licht zu rücken, war die Absicht meines Vor-

trages ; kein anderes Motiv leitete mich, als nach bestem Wissen und Gewissen die Grundzüge jener Arbeit zu erläutern, die wir für das hohe Ziel leisten müssen, einer Arbeit, offen, mutig, wenn nötig rücksichtslos, idealistisch in ihren Zwecken, realpolitisch in ihren Mitteln, unentwegt orientiert nach dem untrennbaren Dreigestirn Wahrhaftigkeit, Gerechtigkeit, Friede.

DISCOURS DE SIR ERIC DRUMMOND AUX REPRESENTANTS DE LA PRESSE POLONAISE ET AUX CORRESPONDANTS ETRANGERS, VARSOVIE, LE 24 NOVEMBRE 1928.

(Le Messager Polonais du 26 novembre 1928.)

Messieurs, ce soir nous quittons la capitale de la Pologne et, à cette occasion, je tiens à exprimer, par votre aimable entremise, notre reconnaissance au gouvernement polonais et à la Pologne pour le cordial accueil et la rare hospitalité dont nous avons été l'objet.

Nous sommes particulièrement reconnaissants pour la sympathie témoignée, à la fois reconnaissants et fiers car en notre qualité de fonctionnaires de la S. D. N. nous comprenons bien que c'est à cette Grande Organisation Internationale qu'allait votre sympathie. Le gouvernement polonais nous a invité, justement, en qualité de fonctionnaires de la S. D. N. et, en tant que tels, nous n'avons aucune compétence pour examiner et d'autant plus pour décider des problèmes politiques internationaux ou nationaux.

Nous sommes venus ici, d'abord, pour apprendre nous-mêmes et, d'autre part, pour servir d'information dans la mesure de nos moyens et aussi pour établir des liens d'amitié, étant donné que le contact personnel exerce un rôle manifeste dans les problèmes de ce monde. Nous demeurons sous l'impression très forte du progrès accompli en Pologne au cours des dernières années.

M. Sugimura et moi-même nous avons eu l'occasion de visiter la Pologne il y a quelques années. M. Sugimura a visité la Pologne il y a 3 ans et moi il y a 5 ans. Lorsque, maintenant, nous nous communiquions nos impressions, nous avons pu reconnaître qu'elles étaient identiques. Ainsi nous constations non seulement l'énorme progrès dans l'ordre, pour ainsi dire, matériel, mais, de plus une grande confiance en l'avenir, confiance qui certainement existait auparavant, mais n'avait pas trouvé cette expression qui lui est donnée aujourd'hui.

Je tiens à ajouter et je suis heureux de le faire, avoir reconnu que la compréhension de l'activité et des buts de la S. D. N. pénè-

tre de plus en plus l'opinion polonaise. Pour moi, personnellement, je me réjouis tout particulièrement de cette constatation étant donné que la collaboration de la Pologne dans les problèmes internationaux ne cesse de s'accroître et que cette collaboration a toujours été fondée sur le sincère désir de faire progresser l'œuvre de la paix.

J'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir de nombreux entretiens avec les dirigeants de la politique de votre pays. Monsieur le Président de la République a bien voulu me recevoir chez lui et M. le Maréchal Pilsudski nous a consacré plus d'une heure de ses précieux instants. Nous avons conféré également, de questions diverses, avec M. le Président du Conseil. M. le Maréchal de la Diète et le Vice-maréchal du Sénat et, de plus, cela va sans dire j'ai eu plusieurs entretiens avec le Ministre des affaires étrangères.

De toute part je n'ai trouvé que l'affirmation du développement de l'idée et de l'attachement de ce pays à l'organisation de la paix.

Nous avons eu également l'honneur de prendre la parole à l'Université et, là, nous avons pu nous rendre compte que les mêmes tendances se font jour parmi la jeunesse. Comme, dans l'avenir, le sort de la S. D. N. se fonde sur la jeunesse actuelle, nous avons quitté l'Université avec confiance dans cet avenir.

Permettez moi, Messieurs, d'ajouter encore quelques mots sur la presse et sur la S. D. N.

Etant donné que la S. D. N. dépend en grande mesure de l'appui qu'elle trouve dans l'opinion publique il est clair que la collaboration de la presse est des plus désirables. Dès le moment de la fondation de la S. D. N. Genève est devenue le grand centre mondial de la presse. Les relations entre la presse et le Secrétariat de la S. D. N, sont très proches. Nous avons, à Genève, une section d'information, une des plus nombreuses du secrétariat, dont le but est, justement, de maintenir ce contact. Les journalistes du monde entier y viennent pour s'informer sur les questions courantes de la S. D. N. Il m'est agréable de constater que la presse consacre à la S. D. N. le maximum de son attention. Mais, en définitive, la presse dépend de l'opinion publique et aucune question ne saurait prendre une trop grande place si l'intérêt du public ne s'y prêtait pas.

Actuellement la S. D. N. aux sessions des Assemblées et du Conseil, s'occupe simultanément de nombreuses questions d'ordre international, ce qui fait que la presse ne saurait présenter toutes ces questions avec les détails voulus.

Certains problèmes trouvent un écho retentissant dans la presse et, étant donné la recherche de la sensation, ce n'est pas toujours le moment le plus important d'une session qui est le mieux reflété dans la presse. Le simple labeur quotidien tendant à l'organisation de la paix, est souvent passé de vue, cependant qu'un incident de peu d'importance est diffusé aux quatre

points du monde. Néanmoins la presse a rendu de précieux services par ses informations fournies sur la S. D. N. et elle a toujours témoigné d'une compréhension si parfaite de sa responsabilité, que tous ceux qui sont rapprochés de la S. D. N. doivent lui exprimer leur estime et leur reconnaissance.

Je me rends compte de ce que la presse polonaise, parmi laquelle je vois ici certains de ses représentants qui maintiennent un contact suivi avec Genève, a justement le sentiment de cette responsabilité. Qu'il me soit permis de vous inviter Messieurs, à collaborer dans la tâche que nous avons assumée et qui s'exprime par le développement de la collaboration internationale en vue d'assurer la paix et la sécurité. Vous pouvez faire beaucoup, Messieurs, et je suis sûr que vous le ferez.

DISCOURS PRONONCE PAR LE MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE BULGARIE M. ATH. BOUROV, SOFIA, CHAMBRE DES DEPUTES, LE 29 NOVEMBRE 1928.

(La Bulgarie, du 1 décembre 1928.)

J'ai eu déjà plusieurs fois l'occasion de définir les méthodes et les moyens de notre politique extérieure. Ils se réduisent à trois idées fondamentales. premièrement, s'entendre avec les voisins ; deuxièmement, enrichir le capital moral de la Bulgarie, relever son prestige et sa valeur devant les nations civilisées et devant leurs gouvernements ; et troisièmement, gagner la confiance et l'appui de la nouvelle Institution Internationale, qui est encore à ses débuts, qui n'exerce peut-être pas encore un rôle efficace dans la vie des peuples, mais qu'un grand avenir attend. Vous comprenez que je veux parler ici de la Société des Nations.

Personne ne doute parmi vous que le crédit moral et politique de la Bulgarie est bien plus grand aujourd'hui à Londres, à Paris, à Rome et à Berlin qu'il y a 5 ou 6 ans. Vous voyez aussi que le peuple bulgare n'est plus aujourd'hui soupçonné d'être un peuple prêt à chaque instant à troubler la paix. Aujourd'hui il montre à l'Europe sa véritable physionomie, celle d'un peuple laborieux et pacifique qui n'aspire qu'à garder la place qui lui revient et qui a toutes les raisons d'attendre l'appui moral du monde civilisé.

Je n'ai pas besoin et il m'est incommode de vous rappeler les paroles pleines de sympathie pour la Bulgarie qui ont été dites par les plus grands hommes d'Etat. Mais vous lisez la presse, vous voyez le ton des plus importants organes de presse anglais, français, italiens et allemands. Ne voyez-vous pas vous-mêmes, avec un sentiment de joie, comment l'image de la Bulgarie appa-

raît toujours plus pure ; comment son crédit s'accroît sans cesse et l'application de ses efforts se fait toujours plus sympathique et plus encourageante.

Est-ce que tout cela est peu pour un pays comme la Bulgarie qui n'a pour sa politique que des moyens pacifiques ? Est-il peu de choses que de gagner les sympathies et la confiance des grandes nations, de leurs gouvernements, ce qui nous permettra de former le capital moral dont les fruits ne se feront pas attendre ? N'est-ce pas là la bonne voie, la seule qui permettra à la Bulgarie désarmée de pouvoir compter sur un appui efficace pour la solution de ses problèmes. N'est-ce pas la première phase d'une politique longuement réfléchie, politique qui ne cherche pas d'effets extérieurs, qui n'attend pas des résultats faciles, mais qui cherche à établir son action sur un terrain définitivement consolidé. Comment avons-nous gagné la confiance du monde civilisé ? Avant tout, grâce aux qualités de notre peuple.

Le monde apprécie les qualités du peuple bulgare. Mais, jusqu'à un certain point, cela est dû aussi à la politique de son gouvernement ; cela est dû à cet important fait que les deux cabinets issus de l'Entente démocratique ont compris, dès le premier jour, que si nous voulons gagner la confiance et l'appui des grands facteurs à l'Etranger, nous devons nous conformer à leur mentalité. Nous avons la prétention de connaître la psychologie européenne et les grands intérêts politiques qui agitent, à l'heure actuelle, l'Europe ; nous avons la prétention d'être pénétrés de la mentalité européenne et avons la ferme volonté de marcher droit dans la voie de cette mentalité, malgré les critiques, les suggestions, les inspirations aventureuses. Cette voie, cette politique, cette manière d'apprécier les choses a créé pour la Bulgarie une atmosphère de bienveillance, de confiance et de sympathie active.

J'ai entendu ici deux critiques de la Société des Nations. L'honorable M. Malinov a dit : il ne faut pas s'exagérer le rôle de la S. D. N. ni sousestimer le rôle et les possibilités du gouvernement bulgare. Une autre critique, formulée par d'autres orateurs, était la suivante : la S. D. N. est un organisme dont le but principal et essentiel est d'assurer aux vainqueurs les fruits de la victoire. C'est donc vaine illusion que d'attendre la justice de la S. D. N.

Permettez-moi, Messieurs, de ne pas être tout à fait d'accord avec la première critique et, en second lieu, de protester énergiquement contre la seconde affirmation. Que la S. D. N. ne dispose pas de moyens efficaces pour imposer réellement sa volonté, cela est certain. Elle n'est pas un organisme disposant d'une force matérielle. Elle est plutôt une synthèse de ce qui est commun aux peuples civilisés, une synthèse s'exprimant par un Conseil qui a le devoir de résoudre les questions en s'inspirants des intérêts généraux des Etats et de l'humanité et non des intérêts particuliers de tel ou tel autre Etat.

Il est vrai qu'au début les Grandes puissances exerçaient une influence prépondérante, il est également vrai que leur influence est toujours considérable. Mais il est tout à fait naturel qu'une Grande-Bretagne, qui possède un tiers du monde et a sous son sceptre quelques centaines de millions d'habitants, joue un rôle plus important que n'importe quelle autre nation qui compte 5 ou 10 millions de population. Néanmoins, permettez-moi de vous le dire, la S. D. N. exerce même pour les grandes puissances une tutelle morale et lorsque les représentants des grandes puissances plaident leur cause, ils cherchent des arguments non pas dans leur force, mais dans le droit et la justice. Cette seule nécessité qu'éprouvent les grandes nations de chercher à s'appuyer sur des principes généralement admis, et non pas sur leurs intérêts personnels, témoigne d'un progrès considérable de la vie internationale. Il est des moments où la parole des hommes éminents, représentant une petite nation, mais jouissant d'une grande réputation, a bien plus d'autorité que celle des représentants d'une grande puissance. Et ces hommes d'Etats éminents, ces défenseurs désintéressés et ardents de l'idéal de la S. D. N. quoiqu'ils soient des représentants des petites puissances, exercent une influence de plus en plus forte sur l'activité et les décisions de la S. D. N.

Quand nous faisons des efforts pour gagner les sympathies de la S. D. N., il ne s'agit pas seulement de gagner les sympathies des Grandes puissances, il s'agit également de gagner à notre cause ces travailleurs du nouveau droit international, du nouvel ordre européen, qui doit s'appuyer sur des principes de justice.

Aujourd'hui, la Bulgarie, après avoir enduré tant de souffrances, après avoir été calomniée tant d'années sans avoir pu se défendre, trouve en la personne des représentants des Etats neutres, des Etats qui n'ont pas pris part à la guerre mondiale, ses meilleurs, ses plus éloquents défenseurs. Il est donc nécessaire que nous tenions compte de la mentalité de ces nations et que nous évitions tout ce qui pourrait nuire à notre cause.

S'il en est ainsi, et c'est le cas, c'est là qu'il faut chercher la réponse à la critique que la politique extérieure bulgare joue un rôle passif. Je poserai la question suivante à ceux qui m'ont adressé des critiques: d'où tirent-ils la conclusion que cette politique a un rôle passif ? Sont-ils au courant de tous les efforts que fait le gouvernement bulgare dans tout sens pour défendre les intérêts de la Bulgarie, pour défendre ses droits légitimes avec une ténacité continuelle, inflexible ? Peuvent-ils consciencieusement affirmer que nous ne faisons rien ? Ce qu'ils pourraient dire tout au plus, c'est que nous ne rendons pas publique notre action politique, que nous ne faisons pas appel à un forum international, que nous ne défendons pas au su de tout le monde nos thèses. Et ils concluent alors que nous ne faisons rien ou le peu que nous faisons est insuffisant.

Cette conclusion est entièrement erronée. Je suis profondé-

ment convaincu que si nous défendions les intérêts du pays, non pas de la manière que nous avons adoptée, c'est-à-dire en plaidant en personne et directement notre cause, mais par la voie d'une lutte diplomatique ou d'une campagne oratoire ou de presse, non seulement nous n'obtiendrions pas des résultats plus rapides mais nous risquerions de provoquer contre nous de nouveaux blocs, de nouvelles combinaisons, de nouvelles méfiances. Ainsi notre action serait beaucoup plus facilement entravée que si elle prenait la forme qui est digne et n'a rien d'humiliant pour un petit peuple, la forme d'un appel continuel envers grands et petits, envers leur raison, leur conscience, leur sentiment de responsabilité en leur qualité de créditeurs de l'ordre qui existe actuellement en Europe.

On nous a proposé ici une formule, inspirée, il me semble d'une parole du grand homme d'Etat français M. Barthou, qui a dit : « il n'y a pas de gains sans risque ». Permettez-moi de vous déclarer que ma profonde conviction est que la Bulgarie se trouve dans une telle situation qu'il n'est pas permis à ses hommes d'Etat de l'entraîner dans n'importe quel risque. Il est préférable — je le déclare sciemment — qu'un resultat tarde de quelques mois ou d'une année plutôt que d'entraîner des risques pour les intérêts, la dignité et la souveraineté de l'Etat. Je suis convaincu que quand je soutiens ici cette thèse, je me fais l'interprète non seulement des sentiments du parlement bulgare, mais de la volonté et de l'opinion du peuple bulgare entier. Celui qui veut suivre une politique ferme, une politique extérieure de longue durée, doit baser celle-ci sur la volonté de la nation pour qu'elle soit durable, immuable, indépendante de caprices, de changements ministériels appuyée sur la volonté et la conscience du peuple bulgare.

M. Smilov, dont je regrette l'absence, en quelques phrases dites à la légère, a réduit à rien toute la politique suivie par la Bulgarie. Je ne veux pas m'arrêter sur ses paroles, puisqu'il s'absente, mais j'estime de mon devoir de déclarer que si nous voulons être conséquents à la formule que nous avons tous adoptée, c'est-à-dire que tous les partis politiques bulgares et le peuple bulgare entier sont décidés de poursuivre les buts de notre politique extérieure uniquement par des moyens pacifiques, nous devons comprendre que quand nous parlons de « moyens pacifiques » cela ne signifie pas seulement des moyens où les fusils, les canons, la dynamite sont exclus, mais avant tout un esprit de réalisation pacifique. Cela ne signifie pas également des joutes diplomatiques oratoires qui peuvent souvent amener à des tensions entre les peuples aussi dangereuses que les guerres. Cela signifie que si malgré toute notre bonne volonté nos rapports avec tel ou tel autre Etat empirent, il faut que le monde extérieur sache que ce n'est pas la Bulgarie qui en porte la responsabilité. Nous sommes un pays qui a beaucoup souffert et non seulement nous devons avoir une conduite

irréprochable, mais nous devons éviter même le soupçon que nous nous engageons dans des voies qui ne répondent pas aux conceptions européennes.

Se trouvant dans des conditions qui l'obligent de tout attendre de l'Europe et de l'influence morale de la Société des Nations, tout geste de notre part, toute action qui témoignerait d'un esprit d'agression, même en paroles, pourrait avoir des conséquences funestes pour la Bulgarie. Mais lorsque tout sera épuisé, lorsqu'il deviendra clair jusqu'à l'évidence que le gouvernement bulgare n'a nullement provoqué aucune réaction ou tension dans ses rapports, lorsque malgré tout cela aucun résultat n'aura été acquis pour certaines demandes légitimes du pays, soyez convaincus que ce gouvernement aura suffisamment de courage, de savoir et de volonté pour défendre même en public les intérêts de la Bulgarie.

TELEGRAMS EXCHANGED BY MR. FRED. BRITTEN, CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON NAVAL AFFAIRS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MR. STANLEY BALDWIN AND LIEUT. COMMANDER KENWORTHY, M. P., DECEMBER 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, December 4, 1928).

Telegram sent by Mr. Britten to M. Baldwin :

Recalling your publicly expressed desire of November 13 for more frequent personal discussion between American and British representatives, and remembering very pleasantly my personal participation in Inter-Parliamentary conferences, both here and in Europe, I am impelled to suggest a joint meeting of the Committee on Naval Affairs of the United States House of Representatives and a Select Committee of members of Parliament for the purpose of friendly discussion and the hearing of testimony in connection with appliyng the principle of equality in sea power between Great Britain and the United States on all ships of war not already covered by the Washington Treaty ; meetings to take place preferably in Canada after March 4, 1929, and each Committee will report with recommendations to its respective Government just as may now be done annually by the various groups of the Inter-Parliamentary Union.

Were there is so much genuine regret among the people of England and America over the failure of the last Geneva Naval Limitation Conference, surely some way should be found for a meeting before 1931, when the five leading naval Powers will

again assemble at Washington. I will respect your personal desires in connection with these suggestions.

MR. BALDWIN'S REPLY.

The following is the text of the reply sent to Mr. Britten, december 4, 1928.

I have learnt with great interest of your proposal for a joint meeting of members of the United States Congress and members of the British Parliament for a friendly discussion on the question of the limitation of naval armament. I cordially reciprocate the spirit which inspires your suggestion, and I share your earnest desire for a complete understanding between our two countries.

In my speech of November 13, however, I was speaking not of the Legislatures but of the Executives of Governments, and it was the absence of facilities for personal intercourse between Ministers which I regretted. Except to remove this possible misunderstanding of my speech I feel that it would not be consistent with the courtesy which I owe to the United States Government to express any further opinion on a proposal about which, as I understand it, they have not been consulted. I would, therefore, only repeat my appreciation of your friendly sentiments.

COM. KENWORTHY'S CABLE TO MR. BRITTEN

As a member of Parliament, I take advantage of your kind invitation to inform you that your action in proposing a meeting between a Select Committee of members of the House of Commons and your Committee on Naval Affairs has been warmly received by a great number of my colleagues at Westminster. We believe that nothing but good would come from a free and frank exchange of views between independent members of Congress and independent members of Parliament, and still hope that opportunity may be afforded.

SPEECHES OF MR. HOUGHTON, AMERICAN AMBASSADOR, AND THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, LONDON, PILGRIMS DINNER, DECEMBER 5, 1928.

(The Times, December 6, 1928).

Sir Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was the principal guest last night at a dinner of the Pilgrims given to celebrate the signing of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War. The dinner, which was held at the Hotel Victoria, was attended by Ambassadors, Ministers, and

other diplomatic representatives of many foreign countries. High Commissioners for the Dominions, and distinguished American and other visitors. Lord Desborough, the chairman of the Pilgrims, presided, and on his right were the American Ambassador, the Lord Chancellor, and the Belgian Ambassador. On his left were Sir Austen Chamberlain, the German Ambassador, and Lord Hardinge.

During the dinner the figure of the Angel of Peace with outstretched wings, carved in ice, was carried into the room of and placed amid cheers on the table in on front of Sir Austen Chamberlain and the German Ambassador.

A copy of the text of the Peace Pact, reprinted from *The Times*, with a replica of the signatures of the 15 plenipotentiaries at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Paris on August 27, was provided for each guest.

The Chairman, submitting the toast of "The King," said it had been a time-honoured custom of the Pilgrims to submit the health of the King and the President of the United States in one toast, but that night he would submit the toasts separately. All their thoughts went out to the bedside of the King, and all their wishes were for a complete and speedy recovery. He thought the latest news was more reassuring than it had been for some time. (Cheers.) There had been a slight but decided improvement in the King's condition. He gave them the toast, "God save the King."

The toast was cordially pledged, and that of "The President of the United States" was received with equal enthusiasm.

Mr. Wilson Taylor, the hon. secretary, read the following telegram from the Pilgrims of the United States : —

"The Pilgrims of the United States join with heartiness and deep pride with the Pilgrims of Great Britain in applauding and supporting the Pact of Paris, which formally condemns recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounces it as an instrument of national policy so far as concerns the signatory nations, the list of which now includes substantially the whole civilized world. This epoch-making declaration of international policy and national purpose establishes on a world-wide scale a basis for those relations of friendly understanding and cooperation which the Pilgrims have so long and so effectively laboured to make real and vital among English-speaking people. The time has now come for the Government of the United States and of those of the British Commonwealth of Nations to lead the way in shaping national policies, whether diplomatic, military, naval, or economic, so as to take the fullest advantage of all that the Pact of Paris offers, and to point the way to a peaceful and peace-loving world, abundant in progress as well as increased happiness and satisfaction for all classes of men, whatever their speech, race, or creed. The grave illness of his Majesty the King gives us all the greatest

anxiety. We hope and pray for his speedy and complete recovery to health and strength. May God save the King. — NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, President."

The AMERICAN AMBASSADOR afterwards spoke, first reading the following telegram from Mr. Kellogg, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs : —

"Please extend my greetings to the Pilgrims and express the gratification I feel that they are celebrating the signing of the Anti-War Pact. The Treaty expresses the sentiments of all peoples of the world, and 60 nations have either signed the Treaty, adhered to it, or expressed their intention to adhere to it. Thus it becomes a declaration of the hopes and aspirations of mankind.

The Ambassador proceeded :—

During the days just ahead of us the Multilateral Treaty signed in Paris a few months ago will be laid before the American Senate, and the Senate, after consideration, will either ratify that Treaty or will refuse to ratify it. That is its constitutional right and power. For obvious reasons, therefore, you will understand that I cannot to-night discuss the Treaty as directly as I otherwise would wish to do.

Now, we should all agree that a peaceful settlement of the problems which arise between nations in the conduct of their affairs is wholly desirable. That is the method which the nations signing the Treaty have now agreed to follow. And I have wondered if perhaps our experience overseas might not throw a hopeful light on its practicability. I am thinking, of course, of that long frontier line between Canada and the United States. For 3.000 miles, or, if the Alaskan frontier be added in for more than 5.000 miles, that line stretches away, without a fortification on either side of it, or a ship of war. There are no soldiers and no sailors to guard it. There are no military problems or naval problems involved in its maintenance. No one is scheming to change that frontier. No one is suspected of scheming. Our Canadian friends are on one side of it, and we are on the other. And the fact is accepted by us both with much the same definiteness of mind as if a few thousand miles of sea water divided us. Yet, if you will remember, when that earliest frontier was first laid down there was no great disparity between the populations. There were forts on either side. The dangers and horrors of war had been impressed on both peoples by bitter experience. More than once had war com from Canada south into the United States or gone north from the United States into Canada. Reasons enough existed, in all truth, why both of them should have felt that protection was needed and justified — reasons of defence, or of prudence, or of suspicion — reasons, whatever they were, based on all comparative human experience in the past. If none of those reasons prevailed, and if that frontier is to-day wholly unprotected and unfrontier is to-day wholly unprotected and undefended, the resultant fact that two peoples

have been able to live side by side in mutual safety and contentment cannot be wholly without significance to the rest of the world (Cheers).

It is easy, of course, and it is perhaps natural, to assert that no useful comparison can be drawn between that frontier and any other frontier you may choose to compare with it. The contributing conditions differ too greatly. Such human factors as differences in race, in degree of civilization, in pressure of population, in historic antagonism, and all the rest of the familiar category, prevent it. And the statement has its elements of truth. Such differences do exist. It would be idle to deny them. They cannot safely be overlooked or under-estimated. They must be taken into account. But, on the other hand, there are similarities, which root equally deep in human nature. For that frontier of ours divides two peoples, not one. Each of them is proud and jealous of its independence. Neither of them would permit an infringement of its rights. And the two are vigorously competing forces in every line of human activity. No-in every line but one. I should say. They do not compete in armaments. They do not arm against each other. And I can, I think, best express what I have in mind to say to you if I ask you for a moment to consider what would have been the result if the alternative course had been taken and that frontier between Canada and the United States had in fact been protected by fortifications and by ships of war. There are now great cities along that border which might conceivably be subject to attack. They would now be protected—be sure of that. There are physical resources of one sort and and another of incalculable value which either nation might covet, might conceivably plan at some opportune moment to seize by force. You may be sure they would not have gone unprotected. On the contrary, in addition to fortifications and ships, I suspect we should now have general staffs working out, in secret, plans of defence and offence. There would exist, among both peoples, a deep-lying unrest of mind and a certain suspicion and distrust of the other's good faith and good intentions. In other words, there would be along that frontier to-day, in greater or less degree, much the same conditions that exist, or are thought to exist, along frontiers in other parts of the world.

Do you think that military experts and naval experts and political experts on either side, feeling themselves responsible for the grave task of ensuring the safety of the vast interests committed to their charge, would now agree that armed protection was unnecessary, and that all their preparations for possible conflicts between the two peoples could safely be thrown aside, and that the dangers conjured up were, after all, imaginary ? I doubt it. I think they would be far more likely to approach the matter in good spirit and with a sincere wish that so desirable a result were practicable, but, in view of human experience, would feel compelled to decide that, while

peaceful sentiments should, of course, be sought, and every facility given to make them successful, nevertheless armed protection was prudent and to be really effective ought to be at least doubled. And I dare say that would sound like good sense and the part of wisdom. Yet we know that such a conclusion is false. Those elements of force, whether naval or military, are not necessary for the mutual safety of the Canadian and American peoples. We have demonstrated the fact. We have shown that we are safer and happier without them and without the problems which inevitably go with them. I do not want to exaggerate. I do not want to press the point too far. But I ask you, is there not a measure of truth in what I have said ? Have we not solid ground for hope, now that the nations have agreed to renounce the right to use force and undertaken to reach peaceful settlements, that the apparent necessity of maintaining armaments may be found less substantial than it now seems ? Our experience overseas at least would appear to point in that direction. (Cheers.)

That is one thought which comes to me when I reflect on the obligations to be taken under the Multilaterial Treaty. I would like very briefly to suggest another. As you know, we peoples owerseas are called the new peoples. In the sense that our fathers found there new conditions, and that their lives and our lives have been subtly affected by the influences and experiences growing out of those new conditions, the statement is, of course, true. But in one aspect, at least, we are the oldest peoples. That democratic impulse which our fathers brought with them from Britain, and which has transformed the world and is still transforming it, found its first free field of expression amongst us.

The point I wish to make is that democracy, like any other social or political order, tends constantly to create an environment favourable for itself. And the basic condition most favourable and most necessary for its development and safety is peace. Democratic peoples, self-governing peoples, as you know by your own experience, do not easily go to war. To make war effectively, they must surrender, if only for the time being, all those rights and privileges and powers which are most precious to them, and revert again to despotism. That is difficult for them. There is among them a wholly natural inertia against such violent and dangerous and costly changes as war inevitably brings. And year by year, and almost day by day, I believe, that inertia, that resistance, grows, and is more difficult to move, and with that process the danger of war lessens, and becomes less real. Those men and women now have political power. They are becoming more conscious of themselves as individuals and of the importance to them of their individual concerns. They turn instinctively and sternly from a method of settling disputes which is so costly and so dangerous as war.

They are coming fast to doubt its necessity. They seek a better way. At least, that seems to be the kind of sentiment which is waxing strong overseas, and is waxing strong, I have no doubt, throughout the civilized world. I recognize the differences which exist between old world conditions and new, and the larger perplexities and the more difficult problems which these older civilizations present. But, even so, I believe that democratic impulse which is still driving through the minds and souls of men cannot be denied. Its aim is peace, because peace is necessary for its fullest expression, and peace it will have (Cheers.)

So I conclude pretty much where I began. The task of bringing the differences between nations to peaceful settlements is not easy. It will need patience and forbearance, and all the good will and understanding, God knows, that can be mustered. But it can be done (Cheers) There is nothing inherently impossible in it. Two peoples can live side by side, unarmed against the other, in mutual good will and in mutual safety. That, it seems to me, is an assurance which the peoples of the new world, out of their own experience, may properly offer to the peoples of the old (Cheers.)

SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

Sir Austen Chamberlain said :

It is enjoined upon me by my doctor—and to my doctor I owe as much as anyone can owe to human skill and care—that I must restrict my work, and above all restrict my attendance at public banquets. I am endeavouring to comply with his recommendations, but I could not refuse myself the pleasure, the deep and profound pleasure, of taking part in your celebration of the great work done by Mr. Kellogg and the Government which he represents in the interests of peace. It was a profound disappointment, the greatest disappointment of my illness to me, that I could not be the man who, on behalf of the Government of this country, should sign the Pact which Mr. Kellogg had proposed, and the fruition of which is attended by the eager expectation of all peoples in this world.

Mr. Ambassador, you have indicated certain restrictions which were imposed upon you by the circumstances of the moment in which we are both called upon to speak. I, too, am conscious that at this moment the existence of that Pact depends on the decision of the Senate of the United States. All I would say in regard to it is that, if it should approve itself to the authorities of the United States, no Government will more readily and more eagerly give its ratification to this instrument, which proceeds from the American initiative, than the Government which I have the honour to represent (Cheers.)

Mr. Ambassador, you spoke of that great international frontier, stretching for 3,000 miles, which, by including Alaska, we

can extend still farther, alongside of which I have just traversed the American Continent over the Canadian Pacific Railway. There is only one addition that I would make to what you have said about that frontier, and that is what it stands for to us and all the thoughts it may suggest to others who have been in the past less fortunately situated. You have spoken of it as the frontier between Canada and the United States. It is the frontier between Canada and the United States, but that frontier, unguarded except by the good will and the good sense of those whom it divides only to unite, is not merely the frontier of Canada with the United States, it is the frontier of the British Empire with the United States (Cheers.) When I say that, I say it with the intent that, as far as my voice carries, men may draw the implications which you have drawn from the unguarded frontier of Canada with the United States as being true of the unguarded frontier of the United States und the British Empire. (Cheers.)

Lord Desborough, I hold that there is no greater danger for a Foreign Secretary than to allow his heart to run away with his head, and to use in discussing international affairs language of exaggeration. I have tried as far as in me lay to speak soberly of the improved conditions which I see around me in Europe and the world, and in speaking of the great international pact which is the occasion of our meeting to-night I would desire to hold the same language of sobriety and to link myself as closely to facts without allowing my hopes and my ideals to disguise practical difficulties or to run away with my common sense. But when I speak as soberly as I can of this great instrument, I still find it impossible to disguise to myself or to others the immensity of the act which so far has been accomplished, and which we all hope to see brought to its full fruition in a few weeks time.

What is that 60 nations have done ? For the first time in their history they have renounced war as an instrument of policy, I think it is worth the while of all of us, be we charged with immediate responsibilities of government, be we exponents or instructors of public opinion, or be we simple citizens of our several lands, to consider what are the implications of the pact to which we have set our name. I say, for myself and for the Government which I represent, that from the first moment when we received the proposal of the United States Government we recognized it as important, and our earnest effort was to help it to its conclusion, and that since we have signed it we recognize to the full its implications in the conduct of our own foreign policy and the obligation which it imposes on us to seek the settlement of all international differences by peaceful means. So much is obvious on the face of the document if you consider what is implied in that solemn declaration. Being parties to a document in which others as well as ourselves re-

nounce the right to pursue their individual policies by war, it behoves us, with a care, an exactitude and with a scrupulousness which has never been exercised to the same extent before, not to give others cause of offence. They have promised not to seek solution of any difficulties with us by act of war. Then it is our duty never to put them in a position by any act of ours in which, but for that promise, they would have gone to war with us.

There is something more. Governments must conduct such controversial discussions as may be inevitable in the light of this new document—they must seek, first and foremost, as they always should have done, to put themselves in the position of the other party, to understand his point of view, and if they cannot exactly accept the proposal which he has made to them, at least to go to the utmost of their power to meet the real difficulties with which he is confronted.

But was that duty ever confined to Governments ? Is not the duty to-day, in the light of this new instrument, incumbent on the Press and the public of all the countries to do the same as the Governments who conduct their affairs ? When I was in America I happened to read an article by an American in an American magazine of which the title was « International Window Smashing ". The author drew his title from a saying of Prince Bismarck that " every country had sooner or later to pay for the windows which its Press broke. " We have a Press which is free, and it is important that it should continue to urge upon Governments the peaceful solution of international questions. I desire on this occasion, among the implications of the pact, to say that it places a new obligation on the publicists of our different countries to work for peace, to interpret one nation to another, to be slow to excite suspicion, or entertain suspicion, and that their part in making the Kellogg Pact of Peace effective is at least as important, at least as responsible, and at least as honourable, as that of the men who are immediately charged with the conduct of public affairs.

I go a step further. When I talk in any country to the directors of the Press, and suggest to them that sometimes they make the work of peace-loving and peaceful-minded statesmen more difficult, they are apt to say they give the public, and can only give the public, what the public require and call for. The implications of the Pact of Peace are not alone for Ministers or the Press ; they are for every individual citizen in every country which is a party to the Pact. They should demand information, good news, fair news, sympathetic news, from other countries, they should insist on being informed, and on being given material to form their own judgement on these great international questions, and I venture to say, after many years of experience in responsible Government positions, and four anxious years—they must always be anxious for every Foreign

Secretary—as Foreign Secretary, that if the public will bring the same good will, the same desire to understand, and the same information to the consideration ot these great international questions which is already brought to bear or possessed by their Governments, then the task of those Governments will be enormously facilitated, and the Pact of Peace will be not merely a great ideal but a great reality, rooted deep in the hearts of the nations, which no Government and no people, even in a moment of madness, would venture to uproot (Cheers).

SPEECHES OF LORD PARMOOR AND THE LORD CHANCELLOR, LONDON, HOUSE OF LORDS, DECEMBERR 10, 1928.

(The Times, December 11, 1928).

Lord Parmoor called attention to Article 431 of the Versailles Treaty in reference to the occupation of the Rhineland and to what he called the narrow legal interpretation placed thereon by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He said there was one passage in the statement made by Sir A. Chamberlain in the House of Commons which he welcomed. That was that his Majesty's Government would welcome the early evacuation of the Rhineland irrespective of the legal right of the ex-Allied Governments to continue their occupation until the expiry of the period fixed by the Treaty. It was impossible for the friendly effects of Locarno to develop until the Rhineland was evacuated. If the terms of the treaty were properly interpreted there was in his (Lord Parmoor's) opinion an obligation upon us to withdraw our troops in the immediate future.

He put in contrast the two interpretations which had been placed on Article 431. Sir Austen Chamberlain's view was that the Article only took effect when Germany had completely executed and discharged the whole of her reparation obligations. The other interpretation, which he (Lord Parmoor) suggested was the right one, was that it was sufficient to show that Germany had carried out with regularity her undertakings in the matter of current reparation payments. In a declaration signed by President Wilson, M. Clemenceau, and Mr. Lloyd George a few days before the signing of the Versailles Treaty it was stated that the Allied and Associated Powers did not insist on making the period of occupation last until the reparation clauses were completely executed, because they assumed that Germany would be obliged to give every proof of her good will and every necessary guarantee before the end of the 15 years' term. And this declaration went on to say that if

Germany at an earlier date had given proof of her good will and satisfactory guarantees to secure the fulfilment of her obligations, the Allied and Associated Powers " will be ready to come to an agreement among themselves for the earlier termination of the period of occupation. " So far as he knew, there had never been any statement made on behalf of the French Government or by French statesmen in support of the view of Sir Austen Chamberlain. Certain sections of persons in France were delighted at the interpretation placed on Article 431 by the Foreign Secretary, because that interpretation in effect nullified its whole operation regarding the withdrawal of troops from the occupied areas. If there was to be any difference or dispute as to the construction to be placed on that article, it was important to realize that there was provision in Article 13 of the League of Nations which allowed for a decision under the principles of arbitration. The matter, however, might be settled in the sphere of conciliation before it reached a stage requiring settlement by an outside authority. If the Rhine provinces could be evacuated it would be a step in the direction of general peace, but, so long as they were not evacuated, the true résults of Locarno would never be reached. He was not making those remarks in any spirit of hostility towards France, but felt that all nations must be treated equally, and on the same plane, if good international relationships were to be preserved. He moved for papers on the subject.

LORD CHANCELLOR'S REPLY

The Lord Chancellor expressed his regret that Lord Cushendun, who usually spoke in that House on foreign affairs, was unable to be present. In Lord Cushendun's absence, the responsibility of dealing with the points raised by Lord Parmoor fell to his lot. Undoubtedly it was the right of any of their lordships to bring before the attention of the House any matter which on his responsibility he regarded as of importance, and which in the public interest should be discussed. Whether any of their lordships exercised that right must be a matter for his own discretion and conscience. Having said that, he would like to add that, for his part, he could not conceive what useful purpose could possibly be served by the discussion which Lord Parmoor had thought fit to initiate. The motion was not designed to elicit the views of his Majesty's Government. It was to call attention to views already expressed as to the interpretation placed on the article by the Foreign Secretary, and to raise discussion thereon. The question of interpretation and its correctness was the subject of acute controversy at this moment between France and Germany. His Majesty's Government desired to see an agreement under which there might be early evacuation of the Rhineland. That desire had been publicly stated more than once.

Seeing that there was this direct conflict of opinion between two interested Powers, the Foreign Secretary had been at pains to try to transfer the discussion from the plane of legal argument into the more practical sphere of agreement between the parties, and there was, in fact, a meeting of the Council at Lugano instead of Geneva in order that Dr. Stresemann might be able to attend, and for which Sir A. Chamberlain left this country on Saturday. Whether Sir A. Chamberlain's efforts to bring about such an agreement were likely to be furthered b emphasis being placed on the fact that he took the legal view of France and not that of Germany was a matter on which their lordships could form their own opinions. However, it was of great importance that foreign countries should realize that that debate had not been raised at the instance of his Majesty's Government, and that the Government were compelled to embark once more on this discussion was not due to any desire on their part to harp on legal rights and wrongs, but only because their view on the law had been directly raised and challenged. Germany would have the satisfaction of knowing that, although the Government had again stressed and explained their view as to the law, Lord Parmoor thought the Government wrong and took the opposite view. He hoped that that knowledge would allay any irritation that might otherwise arise.

Article 431 was one of a series of five articles forming one section of the Treaty of Versailles, headed—" Guarantees, Western Europe. " Under Article 428 there was prescribed an occupation of the Rhineland for a period of 15 years as a guarantee for the execution of the treaty by Germany. Article 429 laid it down that there was to be a gradual and successive evacuation of the Rhineland every five years if there were, in the meantime, no default by Germany in faithfully carrying out the conditions of the treaty. Article 430 provided that if there were a subsequent repudiation by Germany of her reparation obligations, whole or in part, the territory evacuated was to be immediately reoccupied. By Article 431 it was provided that if before the expiration of the period of 15 years Germany fulfilled all her reparation obligations the occupying forces were to be immediately withdrawn from the Rhineland. The undertaking which Germany was to discharge in order to secure immediate evacuation was, as Article 232 provided, the payment of compensation for all the damage done. The language of all these articles was clear and conclusive, Germany would not have fulfilled all her obligations until she had paid all the reparations. Lord Parmoor put a different construction on Article 431, because, as he contended, nobody could have supposed at the time the treaty was signed that there was any chance of Germany discharging her reparation obligations within the period of 15 years. The noble and learned lord was

quite mistaken. When the Treaty of Versailles was being negotiated the negotiators must have had present to their minds that in the war between France and Prussia there was an arrangement for the payment of an enormous sum by France to Prussia, and that the payment was made before the time that was fixed, and when it was remembered also that it was provided under the treaty that if Germany issued bonds for the payment of reparations, and if such bonds were operated on the market with success, her obligations would be regarded as being discharged, it must be seen that it was quite possible for Germany to have discharged her obligations in fewer than 15 years.

In fact, the interpretation put upon Article 431 by the Secretary of State was the interpretation put upon it by Germany herself before she signed the treaty. A statement issued on her behalf on May 29, 1919, declared that she would be hard pressed by the form in which guarantees were demanded, and that as it would be impossible for her to discharge her heavy obligations in a short period, or in accordance with Article 431, the evacuation of the Rhineland by foreign troops would be postponed for a long time. Whether they looked at the language of the treaty itself or the contemporary declaration to which Lord Parmoor attached so much importance, they were driven to the same conclusion—namely, that the interpretation which was placed on Article 431 by the Foreign Secretary was obviously and patently right.

His Majesty's Government had stated—he was only repeating what had already been said—that they would like to see évacuation take place as soon as possible. It was no good for us to remove our troops; that would only irritate France, and would not help Germany, because there would be no zone left free; it woul only mean that French troops would take over our zone. No one would thank us for removing our troops. The only thing to work for was to try to achieve anything to work for was to try to archieve an agreement between the occupying Powers under which arrangements might be made for evacuation at a date earlier than the date the treaty provided. To those negotiations Belgium, which was one of the occupying Powers, must, of course, be a party equally with France, ourselves, and Germany, Italy and Japan, who were also interested in the reparations problem, had a right to be consulted and to have an opportunity of expressing their views, and every endeavour would be made to reach an agreement. He most devoutly trusted that the discussion which had been forced on them that afternoon would not have done anything to hamper those negotiations or to prevent them from coming to a successful issue, and that nothing which he had been obliged to say would make any foreign Power think that we desired to handle this problem from the point of view of legal rights, but

only from the point of view of mutual good will and anxiety to secure the friendliness and security of the nations involved (Cheers).

Lord Parmoor said that his opinion on the matter had not been altered by what the Lord Chancellor had said. He regretted what appeared to him to be a wrong interpretation of the article, an interpretation which stood directly in the way of the withdrawal of troops from the occupied areas, and which would threaten the general peace of Europe. This was a matter which ought to be discussed, particularly by the House of Lords, which, if that Chamber was to maintain its position as a great constitutional body, should have full right to state its views on treaty questions such as the interpretation of the article in question. He would not press his motion for papers.

The motion was, by leave, withdrawn.

SPEECH OF LORD CUSHENDUN, EXMOUTH, DECEMBER 11, 1928.

(The Times, December 12, 1928).

Speaking at a Conservative meeting at Exmouth last evening Lord Cushendun said the only real danger to the peace of the world was that international relations were made the instrument of party conflict in the domestic politics of different countries. Although this occured in most countries it never seemed to be fully unterstood abroad. When Mr. Lloyd George declared at Manchester that the nations of the world were heading straight for war, it was not understood everywhere, as we of course unterstood it here, that this only meant that Mr. Lloyd George wanted to belabour Mr. Baldwin's Government, and having no policy of his own he thought he could frighten people into believing peace was endangered by the present Government.

"He does not believe what he says. He must know perfectly well that he is talking pure nonsense, and, so far from heading for war, there never was before such a determination on the part of all the leading nations of the world to maintain peace. Indeed, the only real menace to peace is Mr. Lloyd George himself. For party purposes he denounces our good relations with France, which means that if by any chance he were to be placed in a position to control or influence the policy of this country—of which, thank Heaven, there is little danger—he would be driven by his own wild words to break up the friendship which happily exists between ourselves and our nearest neighbour. That would destroy the best security for European peace,

as is well understood in every country on the Continent, and not least in Germany, whose interests Mr. Lloyd George ignorantly supposes himself to be promoting".

"It is natural", Lord Cushendun continued, "that the thoughts of all political parties are now turning to the General Election which will take place in a few months. The Conservative Party approaches it without misgiving, for whatever the result may be they will have before them as fine a five years record as any party could desire. They have fulfilled every pledge they gave in the last election in spite of special dangers and difficulties they could not have foreseen. Political memories are short, but Mr. Baldwin's Administration will be remembered as the Government that defeated the general strike and so saved the country from revolution on the Russian model".

QUESTIONS PUT BY COLONEL WEDGWOOD AND LIEUT.-COMMANDER KENWORTHY, AND ANSWERED BY SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, LONDON, HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 19, 1928.

(The Times, December 20, 1928).

Colonel Wegdwood (Newcastle-under-Lyme, Lab.) asked the Secretary for Foreign Affairs whether, seeing that the German Government had refused to consider any kind of control in the Rhineland after 1935, that refusal, or the French demand for such control, had the support of his Majesty's Government.

Sir A. Chamberlain. — I would refer the hon. and gallant member to the terms of the third section of the *communiqué* issued to the Press at Geneva on September 16 last, which stated that an agreement had been reached between the representatives of Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, and Japan regarding the acceptance of the principe of the constitution of a Commission of Verification and Conciliation, the composition, operation, object, and duration of which would form the subject of negotiations between the Governments concerned ; and to the terms of the *communiqué* issued to the Press at Lugano on December 15 whereby his Majesty's Government and the Governments of France and Germany declared their faithful attachment to the policy of conciliation and *rapprochement* and their intention to continue in the spirit of that policy the negotiations begun in virtue of the Geneva agreement of September 16. I would especially direct attention to the last paragraph of the Lugano *communiqué*, which reads as follows:—"We are determined to do everything in our power to arrive as soon as possible at a final settlement

of the difficulties arising out of the War, and thus assure upon the basis of mutual confidence the happy development of relations between our respective countries".

Colonel Wedgwood asked whether, in the negotiations now going on in connexion with the duration of the Committee of Control, we were standing out for the French proposition that it should continue after 1935, or for the German proposition that it should close in 1935 ; or, alternatively, whether we had not made up our minds on the question at all. Sir A. Chamberlain said that there was another question relating to the Lugano conversations on the Paper to which he would by replying in a few moments. When he had given that reply he thought he would have said all on the question that could be usefully or properly stated at present.

Sir A. Chamberlain, replying to Lieut.-Com. Kenworthy (Hull, Central, Lab.) and Mr. Thurtle (Shoreditch, Lab.), said :—I have little to add to the *communiqué* issued at Lugano by M. Briand, Dr. Stresemann, and myself. This was the first occasion on whitch we had met since March. It afforded us an opportunity for the removal of some misconception and for a very friendly interchange of views such as has become customary whenever we meet. No new decisions were either taken or sought. The reparations question is being dealt with through the ordinary channels, and we did not attempt to duplicate the negotiations on that subject which centre in Paris. We are agreed that the first thing to do is to secure the appointement of the Committee of Experts, and we hope that they may get to work very early in the New Year. Our discussion of the other problems dealt with in the resolution come to by the six Powers at Geneva last September was of a purely exploratory and preparatory character, but I derived from it the impression that circumstances are favourable for a solution if fresh polemics can be avoited while the experts are performing their task. That is all that it is in the public interest to say at the present time.

Lieut.-Com. Kenworthy asked whether any definite progress had been made towards the evacuation of the Rhineland and whether evacuation was being linked up with what was known as the Polish Locarno.

Sir A. Chamberlain.—I have already said that it is not in the public interest or in the interest of peace to say more. I must respectfully decline to add anything to my answer.

Several Labour members jumped up excitedly to put supplementary questions, and Colonel Wedgwood (Newcastle-under-Lyme, Lab.) asked whether the Foreign Secretary was in a position to refuse information in answer to questions legitimately put to him by hon. members. He wished to ask the right hon. gentleman whether he did not think that it was in the public interest that be should change his policy or that they should change his Government. (Opposition cheers.)

The Speaker said that the right hon. gentleman had given all the information to the House.

Fresh attempts were made by Labour members to put further questions, but the Speaker intervened.

Mr. Kirkwood (Dumbarton Burghs, Lab.), addressing the Speaker, said :—Is it possible that men like us, who love our country, can sit by and see men retained in he Rhineland ? How is it possible to expect the Germans to remain at peace so long as that continues ? (Ministerial cries of "Order !")

The Speaker continued to resist attempts to put further questions, and M. Kirkwood shouted, "It is something ridiculous".

The Speaker said that he did not want to curtail supplementary questions, but the House must get on with the business.

Colonel Wedgwood asked whether they would have an opportunity to-morrow, on the motion for the adjournment, to put questions to the Foreign Secretary which they were not able to put to him at question time.

Sir A. Chamberlain.—May I make an appeal to the House ? (Opposition cries of "No"). The right hon. gentleman said, "Oh, very well", ant sat down.

Mr. Macpherson (Ross and Cromarty, L.) asked if it was not the custom and practice of the House that, while members were invariably allowed to put questions to Ministers, Ministers could refuse to reply to them if it was against the public interest. (Ministerial cheers.)

The Speaker—That certainly is the case. Ministers can say as little or as much as they please.

Replying to Colonel Wedgwood, the Speaker said that, strictly speaking, the rule with regard to supplementary questions was that they must be put in order to elucidate the reply which had been given. If the Foreign Secretary said that he had no further reply to give there was nothing more to elucidate.

SPEECH OF SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, LONDON, HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 20, 1928.

(The Times, December 21, 1928).

On the motion for the adjournment of the House till, January 22,

Sir A. Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (Birmingham, W.), in reply to questions, said that there was really, so far as the Lugano conversations were concerned, nothing which he could add to what he said the other day. No new engagements had taken place, no new engagements were sought by anyone. What they did was purely tentative and

explanatory, preparatory to the negotiations which they hoped might eventually lead them to agreement. The policy of his Majesty's Government had been quite plainly declared in this House on several occasions. They desired to secure the évacuation of the Rhineland as early as possible. The questions directed to obliging to declare himself the supporter of a particular French thesis or a particular German thesis were not conducive to that result. The position of this country depended upon the independence of its own point of view, and if he were to respond to these questions and take sides publicly with one party or the other, he should lessen his influence and the influence of his country for securing that evacuation which all the three Powers would desire to see take place.

In regard to the view which the Government took of the legal position in respect of evacuation under a certain Article of the Treaty, the German Government had been made aware of our view in the course of the September conversations and earlier, and in the September conversations the six Powers had deliberately turned away from the unfruitful discussion of their differences on the legal aspect of the case to seek an avenue, a road, to a practical solution. He held it to be in the general interest not to revive discussion on matters on which they disagreed, but to pursue the road to the practical solution which they all desired.

An hon. member had questioned the advisability of that cooperation which took place between a British cavalry regiment and French troops in the Rhineland. We had reduced our forces in the Rhineland to so small a figure that it was impossible to give them their proper annual training, and our military authorities were glad to take advantage of an invitation in order to secure the normal training of our cavalry. It had no other significance than that, and to attempt to read into it some alteration of the Locarno policy, some new military understanding with France, was not only absolutely without foundation, but was really most mischievous, because it created suspicion which it ought to be our business to prevent. He had been asked whether, in the course of the negotiations at Locarno or in the conversations that took place outside Locarno, any assurance had been given by this country that their participation in the occupation of the Rhineland should not be terminated except with the assent of France. There was no agreement, official or unofficial, to that effect. His Majesty's troops were under the orders of his Majesty's Government and nobody else, and we came under no obligation at Locarno or Lugano, during conversations or during conferences, to maintain our troops there any longer than we ourselves thought it expedient. He did not think any substantial result could be achieved by the withdrawal of 7,000 troops—he thought that was the figure. It was much more important and much more practical to devote

ourselves to seeing whether we could not reach such an agreement as would lead to the complete and early evacuation of the Rhineland.

As to our relations with Russia there had been no change in the situation so far as the Government was concerned. They had received no communications from the Russian Government, nor made any communications to them, and he did not think they could usefully enter into negotiations until they had, from experience, assurances that the Russian Government had abandoned the practices which led to the rupture of the displomatic relations that previously existed. The speeches in Moscow showed that there was no change of heart or mind in the authorities in power there. It was not false pride that prevented our renewing relations, but the conviction that nothing had happened to cause us even to think it probable that if we renewed relations the same abuses would not at once begin again.

As to Anglo-American relations, he profoundly regretted that a little cloud had come over them recently. He refused to believe that between two nations so peacefully minded and so friendly to each other these passing differences were going to create any permanent disturbance of their relations. In regard to the Arbitration Treaty, he had proposed that it should be extended to cover the time which was needed for the consideration of the new proposals which had been put before them by the American Government and which came upon him completely as a surprise, as he had been previously informed that the American Government intended no change and would merely renew the old treaty. It was found impossible, owing to the business before the Senate, to secure an extension of that treaty before it expired. But let them never forget that there was another very valuable treaty, which, being without a time limit, was still in force—the Bryan-Spring-Rice Treaty for conciliation. His own impression was that very probably in the future relations of the two countries that conciliation machinery would be more used by both than any arbitration treaty that might be in existence.

Before they could deal with that matter a much wider and larger proposal was made to them and other Powers by the American Government—the great Peace Pact associated with the name of Mr. Kellogg. He believed their views were shared by the American Government that it was certainly desirable to conclude the negotiations on that point and to lay aside for the time being any resumption of negotiations in regard to the Arbitration Treaty. He would say, broadly, that in regard to the terms of an Arbitration Treaty, in regard to further steps to be taken in relation to disarmament or the limitation of armaments, and in regard to the question of the bearing of belligerent rights on those other points, the Government were engaged in a very careful inquiry and consideration of the very

large issues raised, but they had not yet reached a conclusion which enabled them to proceed further in the negotiations with the Government of the United States.

The House stood adjourned at 9 o'clock till January 22.

DISCOURS DE MONSEIGNEUR MAGLIONE, DOYEN DU CORPS DIPLOMATIQUE, ET DE M. GASTON DOUMERGUE, PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANÇAISE, PARIS, ELYSEE, LE 1er JANVIER 1929.

(Le Temps du 3 janvier 1929.)

DISCOURS DU NONCE

Le doyen, Mgr Maglione, nonce du Saint-Siège apostolique, a prononcé le dicours suivant :

« Monsieur le président,

» C'est un très agréable devoir pour mes collègues du corps diplomatique et pour moi de présenter à Votre Excellence, au nom de nos souverains et chefs d'Etat et en notre propre nom, les meilleurs vœux pour l'année qui s'ouvre.

Nous souhaitons sincèrement et vivement que cette nouvelle année voie grandir de plus en plus la prospérité morale et matérielle de votre grande nation. Le même vœu, nous le formons pour les autres pays, car si la prospérité d'un peuple repose toujours principalement sur la paix sociale intérieure dont il jouit, et sur la possibilité qu'il a de vivre et de travailler dans une sécurité parfaite, elle est cependant aujourd'hui plus que jamais liée aussi à la prospérité des autres Etats et à la bonne harmonie qui doit régner entre eux. Voilà pourquoi nous suivons avec un vif intérêt et une grande sympathie l'œuvre que la France écoutant l'inclination de son cœur, et s'inspirant de ses convictions, ne cesse d'accomplir en faveur de la paix internationale. Cette paix, elle cherche à l'organiser avec les autres nations dans un esprit de justice et de fraternité, et, de plus, elle s'efforce de la garantir en préparant, par le moyen de l'arbitrage, la solution des conflits possibles.

» N'est-ce pas précisément pour rendre hommage à cette bonne volonté du peuple et du gouvernement français que sont venus, naguère, à Paris, les représentants de treize gouvernements pour signer un pacte dû à la noble et généreuse initiative de la France et des Etats-Unis d'Amérique, pacte qui a donné aux peuples une agréable promesse et restera pour eux une solide et douce espérance ?

Dans la confiance que la France continuera de plein accord

avec nos gouvernements son œuvre en vue de la consolidation de la paix, nous vous prions, monsieur le président, de bien vouloir agréer les vœux que nous vous offrons pour votre pays, avec ceux que nous formons pour le bonheur de Votre Excellence. »

DISCOURS DU PRÉSIDENT DE LA RÉPUBLIQUE

Le président de la République a répondu en ces termes :

« Monsieur le nonce,

» C'est avec une vive satisfaction que je reçois chaque année, à cette date, les membres du corps diplomatique accrédité à Paris, et je tiens à remercier très sincèrement Votre Excellence des vœux qu'elle vient d'exprimer en leur nom à l'égard de la France.

» Il est chaque jour plus certain que la prospérité matérielle et morale d'un Etat, fondée sur la paix sociale intérieure et le sentiment de la sécurité, contribue à la bonne harmonie qu'il est si désirable de voir présider aux relations entre les peuples, et je m'associe de grand cœur aux souhaits que vous avez formulés pour les autres pays.

» L'affermissement dans le monde d'une paix dont l'établissement a coûté à l'humanité de si lourds et si cruels sacrifices, demeure la préoccupation dominante du gouvernement français. Les preuves abondent que, pour y atteindre, il n'entend négliger aucune occasion, ni se refuser à aucun effort. Aussi, a-t-il lieu de se féliciter de l'accueil empressé et presque unanime aujourd'hui qui a été réservé au pacte de renonciation à la guerre, préparé en complet accord avec le gouvernement des Etats-Unis d'Amérique sur une formule dont il s'honore d'avoir pris l'initiative. Les paroles que Votre Excellence vient de prononcer sont un précieux témoignage de l'importance reconnue par les gouvernements à cette œuvre de pacification.

» En vous priant, monsieur le nonce, d'agréer les vœux les plus sincères pour Votre Excellence et pour les membres du corps diplomatique, je demande à tous les chefs de mission de bien vouloir être, auprès des souverains et chefs d'Etat qu'ils représentent, les interprètes de mes souhaits les plus cordiaux. »

NOTE DE M. LITWINOFF, COMMISSAIRE ADJOINT SOVIETIQUE AUX AFFAIRES ETRANGERES, AU GOUVERNEMENT POLONAIS, DU 29 DECEMBRE 1928.

(Le Messager Polonais du 3 janvier 1929).

Le 24 août 1926 le gouvernement de l'Union a fait remettre au gouvernement de la République de Pologne, par l'intermédiaire de son envoyé plénipotentiaire à Varsovie un projet de pacte de non-agression. Cette démarche du gouvernement de l'Union fut le résultat des négociations poursuivies entre les deux gouvernements sur l'initiative du gouvernement de l'Union ; elle fut également l'expression de la ligne observée, en matière de politique étrangère, par le gouvernement de l'Union dans ses relations avec les autres Etats, ligne à laquelle répondaient les propositions en vue du désarmement présentées d'abord à la conférence de Moscou de 1922 et, par la suite, à la Commission préparatoire du désarmement de la S. d. N.

Etant donné que le désarmement universel contient la garantie la plus efficace de la paix, le gouvernement de l'Union considère en même temps le traité de non-agression comme un facteur susceptible de contribuer sérieusement à empêcher les conflits armés entre les Etats.

Le gouvernement de l'Union se voit obligé à constater que les négociations engagées avec le gouvernement polonais en vue de la conclusion d'un tel accord bien qu'elles durent depuis plusieurs années déjà, n'ont guère avancé malgré les efforts appliqués par le gouvernement de l'Union à réaliser un accord entre les deux parties.

Estimant à sa juste valeur la signature d'un pacte de non-agression, pour le développement des relations soviéto-polonaises pour le maintien de la paix universelle, le gouvernement de l'Union regrette l'inefficacité de ses efforts et se déclare une fois de plus invariablement prêt à signer, avec le gouvernement polonais, un pacte de non agression.

Alors que les négociations pour la conclusion d'un pacte de non agression entre la Pologne et l'Union Soviétique n'ont donné aucun résultat,le gouvernement polonais,invité à adhérer un pacte Kellogg, c'est-à-dire à un accord mutilatéral, sur le renoncement de la guerre comme l'instrument de politique national, a signé cet accord au nombre d'autres Etats, le 27 août 1928, à Paris. Par la suite le gouvernement de l'Union a également adhéré au pacte.

Invité à adhérer à l'accord de Paris (pacte de Kellogg) le gouvernement soviétique, dans sa note adressée au gouvernement français a fait ressortir le fait que le dit pacte ne contient pas d'engagements concernant le désarmement qui constituent le facteur essentiel des garanties de paix ; il a attiré aussi l'attention sur le caractère insuffisant et pas assez défini de la formule de

renoncement à la guerre, ainsi que sur d'autres éléments de nature à affaiblir la portée du pacte. Le gouvernement de l'Union considère, comme par le passé, que le pacte ne fournit pas les garanties du maintien de la paix qui résultaient du pacte de non-agression et de non-adhésion à des groupements des puissances ennemies, présenté antérieurement par des Soviets.

Toutefois, du moment où le gouvernement de l'Union a reconnu que l'accord de Paris (pacte Kelogg) impose à ses signataires certains engagements de caractère pacifique, il y a adhéré sans retard, pesant avec le plus grand soin toutes ces initiatives dans le domaine du maintien de la paix. Il désirerait par conséquent que le dit accord prenne effet le plus rapidement possible surtout dans les relations entre le gouvernement de l'Union et ses voisins les plus proches.

Malheureusement l'entrée en vigueur du pacte de Paris dépend, aux termes de l'article 3 de sa ratification par 14 Etats dont les noms ont été établis d'avance. Pendant les quatre mois qui se sont écoulés du jour de la signature du pacte aucun desdits 14 Etats n'a procédé à la ratification. Ce fait autorise la crainte que pendant une longue période encore l'accord restera un document ne liant formellement aucun Etat. Bien entendu, entre les Etats particuliers l'accord ne peut prendre effet qu'à la suite de la signature d'un acte séparé complémentaire.

Considérant que le maintien de la paix à l'Est de l'Europe offre une importance de tout premier ordre, étant donné par ailleurs que la Pologne, parmi les Etats limitrophes de l'Union soviétique à l'Est, a signé l'accord de Paris, le gouvernement de l'Union a décidé de s'adresser au gouvernement polonais avec la proposition de signer le protocole ci-annexé en vertu duquel l'accord de Paris sur le renoncement à la guerre prendrait effet entre l'Union Soviétique et la Pologne aussitôt après sa ratification par les deux Etats et indépendamment de la condition prévue à l'article 3 dudit accord. Par la signature du protocole sus-mentionné le gouvernement polonais assumerait sans nul doute l'engagement moral de mener à bonne fin le plus rapidement possible la procédure de ratification prévue tant de l'accord de Paris que du protocole lui-même. En ce qui concerne l'U. R. S. S. son adhésion à l'accord de Paris a été déjà ratifiée par le "Présidium" du Comité Exécutif.

En attirant votre attention, Monsieur le Ministre, sur l'article 4 du protocole en vertu duquel celui-ci serait ouvert à la signature de chacun des Etats ayant adhéré à l'accord de Paris et au fur et à mesure des nouvelles adhésions, le gouvernement de l'Union exprime sa profonde conviction que l'issue favorable donnée à sa proposition actuelle dans le domaine des relations entre la Pologne et l'Union pourra contribuer dans une large mesure à consolider la paix dans l'Est de l'Europe.

Je considère de mon devoir de faire observer que, par sa proposition actuelle, le gouvernement de l'Union n'annule pas la

proposition faite antérieurement au gouvernement polonais relativement à la conclusion d'un pacte de non-agression qui ne pourrait que raffermir dans l'avenir les relations de bon voisinage entre l'Union des Républiques Soviétiques et la République de Pologne.

Considérant que le gouvernement polonais, qui a déjà signé l'accord multilatéral de Paris auquel l'U. R. S. S. a également adhéré et, par conséquent, ne saurait faire des réserves à ce que cet accord prenne immédiatement effet entre les deux Etats, le gouvernement de l'Union exprime l'espoir que le gouvernement polonais donnera suite à la proposition formulée par la présente note.

Le gouvenement de l'Union fait savoir par la même occasion, au gouvernement polonais qu'une proposition analogue a été faite par le gouvernement de l' U. R. S. S. au gouvernement de la République lithuanienne en tant qu'unique Etat baltique qui a déjà adhéré à l'accord de Paris. Le gouvernement de l'Union n'a pas encore adressé de propositions analogues à la Finlande, à l'Estonie et à la Lettonie uniquement pour la raison que ces Etats n'ont pas encore adhéré, d'une façon formelle, à l'accord de Paris. Toutefois, le gouvernement de l' U. R. S. S. se réserve le droit d'adresser la même proposition à ces Etats dès que ceux ci auront adhéré à l'accord de Paris.

Je vous prie, Monsieur le Ministre, de bien vouloir porter la présente à la connaissance de votre gouvernement.

Veuillez agréer, etc...

Moscou, 29 décembre 1928.

(—) Litwinoff,

f. f. du Commissaire du Peuple aux Affaires étrangères.

PROJET DU PROTOCOLE.

Le Comité Exécutif Central de l'U. R. S. S... et le Président de la République de Pologne... animés du désir de resserrer les bonnes relations de voisinage entre l'U. R. S. S. et la Pologne et désireux de procéder à la mise en vigueur sans délai de l'accord sur la renonciation à la guerre en tant qu'instrument de politique internationale, signé à Paris le 27 août 1928, ont décidé de réaliser leur désir, ci-dessus énoncé, au moyen du présent protocole et dans ce but, ont désigné leurs représentants notamment le Comité Exécutif Central de l'U. R. S. S..., et le Président de la République de Pologne... après avoir procédé à l'échange de leurs pleins pouvoirs reconnus avoir été établis selon les usages prescrits, ont décidé ce qui suit :

1) L'accord sur la renonciation à la guerre en tant qu'instrument de la politique nationale, signé à Paris le 27 août 1928 dont la copie a été jointe au présent protocole, en tant que sa partie indivisible, prend effet entre l' U. R. S. S. et la Pologne après la ratification de l'accord de Paris de 1928 ci-dessus dési-

gné par les Chambres législatives de l'U. R. S. S. et de la Pologne.

II) Le présent protocole est soumis à la ratification des Chambres législatives respectives de l'U. R. S. S. et de la Pologne, conformément aux stipulations de leurs Constitutions.

Le présent protocole prendra effet dans les rapports réciproques entre l' U. R. S. S. et la Pologne le jour de l'échange du document de ratification relatif à ce protocole, échange qui aura lieu le... une semaine après sa ratification par les deux parties contractantes.

III) Il sera procédé à l'entrée en vigueur de l'accord de Paris de 1928 en vertu du présent protocole entre les parties contractantes de la manière suivante : dès que, conformément à l'art. 2 du présent protocole, ce dernier sera entré en vigueur et dès que les Chambres législatives de l' U. R. S. S. et de la Pologne auront procédé à la ratification de l'accord de Paris de 1928, chacune des deux parties contractantes, immédiatement après cette ratification, en informera l'autre partie par voie diplomatique.

C'est à partir du moment où aura été faite la seconde des notifications précitées qu'entrera en vigueur l'accord de Paris de 1928 dans les relations réciproques entre l' U. R. S. S. et la Pologne.

IV) Les gouvernements de tous les pays ont le droit d'adhérer au présent protocole. L'annonce sur l'adhésion au protocole devra être adressée à celui des gouvernements qui aura informé qu'il est participant au présent protocole. C'est au moment de la réception de l'annonce sur l'adhésion que le présent protocole prendra effet dans les relations mutuelles entre l'Etat signataire et tous les autres participants du présent protocole.

V) L'entrée en vigueur de l'accord de Paris de 1928 conformément au présent protocole, ceci dans les relations mutuelles entre chacun des Etats signataires et tous les autres participants du présent protocole sera effectuée de la façon suivante :

Dès que, conformément à l'art. 4 du présent protocole, un quelconque des Etats y aura adhéré et les Chambres législatives de cet Etat auront procédé à la ratification de l'accord de Paris de 1928, le gouvernement de l'Etat qui va adhérer en informera immédiatement par voie diplomatique le gouvernement de... qui le notifiera à tous les autres participant au présent protocole. Le moment de la réception par le gouvernement de... de la notification précitée sera considéré comme le moment de l'entrée en vigueur de l'accord de Paris de 1928 entre l'Etat adhérent au présent protocole et tous les autres participants de ce protocole.

VI) L'entrée en vigueur de l'accord de Paris de 1928 prévu par le présent protocole dans les relations mutuelles entre les participants du présent protocole, sera effectuée indépendam-

ment de sa mise en vigueur en vertu de l'accord de Paris de 1928, comme il est stipulé dans l'art. 3 dudit accord.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires ci-dessus désignés ont signé le présent protocole et ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en deux exemplaires le...

DISCOURS DE M. RAYMOND POINCARE, PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL DES MINISTRES FRANÇAIS, PARIS, CHAMBRE DES DEPUTES, LE 12 JANVIER 1929.

(Le Temps du 13 janvier 1929).

Le pacte signé au quai d'Orsay il y a quelqués semaines, sous les auspices de M. Kellog et de M. Briand, pourrait, sans doute, constitutionnellement, être ratifié par M. le Président de la République, sans être au préalable soumis à l'approbation parlementaire. Mais M. le Ministre des affaires étrangères et le Gouvernement tout entier ont pensé qu'étant donné l'importance de cet accord, étant donné la haute signification pacifique et l'heureuse influence qu'il peut exercer dans le monde, il était bon que les représentants élus de la France y fussent directement associés.

Peut-être d'ailleurs, sera-ce là pour la chambre l'occasion de faire un tour d'horizon et de jeter un coup d'œil d'ensemble sur la situation internationale ; et il apparaîtra certainement que de tous les pays du monde la France républicaine n'est pas le moins fermement attachée à la cause de la paix (*Applaudissements*).

Elle a, du reste, donné, et elle continuera de donner, une nouvelle preuve de ses sentiments dans les négociations relatives au règlement de réparations. En consentant à l'expertise projetée, elle a eu, en effet, beaucoup plus en vue l'intérêt général du monde que le sien propre. Si elle ne s'était inspirée que de considérations purement égoïstes, elle n'aurait demandé à ses débiteurs que l'observation loyale des traités et l'exécution régulière du plan Dawes.

En effet, pour le moment tout au moins, elle n'avait rien à gagner à un changement quelconque : non seulement l'Allemagne est en mesure de payer, comme l'a lumineusement démontré M. Parker Gilbert, mais elle paye et elle transfère ; nous avons touché hier, nous toucherons aujourd'hui et nous pouvons espérer toucher demain, soit en espèces, soit en prestations, des sommes importantes, qui nous permettent d'acquitter nous-mêmes, sans difficulté, nos dettes extérieures, et qui nous laissent un excédent appréciable pour nos réparations et même, le cas échéant, pour notre budget. Si le plan Dawes

continue à être exactement appliqué, l'indice de prospérité tel qu'il résulte des éléments déterminés par les experts du plan Dawes va progressivement accroître l'annuité, et cela dans des proportions considérables ; et, dans les années qui viennent, la part de chacun des créanciers, et, en particulier, de la France, se trouvera donc sensiblement augmentée.

De ce point de vue, nous aurions donc avantage à nous en tenir au plan Dawes. Mais les experts de 1923 eux-mêmes ont prévu qu'il pourrait être un jour nécessaire de procéder à un règlement général et ils ont même discrètement indiqué que ce règlement faciliterait sans doute celui des dettes interalliées.

Aussi bien n'ont-ils pas fixé eux-mêmes le nombre des annuités que l'Allemagne aurait à payer. Ils ont laissé la durée indéterminée, si bien que, le total de ces payements restant lui-même dans le vague, il est très difficile, pour ne pas dire impossible, de tenter dès maintenant une mobilisation des dettes internationales et en particulier de la dette allemande.

Cette mobilisation constituerait cependant un avantage, tout à la fois pour la nation débitrice qui pourrait, partiellement au moins, dégager l'avenir, et pour les nations créancières, qui recevraient des payements anticipés.

Mobiliser et commercialiser la dette des réparations, ce serait, en outre, multiplier et même universaliser le nombre des créanciers, diminuer par là les frictions entre Etats et augmenter les chances de régularité dans les payements.

Nous avons pensé que nous ne devions pas écarter ces possibilités d'entente générale, et les autres créanciers ont partagé notre sentiment.

L'Allemagne a insisté, comme M. Parker Gilbert l'avait fait lui-même, pour que les experts fussent indépendants et eussent, dans leur travail, toute liberté de recherche, d'examen et de conclusion. Mais, en revanche, il a été entendu que leur avis ne lierait pas les gouvernements et que ceux-ci décideraient, le moment venu, comment ils entendaient l'appliquer ou le refuser.

C'est ce qui avait déjà été convenu à Genève, entre les ministres des affaires étrangères des gouvernements intéressés. Il va sans dire aussi que, lorsque les gouvernements auront à se prononcer, les Chambres françaises ne seront pas tenues à l'écart.

Donc, tous les droits sont réservés et il ne s'agit, dans l'expertise, que d'un travail technique, qui ne portera nullement sur les questions politiques et qui laissera entières votre liberté et celle du gouvernement. Mais, messieurs, si les gouvernements créanciers avaient laissé les experts se réunir sans s'être fait connaître les uns aux autres et sans avoir communiqué à l'Allemagne débitrice la nature et l'importance de leurs réclamations respectives, et s'ils n'avaient pas pris soin d'indiquer d'avance à quelles conditions minima ils pourraient se rallier aux con-

clusions futures des experts, ils se seraient engagés ou ils auraient risqué de s'engager à l'aveugle dans une aventure qui aurait pu être dangereuse.

Dans les conversations que nous avons eues avec les autres pays après le protocole de Genève, ils ont été unanimes à penser qu'ils devaient prendre et que nous devions prendre nettement la précaution préalable de nous renseigner mutuellement d'abord et de renseigner ensuite l'Allemagne elle-même sur le minimum au-dessous duquel nous serions dans l'obligation de ne pas considérer comme opérante l'expertise que l'on va commencer.

Nous avons donc échangé à cet endroit des notes précises. Dans la nôtre, le gouvernement de la République a simplement mais nettement rappelé la position que M. Briand et moi nous avions prise, lui à Genève, en face des autres ministres étrangers, et moi à Chambéry et à Caen, dans des déclarations publiques.

En d'autres termes, nous avons répété que, pour accepter les conditions des experts, nous demandions qu'il nous fût réservé, pendant aussi longtemps que nous aurons à nous acquitter envers l'Amérique et envers l'Angleterre, des sommes assez élevées pour couvrir nos payements et qu'il nous fût, en outre, alloué une indemnité nette pour nos réparations. (*Applaudissements*).

Nous avons, les autres créanciers et nous, donné communication à l'Allemagne de nos notes respectives pour qu'il ne pût y avoir, à cet égard, aucune surprise. L'Allemagne a fait des réserves. Elle a pris soin de préciser qu'elle ne pourrait accepter elle-même le règlement s'il modifiait son standard de vie. Mais, sous le bénéfice de cet échange de mémorandums, elle a donné son adhésion à la nomination des experts.

Plusieurs questions incidentes se sont alors posées. D'abord, comment seraient nommés les experts ?

Nous nous sommes mis d'accord pour que les nations représentées à la commission des réparations pussent charger cette commission de nommer les leurs, sur leur désignation, de manière à rester soigneusement dans le cadre du traité de Versailles. Il a été admis que l'Allemagne nommerait les siens, que ceux de l'Amérique seraient nommés par la commission des réparations et avec l'assentiment du gouvernement des Etats-Unis.

En second lieu, quel serait le lieu de la réunion ? La plupart des Etats intéressés ont marqué une préférence pour Paris, que nous n'avions pas eu l'indiscrétion de proposer nous-mêmes. Mais finalement il a paru plus convenable de ne fixer que le premier rendez-vous et de laisser aux experts eux-mêmes la faculté de choisir le lieu de leurs séances ultérieures.

S'ils choisissent Paris, nous prendrons d'accord avec la commission des réparations, les dispositions nécessaires pour

qu'ils y reçoivent, pendant leur séjour, une hospitalité digne d'eux. (*Très bien ! Très bien !*)

On a également discuté longuement et, à mon sens peut-être sans grande nécessité, les termes du mandat qui serait donné aux experts par toutes les puissances intéressées. On s'est finalement entendu sur une formule très simple qui donne aux experts mission de rechercher un règlement définitif des dettes résultant des traités et accords existants.

Lorsque le comité se réunira, il aura donc grande latitude dans l'accomplissement de sa tâche. Et j'espère sincèrement qu'après une étude attentive il reconnaîtra, d'une part la modération de nos demandes, d'autre part l'exactitude du mode d'évaluation établi par le plan Dawes pour le calcul de la capacité allemande, et la justesse des récentes observations de M. Parker Gilbert.

Mais si les experts, par impossible, ne nous rendaient pas la justice qui, croyons-nous, nous est due, nous conserverions le droit absolu d'en revenir au plan Dawes et d'en réclamer simplement l'exécution. Car le plan Dawes subsiste et il subsistera tant qu'il ne sera pas conventiellement remplacé par un autre règlement.

Si, au contraire, comme je veux le croire, le comité aboutit à une résolution conforme aux demandes des différents créanciers et conforme, en même temps, aux intérêts reconnus de l'Allemagne, notre situation envers nos créanciers à nous se trouvera singulièrement améliorée. Nos dettes dont nous n'avons jamais songé à nous affranchir et dont nous avons même, jusqu'ici, régulièrement payé les échéances, sans jamais engager l'avenir nos dettes seront, en fait, implicitement garanties par nos propres débiteurs. Si ce résultat est obtenu, s'il l'est notamment avant l'échéance des stoks américains, il nous permettra peut-être, messieurs, d'envisager sous un aspect nouveau la question des dettes interalliées.

Mais à chaque jour suffit sa peine, et, pour l'instant, le seul problème qui se pose devant nous est celui des réparations. C'est lui qui, dans une large mesure, commande celui des dettes ; mais ils ne se confondent pas et nous devons les traiter successivement et séparément. C'est, du reste, le désir des créanciers comme des débiteurs,

Jamais nous n'avons été, je crois, dans des conditions plus favorables pour aborder ces deux problèmes l'un après l'autre, et pour les régler définitivement ; et si nous arrivons à ce règlement, nous aurons fait beaucoup, j'en ai la conviction, en faveur de la paix et de la prospérité de tous les peuples.

C'est cette grave raison — et cette raison seule — qui m'a déterminé à ne pas céder aujourd'hui à la tentation du repos. Nous sommes au milieu du gué et on m'a démontré qu'il était difficile de changer de direction au moment même du passage

(*Applaudissements au centre, à droite et sur plusieurs bancs à gauche*).

Mais pour que nous ayons, bientôt, dans les négociations qui se préparent, toute l'autorité dont nous avons besoin, pour que nous puissions parler librement au nom de la France, il faut que nous ne vivions pas d'une vie incertaine et précaire ; il faut que nous ne soyons pas tous les jours à la merci d'un vote défavorable ; il faut que nous ayons votre confiance pleine et entière ; il faut que nous soyons, autant qu'un gouvernement peut l'être, assurés de notre lendemain.

M. Briand et moi, étroitement d'accord entre nous et avec tout le cabinet, nous avons préparé de notre mieux ce règlement général auquel aspirent tant de peuples. En France et à l'Etranger, on a souvent essayé de nous opposer l'un à l'autre, M. le Ministre des affaires étrangères et moi, comme on a également cherché à mettre en contradiction à certaines heures M. Briand et M. Painlevé. La vérité est qu'à aucun moment il n'y a eu la moindre divergence, dans le ministère actuel pas plus que dans le précédent, ni sur les questions de sécurité, ni sur les questions de réparations.

M. Ernest Lafont. — Ni sur les autres ?.

Le Président du Conseil. — En particulier dans la préparation de l'expertise, il ne s'est produit aucune divergence, mieux encore : aucune différence d'appréciation. Chacun de nous s'est plus particulièrement occupé de la partie du travail qui relevait de ses attributions ministérielles. M. Briand a suivi les pourparlers qui avaient surtout un caractère diplomatique. J'ai dirigé, d'accord avec lui, dirai-je à sa demande, ceux qui avaient un caractère technique.

Aucun de nous, du reste, n'a fait un pas, aucun de nous n'a dit un mot sur une question quelconque sans s'être préalablement concerté avec l'autre.

Nous nous sommes expliqués ensemble devant les commissions. Le moment venu, nous nous expliquerons devant la Chambre. Et, si nous réussissons dans nos efforts communs, l'œuvre à laquelle nous aurons patiemment collaboré n'apportera pas seulement à notre pays une amélioration sensible de sa situation économique et financière, elle ne contribuera pas seulement à effacer les traces matérielles de la guerre, elle en atténuera heureusement les conséquences psychologiques, elle calmera dans l'âme des peuples qui se sont combattus les souffrances morales et les ressentiments, elle leur donnera une notion plus juste et plus sereine des nécessités de l'avenir, elle empêchera ceux qui seraient tentés par des ambitions impérialistes de céder à des entraînements funestes, elle montrera à tous que la prospérité universelle est une garantie pour chaque pays non seulement de la prospérité nationale, mais de sa tranquillité, elle donnera à la paix des assises nouvelles, elle remplira ainsi, j'en suis assuré, les vœux de tous les Français.

NOTE DU GOUVERNEMENT POLONAIS DU 10 JANVIER 1929 AU GOUVERNEMENT DE L'UNION DES REPUBLIQUES SOCIALISTES SOVIETIQUES DU 29 DECEMBRE 1928.

(Le Messager Polonais du 11 janvier 1929).

Par la note du 29 décembre 1928 concernant la mise en vigueur du pacte Kellogg vous avez communiqué que le gouvernement de l'U. R. S. S. propose au gouvernement polonais la mise en vigueur du pacte Kellogg du 27 août 1928 avant la date prévue par l'article 3 dudit pacte, au moyen d'un protocole polono-soviétique dont le projet a été annexé par vous à la note précitée. En accusant réception de cette note j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer, Monsieur le Commissaire du Peuple, par ordre de mon gouvernement ce qui suit :

Le gouvernement polonais, dont la politique pacifique envers tous ses voisins et par conséquent aussi envers l'U. R. S. S. est un fait qui ne saurait être mis en doute, se voit forcé d'exprimer son étonnement que le gouvernement soviétique ait jugé opportun d'exploiter l'occasion de l'envoi de ladite note pour soulever, à l'adresse de la Pologne, les reproches du chef de l'insuccès des accords spéciaux entre les deux Etats concernant soit la non-agression soit le désarmement. Le gouvernement polonais n'a pas l'intention néanmoins de soulever la discussion à ce sujet, en se bornant seulement à constater que le cours de ces négociations est reproduit, dans la note susmentionnée, d'une façon inexacte.

En examinant à son tour la proposition contenue dans votre note j'ai l'honneur de vous communiquer, Monsieur le Commissaire du Peuple, que cette proposition est l'objet d'études sérieuses de la part du gouvernement polonais. Le gouvernement polonais est prêt en principe, à accepter cette proposition en se réservant cependant la faculté de proposer à son tour, au gouvernement de l'U. R. S. S., les modifications qu'après examen il jugerait indispensables. En outre le gouvernement polonais tient à souligner que l'article 3 du pacte Kellogg, par les mots « Le présent traité sera ratifié par les hautes parties contractantes désignées dans le préambule conformément aux exigences de leurs constitutions respectives et prendra effet entre elles dès que tous les instruments de ratification auront été déposés à Washington » impose à tous les signataires le devoir d'une procédure de ratification solidaire comme condition de la mise en vigueur de ce pacte. Etant du nombre des premiers signataires et lié par la teneur de l'article 3 susmentionné le gouvernement polonais doit préalablement s'entendre avec les initiateurs et les premiers signataires du pacte au sujet de la mise en vigueur partielle de ce pacte par un mode différent proposé par vous. Au surplus le gouvernement polonais, tout en nourrissant l'espoir que la ratification prévue par l'article 3 du pacte,

aura lieu bientôt attire cependant l'attention du gouvernement de l'U. R. S. S. sur le fait qu'aucun des Etats qui ont été les premiers signataires, sans excepter même les initiateurs de ce pacte ne l'a ratifié jusqu'à présent. On peut cependant compter sur l'éclaircissement sérieux de la situation sur ce point dans l'avenir le plus proche ce qui permettra aux deux Etats de prendre, au sujet du protocole proposé par vous, une attitude mieux précisée.

En plus le gouvernement polonais tient à faire remarquer que, malgré la distinction flatteuse dont il a été l'objet parmi les Etats voisinant directement avec l'U. R. S. S., il est obligé d'exprimer son étonnement du fait que le gouvernement soviétique ait omis dans sa proposition les gouvernements de la Finlande, de l'Estonie, de la Lettonie et de la Roumanie et qu'il se soit par contre adressé à la Lithuanie qui n'a pas de frontière commune avec l'U. R S. S. et qui, comme le gouvernement soviétique ne l'ignore pas, refuse d'entamer avec la Pologne des relations diplomatiques. Cette distinction rend plus difficile la situation du gouvernement polonais et ceci d'autant plus qu'aussi bien la Roumanie que les Etats Baltes se sont déclarés de telle ou autre façon, prêts à accéder au pacte Kellogg. Le gouvernement polonais rappelle au gouvernement de l'U. R. S. S. qu'il a toujours maintenu le point de vue de la nécessité impérieuse de traiter le problème de la sécurité de l'Europe Orientale conjointement par tous les Etats intéressés, car uniquement cette façon de traiter cette question peut donner des garanties effectives pour le maintien de la paix dans cette partie du monde. Conformément à cette intention le gouvernement polonais considère comme étant de son devoir de s'adresser directement à ces Etats afin de prendre connaissance de leur opinion au sujet de votre proposition, Monsieur le Commissaire du Peuple, ainsi que de leur point de vue en ce qui concerne la signature éventuelle du protocole proposé par le gouvernement soviétique dans votre note du 29 décembre 1928.

NOTE DE M. LITWINOFF DU 11 JANVIER 1929 EN REPONSE A LA NOTE DU GOUVERNEMENT POLONAIS DU 10 JANVIER 1929.

(Le Messager Polonais du 14 janvier 1929).

En accusant réception de votre note du 10 janvier dernier contenant la réponse du gouvernement polonais à la note de 29 décembre 1928, j'ai l'honneur de vous prier de porter ce qui suit à la connaissance de votre gouvernement.

Le gouvernement de l'Union des Républiques socialistes

soviétiques prend acte avec satisfaction de la déclaration du gouvernement polonais où celui-ci se dit disposé à accepter en principe la proposition concernant la mise en vigueur anticipée du pacte signé à Paris proscrivant la guerre dans les relations entre l'U. R. S. S. et la République de Pologne. Toutefois, le gouvernement soviétique regrette que la note susmentionnée ne contienne pas le consentement du gouvernement polonais à la réalisation immédiate de la proposition du gouvernement soviétique qui n'entraînerait pour les deux parties aucun engagement autre que ceux qu'elles ont contractées en vertu du pacte de Paris. Cette proposition a paru au gouvernement soviétique si claire et si simple qu'il a cru pouvoir s'attendre à une réponse aussi claire et aussi simple. Le gouvernement polonais a bien voulu faire connaître une série de faits qui, à son avis, constituent un obstacle à la signature, par la Pologne, du projet de protocole proposé par le gouvernement soviétique. Afin d'éclaircir définitivement l'attitude du gouvernement soviétique je me permettrai de m'arrêter aux points particuliers de votre note.

Le gouvernement polonais exprime son étonnement du fait que la note du gouvernement soviétique du 29 décembre mentionne brièvement les négociations qui se sont poursuivies antérieurement entre les gouvernements soviétique et polonais en vue de la conclusion d'un pacte de non-agression. En outre le gouvernement polonais a cru pouvoir relever la reproduction inexacte du cours de ces pourparlers. Il suffit de rappeler à cette occasion que le gouvernement soviétique avait proposé en son temps à la Pologne et aux Etats Baltes la réduction simultanée et proportionnelle de leurs forces armées, mais cette proposition a été rejetée par lesdits Etats. Le gouvernement soviétique a proposé par la suite, à ces mêmes Etat, la signature d'un pacte de non-aggression et de non-participation à des groupements de puissances ennemies, sans lier cette propositions à des conditions quelconques, pas plus qu'au règlement d'autres questions intéressant l'Union soviétique. En posant une série de conditions le gouvernement polonais a repoussé la proposition du gouvernement soviétique concernant le renoncement mutuel et sans réserves à l'agression. Tel fut, nul ne saurait le contredire, le sens de négociations mentionnées. Il serait superflu de discuter à cette place la question des motifs qui ont conduit le gouvernement polonais à lier le problème de non-agression à telle ou autre condition rendant impossible la conclusion du pacte. Je dois cependant ajouter que le gouvernement polonais a signé sans aucune condition le pacte de Paris de renoncement à la guerre. Cette dernière circonstance, notamment la signature par le gouvernement polonais, sans aucune réserve, du pacte de Paris auquel adhéra également l'U. R. S. S., a amené le gouvernement soviétique à s'adresser à la Pologne avec sa proposition du 29 décembre. Le gouverne-

ment soviétique estimait que si la Pologne reconnaîtra la possibilité d'adopter, dans ses rapports avec l'U. R. S. S., l'engagement de renoncement sans réserve à la guerre, elle ne posera plus de conditions nouvelles, afin d'assurer l'entrée en vigueur formelle de ces engagements dans le plus bref délai.Cependant, le dernier alinéa de votre note peut être interprété dans ces sens que le gouvernement polonais fait dépendre la signature du protocole de la participation à celui-ci d'autres puissances. Cette condition est d'autant moins compréhensible qu'au cas de la ratification du pacte de Paris par les 15 Etats qui l'ont signé, le pacte prendra effet automatiquement entre la Pologne et l'U. R. S. S. indépendamment de l'adhésion de tous les Etats Baltes. Il est difficile de comprendre pourquoi la Pologne ne pourrait pas contracter sans aucune réserve, ces mêmes engagements de renoncement à la guerre envers l'U. R. S. S. aussitôt avant la ratification du pacte par les 14 autres puissances.

Le gouvernement de l'U. R. S. S. a l'inébranlable conviction que la signature du protocole proposé,ne fut-ce que par la Pologne et l'U. R. S. S. servirait non seulement la cause de la consolidation des relations pacifiques entre ces deux Etats, mais deviendrait un puissant facteur de paix dans toute l'Europe Orientale. Si toutefois le gouvernement polonais ne partage pas cette opinion sur l'importance d'une paix durable entre l'U. R. S. S. et la Pologne et s'il estime qu'il est désirable que les autres Etats de l'Europe Orientale adhèrent au protocole ses objections seraient justifiées et compréhensibles dans le seul cas où le gouvernement soviétique ferait des difficultés en ce qui concerne l'adhésion de ces pays au protocole qu'il a proposé. En réalité le gouvernement soviétique dans sa note du 29 décembre a déclaré d'une façon absolument claire et ne se prêtant à aucune interprétation ambiguë, que chaque Etat qui le désire peut adhérer au protocole. Dans cette même note il a exprimé en outre le désir que tous les Etats voisins soient partie au protocole. La note susmentionnée indique que le gouvernement soviétique s'est adressé pour le moment avec une proposition analogue seulement à la Lithuanie et non aux autres pays Baltes pour la seule raison que ces pays selon les informations qu'il a reçues, n'ont pas encore adhéré formellement au pacte de Paris. Le gouvernement polonais doit comprendre qu'il est impossible de s'adresser avec la proposition de mettre en vigueur le pacte à des pays qui ne l'ont pas signé ou n'y ont pas adhéré.

Le gouvernement polonais dans sa note du 10 janvier, exprime l'étonnement de ce que le gouvernement soviétique ait adressé à la Lithuanie la proposition de participer au protocole bien que la Lithuanie en vertu du traité de Riga n'a pas de frontière communes avec l'U. R. S. S. A meilleur droit le gouvernement soviétique pourrait s'étonner de ce que le gouvernement polonais ait demandé que l'invitation d'adhérer au pacte soit envoyée à l'Estonie et à la Finlande qui, territoriale-

ment, sont beaucoup plus éloignées de la frontière de la Pologne. Cependant la différence consiste en ce que, entre l'U.R.S.S., l'Estonie et la Finlande, il n'existe aucune question litigieuse autorisant l'appréhension de voir la paix troublée entre ces deux Etats, alors qu'on ne peut pas en dire autant des rapports existant entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie. A une date relativement peu éloignée les relations polo-lithuaniennes suscitaient des craintes sérieuses pour le sort de la paix européenne et la Pologne elle-même faisait des démarches à la S.D.N. en vue d'obtenir qu'il soit mis fin à l'état de guerre entre elle et la Lithuanie. Le gouvernement soviétique a cru, par conséquent, que la Pologne ne pourrait qu'applaudir à l'invitation qui lui serait adressée d'adhérer à un protocole que la république de Lithuanie était également invitée à signer.

Le gouvernement polonais déclare dans sa note que les Etats baltes n'ont fait qu'annoncer, sous une forme ou sous une autre leur intention d'adhérer au pacte Kellogg, ce dont il résulte que l'acte d'adhésion lui-même n'a pas encore été accompli. Avant d'adresser au gouvernement polonais sa note du 29 décembre et surtout après l'envoi de cette note le gouvernement soviétique s'efforçait de faire connaître par la voie diplomatique l'attitude formelle des Etats baltes en ce qui concerne le pacte de Paris. Cependant ces efforts n'ont pas abouti à un résultat favorable. Le gouvernement soviétique estime qu'une procédure formelle strictement définie doit régir la question de l'adhésion à tout traité international. Lorsque le gouvernement soviétique a reçu l'invitation d'adhérer au pacte de Paris, il lui a été notifié en réponse à la demande d'éclaircissement qu'il avait formulée, dans quelle forme doit être rédigé et signé l'acte d'adhésion audit pacte.

Après son adhésion au pacte de Paris le gouvernement soviétique a été informé grâce à l'aimable entremise du gouvernement français de ce que le gouvernement des Etats-Unis avait pris connaissance de l'acte d'adhésion de l'U. R. S. S. au pacte, en vertu de quoi a été adressée au gouvernement soviétique la copie du pacte de Paris, certifiée par M. Kellogg. Si le même procédé est obligatoire pour tous les Etats adhérant au pacte, il semble facile de déterminer quels sont les Etats baltiques qui ont adhéré au pacte. Jusqu'à ce temps le gouvernement soviétique a été saisi uniquement de la notification officielle du gouvernement lithuanien au sujet de l'adhésion au pacte de Paris. D'ailleurs, dès qu'un quelconque des Etats baltiques aurait déclaré officiellement son adhésion au pacte, le gouvernement des Soviets serait prêt à inviter immédiatement cet Etat à adhérer au protocole proposé par le gouvernement soviétique en vue de la mise à effet immédiate du pacte. En attendant, le gouvernement soviétique poursuit ses efforts en vue d'éclaircir l'attitude des Etats baltiques à l'égard du pacte de Paris.

Le gouvernement soviétique n'ignore pas que le gouvernement

lithuanien poursuit des efforts dans le même sens. Le gouvernement soviétique serait heureux d'apprendre que le gouvernement polonais fait des démarches analogues. De même, au cas où la Roumanie, avec laquelle le gouvernement soviétique n'est pas en relations diplomatiques, se trouvera au nombre des Etats qui d'une façon formelle ont adhéré au pacte de Paris, le gouvernement soviétique sera prêt à l'inviter à adhérer au protocole proposé. Il est évident qu'en adhérant au pacte de Paris, le gouvernement soviétique faisait état du fait qu'il prenait sur lui à l'égard de la Roumanie, l'engagement de renoncer aux méthodes de guerre en tant que moyen de règlement des litiges, jusqu'au moment où la Roumanie adhérerait au pacte, bien que ceci n'exclut nullement l'existence des questions litigieuses en suspens. Le gouvernement soviétique ne formule donc aucune réserve contre la mise en vigueur immédiate de cet engagement dans ses relations avec le gouvernement roumain par voie d'adhésion de ce gouvernement au protocole soviéto-polonais, ce qui d'ailleurs est prévu par le § 4 dudit protocole. Le gouvernement soviétique serait particulièrement reconnaissant au gouvernement polonais si ce dernier l'informait au plus tôt de l'adhésion de la Roumanie au pacte de Paris en précisant si la Roumanie accepte de participer au protocole proposé par le gouvernement soviétique. Ainsi le fait d'invoquer la Roumanie ne peut être considéré comme expliquant suffisamment le refus du gouvernement polonais de la réalisation immédiate de la proposition du gouvernement soviétique. Considérant toutefois que la proposition soviétique a pour but la mise à effet immédiate du pacte de Paris sur la renonciation à la guerre, au moins entre plusieurs Etats, le gouvernement soviétique exprime la crainte que l'attitude évasive ou bien le refus de la part d'un quelconque des Etats de signer le protocole pourrait nuire à la mise en vigueur dudit protocole et en conséquence du pacte de Paris dans les relations entre les Etats qui ont signé ou ont adhéré précédemment au protocole.

Dans sa note, le gouvernement polonais invoque en tant que second obstacle sur la voie de la réalisation de la proposition du gouvernement soviétique, l'obligation à une procédure solidaire de ratification découlant soi-disant, pour ses premiers participants, de la teneur même du pacte de Paris. Le gouvernement soviétique ne trouve nulle part, dans le pacte de Paris un engagement de ce genre, et il n'est dit nulle part dans le pacte que sa ratification, par les Etats signataires, doit avoir lieu simultanément ou bien en vertu d'une procédure déterminée. Le pacte ne contient, à l'égard de ses participants, aucune réserve relative à la conclusion entre eux d'autres traités dont la teneur ne serait pas en contradiction avec le pacte de Paris. En l'occurence, le gouvernement soviétique propose uniquement la mise en vigueur du pacte de Paris entre deux Etats ou deux groupes d'Etats.

Pour autant que les initiateurs ou les participants des traités

désirent consolider les relations pacifiques existantes et exclure des pratiques internationales, ils ne sauraient agir contre les accords poursuivant le même but. Le gouvernement soviétique suppose que la nation russe de même que la nation polonaise, étant donné leurs intérêts et aspirations pacifiques, ne peuvent permettre qu'un Etat-tiers crée à leurs gouvernements des obstacles en ce qui touche le renoncement à la guerre, en tant qu'instrument de politique nationale. Il est peu probable qu'un quelconque Etat-tiers se permette de susciter ouvertement de tels obtacles. En confirmant qu'aucun des Etats tiers signataires du pacte de Paris ne l'a pas ratifié encore jusqu'à présent, le gouvernement polonais exprime, dans sa note, l'espoir que l'attitude de ces puissances à l'égard du traité sera déterminée dans le plus proche avenir. Le gouvernement soviétique est d'avis que cet espoir ne devrait pas être un empêchement pour la Pologne à accepter la proposition du gouvernement soviétique. Le fait de la signature du pacte proposé conservera son immense importance morale dans le domaine des relations réciproques polono-soviétiques, même au cas où les espoirs du gouvernement polonais ne seraient pas trop optimistes et au cas où le protocole serait absorbé par l'entrée en vigueur du traité de Paris, réglant les relations entre tous ses participants. La signature du protocole revêtirait une importance toute particulière au cas où la ratification du pacte de Paris par tous les 15 Etats serait retardée pour un temps prolongé pour telle ou autre raison.

En se permettant de soumettre les considérations ci-dessus à l'attention du gouvernement polonais, le gouvernement soviétique attendra que soit éclaircie, dans le plus bref délai, l'attitude définitive du gouvernement de la République de Pologne dans la question du protocole proposé et espère que le gouvernement polonais se déclarera prêt à accepter la proposition qui lui a été faite.

Veuillez agréer, etc...

DISCOURS DE M. AUGUSTE ZALESKI, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE POLOGNE, VARSOVIE, COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE LA DIETE, LE 15 JANVIER 1929.

(Le Messager Polonais du 16 janvier 1929).

Vous ne m'en voudrez pas, Messieurs, de déroger cette fois au schéma, consacré par l'habitude, de l'exposé du ministre des Affaires Etrangères et de s'abstenir de passer en revue la politique polonaise envers presque tous les Etats étrangers, en me bornant à vous exposer d'une façon plus détaillée différents pro-

blèmes qui sont passés dernièrement au premier plan de notre politique étrangère. J'ai pris le parti d'agir de la sorte principalement à cause de ce que ni la situation internationale générale ni notre politique, depuis le dernier exposé que j'ai eu l'occasion, voici à peine quelques mois de présenter à la Haute Commission n'ont subi aucun changement essentiel. Bien entendu cela n'exclut pas la possibilité d'une discussion sur d'autres sujets que vous jugerez, Messieurs, utile de soulever.

Je commencerai par la Lithuanie. Une année s'est écoulée du moment où nous nous sommes vus accusés par le gouvernement lithuanien devant le haut tribunal du Conseil de la S. d. N. en vertu de l'art. 11 du pacte, non seulement d'infliger des persécutions à la minorité lithuanienne en Pologne, mais aussi de préparer un attentat contre l'intégrité et l'indépendance de la Lithuanie.

Vous vous rappelez, Messieurs, que le premier chef de cette accusation a eu pour motif l'arrestation d'une dizaine de Lithuaniens en Pologne pour l'activité dirigée contre l'Etat ainsi que la fermeture d'une dizaine d'écoles lithuaniennes parce qu'elles ne répondaient pas aux conditions requises pour tous les établissements scolaires. Ni le Conseil de la S. d.N. ni nous-mêmes nous n'avons pu découvrir,en dépit de recherches méticuleuses aucun motif de la plainte nous accusant de préparer un attentat contre l'indépendance lithuanienne. Les arguments du gouvernement de M. Waldemaras se réduisaient en cette matière à quelques potins de presse.

En réponse à la plainte lithuanienne dont le Conseil de la S. d. N. a été saisi dans sa session de décembre 1927 nous avons proposé au Conseil de soumettre la requête concernant les prétendues violations, par la Pologne, de ses obligations minoritaires à la procédure ordinaire applicable à ces questions. Au surplus, en nous basant sur ce même article du pacte dont a cru pouvoir user, ou plutôt abuser, M. Waldemaras pour fonder sur elle sa plainte, nous avons attiré l'attention du Conseil sur le danger que pourrait faire courir à la paix l'état de guerre proclamé par le gouvernement lithuanien entre la Lithuanie et la Pologne.

La fameuse résolution du Conseil du 10 décembre 1927 nous a donné pleine satisfaction. Cette résolution : 1) a aiguillé la plainte minoritaire dans la voie de la procédure ordinaire ; 2) elle a obligé la Lithuanie à renoncer à l'état de guerre ; 3) elle a constaté que la Pologne s'engage à respecter l'intégrité et l'indépendance de la Lithuanie au sujet de quoi les membres du Conseil ne pouvaient d'ailleurs avoir aucun doute. Enfin, et voici le plus important, le Conseil est allé plus loin et a recommandé aux parties d'entamer dans le plus bref délai des négociations en vue de rétablir entre les deux Etats les relations qui doivent exister entre toutes les puissances membres de la Société des Nations. C'est cette dernière stipulation qui constitue

l'axe de nos négociations avec la Lithuanie. Le Conseil non seulement a mis, sur les deux Etats, l'obligation d'entamer les pourparlers à bref délai, mais aussi il leur a imposé expressément le devoir de faire aboutir ces pourparlers à un résultat favorable, c'est-à-dire au rétablissement des relations mutuelles normales.

C'est ainsi au moins que j'ai compris et que je comprends cette résolution. C'est de cette façon également que l'a comprise M. Beelaerts van Blokland, rapporteur devant le Conseil, ce qu'il a eu soin de souligner en interprétant la résolution dans son rapport de septembre. C'est ainsi également que l'a entendue le Conseil en approuvant le rapport sus-mentionné, mais ce n'est pas de la sorte que l'a comprise et la comprend le gouvernement lithuanien. Non seulement il n'a mis aucun empressement à entamer les pourparlers qui auraient pu commencer en janvier et n'ont été abordés formellement qu'au début d'avril et effectivement plus tard encore, mais, après que les négociations furent commencées il a fait tout son possible pour les faire traîner en longueur et différer autant que possible le jour où les représentants de la Pologne et de la Lithuanie pourraient se présenter devant le Conseil et lui dire : " Nous avons exécuté votre recommandation : entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie règne cette bonne entente dont dépend la paix universelle et dont il est question dans le pacte de la Société des Nations ".

Je ne dépeindrai pas ici les procédés et les méthodes dont s'est servi M. Waldemaras pour empêcher la réalisation de la résolution du Conseil qu'il avait solennellement acceptée. Je renvoie ceux qui en voudraient prendre connaissance aux trois volumes que nous avons publiés et qui contiennent les documents concernant les négociations polono-lithuaniennes. Soyez assurés, Messieurs, que la lecture de ces documents présente, d'un façon générale, un très grand intérêt, bien que, par endroits, elle soit assez monotone. En tout cas il ne fait pas de doute qu'en ce qui cencerne les résultats formels des négociations polono-lithuaniennes ils sont presque nuls à l'heure actuelle. Après une année de pourparlers fort laborieux nous avons pu conclure une seule et unique convention sur le trafic frontalier local. Cet accord ne constitue qu'une fraction du projet de convention normale sur le trafic frontalier, projet que nous avons soumis en son temps à la délégation lithuanienne et qui tenait compte dans une large mesure des intérêts de la population de la région limitrophe. La convention conclue donne satisfaction aux besoins seulement d'une partie insignifiante de la population de la zone frontière. Il n'en est pas moins vrai que cette première convention signée avec la Lithuanie offre une grande importance pour nous en tant que précédent. Nos autres projets de convention concernant les communications, le trafic ferroviaire, postal et télégraphique, projets se

rattachant aux accords internationaux existants et liant les deux parties, ont connu des destinées encore moins favorables que notre projet de convention sur le trafic frontalier. Notamment ils ont été rejetés en entier par le gouvernement lithuanien qui ne voulait pas consentir à la communication directe entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie et proposait à la Pologne une communication transitoire à travers les territoires d'États tiers.

Bien entendu nous présenterons à nouveau tous ces projets, dans le courant des mois prochains, au gouvernement lithuanien par l'intermédiaire de la Commission technique consultative des communications et du transit qui, en vertu de la dernière résolution du Conseil de la S. d. N. doit s'occuper des difficultés qui se sont posées, dans le domaine des communications au cours des négociations polono-lithuaniennes.

Comme vous le voyez, Messieurs, nous sommes loin encore de pouvoir établir des relations normales avec la Lithuanie et de pouvoir conclure des accords tels que la convention consulaire, sur la nationalité, l'établissement commerciale, etc.

Je ne serais pas surpris si quelqu'un de vous, Messieurs, au cours de la discussion sur mon exposé, exprimait des doutes quant à l'opportunité de la politique suivie par le gouvernement depuis un an à l'égard de la Lithuanie, pas plus que je m'étonne en entendant les critiques impatientes qui me parviennent des différents côtés. Ces voix, Messieurs, ne me surprennent pas d'abord parce que l'impatience est un trait humain fort répandu et, en second lieu, parce que ces critiques impatientes ou impatientés n'ont pas la possibilité d'embrasser l'ensemble de notre politique lithuanienne considérée dans ses rapports avec notre politique étrangère générale et, pour cela même, ne peuvent pas se rendre exactement compte des bons et des mauvais côtés de notre politique vis-à-vis de la Lithuanie.

Notre méthode d'agir à l'égard de la Lithuanie s'exprime par la patience, la persévérance et l'esprit de suite. Je ne doute pas un seul instant que les moyens d'action qui se fondent sur ces trois vertus cardinales de toute sage politique produisent en général peu d'effet, je puis vous assurer néanmoins, Messieurs, que ce sont les seuls moyens qui soient généralement efficaces. Je crois de même, Messieurs, que, vous orientant parfaitement dans l'ensemble des relations internationales, vous vous rendez bien compte qu'il ne serait nullement recommandable d'user à l'égard de la Lithuanie d'autres méthodes que celles que nous appliquons.

D'ailleurs, en examinant plus à fond le processus du développement des relations polono-lithuaniennes au cours de l'année écoulée, et en évaluant à leur juste valeur les résultats des délibérations poursuivies, nous devons reconnaître que, bien qu'au point de vue formel cette année n'ait pas donné de grands résultats, néanmoins les avantages politiques dans ce domaine sont assez appréciables.

Car, n'est-ce pas un avantage le fait même que, par notre politique nette, claire et logique, pour ce qui est de la question lithuanienne, nous avons réussi à gagner la confiance de la grande majorité de l'opinion mondiale, confiance qui ne nous était pas aussi généralement acquise auparavant en ce qui touche cet aspect de notre politique.

N'est-ce point un avantage, de même, que cette évolution des esprits qui s'est manifestée à l'égard de la Pologne, justement en Lithuanie, parmi cette partie de la population qui se rend compte des intérêts réels du pays et où de plus en plus pénètre l'opinion que l'établissement des relations avec la Pologne est utile et même indispensable à la Lithuanie.

Ce ne sont là, il est vrai, que des avantages d'ordre moral, pour ainsi dire impalpables, mais qui, le cas échéant, peuvent prendre un relief surprenant par les effets qu'ils peuvent produire.

Pour ce qui est du cours que suivra le problème polono-lithuanien, je puis vous dire, Messieurs, sans vouloir pour cela faire des prophéties, que, par tous les moyens pacifiques, nous tendrons à réaliser au plus tôt la recommandation du Conseil de la S. d. N. du 10 décembre 1927, c'est-à dire à établir avec la Lithuanie de bonnes relations normales de voisinage.

Nous nous efforcerons de même de faire aboutir à des résultats positifs les négociations commerciales qui doivent se poursuivre à Kœnigsberg et, avec l'aide de la Commission consultative technique pour les questions de communication et de transit, nous chercherons à rétablir, entre les territoires polonais et lithuanien, la communication interrompue depuis 10 années.

Nous avons tout droit d'espérer que nos efforts ne seront pas vains, comme nous nourrissons l'espoir que le Conseil de la S. d. N., comprenant que le litige polono-lithuanien sur le terrain de la S. d. N. et la Lithuanie, nous aidera efficacement dans nos efforts.

J'espère également que la nation lithuanienne se rend compte de ce que l'obstination de son gouvernement, dans son refus d'établir des relations normales de voisinage, relations qui devraient unir deux Etats faisant partie de la S. d. N., est non seulement contraire au pacte de la S. d. N. et à la résolution du Conseil du 10 décembre, non seulement est au détriment des intérêts des Etats tiers, mais, de plus, cause un sérieux préjudice moral et matériel à l'Etat lithuanien.

J'espère que la Lithuanie comprend que le gouvernement lithuanien lutte, en ce moment, non contre la Pologne, qui peut sembler vouloir par force imposer l'établissement de relations normales avec elle, mais que ce gouvernement lutte contre le développement de la vie sociale internationale, contre de puissantes forces morales qui tendent à établir la fraternité entre nations et non à les diviser et les séparer par un mur chinois, que ce gouvernement s'efforce de nager contre le pro-

fond courant historique, et que c'est là une lutte très difficile sinon sans espoir.

C'est pourquoi j'envisage avec calme et sérénité l'avenir des relations polono-lithuaniennes en continuant avec patience et persévérance d'avancer sur la voie, à mon sens, la seule raisonnable.

Je passerai maintenant à un autre problème où plutôt à un ensemble de problèmes qui se rangent actuellement à la première place des préoccupations de notre politique extérieure.

Plus d'une fois, Messieurs, j'ai eu l'occasion de vous faire connaître notre ferme désir du resserrement des relations de voisinage, d'un rapprochement et d'une collaboration sur le terrain international avec l'Allemagne. Vous avez pleinement le droit, aujourd'hui, Messieurs, de me demander pourquoi ce rapprochement s'effectue avec une telle lenteur et pourquoi il se heurte à tant d'obstacles ?

Je ne vous parlerai pas, Messieurs, de ce que vous savez tous notamment de ce que nos relations avec l'Allemagne revêtent de plus en plus un caractère normal, que, par exemple, jusqu'à présent, nous avons conclu avec l'Allemagne un nombre de conventions qui bat le record. Ce sont là choses connues, cependant si vous me posiez cette question, je vous répondrais : En vérité, l'œuvre en vue du rapprochement entre nous et l'Allemagne avance très lentement et rencontre, sur son chemin, de nombreuses embûches. Les causes de cette lenteur et ces obstacles doivent être recherchés dans l'opinion publique des deux nations. Je dis bien des deux nations, car je ne nierai pas que, dans l'opinion publique polonaise, qui se rappelle la participation de la Prusse aux partages de la Pologne, les longues années d'asservissement et enfin l'attitude de l'Allemagne après notre restauration, se fait jour, à l'égard de l'Allemagne, un sentiment de défiance, mais nullement de haine. Je fais cette distinction pour souligner nettement que, dans notre opinion publique, il n'existe pas une attitude malveillante par principe envers l'Allemagne, et qu'au penchant des esprits dont j'ai parlé on pourrait remédier par de nouveaux faits positifs qui surgiraient dans les relations polono-allemandes. L'opinion publique polonaise, j'en suis persuadé, est toute prête à un tel revirement. Toutefois, il en est autrement, me semble-t-il, de l'opinion publique allemande.

Il est curieux de relever que toute action de la Pologne sur le terrain international, même si celle-ci ne touche pas directement l'Allemagne, n'a jamais manqué de provoquer, ces temps derniers, une véritable tempête en Allemagne. Il semblerait que l'opinion publique allemande ne fait qu'attendre sans cesse un prétexte pour manifester pleinement sa malveillance à l'égard de l'Etat polonais restauré et de la nation polonaise. Il semble qu'il est de notre devoir de rechercher les causes d'un pareil état de choses.

Ces causes sont multiples. En premier lieu, il conviendrait de relever l'intense propagande déployée en Allemagne en faveur de la revision des frontières orientales du Reich, propagande, qui malheureusement, ne se fonde pas uniquement sur des particuliers et des organisations privées. On ne saurait douter qu'une telle propagande, nettement contraire à la lettre et à l'esprit du pacte de la S. d. N., est non seulement un sérieux obstacle au rapprochement avec l'Allemagne que nous désirons, mais constitue également une entrave à la stabilisation générale de la situation en Europe.

Cette propagande suscite dans l'opinion allemande une néfaste illusion sur la possibilité d'une révision pacifique des frontières, illusion qui, cependant, dans certaines conditions, pourrait engendrer de sérieuses complications internationales, même à l'encontre du désir et des espoirs des propagateurs de cette illusion.

J'ai cependant l'espoir, basé sur le réalisme qui caractérise la nation allemande et sur les tendances incontestablement pacifiques et sincères du gouvernement actuel du Reich, que la propagande révisionniste non seulement n'augmentera pas mais, au contraire, qu'elle diminuera progressivement. J'estime que déjà aujourd'hui bon nombre d'hommes politiques sérieux de l'Allemagne se trouvent convaincus qu'il est absolument impossible de faire prévaloir, devant aucun tribunal international la thèse révisionniste allemande, que les arguments pouvant être invoqués en faveur de cette thèse ne résistent pas à la critique, même superficielle, et — ce qui est le plus important — que l'ère de la contraction progressive des territoires habités par les nations slaves est à jamais révolue.

Le problème des minorités constitue la seconde cause du fait que les relations polono-allemandes ne se sont pas engagées sur la voie que nous croyons désirable. L'opinion publique en Allemagne est insuffisamment informée sur la situation de la minorité allemande en Pologne d'où les opinions souvent fantaisistes sur la situation faite à cette minorité, d'où les conclusions fausses auxquelle arrive une grande partie de l'opinion allemande. D'autre part celle-ci semble oublier entièrement le fait qu'en deçà des frontières allemandes il existe une minorité polonaise qui est au moins aussi nombreuse que la minorité allemande en Pologne et que les Polonais d'Allemagne sont soumis, au point de vue de la liberté de leur développement culturel, à un traitement infiniment moins favorable que les Allemands de Pologne.

Je crois toutefois, Messieurs, que la compréhension de cet état de choses, ainsi que de la nécessité de traiter d'une façon égale les deux minorités finira par pénétrer dans l'opinion publique du Reich, et partant la difficulté que constitue le problème minoritaire pour l'entente polono-allemande diminuera progressivement. J'estime qu'une discussion sérieuse, objec-

tive et portant sur tous les aspects des problèmes minoritaires devant le forum de la S. d. N. facilitera le règlement des malendus polono-allemands dans cet ordre de choses. Aussi j'éprouve une vive satisfaction de ce que M. Stresemann, à la dernière session du Conseil à Lugano, ait promis de prendre l'initiative de l'étude, par le Conseil, du problème des minorités dans les pays particuliers. J'ai l'espoir que M. Stresemann tiendra sa promesse. Pour ma part j'ai déclaré publiquement à plusieurs reprises que je ne vois aucun inconvénient à ce que le système international pour la protection des minorités soit perfectionné et développé à condition, bien entendu, que ce système soit généralisé et étendu à tous les membres de la S. d. N. De la dernière assemblée de la S. d. N. j'ai remporté l'impression qu'un certain nombre d'autres Etats partage mon opinion à cet égard.

En recherchant les causes de la malveillance qui se fait observer dans l'opinion publique allemande à l'égard de la Pologne on ne peut passer sous silence l'opinion assez largement répandue en Allemagne selon laquelle la Pologne s'efforcerait de rendre plus difficile les relations entre l'Allemagne et la France alliée de la Pologne. Cette opinion est dépourvue de tout fondement et procède de la méconnaissance des principes directeurs de la politique étrangère polonaise. Nous n'avons jamais fait et nous ne ferons jamais obstacle à la tendance de l'Allemagne à s'entendre avec la France, car nous sommes profondément convaincus que l'amitié franco-allemande n'aura et ne peut pas avoir pour but ni pour résultat d'affaiblir l'amitié polono-française reposant sur un fond solide d'anciennes traditions et d'intérêts communs des deux Etats et sur des liens de sympathie unissant les deux nations. Aussi je ne doute pas que l'opinion allemande comprendra que c'est précisément l'alliance avec la Pologne qui rendra possible à la France un rapprochement avec l'Allemagne.

Les attaques inouies de la presse allemande à l'occasion du discours que j'ai prononcé au mois de juin dernier à Paris au sujet de l'évacuation anticipée de la Rhénanie par les troupes alliées a été une excellente illustration de la méconnaissance dont on fait preuve en Allemagne des tendances de la politique polonaise en ce qui concerne le problème franco-allemand. J'ai eu l'occasion à bien des reprises de souligner que nous n'avons jamais prétendu, pas plus que nous ne prétendrons à l'avenir nous opposer à cette évacuation ce qui ne veut dire aucunement que nous ne soyons pas sérieusement intéressés à cette question. L'intérêt de la Pologne dans les questions des réparations et des garanties de sécurité est assez clair et connu et découle des paragraphes respectifs du traité. En ce qui touche les réparations notre intérêt s'exprime par les chiffres ; quant à la question de la sécurité nous avons au moins le droit et le devoir d'exiger qu'il ne soit pas créée dans le monde l'impres-

sion qu'une mesure différente est appliquée à la sécurité à l'Ouest et à l'Est de l'Europe. Enfin en parlant des causes de la méfiance de l'Allemagne envers la Pologne on ne doit pas oublier que la haine constitue en quelque sorte une nécessité psychologique, nécessité déterminée par l'issue, malheureuse pour l'Allemagne, de la grande guerre.

Vous n'ignorez sans doute pas, Messieurs, les motifs qui m'ont amené à formuler ici une série de reproches à l'adresse d'une partie de l'opinion publique allemande. Je l'ai fait afin d'écarter tous les obstacles du chemin de l'entente et de la collaboration internationale, entre la Pologne et l'Allemagne. J'ai la conviction que, de cette entente, dépend la stabilisation définitive des conditions générales et des esprits à l'est et même à l'ouest de l'Europe. C'est à cette entente que se trouve subordonnée non seulement la paix durable mais aussi le développement écononomique et cultural de cette partie du monde. Aussi je tiens à vous déclarer, Messieurs, que le gouvernement tend et tendra à cette entente d'une façon résolue, sincère et persévérante.

La nation allemande a appliqué à la conduite de la guerre une endurance et un effort remarquables et, pendant toute sa durée, elle a patiemment supporté des privations inouies. Lorsque la guerre, contrairement à l'attente allemande, s'est terminée par la défaite allemande, celle-ci a fait naître un besoin psychologique de haïr. Les conditions redevenant normales à l'occident, cette tendance s'affirmait uniquement dans les rapports avec la Pologne. Nous sommes devenus ainsi, contre notre gré et sans qu'il y ait de notre faute, la victime de cette nécessité naturelle. Mais depuis la guerre, Messieurs, dix années se sont écoulées. L'Allemagne a refait sa vie politique et économique et le besoin de haïr s'y atténue progressivement et il finira, je l'espère, par devenir une simple survivance du passé. Ce moment-là la raison d'Etat polonaise l'attend avec une impatience soutenue.

Pour le moment, je ne fait que constater que tout évènement dans le domaine des rapports polono-allemands se répercute, malheureusement, dans l'opinion publique allemande par une nouvelle explosion d'animosité à l'égard de la Pologne.

Ceci nous avons pu l'observer à l'occasion des négociations commerciales qui se poursuivent si laborieusement. On ne saurait douter que la conclusion d'un traité de commerce avec l'Allemagne est aussi bien dans notre intérêt que dans l'intérêt de l'Allemagne et que c'est là un des problème essentiel de notre politique internationale. La Pologne désire aboutir à la conclusion de ce traité, mais, aussi, désire-t-elle un traité qui assurerait, comme il convient, les intérêts économiques des deux parties et qui, par cela même, serait une garantie de sa vitalité. La signature d'un traité quel qu'il soit ne présente pour nous aucune valeur. Nous désirons mettre fin à l'anomalie de la guerre

douanière polono-allemande et conclure avec l'Allemagne un pacte loyal, que nous serions en mesure d'exécuter loyalement, conformément à nos intérêts. Je n'entrerai pas dans le détail de cette question qui a déjà été présentée sous ses nombreux aspects par mon collègue, monsieur le Ministre du Commerce et de l'Industrie. Je tiens uniquement à rappeler, en passant, que les négociations commerciales se heurtent, du côté allemand, à un grand nombre de prétentions qui, vraiment, ne sauraient être justifiées. Ceci malgré l'intérêt que représente le marché polonais pour l'industrie allemande, s'exprimant ne serait-ce que par le fait, qu'aujourd'hui même, en dépit du conflit douanier, les exportations allemandes en Pologne atteignent environ 3/5 des exportations allemandes d'avant guerre dans tout l'empire russe qui, jadis, constituait la 5e partie des territoires du monde entier. Pour ce qui est de ces prétentions, j'en citerai une seule portant sur les prérogatives à accorder au bénéfice des ports allemands occidentaux, possédant leur propre hinterland, au détriment du port de Gdynia et du port de Dantzig, étroitement unis à la République. Avons-nous besoin de dire que, ceci, nous ne le ferons pas, que nous ne pouvons et ne voulons agir au préjudice de l'accès à la mer édifié par nous, grâce à une inlassable énergie, ni agir au détriment de la Ville Libre qui, si elle est entrée parfois en conflit avec la République, n'en a pas moins le droit de compter sur sa protection.

La presse allemande a pris acte de cette prétention pour parler de la situation particulièrement difficile du port de Koenigsberg. Cependant Messieurs, les difficultés dans lesquelles se trouve Koenigsberg résultent, justement, du manque de relations économiques suffisamment développées entre la Pologne et l'Allemagne. Nous savons tous que Gdynia et Dantzig sont insuffisantes pour la vie économique de la Pologne et qu'en particulier nos provinces de l'Est, sans porter nullement préjudice à Gdynia et Dantzig, profiteraient volontiers du port de Koenigsberg, n'était la malveillance de la part de l'Allemagne qui rend si difficile l'établissement de relations normales. Et c'est notamment, à l'occasion des négociations commerciales polono-allemandes, qui auraient dû persuader l'opinion des deux pays des avantages qu'ils peuvent tirer d'un traité à conclure, qu'on a vu se manifester le plus injustement du monde, dans l'opinion publique allemande, le sentiment de malveillance rendant tout travail difficile.

Les tendances à la consolidation de la paix et au raffermissement de bonnes relations, dont s'inspire notre politique à l'égard de l'Allemagne, commandent également notre politique à l'égard de l'U. R. S. S.

C'est pourquoi nous avons accueilli avec satisfaction la proposition du gouvernement des Soviets tendant à mettre à effet le pacte Kellogg dans un délai le plus proche.

J'ai eu, à plusieurs reprises, l'occasion de dire en public mon sentiment à l'égard de ce pacte. Je n'ai donc nullement besoin de vous persuader, Messieurs, qu'il correspond complètement et sans réserve aucune à la politique du gouvernement polonais et que depuis longtemps nous sommes de chaleureux partisans de l'idée contenue dans le pacte.

A mon avis, le pacte de Paris fournit de très importantes garanties morales pour la paix du monde en général et pour la paix de l'Europe en particulier. Je pense de même que vous ne sauriez, Messieurs, ne pas apprécier à sa juste valeur le fait que c'est la grande République des Etats-Unis de l'Amérique du Nord qui est l'initiatrice et la participante de ce pacte, ce qui constitue une importante garantie morale pour la paix.

L'attitude que nous avons adoptée à l'égard du pacte Kellogg étant généralement connue, il me semble que nul ne saurait avoir le moindre doute au sujet de notre attitude bienveillante à l'égard de la possibilité de la mise à effet régionale de ce traité.

Les deux réserves que nous avons formulées dans notre dernière note, en réponse à la proposition des Soviets, sont, je pense suffisamment compréhensibles pour tout homme de bonne foi et ne cachent nulle arrière-pensée ni but masqué. Il est clair pourquoi, avant d'adhérer au protocole proposé par M. Litwinoff, nous avons désiré nous entendre avec les autres signataires du pacte. Il est compréhensible de même pourquoi la Pologne, et ce n'est pas d'aujourd'hui, défend le principe de la simultanéité de la mise à effet du pacte de non agression entre l'U. R. S. S. et tous les voisins occidentaux de la Russie soviétique, voisins auxquels nous sommes liés soit par une alliance, comme c'est le cas avec la Roumanie, soit par une sincère amitié, comme il en est des Etats baltiques et de la Finlande. Il me semble qu'en cette matière toute explication complémentaire serait superflue.

J'espère que, dans un très proche avenir, déjà nous n'aurons pas à revenir sur les deux réserves que nous avons refoulées. Alors immédiatement nous signerons le protocole proposé par le gouvernement de Moscou. J'espère, de même, qu'au moment de la mise à effet du pacte de non-agression entre la Pologne et l'U. R. S. S., les deux gouvernements de Moscou et de Varsovie, ne s'arrêteront pas là et continueront à déployer tous leurs efforts en vue de raffermir les bonnes relations de voisinage et de créer une atmosphère de confiance entre les deux pays.

Voilà les problèmes essentiels auxquels ont été consacrés les travaux du Ministre des Affaires étrangères depuis mon dernier exposé présenté devant la Chambre. Je sais bien, Messieurs, que le tableau que j'ai pu présenter à vos yeux n'est pas complet, et ceci pour deux raisons. Tout d'abord, l'ensemble des travaux de mon ressort est si vaste et si universel qu'il ne saurait être contenu dans le cadre d'un rapport, nécessairement li-

mité par le temps. En second lieu, comme j'ai eu l'occasion de le dire au début, je n'ai pas voulu répéter ce qui a été dit par moi dans mes discours précédents et ce qui est resté inchangé depuis ce temps ; c'est pourquoi je n'ai choisi que les problèmes essentiels. Comme vous avez pu vous en rendre compte, Messieurs, ces problèmes ont tous un trait commun qui est le souci constant du développement des relations normales avec tous les Etats et la collaboration en vue du maintien et de la consolidation de la paix, si ardemment chérie par la nation polonaise tout entière.

DISCOURS DE M. ARISTIDE BRIAND, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGÈRES, PARIS, SENAT, LE 16 JANVIER 1929.

(Le Temps du 17 janvier 1929).

M. Briand a foi dans la Société des Nations et il ne voit dans les événements récents que des raisons de confiance grandissante pour cette grande institution.

M. Lémery a voulu voir des liens étroits entre le pacte de Paris et le compromis naval franco-britannique. Pareille thèse pouvait être soutenue il y a quelques mois, mais le ministre s'étonne qu'elle soit encore défendue après la publication du Livre bleu.

M. Briand. — Pour faire cesser une odieuse polémique, j'ai publié dans ce Livre bleu tous les documents relatifs au compromis naval.

Après cette publication, il est impossible de ne pas reconnaître l'entière bonne foi de l'Angleterre et de la France.

Il faut donc, pour relier le compromis franco-anglais au pacte de Paris, une persistance incroyable de l'idée qui avait poussé M. Lémery à m'interpeller.

M. Lémery. — Je n'ai pas relié les deux documents. J'ai dit seulement que la presse américaine les avait reliés !

Le Ministre des affaires étrangères. — Sans doute vous avez dit que la presse américaine avait relié les deux actes. Mais vous avez dû apprendre que, depuis, la presse américaine avait renoncé à cette attitude. Je regrette que la même évolution heureuse ne se soit pas produite dans votre esprit. Mais comme je sais toute la difficulté qu'il y a pour un orateur à renoncer à un argument séduisant sur lequel il a pu bâtir ses développements, je ne vous en veux pas (*Sourires*).

Mais je n'apprendrai rien de nouveau au Sénat en affirmant que l'interprétation donnée par M. Lémery n'existe plus nulle part. Aucun orateur, dans aucun Parlement, ne tenterait de faire à la France le procès dont il a parlé, et cela me suffit.

Le ministre demande comment d'ailleurs le compromis naval pourrait être une réponse au pacte Briand-Kellogg, auquel, il ne faut pas l'oublier, il est antérieur.

L'orateur rappelle qu'à Genève une commission, constituée par la Société des nations et dont les Etats-Unis ont accepté de faire partie, est chargée d'examiner comment pourrait être réalisée, par application de l'article 8, une réduction des armements compatible avec la sécurité des Etats.

M. Briand. — On a, comme l'a expliqué M. Lémery, opposé l'activité réaliste des Etats-Unis à la soi-disant impuissance de l'Europe d'aboutir même dans un problème aussi simple que celui de la réduction des armements. Une telle conception est très injuste. Sans doute les contacts annuels entre Etats que crée la Société des nations fortifient peu à peu en Europe le sentiment de la nécessité de s'organiser en vue de la paix. Mais qu'il y ait des difficultés à obtenir des réductions d'armements dans des pays qui ont vécu si longtemps dans un esprit individualiste, qui ont eu à faire face à des guerres comme celles qu'ils ont connues, faut-il s'en étonner ?

Pour ma part, je trouve très beau que 52 nations se réunissent chaque année pour discuter des intérêts de la paix, et étant donné que le statut de la Société des nations exige qu'aucune résolution ne soit prise sans l'unanimité des voix, je dis que les résultats obtenus sont magnifiques, et, loin de désespérer, je suis rempli d'espérance pour l'avenir.

J'ajoute que, plus que personne, j'aurais considéré comme une catastrophe qu'un pacte comme celui de Paris pût affaiblir la Société des nations. Mais il n'en est pas ainsi.

Il suffit de lire l'opuscule qui a été distribué au Parlement pour se convaincre que la Société des nations ne peut, au contraire, trouver dans le pacte de Paris qu'un appréciable renfort.

Le pacte de la Société des nations ne proclame pas seulement pour ses signataires l'obligation de ne pas recourir aux armes ; il prévoit aussi les conditions dans lesquelles les conflits peuvent être réglés.

Le pacte de Paris fait tout autre chose, que je vais expliquer, en m'étonnant d'ailleurs que M. Lémery ne l'ait pas exposé avant moi.

La Société des nations fait tout pour éviter la guerre, mais quand ses efforts pour rétablir l'entente entre les parties ont été infructueux, elle est bien obligée de les renvoyer dos à dos, laissant à chacune la faculté, le droit — je dis le droit — de recourir à la guerre. Juridiquement, la guerre existe, elle est légale.

Le pacte de Paris, et c'est la première fois qu'on a employé une pareille formule, le pacte de Paris a mis la guerre hors la loi. Il l'a déclarée criminelle, il l'a dénoncée à l'humanité. Toutes les nations du monde ont été invitées à signer cette con-

damnation. Ici, on est dans un domaine autre que celui de la Société des nations ; on est dans un domaine qui n'est pas juridique, mais moral.

On peut ironiser tant que l'on voudra à propos de ce pacte de Paris. Il n'en est pas moins vrai que cette réunion de quinze nations venues à Paris pour le signer est une chose qui n'est pas négligeable, qui fait honneur à ces nations et à celle qui leur donnait l'hospitalité.

Cette condamnation morale de la guerre est un acte et un acte considérable. Assurément une nation qui a signé le pacte de Paris peut renier sa signature. Elle peut commettre une agression ; et rien dans le pacte n'oblige ses signataires à se porter contre cet agresseur, à l'en punir.

C'est vrai, mais il est vrai aussi que nous vivons dans une atmosphère où une pareille attitude ne peut être prise impunément. Il y a, pour un agresseur, une question de responsabilité morale qui se pose devant les peuples (*Applaudissements*).

Si un Etat faisait la guerre après avoir signé le pacte qui met celle-ci hors la loi, je ne sais ce qui adviendrait, je ne sais quelle serait l'issue du conflit, mais je plaindrais cet Etat que ses dirigeants auraient conduit à une semblable catastrophe (*Nouveaux applaudissements*).

Quant à la doctrine de Monroe dont a parlé l'interpellateur, M. Briand fait remarquer qu'elle est dans le pacte de la Société des Nations aussi bien que dans le pacte de Paris.

Parlant de l'intervention de la Société des Nations dans le conflit entre la Bolivie et le Paraguay, M. Lémery a assuré qu'elle n'y avait joué qu'un rôle effacé.

M. Briand. — Je voudrais rassurer M. Lémery en lui disant que ce rôle a été plus énergique qu'il ne le croit.

Je me reporte au jour où, à l'étranger, seul et séparé de mes collègues, qui s'étaient dispersés pour rentrer chez eux, j'ai, un matin à dix heures, dans une chambre d'hôtel, reçu la nouvelle que ce conflit avait éclaté et devenait de plus en plus sanglant. J'ai alors pris une plume, et comme président de la Société des Nations, j'ai adressé aux belligérants un télégramme pour leur rappeler qu'étant membres de la Société des Nations, c'était pour eux une obligation sacrée de déposer les armes et de ne pas aggraver leurs gestes de mort. Le lendemain, je recevais la réponse des belligérants. Ils m'annonçaient qu'ils désarmaient et qu'ils se soumettaient aux recommandations de la Société des Nations. J'ai éprouvé alors une satisfaction (*vifs applaudissements*) qui m'aide à supporter certaines critiques.

Ces nations, a dit M. Lémery, n'ont pas soumis leur différend à la Société des Nations mais à la conférence panaméricaine. Il oublie de dire qu'il s'agissait d'une conférence de jurisconsultes qui se trouvait réunie à ce moment, que c'était une conférence d'arbitrage, et que ses membres étaient les plus qualifiés, les plus au courant des questions litigieuses, les plus compétents

pour y apporter une solution. Le conflit était d'ailleurs apaisé grâce à la Société des Nations. On serait vraiment bien malaisé de voir là une concurrence.

Quelle idée en vérité se fait-on de la paix pour concevoir cette idée de la concurrence entre une société des nations dressée contre une autre société des nations ? (*Vifs applaudissements*). Ce n'est certes pas ma conception.

Aussi mon premier mouvement a-t-il été de transmettre à M. Kellogg, président de la conférence panaméricaine, les renseignements qui me parvenaient.

De cette collaboration, je me félicite (*Applaudissements*) ; cette émulation en faveur de la paix je la désire et si elle se maintient et se développe, je m'en réjouirai pour la paix et pour la Société des nations qu'elle aura grandie.

Mais déjà, n'est-ce pas une chose touchante que cet échange de télégrammes entre les deux belligérants et la Société des nations ?

On n'avait pourtant pas manqué de leur répéter depuis plusieurs années comme on le fait dans les pays lointains que la Société des nations est une organisation européenne qui ne saurait s'intéresser à eux. Or la Société des Nations en cette circonstance a rempli son rôle, elle a fait son devoir et la paix s'en est trouvée consolidée.

J'ai, du reste, le ferme espoir que le conflit sera réglé grâce à l'arbitrage panaméricain, et je serai le premier à féliciter les auteurs de cet arbitrage. (*Très bien !*)

M. Briand. — D'ailleurs, n'est-il pas remarquable que les adversaires américains du pacte de Paris lui adressent des reproches analogues à ceux de M. Lémery.

Ils ont la crainte de voir l'Amérique absorbée par la puissance morale de Genève. Vous avez, monsieur Lémery, la crainte contraire. Voulez-vous que nous fassions une moyenne ? (*Sourires.*)

D'ailleurs, j'espère bien qu'un moment viendra où on s'apercevra qu'il n'y a pas une paix européenne et une paix américaine, mais la paix du monde (*Applaudissements*).

Vous m'avez reproché, M. Lémery, de n'avoir pas fait le pacte d'amitié à deux, que je m'étais proposé de faire avec les Etats-Unis, et vous avez dit qu'ayant eu l'intention de faire un déjeuner en tête à tête, je m'étais laissé entraîner dans un banquet de cinquante couverts. Pardon ! Nous avons d'abord fait le déjeuner à deux et le soir nous avons été au banquet (*Très bien ! et rires*).

Pouvez vous vraiment me reprocher d'avoir trop bien réussi (*Rires*).

Après avoir réalisé l'accord à deux, M. Kellogg a pensé à étendre le pacte à plusieurs Etats. Au nom du gouvernement — car, en toutes ces matières, j'ai parlé et agi au nom du gouvernement tout entier...

M. Raymond Poincaré, président du conseil. — Parfaitement, et après délibération du conseil des ministres.

Le Ministre des affaires étrangères. — .. Au nom du gouvernement, dis-je, j'ai dû discuter, car nous ne sommes pas aussi libres de nos mouvements que l'Amérique, enchevêtrés que nous sommes par des traités d'amitié avec de nombreuses nations. Nous avons donc discuté cordialement ; nous avons éliminé les difficultés et nous avons demandé qu'on invite au pacte nos amis et alliés, signataires de Locarno.

Il n'y a donc, à l'heure actuelle, qu'une seule organisation de paix existante: la Société des nations; il y en a une autre qui s'organise, c'est la Cour permanente de la Haye.

Car c'est vraiment incroyable qu'après tant de guerres et de souffrances, il ne se soit pas encore institué, entre les Etats, les mêmes organisations de justice qu'entre les individus. C'est cette justice qui est à constituer et qui s'organise peu à peu.

M. Lémery nous disait tout à l'heure : on fait du pacte de Paris un usage dangereux. Et d'invoquer l'exemple de la démarche des Soviets auprès de la Pologne. Mais j'y vois, moi, un hommage au pacte de la part d'un peuple qui ne ménage pas les manifestations d'ironie à l'égard de la justice bourgeoise. Quel hommage, diriez-vous, si ce n'est pas une ruse ?

Vous pensez bien que le gouvernement a fait le tour de ces problèmes. Le pacte, dans ce cas, prendrait le caractère d'un pacte de non-agression mais à la condition qu'il s'applique à tous les pays de la frontière de l'est, depuis la Roumanie jusqu'aux Etats baltes.

Et à l'heure actuelle, une discussion s'engage; la Pologne dit : « Je veux bien condamner la guerre d'une façon absolue, mais je n'ai pas le droit de me désintéresser d'autres nations ».

Supposons que cette conversation aboutisse et que tous les pays en question souscrivent au pacte de Kellogg. Qu'aura-t-on à déplorer ? Nous verrons, dans une région de l'Europe où des questions particulièrement préoccupantes se posent, s'établir des garanties nouvelles de sécurité.

Je demanderai maintenant à M. Lémery de relire page par page les documents auxquels il a fait allusion. Il verra que le pacte de Paris n'a pas créé la doctrine de Monroe et qu'il n'institue aucune concurrence à la Société des nations. Loin de créer une opposition entre les Etats-Unis et l'Europe, le pacte de Paris est un trait d'union nouveau, une possibilité supplémentaire de cette collaboration qu'au nom du gouvernement tout entier je désire de tout mon cœur (*Applaudissements prolongés. L'orateur reçoit des félicitations de nombreux sénateurs*).

SPEECHES OF THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR MR. HOUGTHON AND THE BRITISH FOREIGN MIMISTER SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, BIRMINGHAM, JANUARY 26, 1929.

(The Times, January 28, 1929).

The American Ambassador, Sir Austen Chamberlain, and Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland were among the guests at the annual dinner on Saturday of the Birmingham Jewelers' and Silversmith' Association.

Responding to the toast "Our Friends Across the Sea" proposed by the Lord Mayor of Birmingham (Alderman W. Byng Kenrick), the American Ambassador expressed on behalf of the great and kindly people he represented their deep thankfulness that the King's long and distressing illness was now apparently spent and that his Majesty was on the high road to recovery. "For that unquestioned mercy," he added, "they rejoice as whole-heartedly and as sincerely as do you yourselves".

The years that had passed since the end of the Great War, Mr. Houghton continued, had thrown upon statesmen a burden almost too great for human shoulders to bear. They faced problems that seemed to defy solution, they were without precedents to guide them, they were given a task of almost unimaginable difficulty, and yet out of those conditions came Locarno (Cheers). There must have been moments when the strain must have seemed to Sir Austen Chamberlain almost unendurable; but no one who knew him, and no one, even more, who had had the privilege of working with him, had ever doubted that Sir Austen had had one goal always before him – the stable peace of the world. (Cheers).

Altuding to Anglo-American relations, the American Ambassador said he felt very strongly that too much had already been said, for he was persuaded that those ancient ties of friendship and good will which bound our peoples together needed no discussion and remained fundamentally unimpaired. Perhaps the profoundest conviction thad had been borne in on him during his stay in England was that the more the two peoples saw of each other the better the relations between them were going to be. That had led him more than once to ask himself why it was that the tens of thousands of Americans who year by year in increasing numbers made their summer voyage oversea either did not come to England at all or, if they came, remained here a few days only and then proceeded to the Continent. Leaving aside all those other inducements which it would seem would naturally bring Americans to Britain—the common language, ties of blood, historic associations, literary landmarks, cathedrals, and a thousand other things—the fact remained that these islands were among the most beautiful bits of the whole created world. Foreign Secretaries and Ambassadors could, he suppo-

sed justify their existence if pressed to do so ; but let the two peoples mix more and more and friendship would be born between them, that friendship, that fruit of the spirit, which was peace.

Why was it that his people did not come to this country when here was so much to draw them here? "You possess one of the most beautiful bits in all the world," he said, "but you are not very willing to admit the fact, and you are most reluctant and unwilling to proclaim it from the housetops. That is to say, you are not making use of that loud-speaking machinery which our own vast area and enormous numbers make necessary. Other countries have recognized its importance. They are desirous of bringing into their lands these thousands of visitors from oversea, and they have made those desires known and understood throughout the length and breadth of the American Continent. They have issued their invitations in the attractive language of pictorial art, and they reap what they sow."

The toast of "His Majesty's Ministers" was submitted by Mr. R. C. Rodgers, president of the Birmingham Chamber of Commerce.

Sir Austen Chamberlain, who had an enthusiastic reception, renurned thanks for the cordiality with which the company had drunk the toast of his Majesty's Ministers, a body of men, he said to whatever party they might belong, always exposed to something more than their fair share of criticism. It was only on the previous day, or that day that in the Press he noticed that Sir Herbert Samuel had observed that the present Government was useless, that a Labour Government would be dangerous, and, if he (Sir Austen) correctly understood him, that there were not enough Liberals to form a Government. (Laughter.) He hardly liked to mention criticism of that kind in the presence of the Ambassador of another Power, lest he should think that we believed all the evil we spoke of one another. But when he read, as he did, the speeches of their opponents rather than the defence of the Government's action which was offered by his colleagues and friends, he could not but be grateful to any gentleman who would consent to propose the health of his Majesty's present advisers, and to any company who would receive it in so friendly a way. The present was not the occasion on which he could embark on anything in the nature of a party defense of the present Government. But he would venture to say this, that the Prime Minister and his Foreign Secretary, ever since this Government was formed, had devoted themselves steadfastly and patiently to the promotion of peace, both within this country and in our relations with foreign countries. (Cheers.) He would go further and he would add that they had met in both spheres with a measure of success which was not to be despised. If he might go one step further, in that gathering, he would even say

that when this Parliament came to its appointed end, they might look back upon history, and with difficulty would they find four years so full and rich in constructive effort as the four years which were now drawing to their close.

As he listened to the president of the Chamber of Commerce there was borne in upon him in ful force what an avantage it was not to be a politician—(Laughter)—when one had to make a public speech. The American Ambassador indicated that there were certain difficulties for one in his (the Ambassado'rs) or in his (Sir Austen's) position in making speeches on national and international affairs. He (Sir Austen) wished he were the president of the Chamber of Commerce. He could indicate clearly to any Government what was their duty regardless of the difficulty which they might meet with in executing it, in public opinion. He could deal with all international relations with a freedom, with a certainty that he would not raise international difficulties, which no Foreign Secretary could venture to emulate.

And yet one did not discharge one's task if one evaded difficulties and he was, greatly daring, going to say a few words upon international relations and particularly on our relations with America. He found it easier to do so because the American Ambassador, while disclaiming any such intention, said something which he (Sir Austen) thought was profoundly true, and indeed to be said a this moment. He said, paradoxical as it would seem, that too much had already been said about the relations of the United States to this country, that they needed no discussion, for, whatever were our momentary difficulties, our relations remained fundamentally unimpaired.

"It is true," "Sir Austen proceeded, "that there has been, a great deal of discussion recently in this country—and it is about this country that I am going to speak—of our relations wilh America. I think the reason is, not that those relations are impaired ; they remain, as his Excellency has said, fundamentally unimpaired. The reason is that we are peculiarly sensitive as a people to anything which even seems to derogate from the close add warm friendship which it is the traditional policy of every Government, and the fundamental desire of our people, to maintain with the people and the Government of the United States of America. (Cheers) . Accordingly, a passing difference of opinion, a problem which for the moment is unsolved, when it is a difference of opinion or a problem between us and the United States of America, looms far larger in our eyes than the same difference or the same problem if it exists betwen us and any other country in the world.

"We are right to be sensitive on the subject of our relations with the United States. After all, if an American historian sits down to write of the foundation of what has now become a great nation , he writes British history as well

as American history ; and if an English historian writes of any period of English history before the latter part of the 18th century he is writing American history as well as British history. We have a common language (laughter)—we still have a common language – though I confess that there are American novels for the proper understanding of which I often wish that there was a glossary at the end of the book. But we have a common language, as of a great part of our two peoples there is a common ancestry. We have a common literature in the past and a common literature in the present. If we quote, we are as likely to quote an American poet as an English poet. The literary allusions which we make in the English tongue are as well understood on one side of the Atlanticas on the other, and from alle these different and confluent circumstances it comes about that in spite of all the other elements, which enter into the American nation, in spite of all the differences which those different elements and their different conditions have created, there is a greater measure, so we feel and believe, of common thought, common outlook on events, between American and us than between us and any other nation in the world.

" It is natural, therefore, as I say, that if we have a difference it looms large in our eyes ; that if there is any little difficulty it has an importance to us, and attracts an attention such as similar difficulties do no attract in our Press, or amongst our citizens, when they occur with any other nation. There are no two nations who always see alike. There are no two nations whose relations are always easy and smooth. But there are certain nations—and I would count the United States and ourselves in the first rank—where any observer can have a sure and founded confidence that among peoples whose friendship has been so long and so close, whose common possession is so large and so far-reaching, those differences must, and will, be settled in the spirit of friends and with only such difficulty as friends may meet in reconciling a difference of opinion.

" And if you look at what is really at stake in all the discussion which has been going on lately, there is at botton but one difference that we have had with the American Government, a difference which resulted in the failure of the Three Power Conference at Geneva, a difference as to how we shall apply the limitation of naval armaments fairly and justly to our different circumstances and different conditions. That is the only question on which we have set ourselves down to agree, sat in conference, and the conference, has broken upwithout agreement. But observe, and it is important to observe, that the difference between us even then was not a difference of principle. We admitted, freely and willingly admitted, parity betwen the United States naval forces and our own. It is an admission which we have never made to any other nation, which we

should have made to no other nation. But we admitted it freely and willingly as between ourselves and the United States, and such differences as have occurred have not therefore been differences of principle, but merely differences arising out of the difficulties of applying that principle to the very different circumstances and needs of our two countries.

" That is the real problem about which so much has been said, and out ot which, just because of our sensitiveness to anything which, even for a moment, divides us from our friends across the seas, has grown out of all proportion in public controversy, until there is a certain danger lest by talking about it so much we shall really create a difficulty which does not exist and magnity out of all proportion whatever difficulties do exist. See in its true proportion as a purely practical problem, how to apply an agreed principle in circumstances which are, so different, it is reduced to its proper proportions and I venture to say that it is inconceivable that with patience and at an opportune moment friends should not be able to resolve the technical difficulties which have hitherto prevented them from reaching an agreement.

" We have a widely scattered Empire, the communications of which pass across the oceans and the seas. The United States is a compact nation upon a continent, where it runs no danger, separated by ocean from the troubles, the passions, the hatreds, the prejudices of the Old World, self-supporting, self-contained, independent. Between their circumstances and ours there is an immense gulf fixed by history and by geography. Their needs are different from ours ; our needs are different from theirs. The problem is to find some equation by which we can measure naval strength so that that parity which both nations desire may be reached,and reached at a level which indicates not an increase in the armaments of the world but a reduction. (Cheers).

" Do not be discouraged, do not let anyone on either side of the Atlantic be discouraged, if we have not solved the problem at once. Nearly 50 nations represented at Geneva have been trying through a committee to find a comman denominator for the limitation of armaments. I doubt whether any two nations see exactly alike on any one of the different arms which are comprised within that phrase—'the limitation of armaments'. Is it surprising, in these circumstances, that even the United States and ourselves have not at the first effort found a solution of our common problem ?

" Here in Great Britain we pride ourselves, I think not unjustly, upon our loyalty to friendship. I said in this town not so long ago that this country would not sacrifice an old friend to win a new one. It was a phrase which, taken in connexion with another subject I was treating in the same speech, was misunderstood in some quarters, and misunderstood in some quarters in America. I repeat it to-night. We have no nearer and dearer

friendship than our friendship with the United States, and as we seek to be loyal to other friends so we will be loyal to our friendship with those who are nearest to us, most akin to us racially and in their moral outlook on the world of all the nations of the earth." (Cheers.)

REDE DES DEUTSCHEN REICHSKANZLERS HERMANN MUELLER, BERLIN, VEREIN BERLINER PRESSE, 12. DEZEMBER 1928.

(Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung vom 14. Dezember 1928)

Ich habe die Ehre, vor einem Kreise zu reden, in dem sich Wissenschaft und Politik, Wirtschaft und Kunst auf Einladung des Vereins Berliner Presse treffen. Das zeigt, dass die deutsche Presse ein Spiegelbild aller hervorragenden menschlichen Betätigung gibt. Ich habe die Aufgabe, vor Ihnen politisch zu reden.

Seit dem letzten grossen Bankett des Vereins Berliner Presse sind 13 Monate vergangen. Damals gab mein verehrter Vorgänger, Herr Reichskanzler Marx, Ihnen einen Rechenschaftsbericht über die Tätigkeit der Reichsregierung, die die Auflösung des Reichstags bereits ins Auge gefasst hatte. Die Wahlen, die dann am 20. Juni stattfanden, haben die Zusammensetzung des Reichstags wesentlich verändert. Gemäss dem parlamentarischen System wurde daraus die Folgerung gezogen. Seit Ende Juni stehe ich an der Spitze des Kabinetts.

Die Regierungsbildung war nicht einfach. Wir haben in Deutschland nicht nur zwei bis drei Parteien, sondern sieben bis neun, wie das auch schon vor dem Kriege der Fall war. Der Zugang der Jugend hat in der Nachkriegszeit zur Vereinfachung des deutschen Parteiensystems noch nicht beigetragen. Vielleicht liegt das mit daran, dass wir in Deutschland immer noch nicht unsere volle Freiheit wiederhaben.

Gemäss dem Diktat von Versailles haben wie zehn Jahre nach dem Kriege immer noch fremde Truppen im Lande, wir sind immer noch nicht im Besitz der vollen Souveränität.

Wir denken deshalb auch in dieser Stunde an den Herrn Reichsaussenminister, der, von schwerer Krankheit genesen, sich in Lugano dafür einsetzt, dass Deutschland von fremder Besatzung frei werde. Das ist ihm nicht nur deutsches Ziel, sondern Ziel der internationalen Politik. Für die Befriedung Europas hat er in den letzten fünf Jahren seine ganze Arbeitskraft eingesetzt. Es wird Zeit, dass diese Arbeit bessere Früchte trägt.

Es ist verständlich, dass ich mir heute eine gewisse Zurückhaltung auferlege. Ich will nichts sagen, was die Verhandlungen in Lugano stören könnte. Aber das kann mich nicht hindern, einige aussenpolitische Thesen aufzustellen, die Gemeingut des

deutschen Volkes sind, und deren Erörterung deshalb nicht störend wirken kann.

Die Welt muss wissen, dass, so uneinig das deutsche Volk sonst in seinen politischen Auffassungen ist, es einig ist in dem einen Punkt: der Forderung der Räumung der besetzten Gebiete.

Der Ausgangspunkt für diese Forderung ist und bleibt der Rechtsstandpunkt. Die Forderung der Räumung ist aber gleichzeitig ein Politikum allerersten Ranges. Wir sind dem Völkerbund beigetreten. Für diejenigen, die wie ich den Beitritt seit Jahren gefordert hatten, weil sie von der Notwendigkeit der Durchsetzung der Völkerbundsidee überzeugt waren, war es selbstverständlich, dass Deutschland im Völkerbund als gleichberechtigt anerkannt wurde. Mit der Idee der Gleichberechtigung verträgt sich aber die Fortdauer der Besetzung nicht. Die Besetzung, die nach dem Versailler Vertrag zeitlich begrenzt ist, ist kein Sicherheitspfand. Ausserdem ist die Entwaffnung Deutschlands anerkannt, die Besetzung ist auch kein Leistungspfand. Nach dem Versailler Vertrag wird sie im Jahre 1935 auch für die dritte Zone enden. Im übrigen hat der Dawesplan bisher funktioniert. Der Reparationsagent bestätigt das von Bericht zu Bericht öffentlich.

Was fehlt, ist die Endlösung. Sie darf nur gefunden werden, nachdem die Leistungsfähigkeit Deutschlands ernstlich und genau nachgeprüft ist. Diese Auffassungen hat die deutsche Presse erfreulicherweise einmütig vertreten.

Ich muss mich in diesem Zusammenhang mit einem Vorwurf auseinandersetzen, der der deutschen Regierung vor kurzem gemacht worden ist. Es ist behauptet worden, dass der Herr Reichsaussenminister seine letzte Reichstagsrede über die aussenpolitischen Fragen aus Gründen der inneren Politik gehalten hatte. Da das deutsche Volk, wie ich soeben auseinandergesetzt habe, in der Forderung der alsbaldigen Räumung einig ist, sind Rücksichten auf die innere Politik nicht notwendig.

Ich habe aber in Genf bereits in den Verhandlungen der Sechs darauf hingewiesen, dass auch keine Sorge um die besetzten Gebiete uns veranlasst, diese Forderung zu erheben. Die Reichsregierung wird aus den besetzten Gebieten mit Kundgebungen förmlich bestürmt, in denen sie dringend ersucht wird, ja keine neuen Lasten zu nübernehmen für die Brefreiung. Die Bevölkerung der besetzten Gebiete will ausharren, wenn das notwendig sein sollte. Nicht aus Gründen der inneren Politik, sondern aus denen der äusseren Politik fordern wir die Räumung, weil sie zur Befriedung Europas einfach notwendig ist.

Die Grenzen im Westen sind durch die Locarno-Verträge garantiert. Auch daraus muss als Konsequenz gezogen werden, dass endlich Rhein und Saar befreit werden. Die Saarbevölkerung ist kerndeutsch. Als Sohn eines Saarländers bin ich dafür ein lebender Zeuge. Wenn wir die Befreiung dieser Gebiete von der

Fremdherrschaft fordern, so nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil damit auch die Zwischenfälle ausgeschaltet werden, die immer wieder dazu beitragen, dass die alten Wunden aufgerissen werden. Wir wollen in friedlicher Mitarbeit unsere Stellung beziehen im Rate der Völker. Selbstverständlich muss dann auch für die Deutschen das Selbstbestimmungsrecht gelten.

Wenn ich vom Selbstbestimmungsrecht rede, denke ich auch an Deutsch-Oesterreich. Die Prozedur für den Anschluss ist im Vertrag von Versailles geregelt. Zurzeit ist die Anschlussfrage weder von deutscher noch von österreichischer Seite als aktueller Punkt auf die Tagesordnung gesetzt. Trotzdem ist das Wort "Anschluss" schon in fremde Sprachen übergegangen. Wir können uns die Voraussetzungen nicht nehmen lassen, die selbst nach dem Vertrag von Versailles für den Anschluss gegeben sind. Mit dem Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker steht der Anschluss Oesterreichs an Deutschland in keiner Weise in Widerspruch.

Es gibt kein österreichisches Volk. Es gibt nur deutsche Stämme in Oesterreich. Wie die Bretonen Franzosen sind, so sind die Oesterreicher Deutsche. Wir sind eine Nation. Wir tragen gemeinsames Leid, und das hat uns gefühlsmässig nur noch näher gebracht. Auch in der Anschlussfrage ist das ganze deutsche Volk einig.

SPEECH OF MR. W. C. BRIDGEMAN, FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY, LONDON, JANUARY 31, 1929.

(The Times, February 1, 1929)

An after-luncheon address on the naval situation was given yesterday by Mr. Bridgeman, the First Lord of the Admiralty, at the Constitutional Club. Mr. P. J. Hannon, who presided, in an allusion to Mr. Bridgeman's forthcoming retirement, said that no statesman had discharged his responsability to the Navy, to the people of this country, and to the maintenance of sea power more effectively, more sincerely, and, indeed, more successfully, than Mr. Bridgeman.

Mr. Bridgemann said that he could usefully direct his attention to the exposure of some of the fallacies which their opponents were spreading about the country. British naval policy was now, and always had been, a pacific policy, and he did not subscribe to the view that an adequate British Navy was in any way a menace to the peace of the world. On the contrary, he regarded it as a great safeguard ; it was non-aggressivc, and its purpose was to be of use wherever possible. They had made a great many reductions, and had offered a good many more

which had not always been accepted. They were prepared, if other countries did the same, and on that condition, to go farther, but for a country which was the only country in the world dependent entirely upon the free passage of the seas we had done our part, and more than our part, in the reductiou of armaments. Before the Washington Conference we had scrapped 1,250,000 tons of warships, and at the Washington Conference, although it was true the United States of America scrapped 458,000 tons, we scrapped another 818,000 tons.

Another common fallacy was that we started the race to build cruisers of 10,000 tons. It was tolerably plain that the limit was put too high at the Washington Conference for the interests of economy, but other countries so soon as they set about the design and building of new cruisers did so on that basis, so that the maximum became the standard. Great Britain had to do the same, but it was not until two or three years afterwards that any cruisers were laid down in this country. They were laid down by the Socialist Government and, if he might say so, it was one of the most creditable performances which they could attribute to that otherwise objectionable Government. It was forgotten, too, that our policy had not been one of increase but of replacement of ships becoming obsolete, an the increase in size was due to the necessity of keeping level with other nations. Another fallacy was in regard to the Coolidge naval conference, and he wished to emphasize that dis-agreement was not upon policy or upon whether the British and United States naval strength should be equal, but whether such equality could be carried out to a formula of reduction of armaments. The simple question was that the United States thought it was necessary to have larger cruisers of 10,000 tons, whereas our requirements were in the direction of numbers and not size, and we were in favour of 6in. and not 8in. guns. It was impossible to make an equation between cruisers carrying 6in. and those carrying 8in. guns, as the larger cruisers, given fair weather, could compete with any number of vessels with 6in. guns owing to their greater gun range. No blame attached to either side for holding out for what it considered were its national requirements and because of the impossibility of finding a formula the conference broke down.

He supposed that he was expected to say something about the Cruiser Bill now before the Senate in the United States of America. He did not propose to make any remarks upon that particular subject. He noticed that the Leader of the Opposition had rushed into print in some American papers on the subject of American naval-policy, the result of which was a headline in a New York paper " Mr. MacDonald helps our Cruiser Bill ". He hoped to avoid any interference on such a difficult subject. When they were in a conference trying to get agreement upon a subject it was legitimate to put their own view and show if possible

where the other view could be modified, but in the question of the Cruiser Bill it seemed to him that it was no business of theirs to attempt to interfere. They had the Kellogg Pact, and he for one believed that all the nations who had signed that pact intended to keep it. They knew from what had been said on the other side of the water that war was not to be used as an instrument for the advancement of any national policy, and he was perfectly prepared to trust to that. Whatever America thought fit and necessary for her defence would only be used for that purpose. He would far rather take the attitude of not criticizing the numbers or size of whatever America thought necessary, or try to get any very precise formula, because he believed that now and in the future the peace of the world was much more safe in the hands of countries who had generous confidence in one another than in the hands of scaremongers who tried to make out that there was great risk of war between one country and another. After all, they had had peace in very difficult circumstances for ten years, and they should enjoy it, for if they did they were far more likely to keep it than if they believed that any one action would at once lead to strained relations between one country and another. He preferred to have complete confidence in the nation which introduced the Kellogg Pact and the nations which had signed it.

DISCOURS DE M. AUGUSTE ZALESKI, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGÈRES, VARSOVIE, COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES ETRANGÈRES DU SÉNAT, LE 11 FÉVRIER 1929.

(Le Messager Polonais du 12 février 1929)

La collaboration économique et les garanties de paix internationales.

Déjà en mai dernier j'ai eu l'occasion de parler de notre participation à la collaboration économique internationale que j'avais définie comme un des fondements de la paix mondiale. Aujourd'hui, je tiens à développer, Messieurs, le programme que je n'ai pu qu'esquisser alors.

Les principes qui ont guidé notre politique dans ce domaine sont demeurés immuables. Je dirai même que, plus que jamais, nous sentons se manifester l'interdépendance entre nations dans le domaine économique. Cette interdépendance est le fil d'Ariane qui conduit tous nos efforts et ceux de nos voisins, ainsi que les voisins de nos voisins, suscitant à travers les mers, la nécessité d'une compréhension mutuelle et de la solidarité économique des peuples appelés à se compléter mutuellement.

On ne saurait admettre aujourd'hui l'idée d'une politique économique isolée lorsqu'on considère dans quelle mesure en Europe les capitaux sont engagés de pays à pays. On ne saurait oublier que les créances américaines privées dans notre partie du continent viennent s'ajouter à une somme de plusieurs milliards et que le règlement du problème des réparations qui touche les centres nerveux des Etats les plus puissants de l'Europe, ne peut être résolu autrement que sur le plan de la collaboration intercontinentale, financière et économique. Je considère l'universalité de la collaboration économique internationale comme une condition essentielle de son succès. Et ce n'est là nullement un postulat théorique.

Qu'il me soit permis, en manière d'exemple, d'attirer votre attention sur les tentatives faites en vue de résoudre certaines difficultés actuelles du commerce international par le moyen d'une action collective des Etats en vue de la réduction, d'un commun accord de certains tarifs douaniers portant sur les produits du commerce mondial. Le système auquel tendent ces efforts n'implique nullement une réduction simultanée des tarifs. Au contraire la réduction des tarifs est prévue pour certaines régions économiques de manière à ce qu'il soit tenu compte des intérêts des Etats particuliers ou de groupes d'Etats. C'est là, dirai-je, une tentative d'un désarmement douanier régional. Toutefois une action collective de ce genre n'aura sa raison d'être que lorsque, en définitive, les bénéfices seront équivalents aux pertes qui peuvent en résulter pour certains Etats particuliers. Cette action ne sera donc possible que lorsque tous les Etats qui y sont sérieusement intéressés y prendront part.

Si, par exemple, les Etats sud-américains devaient ne pas participer à la réduction du tarif à l'entrée du ciment, une telle action fragmentaire, ne touchant que certains pays de l'Europe, ne procurera des avantages à personne. Je pourrai donner un autre exemple : l'aluminium, au sujet duquel un accord relatif à la réduction du tarif douanier n'est réalisable pour les Etats européens qu'en accord avec les Etats-Unis.

A mon avis l'action collective des Etats tendant à la réduction du tarif douanier mérite d'être encouragée par la Pologne, malgré les obstacles à sa réalisation, pour ne parler que des difficultés résultant de la politique des traités et de l'application de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée. Cette action mérite l'encouragement de la Pologne car elle ouvre de nouveaux horizons, à condition toutefois que tous les pays intéressés y participent. Il y a une seconde condition se rapportant à notre participation à cette action collective et qui commande en quelque sorte notre attitude à l'égard de la collaboration économique internationale. Déjà en mai dernier j'ai eu l'occasion de rappeler devant vous, Messieurs, la nécessité d'un traitement égal et sur le plan international des postulats de l'agriculture

exportant ses produits et de l'exagération des exigences des Etats ayant une industrie fortement développée et pratiquant le libre échange. Je tiens à affirmer à cette place avec conviction, comme j'ai eu l'occasion de le faire à la séance de la S. D. N. de septembre dernier, que l'équilibre entre ces deux tendances doit être trouvé et que la Pologne, en tant que grand Etat agricole, exige que les sacrifices soient compensés par des avantages de la collaboration internationale et que c'est là une des conditions de sa participation active. Le libéralisme dans le domaine industriel et douanier n'est guère possible sans qu'une plus grande liberté soit donnée au commerce des produits agricoles. Ils se trompent, ceux qui croient qu'ils pourront, dans l'Europe d'après guerre et dans l'opinion mondiale, camoufler leur protectionnisme agricole sous couleur de libertés de commerce pour les produits industriels, c'est-à-dire pour leur expansion.

J'affirme donc que le programme de notre action dans le domaine de la collaboration économique internationale se fonde sur deux conditions, l'universalité de cette participation et l'équilibre entre les sacrifices et les avantages que les Etats particuliers peuvent en tirer.

Comme vous voyez, Messieurs, la réalisation d'une telle collaboration économique se heurte à des difficultés partout et dans tous les Etats. Les causes en sont multiples et s'expliquent par la diversité d'intérêts des Etats et souvent par la difficulté de s'adapter aux nouvelles conditions et d'entrevoir de nouveaux horizons.

Néanmoins la solidarité et la collaboration économique sont dans l'intérêt de la Pologne et c'est pourquoi, sous les conditions que je viens d'énumérer, nous nous efforçons, pas à pas, d'approcher de cette collaboration en lui donnant une forme de plus en plus réelle, car nous sommes très fortement et directement intéressés à cette collaboration qui englobe des domaines sans cesse plus étendus de notre vie économique. C'est pourquoi je considère comme indispensable de lui accorder toute notre attention et de la suivre avec un intérêt soutenu.

Si les probtèmes dont je viens de parler peuvent être considérée par vous, Messieurs, comme embrassant une vaste étendue, de nos intérêts économiques et politiques, il existe un domaine, plus restreint de notre action dans ce domaine, je veux dire notamment les relations économiques établies entre nous et nos voisins. Ces problèmes, il est évident, nous devons les aborder avant tout du point de vue de notre intérêt, cependant, c'est dans la juste compréhension de cet intérêt que nous considérons que les traités de commerce que nous conclurons sont en quelque sorte des marches conduisant à cette solidarité économique dont je viens de parler.

Nos traités sont autant d'élements d'organisation économique de la paix.

J'ai eu l'occasion, à la Commission de la Diète, de parler du traité de commerce avec l'Allemagne. Le gouvernement polonais désire la conclusion de ce traité considérant que l'accord fondé sur l'équilibre des sacrifices aussi bien que des avantages réciproques est dans l'intérêt aussi bien de la Pologne que de l'Allemagne.

Je tiens à exprimer une fois de plus l'espoir que nous réussirons à surmonter les difficultés auxquelles se sont heurtées nos négociations et trouver une issue à l'atmosphère de malentendus que j'ai eu l'occasion de caractériser dans mon discours prononcé à la Commissiou de la Diète. De même, j'ai l'espoir que la conclusion du traité nous permettra d'apporter dans les relations polono-allemandes certains éléments actifs qui constitueront la base d'une plus large collaboration économique profitable aux deux Etats.

Si nous nous heurtons à certaines difficultés avant la conclusion d'un traité de commerce avec l'Allemagne, difficultés inhérentes à l'atmosphère politique de certains milieux allemands et aux objections soi-disant économique, le règlement des relations commerciales avec l' U. R. S. S. est encore plus difficile. A ces deux éléments rendant difficile l'entente avec l'Allemagne vient s'ajouter un autre et des plus importants, notamment l'extrême divergence entre la politique économique des Soviets et la nôtre. A cause de ce fait, les prochaines négociations commerciales et le traité éventuel avec la Russie occuperont une place spéciale parmi les autres accords économiques conclus par notre pays qui ne pourront pas lui être comparés. Ceci est d'autant plus compréhensible si l'on songe à la grande importance qu'aura, pour le développement ultérieur des relations économiques avec la Russie, le fait de trouver un mécanisme de crédit approprié permettant le fonctionnement des échanges entre les deux pays.

Je tiens à constater à cette place qu'en dépit des difficultés, le gouvernement polonais désire la conclusion d'un traité de commerce avec la Russie et que nous tendons sincèrement à sa réalisation. Un traité de commerce qui réglerait les contingents de produits des deux pays, qui fixerait les commandes industrielles, qui contiendrait la clause de la nation la plus favorisée dans les limites du système de commerce extérieur en vigueur en Russie, qui définirait les compétences des particuliers et réaliserait la liberté du transit, un tel traité est dans l'intérêt réel des deux Etats. J'ai le profond espoir et la conviction que le protocole signé samedi dernier à Moscou, contribuera à éclaircir l'atmosphère politique et permettra que, dans un proche avenir, les négociations commerciales avec la Russie entrent dans une période de réalisation.

En parlant de nos efforts en vue de régler les relations commerciales entre la Pologne et nos voisins, je ne saurais passer sous silence les négociations engagées à ce sujet avec la Lithuanie.

L'ensemble de notre politique à l'égard de la Lithuanie vous est connu. La patience, l'endurance et le calme, ces vertus cardinales qui caractérisent notre attitude dans d'autres affaires, qui divisent nos deux pays, est appliquée également en vue de l'établissement des relations économiques normales avec la Lithuanie, ce que le gouvernement polonais désire très sincèrement. Il est inadmissible qu'au moment où l'économie mondiale tend à renforcer les échanges internationaux, au moment où la Conférence Economique et le Comité Economique de la S. d. N. recommandent le développement des relations économiques entre Etats, il est inadmissible qu'existe entre la Pologne et la Lithuanie un vide dans le domaine politique et commercial et que les relations entre ces deux pays ne puissent être réglées au moyen d'un traité normal.

A la conférence de Kœnigsberg M. Waldemaras a proposé de limiter les négociations aux seuls accords commerciaux et a promis de nous soumettre un projet de convention. Le gouvernement polonais attend ce document jusqu'à ce jour. Je voudrais pouvoir espérer que ce retard sera mis à profit par le gouvernement lithuanien pour examiner à nouveau les avantages que pourrait procurer à la Lithuanie le règlement de ses relations avec la Pologne et que le projet qui nous sera soumis constituera un progrès par rapport aux négociations de Kœnigsberg et de Genève. Le traité de commerce polono-lithuanien ne doit pas constituer uniquement la légalisation des formes un peu spéciales que revêtent aujourd'hui les échanges de marchandises à travers la frontière polono-lithuanienne ; il ne saurait viser uniquement ces échanges sans régler les droits des personnes physiques et morales des deux côtés de la frontière. Si tel était le cas l'accord en question serait mort-né et répondrait uniquement à une conception abstraite. A notre sens le futur traité avec la Lithuanie doit répondre à la doctrine, professée invariablement en cette matière par la Pologne et contenir de même que les autres traités entre les Etats européens, les clauses généralement admises destinées à régler le statut juridique des citoyens des deux parties.

Tout en attendant le projet lithuanien, nous menons des négociations actives avec toute une série de pays. Je me bornerai à mentionner ici les pourparlers en cours avec la France, la Grèce et la Lettonie, l'accord déjà réalisée avec la Tchécoslovaquie et la Hongrie, les prochaines négociations avec la Yougoslavie.

Lorsqu'il est question du développement, de la consolidation et de l'organisation des relations économiques internationales nous ne pouvons oublier que la condition indispensable des progrès dans ce domaine est la paix durable. En d'autres mots l'organisation de la sécurité des nations doit se trouver à la base de l'organisation économique internationale. Dans le domaine de la paix autant que dans le domaine économique,

l'interdépendance mutuelle des Etats s'affirme de plus en plus nettement et l'opinion de presque tous les pays se rend de plus en plus compte qu'il n'est point possible, pour chaque pays particulier, de s'assurer des garanties de paix stable si cette même paix n'est pas garantie aux autres pays.

Aujourd'hui après l'expérience de la grande guerre au cours de laquelle la moitié du monde s'est trouvée dans un des deux camps belligérants, il n'est plus douteux que la tendance à se généraliser est en quelque sorte la loi naturelle de la guerre moderne et que la localisation d'une conflagration sur le continent européen appartient presque au domaine des impossibilités. Aussi trouverait-on difficilement aujourd'hui un Etat qui envisagerait avec calme le danger de guerre menaçant ses voisins ou même les Etats géographiquement éloignés. Il serait difficile de trouver un homme d'Etat qui, dirigeant la politique étrangère de son pays, dirait avec Lucrèce :

Suave mari magno turbantibus æquora ventis
Et terra magnum alterius spectare laborem.
Suave etiam belli certamina magna tueri
Per campos instructa, tua sine parte periculi...

Ainsi on voit s'accroître, dans tous les pays, le sentiment de ce que la sécurité et les garanties de paix de chaque Etat dépendent de ceux des autres. Le corollaire de cette conscience croissante est l'effort ascendant appliqué à l'organisation de la paix sur le plan international.

La création de la Société des Nations constitue la principale expression de ses tendances. Le pacte de la S. d. N, bien qu'il n'ait pas assuré au monde, exténué par la guerre, une sécurité définitive et parfaite, a posé les fondements durables sur lesquels pourra s'élever l'édifice de la paix universelle. Cinq années après que ces fondements eussent été déposés on pouvait croire un moment que les architectes de la paix universelle ont réussi à édifier un arc puissant « ære perennus » arc de la fraternité internationale. Dans un élan enthousiaste où s'affirmèrent les plus nobles sentiments humains 50 représentants des Etats-membres de la S. d. N. adoptèrent à l'unanimité le protocole de Genève fondé sur les maîtres-piliers de la sécurité, des sanctions et de l'arbitrage. Ce protocole était un complément achevé et harmonieux du pacte de la S. d. N.

Le protocole de Genève était destiné à combler les lacunes du pacte interdisant toutes les guerres et prévoyant le règlement de tous les conflits internationaux par la voie pacifique. Le protocole était fondé sur les éléments suivants :

1) Toute guerre d'agression, c'est-à-dire n'ayant pas le caractère de guerre défensive ou d'une action collective de la S. d. N. a été reconnue comme crime international et, comme tel, interdite sans réserve.

2) Tous les litiges entre Etats devaient être déférés devant les

organes internationaux compétents telle la Cour permanente de Justice internationale, le Comité d'arbitrage et le Conseil de la S. d. N. Les décisions de ces organes devaient être définitives et obligatoires pour les parties.

3) Dans le cas où un Etat quelconque viendrait à violer l'interdiction de recourir à la guerre tous les Etats signataires du protocole seraient tenus d'engager une action commune, militaire, économique et financière en vue de venir en aide à l'Etat victime de l'agression.

A la huitième assemblée de la S. d. N. de nombreux amis de la paix se figuraient qu'une ère nouvelle venait de commencer dans l'histoire de l'humanité, que la guerre a été condamnée définitivement et sans retour à disparaître des relations internationales, que tout pays voulant recourir à la guerre se heurterait immanquablement au puissant et impitoyable rempart des sanctions collectives internationales.

Malheureusement, comme vous ne l'ignorez pas, Messieurs, la réalité a déçu la Pologne et les amis sincères de la paix : le protocole de Genève a échoué. On peut dire qu'il s'est écroulé sous le poids de sa propre perfection parce que le temps n'est pas encore venu de construire le toit du grand édifice de Genève alors que ses fondements n'ont pas encore été suffisamment consolidés.

Le protocole a échoué, mais, depuis ce moment, les efforts n'ont pas faibli en vue d'en assurer la mise en vigueur progressivement et par étapes. Dans ces efforts la Pologne, elle aussi, a eu sa part.

La reconstruction du protocole est dans l'intérêt de la Pologne autant que dans celui des autres Etats qui ne considèrent pas comme idéales leurs garanties de sécurité et qui ne tendent pas au bouleversement du statut politique actuel du monde. Le protocole offrait un maximum de garanties du maintien de la paix. Sa reconstitution peut se concevoir de deux façons : 1) par la réalisation de ses éléments particuliers dans le cadre de traités universels, 2) par l'application de l'ensemble du protocole mais pris, si l'on peut dire, en miniature au moyen de traités régionaux embrassant chacun un groupe limité d'Etats. La Pologne en déposant sa proposition à la VII Assemblée de la S. d. N. s'est engagée dans la première voie. Sa proposition détachait du protocole de Genève le principe de non-agression universelle en vertu duquel toutes les guerres sont frappées d'interdiction. Le même principe a trouvé son expression dans le pacte Kellogg dont la teneur concorde en tous points avec la proposition polonaise.

On peut aussi reprendre tous les éléments à la fois du protocole de Genève, non sur le plan universel mais sur un plan régional.

Le gouvernement polonais a déposé en 1926, à la Commission préparatoire de la Conférence du désarmement une motion

demandant que le Conseil de la S. d. N. étudiât le problème des pactes régionaux d'assistance mutuelle. La Commission a renvoyé cette proposition au Conseil et celui-ci en a ajourné l'examen jusqu'au moment où les travaux techniques de la Commission préparatoire seront suffisamment avancés. Depuis, la question des pactes régionaux a acquis un caractère d'actualité spécial, le Comité d'arbitrage et de sécurité (sous-comité politico-juridique de la Commission préparatoire) ayant étudié cette question et élaboré un modèle d'accord (dit modèle D) qui reprend à peu de différences près les dispositions du pacte rhénan.

La IX[e] assemblée a approuvé le modèle de traité d'assistance mutuelle élaboré par le Comité d'arbitrage et de sécurité, l'a recommandé aux Etats en les autorisant à demander au Conseil de la S. d. N. la médiation dans les pourparlers ayant pour objet la conclusion de traités régionaux établis d'après ce modèle. Celui-ci est basé sur les principes du protocole de Genève. Selon l'accord proposé : 1) tous les conflits doivent être résolus par voie pacifique ; 2) les guerres entre les parties sont interdites sans réserve ; 3) cette interdiction venant à être violée par une des parties au détriment d'une autre les autres signataires sont tenus de prêter leur assistance à la victime de l'agression.

Je nourris l'espoir, Messieurs, que la recommandation formulée par la dernière Assemblée ne restera pas lettre morte et, que les Etats sincèrement désireux de consolider la sécurité et la paix universelle s'appliqueront sérieusement à sa réalisation. Aussi je suis heureux que la Diète, dans sa dernière résolution relative au renforcement des garanties de sécurité de l'Etat polonais, ait porté son attention sur le projet de traité que je viens de mentionner.

Je ne crois pas, Messieurs, le moment proche où notre continent se couvrira d'un réseau d'accords régionaux. J'estime toutefois que les efforts des Etats désireux de stabiliser les rapports internationaux et consolider la paix dans cette partie du monde doivent orienter dès aujourd'hui leurs efforts dans ce sens. Je crois également que, dans les circonstances présentes, la conclusion d'accords d'après le modèle sus-mentionné est seule susceptible de conduire à un accord général dans le genre du protocole de Genève dont les buts et les principes doivent toujours nous guider dans le chemin semé d'obstacles qui mène à la consolidation définitive de la paix universelle.

SPEECH OF PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY, LONDON, OCTOBER 23, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, October 24, 1928)

Professor Gilbert Murray, delivering last night in the Memorial Hall, London, the third of the Halley Stewart lectures on " The

ordeal of civilisation ", declared that if only nations would confer with one another, if they would form the habit of sitting round a table and discussing, they could avoid most of their conflicts.

The international system of the nineteenth century had proved itself to be unworthy, intellectually and morally, of the men and women who lived under it. It had landed the world in disaster. Consequently there arose a general demand that the system should be changed. The demand was at first confused and took some little time to clarify itself. It seemed obvious that disputes ought to be settled by arbitration, and war ought to be absolutely prevented, but in the early discussions about the League all took too lightly the difficulty of a frontal attack on the real wish of a sovereign State.

All through the war the Allies had formed the habit of conference. They had learned to co-operate. No Great Power, indeed, had quite consented to allow itself to be outvoted by a majority, but they had learned to work the rule of unanimity under which, no one was outvoted but everyone made, or was ready to make, concessions. The Treaty of Peace provided for regular inter-State conferences, and these conferences necessitated a permanent international secretariat. The conferences, plus the permanent secretariat, sufficed to constitute the League, and made in themselves the chief correction that was immediately possible in the old international anarchy. It was noteworthy that the original proposal spoke of " an annual meeting of the Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of the Great Powers " and " quadrennial meetings of representatives of all States included in the League ". As a matter of fact, the conferences had been found so useful that they were in practice convened four times as frequently as was planned.

The importance of the secretariat proved far greater than was anticipated either in the various unofficial schemes for a League of Nations, or (Professor Murray thought) in the actual debates at Versailles. The cardinal difference which it made in world affairs was that it constituted a great permanent staff of international officials, whose business was international co-operation, and whose professional self-respect was vrapped up in the preservation of peace. Further, the secretariat not only produced the atmosphere in which the machinery of conciliation could work—it gave rise to almost all the constructive and co-operative work of the League. At this moment they might be thinking most about such problems as disarmament, the evacuation of the Rhineland, or sanctions against the aggressor.

But if the League was successful those problems ought before long to be settled and pass into the background. The activities that were bound to increase were those which now seemed secondary and which short-sighted politicians were always trying to cripple and reduce— those in which nations were working constructively for the common good and laying the foundations of international government—economic co-operation, the for-

mation of international law, co-operation against disease, various humanitarian undertakings, the immense field of joint action that lay before the International Labour Organisation, and perhaps in course of time the full development of the latent seeds of intellectual co-operation.

But the League had, after all, to prevent war, and if disputes were not to be settled by war there must be some other way of settling them. This machinery was the second constituent factor of the League, and lastly, the ultimate question had to be faced of coercing the peace-breaker. This was the third constituent factor of the League, and a necessity it the world was to be sure of peace.

SPEECH OF LORD CECIL OF CHELWOOD, NORTH FINCHLEY. OCTOBER 25, 1928.

(The Times, October 25, 1928).

Lord Cecil addressed a meeting of the League of Nations Union at North Finchley on Monday night.

As Sir Hall Caine was unable to take the chair, his son, Mr. G. R, Hall Caine M. P., read a message in which his father paid tribute to Lord Cecil's contribution to the cause of inernational peace. He said that for long Lord Cecil had to struggle on, almost alone among British statesmen, or yet the statesmen of the world, for the cardinal doctrine that sooner or later it would be necessary to establish a world court of peace, if civilization itself was to survive ; but he held on steadfastly to his great thought amid deep discouragements, as well as signal triumphs, and he had sacrificed all other and more personal interests to promote and sustain it.

Lord Cecil said he had noticed that Mr. Bernard Shaw had attended meetings of the League Assembly and had written articles giving his views. Mr. Shaw's articles were very good. He selected for his chief eulogy the Secretariat of the League. He (Lord Cecil) thought the Secretariat was, on the whole, the best thing that had come out ot the Covenant of the League. Mr. Shaw complained that the debates in the Assembly were unreal and insincere, and he was struck with the amount of hot air given off into the atmosphere of the Assembly. There was a certain truth in that. It was true that representatives of various countries attending the League for the first time were apt to talk of their beliefs in peace, and repetition of those beliefs might appear to become tiresome. Yet it was not on the whole useless. There was some advantage in those rather florid tributes to peace because after all peace depended in the last analysis upon whether the nations wished to keep the peace. One method of creating an atmosphere of peace was undoubtedly to have speeches made in a central position like Assembly. This in itself was a blow struck in the cause of peace.

SPEECH OF VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLODON, LONDON, NOVEMBER 5, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, November 6, 1928)

Viscount Grey of Fallodon delivered an important speech on « The Anglo-French Naval Agreement and its consequences » at a luncheon given by the Liberal Council at the Hotel Metropole to-day. M. Walter Runciman presided and there was a large gathering, which included Mrs. Runciman, M.-P., Lord Buckmaster, Lord Shuttleworth, Sir Donald Maclean, M. J. A. Spender, and other well-known Liberals.

The chief point made by Lord Grey was that in order to retrieve the situation created by the compromise it is necessary that the Government should now declare that the agreement is at an end, and should also make it clear that the words of the Prime Minister about not building in competition with the United States « hold good in the Admiralty as well as on the platform ».

Lord Grey said : What has been done by the British and French Governments in Paris this year is very peculiar and very unfortunate. I do not think I can recall anything so peculiar. In itself it is a very small thing, but it has had most tremendously unfortunate consequences. When such a thing has happened in foreign affairs the question we ought to put to ourselves is this : Is it a new and wrong departure in policy, or is it an isolated blunder not related to policy ? If it is a wrong and new departure in policy we are bound not only to expose and to oppose it, but to go on fighting against it till we have succeded in getting it reversed. If it is a wrong departure in policy it becomes an acute party question in this country. It is very undesirable that foreign affairs should become an acute source of division in this country.

It is very desirable that British foreign policy should have continuity. I am therefore anxious to treat this as an isolated blunder not related to policy, of which the consequences have been to a large extent due to misunderstanding, misconception, and misrepresentation. If the Government are to feel the country behind them again, as I hope will be the case as regards foreign policy, if they are to get foreign affairs upon such a footing that we may feel that there will be continuity in foreign policy which will be pursued by any other party which succeeds them as a Government, then they must take the steps which are necessary to repair as far as possible the mischief which the blunder has done. The consequences of the Anglo-French naval compromise in Europe have been very untoward. The agreement between the two Governments has given the impression abroad certainly in Italy and Germany, that a new entente, a political entente between France and Britain so close as

to be almost equivalent to an alliance, has been created, and that it is intended to lead to separate naval and military cooperation between the two countries. If that were true it would have been a new departure in policy.

I believe that the account which Lord Cushendun gave in his speech at Geneva on August 30 and in the White Paper is the true one. It amounts to this, that the British and French Governments differed in their views about principles,or the applications of some of the principles, relating to the limitation of navies. That difference caused a deadlock in the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament, and the two Governments got together in discussion in order, by coming to an agreement with each other as to the line they should take in the Preparatory Commission, to remowe that deadlock and smooth the way toward general naval agreement. If the views about the limitation of navies which the two Governments agreed upon were not acceptable to other Governments, then they could serve no useful purpose.

That is a perfectly innocent thing—for two countries to come to an agreement as to the line they would take in the Preparatory Commission and then to put it before the other Powers,and if they did not like it it would come to nothing. There is no harm in that. How, then, did the trouble come about ? Because the whole thing was so misconceived and so extremely badly handled between the two Governments. The agreement was announced as if it was a really big thing—with big headlines as a new agreement with France. Then nothing was published. For weeks, even months, the world was left to speculate what this big thing consisted of. Then Lord Cushenduu made his speech explaining that it was a very small thing. You don't dispose of misconceptions of such importance by a single speech. Still the documents were not published,and even the publication has not removed altogether the untortunate impression that had been produced. It is for the French and British Governments to show that this is not a new departure in policy.

The wrong policy both for Britain and France in the policy which Germany pursued after 1870, when Germany made the Triple Alliance an exclusive alliance and forced the pace in armements.That let to counter-alliances and counter-armaments, and that policy produced conditions in Europe which led to war. I am convinced that is the true rading of history, and precisely because I am convinced of that I am convinced it would be a great blunder to repeat the policy of Germany after 1870. They have, on the contrary, up to the present pursued the right policy, that of the League of Nations and the Covenant, and the aim has been to bring about agreement among the lies not against other countries, but with the object of bringing other countries, especially Germany, into the Covenant. They got Germany to come

into the League of Nations on equal terms,and that was the right policy.

If, however, the Government were now to make a separate political entente with France it would be a step backward from the right policy. The Government ought to realise—they must, I think, realise, and France also—that one of the unfortunate consequences of the Naval Compromise has been that a certain number of people in this country have become somewhat impatient of Anglo-French co-operation.If the two Governments reat the compromise as I hope they will assuming that it is exactly what Lord cushenden assures us it is, — then it is no new departure of policy. Anglo-French co-opération, a good understanding, and confidence between the tow Governments, are essential to the achievement of a League of Nations and Locarno policy. If the relations between this country and France were to change to friction and suspicion from good understanding and confidence, it would be just as damaging to the true policy of the League and Locarno, and that would be the result if the two countries made a separate agreement from which others were to be excluded.

We are still more concerned to see the effect it has had in the United States, and that really is the most disastrous consequence. In the United States the effect has been to set back all further discussion of naval agreement,for a period at all events, and to turn people's thoughts there to the building of large cruisers and to divert attention to that instead of to the pact for the renunciation of war. That is a most disastrous thing. It was produced by what seems to be the utter folly of the compromise. It is clear from the White-paper that the two Governments came to an agreement as regards the limitation of cruisers, which was the very thing which the United States had carefully explained at the Three-Power Naval Conference they could not agree to.

The object of the compromise was to promote general agreement about navies. Can you imagine anything more futile than to begin by coming to an agreement to promote and press a particular scheme as regards cruisers which they ought to have know in advance the United States could not accept ? Can you imagine anything more simple—I use the world in its least favourable sense—than, having drawn up something you ought to have known the United States would not accept, then gravely to go and ask them if they will accept it ? The answer,of course, of the United States was that they had shown they could not agree to this principle of the limitation of armaments. That was the rock on which the Three-Power Conference failed, and now the two Governments have agreed upon what the United States had said it could not accept, only in a more aggravated form.

Such a procedure is worse than futile for it has produced an

untoward political effect. It has produced the impression that the British and French Governments between them were trying to get the better of the United States and either to press upon the United States something which it was know they could not like or to manœuvre them into an unfavourable position. The price of blunder like that has to be paid. We are paying the price in what I hope is only a temporaly political estrangement between public opinion in the United States and here—very undesirable thing in British interest and the interests of the worl. The United States and ourselves are the two countries which from long experience are most firmly devoted to free democracy and I believe it is true of each of them that a great body of public opinion is devoted to world peace.Those ideals are common to the two countries, but if you get friction over naval armaments these ideals begin to be obscured, and instead of the countries coming together they become estranged. The United States will also have to pay the price in dollars. They are going to build for certain a very large number of big cruisers because they think that we have been trying to get the better of them in naval armaments.

How is it to be put right ? Mr. Bridgeman said last year that he observed that America was going to build a large number of cruisers. We, on the contrary,had dropped two big cruisers. He did not complain of what the United States were doing, and if they went on with their full programme it would make no difference to our plans. If he had only said and acted upon that at Geneva there would have been no failure. Mr. Baldwin, the other day, said that we were not going to build in naval competition with the United States. That is very important from the Prime Minister, and very welcome and timely. There seems to be a feeling among Bristish and American naval experts that there is a real rivalry about the respective fleets. The Prime Minister should make it quite clear that we do not take the American fleet into calculation in our building. Previous British Governments have never done so, and we want to be sure that the Government have instructed the Admiralty that in drawing up their programme of our naval requirements they should not take the American fleet into account. It is for the Government to instruct the Admiralty as to what contingencies they are to provide against,and it is then for the Admiralty to provide what is necessary. It is not for the Admiralty to say up to what standard they should build. So long as there is no rivalry in armaments, no challenge between the United States and this country our position remains perfectly secure. We shall never secure it against the United States by armaments. The principle on which the Canadian frontier is secure is one which applies to the whole of the Bristish Commonwealth, and if you only stick to that principle in practice, as the Canadian Government sticks to it in its own sphere, there would

never be any risk of the British Commonwealth being interfered with by the United States.

The Bristish and French Governments should say tha t as the now know that two big naval Powers will not accept th e agree ment, even as the basis for discussion, that agreement can serve no good purpose and is at an end. The agreement has proved to be a false start and a mistake, and if it is declared at an end that means that not only the naval but the military part of it—(cheers)—should also be declared at an end. Both Governments must feel that they are to make a fresh start, and must clean the slate completely. The Government should also make it clear that the words of the Prime Minister about not building in competition with America hold good in the Admiralty as well as on the platform (Cheers). They will do so if Mr. Baldwin meant what he said. If the agreement comes to an end and the position between the United States and us is made perfectly clear, the French and British Governments together will end the mistake which has been made and get over its consequences.

It will require real co-opération between the two Governments to remove the misconceptions and make the world feel sure again that the co-operation between them is co-operation in the League of Nations and on the lines of Locarno, and aimed at bringing nations together and not keeping them apart. If the agreement disappears, in time the two Governments will recover the ground which has been lost abroad and in this country. They will again restore confidence in Anglo-French co-operation. If the Government will do that, then let us forget and endeavour to get the world to forget, the mistake that has been made, and give them all support in overcoming the consequences.

We want, as patriotic people, to keep foreign affairs out of the coming election because it weakens this country if they have to be brought in. But it is really necessary, after what has passed, that the Government should put us in a position to say that a false start has been made, and a new start is being made on lines upon which they can appeal to the whole country for support.

SPEECH OF VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD, STOCKPORT, NOVEMBER 14, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, November 15, 1928)

Viscount Cecil addressed a big meeting of the League of Nations' Union at the Stockport Centenary Hall on Tuesday, Sir Thomas Rowbotham presiding.

Lord Cecil deprecated the action of the British Delegation to the League of Nations, at its last meeting, in raising an objection to the expenditure of £4,000 in connection with the League's budget. The expenditure was sanctioned, and the British action produced a bad effect and weakened the authority of the League.

"We want to make it clear to the world," Lord Cecil said, "that we stand hehind the League. The whole principle of the reduction of armaments depends upon an agreement between the United States and ourselves on a proper system of the reduction of our navy. The United States ask for equality, and I see no reason why they should not have il. We are not afraid of their navy, and I regard it as little better than insanity if we should refuse to enter into negotiations because we are not prepared to meet the facts in the face. Once that is done the rest follows. We should have a proportionate agreement with Japan, and we should then, press for real military, disarmament throughout the rest of the world."

He urged the Government to sign the optional clause of the statutes of the Court of International Justice, which committed the signatories to a judicial settlement of all international questions of a legal character, and in the second place to declare its willingness to contract an all-inclusive treaty for the settlement of all international disputes by conciliation and arbitration on the lines of the proposals accepted at the last assembly of the League of Nations.

SPEECH OF VISCOUNT CECIL OF CHELWOOD, MANCHESTER, NOVEMBER 13, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, november 14, 1928)

Viscount Cecil of Chelwood was the guest yesterday of the Manchester Luncheon Club at the Midland Hotel. He spoke on the importance of reducing armaments by agreement, primarily, with the United States, if we would make permanent the hope of peace and if we would see an end of the present state of unemployment in this country. The chair was taken by Dr. W. H. Moberly, the Vice Chancellor of the Manchester University, who was supported by Mr. W. E. Thompson, the president of the Manchester Chamber of Commerce, Sir Edwin Stockton and Dr. Rée (past presidents), and Mr. E. D. Simon.

Lord Cecil said he proposed to begin a little off the point. He was going to talk about unemployment, and in that complicated and thorny question there was one point on which practically everybody was agreed—that was, as to the broad cause,

not the special and individual causes, of unemployment. The broad cause was that we could not find customers to buy the goods we made at a price which would pay us to make them. Therefore there was not enough work to go round the working population. Perhaps one other cause should be added, want of that confidence on which credit was based.

Everybody was also agreed that if you could reduce taxation, that would produce a very important alleviation of the difficulties under which industry was suffering. To reduce taxation was not simple. A great deal of our expenditure was inevitable. So far as he knew, there were only two really hopeful avenues of economy—avenues which might lead to a really genuine reduction of taxation. One was the conversion of the debt and a reduction of interest, and there a fundamental condition was that the confidence and credit of the country should be at a high level. The other avenue was the reduction of armaments. We were spending something between £100.000.000 and £120.000.000 a year on armaments. That was something over an eighth of our total expenditure. It was actually, in figures, more than we were spending in 1913 ; but the difference in the value of money should be remembered. It would not be far from the truth to say that to-day we were spending roughly the same as in 1913—perhaps a little less, perhaps a little more. For that money we were getting a force which, mechanically, was far stronger, more powerful, more destructive than anything that could be had in 1913. Our armaments of to-day could destroy without difficulty the armaments of 1913.

That was the situation ; and there was no doubt that a reduction of this force would yield a very large sum of money, for. however desirable the force might be from other points of view from the economic point of view it was unproductive. It was said that it would not be safe for us to reduce our armaments. He was not sure that he could agree with that proposition, even set in that way. " I observe," went on Lord Cecil, " that President Coolidge, in the statement which was issued to the press yesterday morning, seems to be of opinion, at any rate in one passage, that the armament of 1913-14 did preserve the peace —that we should have had war much earlier it there had not been large armaments. On that point I am not able to agree. I take rather the view of Lord Grey of Fallodon, who is clear that the growth of armaments and the competition in armaments were one of the most important predisposing causes of the war. " (Applause)

But whatever anyone might say about the reduction of our armaments by themselves, he imagined that no one, and least of all President Coolidge, would doubt that a reduction of armaments by international agreement all round would make the world safer and would certainly be very much cheaper for all

the nations of the world. (Hear, hear) It was not only that it would save our money ; it would save the money of everybody, We should be able to produce cheaper by reason of the lowering of the burdens, on industry, and our customers would have more money to spend. As to the question of confidence, there was no doubt at all in his mind or, he thought, in the mind of anybody who had impartially considered the subject that the existence of large armaments was one of the most important causes in keeping alive international distrust and suspicion, which were at the bottom of the want of confidence. (Applause)

What, then, was the best hope we had of getting a reduction of armaments ? It was an important question, because he thought there could be not real confidence in the permanence of the League of Nations or the permanence of peace unless some way could be found to reduce armaments by international agreement. In the last few years he had had a good many opportunities of considering the question "How is it to be done ?" "I am quite sure", said Lord Cecil, "that the fundamental condition, without which you cannot hope to make any advance, is an agreement with the United States about naval armaments. (Applause.)

"The moment you begin in an international gathering to talk about disarmament and suggest to this or that Continental Power that it would be a good thing, they say. ,Yes. What about your navy ?' There is no answer. You may say that we are to be trusted with our navy but that they are not to be trusted with their armaments, but it is not likely that they will agree. They begin by saying that naval disarmament must go pari passu with military disarmament, and I see no answer from an international point of view.

"It is quite plain that you can have no agreement into which you can possibly ask this country to enter—no agreement for complete naval disarmament—unless the United States and Japan were also prepared to enter into such an agreement. (Hear. hear.) We cannot tie our hands unless other people are equally prepared to tie theirs. Therefore, if you are to have disarmament at all you must have naval disarmament, and if you are to have naval disarmament you must have an agreement with the United States and Japan. With Japan no difficulties arise. She made it quite clear last year that she was prepared to enter into practically any scheme for naval disarmament provided it meant a real reduction, because she is very anxious to save money, and provided that America and this country were equally ready to enter into that agreement. "

Holding this view strongly, said Lord Cecil, he read with something akin to anxiety the utterance of President Coolidge to which he had already referred. In form, at any rate, some of the passages were slightly disappointing.

Mr. Coolidge praised—very justly—the Pact of Paris, and said he regarded it as an immense step forward in the peaceful evolution of the world. Therefore it was a little disappointing that so much of his speech was taken up with a justification of the preparation for war. Lord Cecil said he could not help being reminded of Newman's retort to Pusey, when Pusey wrote a pamphlet designed to bring together the Churches of England and Rome. "You discharged your olive branch as if from a catapult." But when one looked below the form of Mr. Coolidge's utterance and got down to the substance the result was very encouraging.

" He seems to me," said Lord Cecil, " to urge four things on this question. In the first place, he advocates the continuance of the negotiations for disarmament that have been going on at Geneva. That is very good indeed. That shows that, despite all the talk that there has been about the Anglo-French compromise and the rest, America is still prepared to cooperate to the utmost of her power in the effort being made at Geneva to find a solution of this problem. He next rejects, in so many words, competition in armaments with this country. That is also very gratifying all the more because it follows the very striking and important speech which the Prime Minister made at the Albert Hall a few days ago in which he too rejected in the strongest and most explicit language competition with America in naval armament. No competition, therefore, with one another is the basis of the policy of each of the countries.

" Next he asks for a real reduction—not only a limitation, but a real reduction on both sides. I will not go into criticisms that he makes about the Anglo-French compromise or about the Three Power Conference. On some points I would be disposed to say he was justified ; on others that he puts the case too high. But when he asks for a real reduction we have got to say that this is what we want or that it is not. I am quite sure it is what I want. I hope it is what all of you want. (Applause).

" Then he claims, or implies—and this underlies the speech —he claims absolute and complete equality. There has been a great deal of talk about strategic equality." Lord Cecil went on to explain that strategic equality was a matter about which talk might go on for ever. He thought it was perfectly hopeless and would never come to an end. " Mathematical equality," he went on, " is another matter. It is unquestionably mathematical equality that is in the mind of every American statesman and other American negotiators with whom I have talked for the last three or four years. Is there any reason why we should hesitate to agree that the United States should have that equality with us ? I see none. Why not ? What are we afraid of ? Is it or is it not true that we have always ruled out war with the United States as one of the contingencies against which we

ought to provide ? Certainly before 1914 it was common ground with every political party that we were not to consider the fleet of the United States in estimating the fleet that we ourselves should require." It was common ground that we did not consider the possibility of the invasion by the United States of Canada. If there was not to be war between the United States and one part of the Empire you could not have it between the United States and any other part of the Empire, for the Empire was one thing.

" What possible reason is there, then," asked Lord Cecil, " why you should not agree to complete equality in all respects with the United States ?" By equality he meant, to begin with, equality in tonnage—not necessarily every ship the same, but a general equality in tonnage. He meant also equality in guns. " If you can get that equality in tons and guns, you have no reason whatever for rejecting that as the basis of negotiations. It may be asked : " If you rule out war, why is it necessary to have an agreement at all ?" The necessity is quite clear. You cannot get an agreement for disarmament at all until you begin by having a naval agreement, and you cannot have a naval agreement without the United States. There are advantages from every point of view in getting a definite agreement beyond which each country will decline to go whatever the pressure of its own people or from outside sources may be."

When Sir Austen Chamberlain assisted in arriving at the Locarno Treaties he spoke of them not as a substitute for the League of Nations but as a bulwark, as an underpinning of the League. That was true ; that was the great recommendation of the Locarno Treaties. " If the Locarno Treaties were a bulwark of the League," said Lord Cecil, " believe me, a movement for the reduction of armaments is a far more essential bulwark (Applause). Do not think you can ever secure peace, ever hope for permanent peace, unless you can get some solution of this question. Now we see an opportunity of entering upon a negotiation with the United States—the key negotiation on this subject. If we agree it would be far easier to secure agreement from all the other countries of the world. Surely we ought to embrace this offer with enthusiasm, and with complete agreement. We ought to say at the proper moment to the United States : " We are with you. We are prepared to offer equality. We accept the basis you put forward. Let the equality be complete, extending to ships and guns alike. " I say that is a sound basis for agreement. If it could be concluded it would be a worthy sequel to the Peace Pact, and a great glory to the English-speaking countries of the world " (Prolonged applause).

RÉSOLUTIONS ADOPTÉES PAR LE CONGRÈS INTERNATIONAL DES PASTEURS ANTIMILITARISTES, DU 13 AU 15 AOUT 1928.

Le christianisme et la guerre.

Le Congrès international des pasteurs antimilitaristes, réuni à Amsterdam du 13 au 15 août 1928,

Considérant,

1. Que les principes moraux du christianisme, tels qu'ils ont été révélés dans l'Evangile de Jésus-Christ, sont en contradiction absolue avec la guerre,

2. Que la guerre, surtout la guerre moderne, bouleverse par son caractère même, toutes les valeurs chrétiennes,

3. Que l'Etat qui se prépare à la guerre et force ses ressortissants à partager son activité guerrière, déchristianise le peuple,

Adresse un urgent appel aux églises chrétiennes et les invite à considérer comme leur devoir :

I. De s'élever, dans un esprit essentiellement antimilitaire, contre le péché de la guerre et de la préparation à la guerre ;

II. De déclarer que la situation d'aumônier militaire est incompatible avec l'Evangile ;

III. De protéger le protestataire conscient qui, à ce titre, observe la pure attitude chrétienne ;

IV. De convaincre les nations qu'elles devraient désarmer sur une base nationale et que, au lieu d'encourir le risque criminel de la guerre, elles devraient accepter, confiantes dans l'aide de Dieu, le risque de paix.

La guerre et l'économie.

L'impérialisme économique a pris une place de plus en plus prédominante parmi les causes de guerre. Cette situation est absolument inévitable sous le régime du capitalisme, c'est-à-dire sous un régime qui repose sur le gain individuel. En conséquence, nous sommes persuadés que concurremment avec le mouvement pour la suppression de la guerre, il est également nécessaire de travailler en vue d'un ordre de choses où l'homme dominera le monde matériel de façon que chacun reçoive son dû.

Etant donné que les facteurs économiques, surtout en temps de guerre, échappent de plus en plus à tout contrôle, et, par suite, empêchent de plus en plus l'homme de réaliser l'idéal humain selon l'Evangile chrétien, nous devons lutter contre la guerre d'une manière tout à fait positive, pour le salut de l'humanité, que domine la Volonté de Dieu.

La guerre et le droit.

Le Congrès international des pasteurs antimilitaristes rejette l'assertion selon laquelle le désarmement militaire implique la dissolution de l'Etat et l'abandon de toute justice ; car la conséquence de la justice n'est pas la guerre mais la paix. La justice,

dans son essence, n'a pas pour objet de définir, par la loi du plus fort, ce qui doit être considéré comme légitime dans la vie sociale ; au contraire, elle essaie de plus en plus d'éviter la contrainte.

Cet objet n'a encore été atteint nulle part ; toutefois, cela ne justifie pas le maintien d'un état de guerre sans justice ni de toute la violence militariste dans la vie des nations. Dans ce cas également, un état de guerre doit être dominé par un état de justice. Ce résultat ne saurait être atteint si les nations cherchent la sécurité d'abord et ne commencent qu'ensuite à désarmer : en premier lieu, le désarmement militaire doit être risqué, car il aboutira à une sécurité plus grande que celle que pourrait jamais offrir aucun armement militaire.

En conséquence, le Congrès invite les églises chrétiennes à reconnaître et à accepter comme leur devoir sacré d'amener leurs membres à réaliser la tâche qu'ils se sont engagés à accomplir.

Le Congrès déclare que le désarmement n'est que le premier pas dans la voie qui conduit au but final de la véritable solidarité fraternelle des nations dans la Liberté et l'Amour.

La guerre et les races.

La Conférence internationale des pasteurs antimilitaristes exprime sa profonde conviction que la guerre est nécessairement une trahison des principes du Christ.

En ce qui concerne le problème des races, nous sommes convaincus que la guerre ne peut que l'aggraver infiniment et ne saurait jamais contribuer en rien à sa solution.

Reconnaissant que dans le passé les représentants de la civilisation occidentale ont fait beaucoup pour le bien des races indigènes, mais reconnaissant aussi la nécessité du repentir pour tous les maux et toutes les cruautés infligées à ces races, nous prenons et nous invitons toutes les églises chrétiennes dans le monde entier à prendre les engagements suivants :

1. Faire de la fraternité chrétienne de tous les hommes selon le Nouveau Testament la règle de notre conduite effective à l'égard des membres de toutes les races.

2. Développer de toutes les manières possibles l'application pratique de ce principe dans le domaine économique et dans les rapports politiques et inculquer cette règle à notre peuple.

3. User de notre influence auprès de nos gouvernements pour lutter contre toute domination politique et toute exploitation économique d'une race par une autre.

4. Nous efforcer d'obtenir que l'idée de dévouement et non plus le goût du lucre guide aussi bien les individus qui vivent parmi d'autres races que les gouvernements qui doivent, d'une manière quelconque, s'occuper du développement d'autres races.

5. *a*) Faire connaître à notre peuple l'histoire et les faits actuels de leurs rapports avec d'autres races ;

5. *b*) Soutenir toutes les sociétés missionnaires dans leur refus de tout appui armé, selon les principes de la Conférence de Jérusalem ;

5. *c*) Insister sur la nécessité d'une instruction complète de toutes les races indigènes.

6. Chercher à réaliser l'unité du corps du Christ en développant l'amitié chrétienne avec les églises des autres races.

MANIFESTO SUBMITTED BY MR. J. RAMSAY MACDONALD TO THE LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE, BIRMINGHAM, OCTOBER 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, october 1, 1928)

This Conference rejoices that the Governments of the world have solemnly declared in the name of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and agree that a settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be which may arise among them shall never be sought except by pacific means. It notes, however, with profound disappointment that this declaration has been made with reservations and that many of these Governments are pursuing in a pre-war spirit a policy which is preventing any progress being made towards disarmament, and assumes that the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Pact for the Outlawry of War, and the Locarno treaties have contributed nothing to the security of the world.

The Conference especially emphasises the very serious responsibility of the British Conservative Government in these respects since 1924 : —

(a) This Government destroyed the comprehensive plan for the organisation of world peace known as the Geneva Protocol and thus made it impossible to hold a disarmament conference in 1925.

(b) They weakened the significance of their signature of the Pact for the Outlawry of War by reserving at their own discretion the right to go to war in self-defence and for the defence of certain unspecified regions of the world, reservations which are incompatible with the Covenant of the League of Nations.

(c) They refused to sign any part of the General Act of Arbitration, Conciliation, and Judicial Settlement drafted and approved by the recent Assembly of the League of Nations.

(d) They created the present deadlock in the disarmament

negotiations in the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. Last year they opposed the limitation of expenditure on armaments. They opposed the limitation of the equipment of modern armies, they opposed any effective international supervision of the observance of a disarmament treaty. Their general reactionary attitude led to the resignation of Viscount Cecil, their representative on the Commission.

(e) They brought about the failure of the Three-Power Naval Conference by their reactionary demand for 70 cruisers, an increase on existing tonnage. Later came to an agreement with France that certain classes of cruisers, destroyers, and submarines should not be limited by international treaty, this to give Great Britain the cruiser programme which our Government knew to be unacceptable to the United States. The agreement has had a disastrous effect upon American public opinion. The Government of the United States refuses to accept it even as a basis of discussion.

(f) Finally, in order that negotiations may be continued outside the machinery of the League, the Government at the recent Assembly opposed an early meeting of the Preparatory Disarmament Commission, which has not met since April, 1927. Their representative, Lord Cushendun, quoted Great Britain as an example of a Power which had already undertaken a large measure of actual disarmament although the annual expenditure of his Government on armed forces is now £114.500.000. At the same time the British Delegation made a vigorous effort to reduce the Budget of the League by a few thousand pounds.

This Conference calls upon the Government to sign the General Act of Arbitration, Conciliation, and Judicial Settlement adopted by the last Assembly of the League of Nations without any reservations which would weaken the obligation to settle all disputes by pacific means. It declares that the Pact for the Outlawry of War should be honestly interpreted as renunciation of war except in so far as may be necessary to permit the enforcement of the public sanctions provided for in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

The Conference declares that the existing conditions of international security justify an immediate drastic reduction in all forms of armaments by international agreement. The Anglo-French Naval Agreement, should be at once abandoned. The Preparatory Commission for Disarmament should meet as soon as may be and continue in public session until the Draft Treaty of Disarmament is completed with a view to the early convocation of a General Disarmament Conference.

The Conference declares that an effective disarmament treaty must limit the personnel of all armed forces, including trained reserves. It must limit the number of conscripts to be called up year by year and the period of instruction. It must limit

the store of arms and munitions which individual States may hold in readiness for war. It must limit the number of heavy guns, tanks, and fighting aircraft. It must limit navies both in respect of their aggregate strength and of the various categories of ships. It must prohibit gas warfare and the use of bacteria in war. It must limit the expenditure of each State on its armed forces. It must include provisions for the international supervision of the enforcement of all those limitations and prohibitions by the League of Nations or by a wider organisation embracing also the nations not affiliated to the League. It must provide for the national and international supervision of manufacture, trade, and transport of war material and establish some form of international control of civil aviation.

The Conference calls upon the British Government to abandon their opposition to an effective treaty of disarmament and to announce that they are ready to effect an immediate all round drastic reduction of armaments as part of a plan of total disarmament by successive stages. A Labour Government on assuming office would publish any international agreement that had not been disclosed or only imperfectly disclosed, and its continuance would be subjet to a decision of the House of Commons.

Having regard to the agreement signed by President Wilson, Mr. Lloyd George, and M. Clemenceau and presented to Germany in June, 1919, to article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles and the fulfilment thereof by Germany, to the facts that Germany is a member of the League of Nations, a signatory to the Locarno treaties of 1925 and the Pact for the Outlawry of War of 1928, this Conference demands the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Rhineland.

LETTRE ADRESSEE PAR M. LE PROFESSEUR DR. LUDWIG QUIDDE AU NOM DU CARTEL DES SOCIETES ALLEMANDES DE LA PAIX AU GOUVERNEMENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE ALLEMANDE, NOVEMBRE 1928.

(Le Mouvement Pacifiste, décembre 1928)

Monsieur le Chancelier,

Je suis chargé par le Cartel des Sociétés Allemandes de la Paix d'attirer l'attention du gouvernement de la République sur le fait que le Pacte Kellogg ayant été signé à Paris le 27 août il est nécessaire que certaines dispositions de notre Constitution soient adaptées à la situation nouvelle.

Du moment que l'Allemagne, comme d'ailleurs les autres

puissances signataires, s'est engagée à renoncer à la guerre comme instrument de politique nationale, il est impossible que soit maintenu le second paragraphe de l'art. 45 de la Constitution qui dispose que « la déclaration de guerre et la conclusion de la paix sont réglées par la loi ».

Nous nous permettons de proposer que cette disposition soit remplacée par le texte suivant qui tient compte du reste des obligations qui pourraient découler pour nous des dispositions du Pacte de la Société des Nations :

1, La République allemande renonce désormais à la guerre. Les conflits d'ordre international sont réglés exclusivement par les voies amiables par conciliation, par arbitrage ou par la Cour Internationale de Justice.

2. Les droits et les obligations prévus en l'art. 16 du pacte de la S. d. N. restent intacts.

Néammoins les mesures militaires dont il est question en l'art. 16 du dit Pacte ne peuvent être prises qu'en vertu d'une loi adoptée à la majorité exigée pour la revision de la Constitution.

3. Les entreprises d'ordre militaire qui ont été ordonnées en violation des présentes dispositions, sont considérées comme crimes. Une loi spéciale déterminera les peines applicables aux personnes qui en sont responsables, et les formes de la procédure qui sera ouverte contre elles.

En même temps nous demandons que soit biffée la première phrase du second paragraphe de l'art. 133 de la Constitution qui dit : « Les obligations militaires sont réglées par la loi sur la Reichswehr, — et qu'elle soit remplacée par la disposition que voici :

« Aucun citoyen allemand ne peut être tenu à faire du service militaire ».

Pour compléter la justification de notre requête, je me permets d'attirer votre attention sur les quelques faits qui établissent que la question dont il s'agit préoccupe dans d'autres pays tout particulièrement en France, les amis de la Paix et du rapprochement des peuples, et qu'en introduisant les dispositions proposées dans la législation de l'Empire, nous accomplirons un acte d'une portée internationale.

Au cours de la session du Conseil général de l'Union des Associations pour la S. d. N. qui s'est tenue à Prague au mois d'octobre dernier, l'Association française pour la S. d. N. a fait la proposition suivante :

« Considérant.

« *a*) Que la création de la Société des Nations, avec la transformation profonde qu'elle suppose dans les relations des Etats est postérieure à la mise en application de la plupart des constitutions existantes ;

« *b*) Que le Pacte Briand-Kellog a proclamé solennellement la

condamnation de la guerre comme instrument de politique nationale ;

« Qu'il résulte de cette interdiction, pour les citoyens, un véritable *droit à la paix*, et que ce droit doit être inscrit dans le *contrat* qui lie les citoyens au gouvernement, c'est-à-dire dans la Constitution nationale ;

« Que le citoyen doit avoir légalement un recours contre le gouvernement de son pays qui commettrait le *crime* de recourir à la guerre sans avoir épuisé toutes les possibilités politiques et juridiques de résoudre un conflit éventuel par des voies pacifiques ;

« Et, réciproquement, que le gouvernement qui s'efforce loyalement d'appliquer le Pacte Kellog dans sa lettre et dans son esprit doit être armé par la Constitution contre les citoyens qui entreprendraient, par des appels à la haine, des excitations, la diffusion de fausses nouvelles ou autrement, de compromettre l'action sincèrement pacifique dudit gouvernement ;

« L'Union internationale des Associations pour la S. d. N. invite instamment les Associations nationales à agir que la législation de leur pays soit mise en accord avec le Pacte Kellogg et, d'une façon générale, avec les prescriptions de la S. d. N. »

Cette proposition a été transmise par le Conseil Général de l'Union à son Bureau. Elle va manifestement au delà de ce que nous demandons et contient des suggestions dont il y aurait lieu de tenir compte lors de la discussion de notre Code Pénal.

Le Comité-Directeur du Bureau International de la Paix, dont j'ai moi-même l'honneur de faire partie, en qualité de Vice-Président, a décidé, à l'unanimité, dans la session qu'il a tenue le 30 octobre à Paris, de demander aux Sociétés de la Paix :

« Qu'elles fassent auprès du gouvernement de leur pays une pressante démarche afin que le Pacte Kellogg soit ratifié sans retard et pour que soient abrogées les dispositions constitutionnelles et législatives qui se rapportent à la déclaration de guerre ou qui sont de toute autre manière en contradiction avec le Pacte Kellogg. »

A la même époque a siégé à Nancy l'Assemblée générale de l'Association française « La Paix par le Droit », qui a adopté les deux résolutions que voici :

I, — L'Assemblée générale de la paix par le Droit.

Considérant que le Pacte de la S. d. N. a retiré aux gouvernements des Etats-Membres toute compétence pour la conclusion de traités secrets :

Considérant de même que le Pacte Kellogg enlève aux pouvoirs publics toute compétence pour entreprendre une guerre offensive « dans un but de politique nationale » ;

Estime qu'il est nécessaire de reviser les textes des articles 8 et 9 de la loi constitutionnelle du 16 juillet 1875 dans le sens qui suit :

Article 8. — Aucune ratification de traité ne sera donnée qu'après l'assentiment des Chambres, et tout traité devra être enregistré intégralement au Secrétariat de la Société des Nations.

Article 9. — Aucune déclaration de l'état de guerre ne sera faite et aucune mobilisation ne sera ordonnée qu'avec l'assentiment des Chambres, assentiment qui ne pourra être obtenu qu'après que celles-ci auront constaté que le pays est en situation de légitime défense ou qu'il doit une assistance internationale en vertu du Pacte de la S. d. N., du Pacte de renonciation à la guerre ou de tout traité d'assistance et de garantie conclu dans le cadre de ces deux pactes.

II. — Considérant, en outre, que le citoyen a le droit d'exiger le respect de sa vie et de sa liberté dans les limites garanties par la Constitution et les lois,

L'Assemblée estime qu'il est urgent de mettre à l'étude l'organisation d'un contrôle juridictionnel, interne et international, sur les actes des pouvoirs publics, en vue d'assurer le respect des principes constitutionnels ci-dessus énoncés. Ce contrôle juridictionnel devrait pouvoir être mis en mouvement, individuellement ou collectivement, par les citoyens eux-mêmes.

Ici encore sont envisagées des mesures d'ordre national et international qui dépassent celles que nous proposons.

Toutes ces manifestations montrent l'importance que l'on attache partout aux conséquences qui découlent du Pacte Kellogg Le pays donc qui, dans ce domaine, marchera en tête, acquerra de ce fait une autorité morale et politique dont il bénéficiera. Nous estimons que, de ce point de vue encore, nos propositions méritent d'être sérieusement prises en considération.

Le Cartel des Sociétés allemandes de la paix est d'avis que la prompte ratification du Pacte et le dépôt des projets y relatifs sur le Bureau par le Gouvernement du Reich sont des formalités qui vont tellement de soi qu'il n'a pas jugé nécessaire d'en faire l'objet d'une démarche spéciale. Mais la décision du Comité Directeur du Bureau International de la Paix m'impose néanmoins le devoir de rappeler ici l'impatience avec laquelle l'opinion publique attend ces mesures d'exécution.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTEES PAR L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DE L'ASSOCIATION LA PAIX PAR LE DROIT, TENUE A NANCY LES 31 OCTOBRE ET 1 NOVEMBRE 1928.

(Le Mouvement Pacifiste, décembre 1928.)

Les aspirations traditionnelles du pacifisme et la S. D. N.

La Société des Nations a incontestablement réalisé une partie des aspirations du pacifisme d'avant-guerre ; elle les a même

dans une certaine mesure dépassées, puisqu'elle constitue depuis bientôt dix années non seulement un système général de conciliation et d'arbitrage, mais une organisation permanente, à la fois politique, juridique et administrative, embrassant plus de 50 Etats et chargée dès à présent de la gestion d'un certain nombre d'intérêts communs de l'humanité tout entière.

Il s'en faut, cependant, que cette conquête, si précieuse soit-elle, dispense les anciennes sociétés de la paix de poursuivre, ou même d'intensifier leur propagande. On peut même assurer que la création de la S. d. N. ouvre aux organisations pacifistes, dont beaucoup ont pris d'ailleurs le nom d'Associations pour la S. d. N., des perspectives d'action plus variées, plus intéressantes et plus efficaces que jamais.

La S. d. N. a besoin de la pression d'une opinion publique avertie et vigilante.

D'une part, en effet, il ne faut pas se lasser de redire que la S. d. N. n'a pas par elle-même d'activité propre et qu'elle dépend à tout instant du concours des Etats qui la constituent. Ce sont les Etats qui assurent sa vie par leurs contributions annuelles ; ce sont eux qui lui assignent les tâches qu'elle doit remplir, soit à l'Assemblée, soit au Conseil, soit dans les diverses Commissions permanentes ou temporaires ; ce sont eux enfin qui sont exclusivement en mesure de mettre en pratique les recommandations des divers organes de la S. d. N., celle-ci n'ayant ni armée internationale à sa disposition, ni même des agents d'exécution proprement dits.

Or, il n'est pas douteux que les Etats membres de la Société sont encore mal adaptés à ces modalités nouvelles de la vie internationale. Les mieux intentionnés eux-mêmes ne tiennent qu'un compte insuffisant et tardif de l'œuvre accomplie par l'organisation de Genève et ajournent indéfiniment la ratification des Conventions adoptées à Genève, tandis que d'autres poursuivent, au sein même de la Société, une œuvre silencieuse, mais obstinée, d'obstruction, pour ne pas dire de sabotage.

Ce sont ces hésitations, ce sont ces résistances, ce sont ces menaces que l'opinion publique doit s'efforcer de surmonter avec une vigilance sans défaut, par l'organe des Associations pour la paix et par la voix de leurs périodiques.

La S. d. N., qui est née d'une exigence de la conscience humaine, a besoin que celle-ci manifeste continûment énergiquement sa volonté de voir l'organisation de Genève produire son rendement maximum.

Sécurité-Désarmement.

Ce qu'on attend avant tout de la Société des Nations, c'est la consolidation de la sécurité internationale qui permettrait de réduire les armements. Déjà le Pacte de la Société apporte à cet égard de précieuses garanties, puisqu'il prévoit que « toute ques-

tion qui affecte la paix du monde » relève de la compétence de l'Assemblée ou du Conseil de la Société. Mais cette affirmation de principe risque de demeurer vaine tant que la Société des Nations n'a pas de pouvoir propre pour intervenir par elle-même contre un Etat qui se déroberait aux recommandations de prudence, aux conseils de modération que peut lui adresser la Société. L'arbitrage, tel que le préconise le Pacte, n'est encore qu'une procédure incertaine, tant que les Etats demeurent libres de n'y pas recourir ou de se refuser à l'exécution des sentences arbitrales. La sécurité ne pourra naître que d'un système d'obligations mutuelles analogue à celui qu'avait si heureusement réalisé le protocole de 1924, malheureusement demeuré lettre morte. Retour au Protocole, tel doit donc être le mot d'ordre des Sociétés pour la Paix et pour la S. d. N. Mais l'arbitrage et le Protocole eux-mêmes peuvent être dépassés et les Sociétés de la Paix doivent étudier s'il ne serait pas possible d'appliquer aux Etats un système de garanties juridictionnelles analogues à celles qui assurent entre hommes d'une nation civilisée un état de paix et de sécurité à peu près parfait. Ample matière à études scientifiques et riche thème de propagande !

D'autre part, l'opinion publique ne peut se lasser de répéter que la lenteur, pour ne pas dire la stérilité des travaux poursuivis par les divers organes de la S. d. N., en matière de réduction des armements constitue un scandale intolérable qui n'a que trop duré. Elle ne demande pas que cette réduction soit opérée à l'aveugle, hâtivement ni d'un seul coup ; elle ne perd pas de vue le besoin de sécurité qui préoccupe justement les gouvernements ; mais elle estime que, dès à présent, la sécurité a réalisé, par l'institution de la S. d. N., par les accords de Locarno et enfin, par le Pacte Kellogg-Briand, de tels progrès qu'une première étape peut et doit être enfin franchie, afin d'attester que les prescriptions de l'art. VIII du Pacte ne sont pas lettre morte.

La force au service de la S. d. N.

Si la sécurité et le désarmement progressent ainsi de pair, le jour s'approchera enfin où les Etats comprendront que leur sécurité dépend bien moins de leur propre force, toujours susceptible d'être dépassée par une autre, que de la Société des Nations elle-même, munie d'une armée de police internationale, à laquelle ils pourront remettre le soin de garantir, contre toute agression, leur intégrité et leur indépendance.

La collaboration des peuples. — L'organisation de la production, la répartition des matières premières. — La circulation des produits.

Ce n'est pas tout ; la réduction générale des armements apparaît elle-même comme le couronnnement d'une œuvre générale de rapprochement des peuples sur un double terrain, économique et moral.

Sur le terrain économique, la guerre douanière a succédé à la guerre des armes, prolongeant la misère, aggravant les antagonismes, semant des germes de conflits nouveaux. La S. d. N. a heureusement réagi. La Conférence Economique internationale de mai 1927 et le Comité économique consultatif ont dessiné de précieuses directives. Une œuvre immense d'organisation internationale de la production et de la répartition des richesses se prépare à Genève. Mais d'énergiques résistances se dessinent dans les milieux intéressés à la persistance de l'anarchie économique, et le succès ne sera assuré que si cette œuvre est connue et appuyée par une opinion informée et agissante.

Le programme d'action des pacifistes.

Mais c'est surtout dans le domaine du rapprochement moral que les organisations privées ont encore une tâche ample et difficile à remplir. La dernière guerre a accru démesurément les malentendus entre les peuples, qui se haïraient moins s'ils se connaissaient mieux. Pour créer l'atmosphère morale dans laquelle pourra prospérer la paix politique et économique, des méthodes les plus variées s'offrent aux bonnes volontés : multiplier les conférences et les articles sur les problèmes internationaux les plus actuels, échanges de conférenciers, d'étudiants, d'enfants, de correspondance, etc., de pays à pays, participation aux congrès internationaux de tout ordre, organisation d'écoles d'été ou de camps de vacances internationaux, voyages collectifs à Genève au moment de l'Assemblée de la S. d. N. ou de la Conférence du Travail, organisation de fêtes de la paix avec accompagnement de chants, de déclamations, de représentations dramatiques, de jeux rythmiques, de projections lumineuses ou de films cinématographiques, distribution de tracts, de brochures, de livres de propagande, organisation de bibliothèques circulantes ; action dans les écoles des divers degrés, lutte contre les manuels scolaires haineux ou chauvins, autant de procédures qui ont déjà fait leurs preuves et que l'initiative privée peut s'ingénier à compléter et à perfectionner.

En résumé, la S. D. N. est un cadre fragile encore, qu'il s'agit à la fois de consolider et de remplir. Jamais activité plus nécessaire ni plus passionnante s'est offerte aux volontés éprises de progrès social et de justice humaine.

SPEECHES OF MR. J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, SIR OSWALD MOSLEY, CAPTAIN BENN, LIEUT.-COMMANDER KENWORTHY, ETC., LABOUR PARTY CONFERENCE, BIRMINGHAM, OCTOBER 2 AND 5, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, october 3 and 6, 1928).

The morning session of the Labour party Conference at Birmingham to-day was devoted mainly to consideration of foreign politics. Mr. Ramsay MacDonald moved a long resolution setting forth the Labour criticism of the Government's foreign policy. The resolution called upon the Government to sign the General Act of Arbitration, Conciliation, and Judicial Settlement adopted by the last Assembly of the League of Nations without reservations, declared that the Pact for the Outlawry of War should be honestly regarded as a renunciation of war, demanded that the Anglo-French naval agreement should be at once abandoned, called upon the British Government to abandon their opposition to an effective treaty of disarmament, and demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of all foreign troops from the Rhineland.

Mr. MacDonald said that the resolution, in its full text, was a complete condemnation of the present Government's foreign policy. This condemnation fell under two heads. First of all the Government had done nothing at Geneva of any effect. Since 1924 the Government had done nothing but put obstacles in the way of an agreed peace. The other head of indictment was that since 1924 the Government had surrendered the independence of British diplomacy, that instead of laying down quite clearly what we wanted, what our ideals were, and what our conception of an arranged peace was, the Government had done nothing but make compromises with other Powers until it was difficult to understand what British diplomacy stood for in the world to-day. Locarno had been passed, Germany had entered the League of Nations, and then the Kellogg Pact had been signed, and yet to-day every time our Government discussed disarmament, it discussed it upon the assumption that we had still to prepare for war.

About eighteen months ago, when the Preparatory Commission came to a deadlock, it came to a deadlock because we, and other nations, assuming war might break out, said we could only agree to a scheme of disarmament which would leave us in an effective fighting position in relation to other nations. When the Geneva Conference met upon naval questions that conference broke down because when our admirals went to Geneva they began their conversations by saying, "Assuming war breaks out what is to be our position ?" America had certain naval needs. It needed a navy of a type that was very little use to us, and why we failed to agree was that we demanded

what suited us and America put down what suited her. The result was that no pact was signed here. Later the Kellogg Pact was signed, but hardly was the ink of that Pact, dry when delegates went back to their old assumption, the assumption that disarmament was an element in the reduction of military forces, and that when reductions in military forces were made, they were to be made in such a way that each country should remain in precisely the same relative position as before.

There was the fundamental mistake, and until that mistake was removed they would never get peace. There was a deadlock, and until some nation,and he was bound to say he would like it to be our own nation, went back again to Geneva and tried to do what Labour did to give a new outlook and a new point of view they were not going to advance beyond words in the creation of peace.

Now what was the position with regard to the Anglo-French understanding ? After the successive failures at Geneva France and ourselves came together and said, "Now look here, can't we make an agreement ?" And an agreement was made. And what was the agreement ? It was this, that we said to France, ,'We will give you everything you want", and France said to us, "We will give you everything you want". There was no disarmament, but an agreement that France's requirements in the event of war and Great Britain's requirements in the event of war would be recognised by both. The assumption was that sort of agreement made for peace, and that other nations would accept it as a contribution to European disarmament.

But things were worse than that. There was deadlock with America. To assist America to come to an agreement France and ourselves in the most innocent way sent that agreement to America, on agreement of a kind that challenged the American position and which said, "We two nations in the interests of international peace ask you to agree to this". Was ever diplomacy more stupid than this ?

The method by which this had been done had been described as secret diplomacy. It was not secret diplomacy. The generation of diplomatists who did their work in secrecy were exceedingly careful and, as a rule, able men. He saw no trace of the art and science and skill of secret diplomacy in what had been done, and in the way it had been done. "You can either have your diplomacy with your cat in the bag, well in the bag, and kept from mewing", said Mr. MacDonald, "or you can have your cat out of the bag and open to the inspection of everyone. Now it was not secret, because Sir Austen Chamberlain knew and the newspapers knew. It was not open because even to-day we have had no official statement of it. I am not going to take the report of an American newspaper as to what the agreement has been. We are going to ask that it shall be published as a White Paper

along with the Notes that were exchanged between the two Foreign Offices.

What is the present position ? The cat is not in the bag. It is not out of the bag. (Laughter). But the tail of the cat is sticking out and we must find out what is attached to the tail. (Laughter). The Government has certainly invented a new kind of diplomacy, what I could call "the tail out of the bag diplomacy".

Concluding, Mr. MacDonald said that while he was at the Foreign Office he arranged for the preparation and publication of the diplomatic documents which led up to the outbreak of the Great War. Three volumes had already been published, and although very ponderous they were very important. These volumes, he suggested, showed the danger not of tying ourselves up with secret treaties but of getting intangibly mixed up with somebody else's diplomacy. The time came when you had got to make good all that your co-operation, your understandings, and your manifestations of affection implied. Now there was no safety in going courting and walking out, changing the lady as it suited month after month and year after year. (Laughter). Safety lay in sitting at your own fireside (Laughter). Read these published papers and you found that here was the honest man saying, "There is no contract, there is no binding link". But 1914 came and he had to implement not his agreements but his winks and smiles and his indefinite walkings out. Read the Foreign Office papers from 1906 to 1914, read the reports of Geneva since 1924 and try to understand the meaning of what had been revealed of the Anglo-French understanding. What did they find ? They found the history of 1906 to 1914 rewriting itself.

We had got to orientate our foreign policy anew. It was no good for France, it was no good for us to establish any sort of alliance. It was good for France and it was good for us that we should stand shoulder to shoulder with other nations of good intent and goodwill. "If we never come into office again", said Mr. MacDonald, "if the voice of a Labour representative is never lifted again at Geneva Europe and the nations of Europe believe in peace, and to win peace they will have to go back to where we stood in 1924. It may not be in our formula. There is no formula that is permanent. It may not be in exactly the same detailed conception that we had in 1924, but they have got to go back to the same point of view, the same outlook, and they will have to follow generally the same roads as those we started on if Europe is going to have peace and you are going to create in the nations of Europe that psychological sense of security, mutual confidence, and common trust upon which alone the peace fabric is going to be built up. (Applause).

Sir Oswald Mosley seconded the motion. He said the motion contained a warning to the world and a condemnation of the

terrible work of the present Government in destroying the great heritage of peace that was bequeathed to it by the Labour Government. Sir Austen Chamberlain in one of his very early speeches made a statement which ruined all hopes of achieving peace upon the secure foundation of arbitration and disarmament. "Where the honour and interests of this country are involved" (said Sir Austen) " we will not arbitrate". What was this national honour that could not be defended in the court of the nations ? What was the national interest that was greater than the interest of preserving peace ? What was honour if it could not be defended before the tribunal of reason ? It was no true interest that had to be bought with blood.

He said advisedly that the Coolidge conference was wrecked by the British representatives, and the proof of the statement was the resignation of Viscount Cecil. It was wrecked because Britain attempted to limit the use of ships that were of service to America and would not limit the use of ships that were of service to Britain. Then came the strange history of the agreement with France, followed by America's very grave rebuke to this country.

The final stage of the tragedy had been a setback to the growing understanding between two great English-speaking peoples.

There was little worse in the record of the Government than its treatment of the League of Nations, and the final degradation came when the Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs was put up to make a miserable attempt to knock a few pounds off the League Budget. He had travelled a large part of the world since the last general election and he had heard universal tributes to the Foreign Secretary of the Labour Government, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, and he could tell the Conference that there was a longing and yearning for the return of that Government to take up its great role.

Mr. E. L. Mofschouitz (Amalgamated Union of Tailors and Garment Workers) said that nothing less than the Russian disarmament proposals should be accepted as the Labour party programme. He criticised the resolution as not being sincere in the present state of international affairs.

Captain Wedgwood Benn, who followed, described the motion as one of the most important before the conference, and one which would make an appeal far beyond the ranks of the party. Of all the shams and pretences put forward by the Conservative Government the greatest was that they had pursued a path of international pacification. Locarno, a possibility which opened the door, was itself founded on the London Conference of 1924, but the Locarno Treaty stood to-day as a naked, stark obligation which had brought us none of the alleviations it was supposed to bring.

Leaving the " limping progress of the Preparatory Commis-

sion" and turning to the Government's record outside, Captain Benn said we were faced with the remarkable fact that the incredible had happened and that the one country in the world, the United States, with whom it appeared inevitable that there should be a peace agreement was the one country to-day in which the Government's policy had dangerously exacerbated feeling. "The Government went to work to select the most stupid member of the Cabinet, a very difficult task—(laughter),—and they sent him to Geneva to discuss disarmament with the admirals. They sent the admirals in command—(laughter),—just as if you should appoint a committee of butchers to organise the observation of Lent". (Laughter). That procuded the feeling which led to the naval programme going before Congress. The good feeling of many people in the United States stunned if it did not scotch the proposal, and then the Tory Government, never weary of well-doing, hinted at the existence of the Anglo-French Pact, the immediate effect of which was to regalvanise all the demands in America for a full naval programme.

Through the offices of Mr. MacDonald we took priority of the world in peace, but in 1928 we were ignored and despised by all the peace-lovers of the world.

Commander Kenworthy said the position as seen in every Chancellery in Europe to-day was this : that the danger of war between this country and America and France and Italy was as real as was the danger of war between this country and Germany in 1906. The same process was beginning. Sir Austen Chamberlain said that war between this country and America was unthinkable. In 1906 people looked upon war between England and Germany as unthinkable.

Commander Kenworthy went on to refer to the omission from the resolution of any reference to Egypt. What was happening in Egypt ? Who knew ? The Executive must take the first opportunity of probing this matter as soon as Parliament reassembled. Were we making any effort for Egyptian entry into the League, which would solve all the great questions which divided us ?

Mr. Alexander Gossip (Furnishing Trades) asked why the resolution did not ask for the total abolition of all armaments and of all forms of conscription.

Mr. MacDonald, replying, said it was a question of handling the situation. You could pass a resolution in favour of the total abolition of armaments, but that was not the problem confronting a Foreign Secretary at Geneva. The question for him was : What are we going to do to get an agreement that everyone will agree to, a substantial stage towards disarmament ? The task was to get an agreement between ourselves and other nations which would get them into that mentality which would enable them to say as soon as possible—the sooner the better,

and (said Mr. MacDonald) we will always bring pressure to bear to make that soon at once—what is the use of arms ? Let us scrap the whole lot.

With reference to the Russian disarmament proposal, Mr. MacDonald pointed out that earlier in their consideration of the report the Conference had approved a resolution of the National Joint Council welcoming the Russian declaration, and saying that it should be used as a basis by the League of Nations. In reply to what had been said, he added that the League was not a capitalist League, it was only a capitalist League as long as capitalist Governments sent capitalist representatives. It had got no personality of its own, but was exactly what the Governments of Europe made it. When Labour representatives go to the League of Nations you can depend upon this, that Labour international ideas will thrash capitalist international ideas and make them so much ashamed of themselves that they will not voice themselves. (Cheers).

A discussion on disarmament brought the Conference to an end. Miss Mary Chesley (St. Albans) moved that the party would ask the League of Nations to call a conference of all Governments for complete disarmament, and to support a policy of immediate complete disarmament.

Major D. Leigh Aman reminded the Conference that disarmament would create economic difficulties and distress through the displacement of labour in the dockyards and munition works, and pleaded that the party in its programme should acknowledge that consideration was due to these workers and should consider turning labour thus displaced to productive work.

Mr. MacDonald, in reply, said the Executive would be ready to accept in the programme some form of words acknowledging in the sense indicated by Major Leigh Aman its responsibilities to these classes of workers. Reviewing the discussion as a whole, he said he was rather tired of hearing about the wonderful proposal of the Soviet Goverment for total disarmament. The Soviet Government did make such a proposal, and then ran away from it. The proposal was turned down by other nations, and the Soviet Government at once withdrew it, and substituted another which did not provide for total disarmament but for the reduction of forces by one half in the case of certain groups of nations. It was no good people going on talking about the Soviet Government's proposal as a proposal for total disarmament.

A Voice : It was in the beginning.

Mr. MacDonald : Of course it was, but the Soviet Government was wise enough to withdraw it because instead of helping disarmament it was increasing the difficulties of disarmament, and the Soviet Government withdrew it in such terms as to show they recognised that. Replying to other critics of the pro-

gramme, Mr. MacDonald asked if they were willing to wait until all the Governments represented at Geneva were Socialist Governments. He was not willing to wait. "We can get a disarmament policy by using the opportunities we have now got". He asked the Conference to leave the declaration in the programme as it stood. He complained that the critics wanted to tie their hands, not as to policy but as to method. He asked for permission to make it clearer than it was in the draft programme that when they talked about drastic reductions they meant that only when nations had agreed to a policy of disarmament and had disarmed was peace secured in Europe. As to disarmament by example, that was perfectly impossible. If they started such a policy it would take some years to carry it out, and the chances were that before then—on account of that policy—there would be a change of Government and the reaction would be far more serious than if the situation were handled with diplomatic care.

The amendment on disarmament was defeated, and the draft programme as amended was then agreed to.

RESOLUTIONEN ANGENOMMEN VOM EXEKUTIVKOMITEE DER WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LAEGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM. LYON, OKTOBER 1928.

Die I. Fr. Fr. Fr. dankt all den Persönlichkeiten in China, die ihre Delegierten unterstützten und durch deren Hilfe es diesen möglich wurde, so viel Wertvolles für die internationale Friedensarbeit zu sehen.

Die I. Fr. Fr. Fr. freut sich unendlich, dass die Einheit Chinas jetzt verwirklicht werden soll. Sie hofft, dass eine aufgeklärte Regierung jetzt dem chinesischen Volk bessere soziale, politische und wirtschaftliche Zustände schaffen und den Frauen Chinas volle Befreiung bringen wird.

Die I. Fr. Fr. Fr. stimmt einer Resolution der Chinesischen Industriellen-Landeskonferenz zu, wonach die Unternehmer in Ländern, wo ungünstigere Arbeitsverhältnisse vorherrschen als in ihrer Heimat, aufgefordert werden, sich bei ihren Unternehmungen nach dem besten Masstab ihrer Heimat zu richten.

Die Frauenliga stimmt allen derartigen Beschlüssen, die die geeignet sind, die öffentliche Meinung zur Notwendigkeit der Einhaltung der besten international angenommenen Arbeitsbedingungen zu erziehen, freudig zu. Sie betont insbesondere die spezielle Verantwortung der Unternehmer, die einheimische Arbeitskräfte in fremden Ländern beschäftigen und ihre Verpflichtung, diese Bestimmungen in Zukunft einzuhalten.

Das Exekutivkomitee hat die Denkschrift der Anti-Opium-Vereinigung Chinas mit grossem Interesse gelesen.

Es beabsichtigt alles zu tun, was in seiner Macht steht, um die Ziele dieses Vereins zu fördern, und schlägt vor, dass jeder Landeszweig die Erzeugung, die Verarbeitung und den legalen wie illegalen Handel mit Opium und anderen Rauschgiften studieren möge, um die öffentliche Meinung aufzurütteln und dazu zu bewegen, die Beschränkung der Opiumerzeugung auf jene Mengen, die für medizinischen und wissenschaftlichen Bedarf genügen, zu fordern.

Der Kellogg Pakt und die Abrüstung

Da wir glauben, dass der feierliche Verzicht der Staaten auf den Krieg und ihre Verpflichtung, alle Streitigkeiten nur mit friedlichen Mitteln zu lösen, die Abrüstung mit sich zieht, so sollte eine Abrüstungskampagne auf dieser Basis unternommen werden.

1. Es wurde beschlossen, dass falls die Landeszweige damit einverstanden sind, und gute Aussicht auf Erfolg besteht, zur Zeit der Abrüstungskonferenz in Genf eine grosse Abrüstungsdemonstration veranstaltet werden soll.

2. Es wurde ferner beschlossen, dass das Genfer Bureau an alle Regierungen, die den Kellogg Pakt unterschrieben haben, das Ansuchen richten soll, alle Menschen, die wegen der Verweigerung des Kriegsdientes eingesperrt sind, freizusetzen.

Das Exekutivkomitee erinnert alle Zweige an die Resolution, die es im März in Bezug auf den Kellogg Pakt gefasst hat und da es glaubt, dass nur die Stimmung der Bevölkerung den Pakt wirksam machen könne, fordert es die Zweige auf, alles, was in ihrer Macht steht zu tun, um die öffentliche Meinung nach dieser Richtung zu beeinflussen.

Das Exekutivkomitee bedauert die Vorbehalte, die gewisse Staaten vor ihrer Zustimmung zum Kellogg Pakt machten, ebenso wie die Undeutlichkeit der Vorrede und bittet die Frauen jener Länder, die Vorbehalte machten, dagegen zu protestieren und die Zurückziehung dieser Bestimmungen durchzusetzen.

Folgende Arbeiten werden vorgeschlagen:

1. Das Studium des Friedensapparates und der Möglichkeiten, Aenderungen ohne Kriege herbeizuführen. Studium der Konventionen des Völkerbundes.

2. Die Verfassung des Landes in Uebereinstimmung mit dem Pakt zur Aechtung des Krieges zu bringen und alle Bestimmungen über die Erklärung oder über die Führung eines Krieges zu eliminieren.

3. Für die Abschaffung der Kriegsministerien zu arbeiten.

4. Alle Militärbudgets zu verweigern und so die Abschaffung des Krieges durchzusetzen.

Die besetzten Gebiete.

Das Exekutivkomitee spricht die Meinung aus, dass alle besetzten Gebiete, wie Aegypten, das Rheinland, Nicaragua und Haiti sofort und ohne Verzögerung geräumt werden sollen.

Das Minoritätenproblem.

Da die Lage zahlreicher Minoritäten in Europa zu fortwährender Unruhe und zur Gefährdung des Friedens führt,

da ferner die Staaten genau so in Bezug auf die loyale Erfüllung der Pflichten von den Minoritäten abhängen, wie diese in Bezug auf die Achtung ihrer Rechte von den Staaten,

da es dringend notwendig ist, den Minoritäten in allen Staaten Gerechtigkeit und Gleichberechtigung angedeihen zu lassen,

drückt die Frauenliga den Wunsch aus, dass der Völkerbundsrat ohne Verzug das Minoritätenproblem studiert, um festzustellen, welche Erfolge das gegenwärtige System gezeigt hat und um in dieser überaus wichtigen und schweren Frage zu einer endgültigen Lösung zu gelangen.

Die Landeszweige werden gebeten, obige Resolution ihrer Regierung vorzulegen und ihr die Wichtigkeit der Durchführung vorzuhalten; besonders jene Länder, deren Regierung im Völkerbundsrat vertreten ist, werden um diese Arbeit gebeten.

DECLARATION OF POLICY ON PEACE AND DISARMAMENT, ADOPTED BY THE COUNCIL OF THE BRISTISH NATIONAL LIBERAL FEDERATION, YARMOUTH, OCTOBER 11, 1928. SPEECHES OF MRS. WALTER RUNCIMAN AND OTHER DELEGATES.

(The Manchester Guardian of October 12, 1928)

Mrs. W. Ruciman moved the adoption of the following paragraphs in the *declaration of policy*:—

The foundation of all national well-being lies in the establishment of settled peace and mutual confidence between nations. The British Empire ought always to be in the forefront of every effort for real peace, whether associated with the League of Nations or, like the recent proposals of the United States, originating outside that League It should be our aim not to act as a brake on the efforts of the League but to stimulate them. We should strive for the conclusion of complete arbitration treaties with all Powers ready to make them and should sign forthwith the Optional Clause of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

We should regain the lead which has been lost by the hesitancy and irresolution of the Government in the movement towards disarmament, both by mutual agreement and by the reduction of our own armaments to the lowest limit compatible with national safety.

The maintenance and improvement of close and friendly relations with the other members of the British Empire is one of the supreme interests of this country. In particular it is important that more effective arrangements should be made for continuous consultation on foreign affairs and defence with a view to avoiding misunderstandings such as have already arisen. Inter-Imperial migration should be more systematically encouraged, the flow of capital for the needs of the Empire should be better regulated, while steady encouragement should be given to development of institutions in the dependent régions of the Empire, and primitive peoples should be protected against unfair exploitation.

It is as a fellowship of free nations that the British Empire has held together. This and not any system of fiscal true bonds such as once led to the disruption of the Empire is the cement of our Commonwealth. A system of Imperial Preference, such as advocated by Protectionists, would dislocate the tested economic system under which this country has thriven and would impose upon our already burdened people and more particularly upon the poorer classes, a serious increase in the cost of living. It would therefore have the effect not of strengthening but weakening the Empire.

Mrs. Runciman said that the present Government did not give the impression at the last Geneva conference that they were wholeheartedly devoted to the League of Nations. They haggled over the amount spent on the League. They brought about delays. She wished they could have representing us at Geneva a body of people who were wholeheartedly in favour of the League. The Home Secretary had said we must not expect too much from the Kellog Pact because we could not alter human nature. What a creed on which to govern a great Empire ! Personally she could not understand why the Government should be so nervous about signing what was known as the Optional Clause. There was great reason to believe that if Great Britain would sign the Optional Clause it would have énormous influenee on other nations.

On the question of disarmament Mrs. Runciman said she could not believe it was impossible for us to effect some reductions in our armaments without weakening our position. It was incredible that we could not reduce the scale of expenditure which we had reached before the war. In her view the first task of a responsible Government should be to endeavour to make an all-round treaty of arbitration with the United States. Surely the English-speaking peoples should show the world

they were prepared to renounce entirely war between themselves and their kindred.

Dr. E. Leslie Burgin, who seconded the resolution, said that if France could not see her way to whitdraw her troops from the Rhineland that ought not to be an obstacle to our own country. The policy of the Liberal party was that Germany having complied with the conditions imposed upon her the troops occupying the Rhineland should be withdrawn. He thought there ought to be an improvement in the British delegation sent to Geneva. It should be a national delegation rather than the delegation of the party in power.

Birkenhead and Huddersfield had given notice of an amendment to alter the resolution to demand "an immediate and substantial reduction of our own armaments in accordance with the spirit of our undertaking in the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Locarno Pact, and the Kellogg Pact".

Mr. H. Graham Withe (Birkenhead) said those responsible for the amendment felt it essential it should go forth that the disarmament policy of this country should be no less than its oft-pledged words.

Mr. W. Mabane (Huddersfield), seconding, said if the advocate of disarmament was not prepared to say "how much", his sincerity was suspect. It was because the disarmament question was being lost in a mass of vague phrases that the world was beginning to distrust the efforts to disarm. Disarmament conferences tended to become more and more like mad hatters' tea-parties, where the dormice were aroused only to mutter " The time is not yet". The time was ripe for Liberals to give a clear lead as to reduction of armaments.

In the course of the discussion it was observed by one delegate that the Anglo-French Pact vas a return to pre-war diplomacy, and went hand in hand with the old way of thinking about armaments.

Supporting the amendment Mr. Ashley Mitchell said he looked forward in the comparatively near future to a Liberal Government, and the point of the amendment was that when a Liberal Government was in office it would be definitely committed to do certain things, so that even a Liberal Government could not get out of doing what it had been definitely pledged to do.

The amendment was carried by a large majority.

Mr. Geoffrey Le Mander, speaking on the resolution as amended, said that Tories would be delighted to take refuge behind the Union Jack, but they had made foreign politics an issue of the greatest importance at the present time. British prestige had never sunk to such a low level as it had this year. At Geneva in personnel and quality the delegation was of a very low order indeed. Its policy was described by an acute observer as "malice tempered by incompetence". He (the peaker) thought it

might be alternatively described as "suspicion tempered by cynicism". The British Government's policy appeared to him to be this : "We have carried out already most of our obligations to disarm under the Covenant. We may have to go farther. Disarmament may be desirable, but it is not vital as we have decided not to fight". There the whole issue was raised. "They don't seem to appreciate the interdependence of peace and disarmament. If you go on having armaments you are bound to get back to the old balance of power". The resolution was then formally adopted.

SPEECHES OF MR. E. L. POULTON AND MR. W. THORNE, LONDON, DECEMBER 8, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, December 11, 1928)

Speaking at a conference of trade unions on the work of the League of Nations held at Westminster on Saturday *Mr. E. L. Poulton*, a member of the Governing Body of the International Labour Organisation, emphasised the importance of the conventions governing labour conditions in various countries.

One complaint had been that Japan had been buying raw material in India, making it into the finished article in Japan, taking it back to India, and underselling Indian labour. It could easily be seen what an increasing danger there must be to labour standards in Britain unless other countries could be influenced to carry out the conventions.

He hoped that before long Russia would take her place with other nations in the work of the International Labour Office.

Referring to the Washington Hours Convention, Mr. Poulton sait that there was no legal obligation on the part of Great Britain to carry it out, but seeing that this country voted for it there was a strong moral obligation to ratify it. The British Government had given notice for a revision of the Convention, but had studiously refrained from stating what was wanted. The attitude of Britain was keeping back other countries.

Mr. Will Thorne, M. P., presided over the conference, which was organised by the London Trades Council and the League of Nations Union.

There were no political or religion barriers, he said, so far as the League of Nations was concerned, and they were allon one side in seeking to abolish war. The money spent on armaments through out the world was a wicked waste. If a plebiscite were taken of all people in alcountries there would be an overwhelming verdict against war.

No Government should have the power to make a declaration

of war, and in saying this he did not except a Labour Government. It was sometimes said that the League of Nations was a capitalist organisation and that its work was futile. There was no doubt, however, about the soundness of the structure, and its organisation could be moulded or changed as the people desired, according to the form of Government they elected.

SPEECH OF VISCOUNT LEE OF FAREHAM, LONDON NOVEMBER 22, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, November 23, 1928)

At the banquet of the Newsvendors' Benevolent Institution at the Connaught Rooms, London, *Viscount Lee of Fareham* proposed the health of the American Ambassador.

He said : Mr. Houghton is not only a faithful servant of his own country, but a clear-eyed and candid observer of the country and people to whom he is accredited, and in doing his best, as he has done since he came amongst us three years ago, to promote a better understanding between our peoples and Government, he has shown that he believes neither in ghost stories nor fairy tales. He is essentially a "realist" in the field of Anglo-American relations and a convinced observer of Theodore Rooseveet's eleventh over." We thank him for his refreshing commandment. "Thou shalt not slop abstention from postprandial "bunkum." I have not once heard him refer to "hands across the sea" or "blood is thicker than water," and I can assure him that the caustic commonsence which pervades his public utterances has never been resented or misunderstood her. On the contrary, it has made him recognised as a sincere friend and a most valuable ambassador.

He has come back to us fresh, so to speak, from the American "fount of inspiration," recharged by personal contact with the authentic views of the American elector and fortified by consultation with the powers that be in Washington. Before he speaks I hope he will not take it amiss I make some observations on the present state of Anglo-American relations as they appear to one who for 35 years has cared more about the subject than about any other in world affairs, and who has twice had the privilege of representing his country at Washington, first during the Spanish-American war and later at the disarmament conference of seven years ago.

It would be foolish to pretend that at this moment all is as well as it should be, or as it has been between England and America. For the time being the sky is overcast, and, so far as I can see, for no adequate reason. I do not wish to impute any

blame for this to any individual or Government on either side of the Atlantic. Still less do I wish to attach the Government of my own country. Why should I ? for although I no longer have any connection with politics, most of our present Ministers are old friends or colleagues of mine, and I am sure they have been doing their best. But as one who has been in Cabinets and responsible for Admiralty policy there seems to be much that is unreal and even absurd in this naval controversy which has broken out between our two countries. What is it all about if we set aside, as I trust we may, any petty considerations of national "amour propre" ?

There is no existing or likely cause for dispute between our two countries. There are no unsolved frontier questions. There are no conflicting interests (except possibly in the peaceful sphere of commerce). There is no desire to seize each other's possessions in any part of the world. There is no part of the world in which our co-operation should not be favourable to peace and in the interests of civilisation. Why, then, all this excitement over naval "parity"—a principle or a sentiment to which both countries gave their whole-hearted and emphatic disapproval in 1921, and which neither of us has ever challenged since ? Indeed, to question its validity in any way would be to dishonour our signatures at Whashington, my own amongst them, and to make us bywords amongst the nations.

What, then, is the object of this jealous and meticulous scrutiny of cruiser programmes, this controversy about tons and guns ? What reality—or advantage—can there be in such nice balancing of deadly weapons for the two great nations concerned ? Is it to prepare for the possibility of war between us with a 50—50 chance of victory for one or the other. Is this Miasma of suspicion to be the only outward and visible residue of our comradeship in arms during the Great War and of our outspoken sympathy with America in 1898 ? What poison is bemusing our brains—what "ignis fatuus" is luring us to the abyss ? Can we not dispel it by a little cool thinking and by what Mr. Coolidge calls more "reciprocity of goodwill" ?

Here may I say that I am not altogether convinced by his acceptance of the old maxim—so beloved by naval and military experts—"If you wish for peace you must prepare for war". On the contrary I am convinced, particularly after the experiences of 1914, that if you "prepare for war" you are fairly certain to get it sooner or later. However that may be, England and America are certainly not going to fight each other. There is nothing for them to fight about, and even if the folly of Governments or the perturbations of naval experts brought us to the verge of open quarrel our peoples would flatly refuse to march againts or outcher each other in order to "honour" (Heaven save the word) the criminal and catastrophic commitments of political leaders on either side of the Atlantic.

We know too well that such a war could only bring complete and irretrievable disaster to both countries and ensure the final ruin of civilisation itself.

Throughout this recent unhappy and most unnecessary controversy over the cruiser, and the so-called but miscalled "Anglo-French Pact," it must have been obvious to all the world—and that is the one redeeming feature of the whole sorry business—that the hearts and heads of the British people were sound and that the Government departments concerned were not representing either our views or our intentions. There is not and there never will be sanctioned by our people any pact, agreement, or understanding—with the French or any other Power—which could adversely affect the interests of the United States. May I go further and say : We ask nothing of America, we want no political or financial favours, nor have we any desire to interfere with her discretion in building as many cruisers as—after duly weighing all the implications of the Kellogg Pact—she may consider right and necessary. All that we do ask—and I think we have a right to expect this much—is a belief in our good faith and our "reciprocity of goodwill."

That is the overwhelming feeling here, and yet, after an almost unparralleled outburst of condemnation and indignation in the press and on every public platform, professional diplomats and experts on both sides of the Channel have shown themselves strangely incapable of promptly disengaging themselves from their inept and futile commitments. What it is difficult for the ordinary man to understand is why things should ever have come to such a pass.

At the Washington Conference in 1921-2 there was a close and complete accord—not only in theory but in practice—between the British and American plenipotentiaries. They were none of them naval experts, nor did they take their instructions from any such. It was there recognised—as it always should be recognised—that in these great matters of international relations the civil and political power is paramount, and that the expert is there only to advise on technical matters, and not to interfere in policy. It is not fair to bring them in or to seek to make them responsible. No international conference of admirals or admiralties could be expected to agree. They have, after all, no right to consider anything but naval interests and comparative tables of strength. They must, moreover, envisage all imaginable possibilities even to the extent, as the late Lord Salisbury one suggested, of fortifying the moon against a possible invasion from Mars. At the Washington Conference, on the other hand, there was achieved the greatest measure of naval disarmament that the world has ever seen, and for this the greatest credit was due to America, which not only preached but took the first and most courageous plunge.

At Geneva last summer an entirely different system was pursued. The experts and Admiralty representatives predominated at the Council table and—with the best will in the world and the most innocent intentions—they succeeded in entangling the skeins of peace and good understanding almost beyong the possibilities of any subsequent unravelling. And even now they cannot understand what it was that happened, or why they are blamed for the present intolerable position.

The reason is surely plain enough, and it has been clearly and curtly stated by President Coolidge in his speech on Armistice Day. He said :

France and England have made a tentative offer which would limit the kind of cruisers and submarines adapted to the use of the United States, but left without limit the kind adapted to their own use. The United States, of course, refused to accept this offer.

That undoubtedly crystallises in a sentence the opinion of Americans on the subject, and it would be as provocative as it would be futile to attempt to argue them out of it. Nothing is so irritating and useless as to tell another man what is good for him and what are his real needs if he does not believe you or want your advice. To ask the American people to admit officially that they do not need as many cruisers or any other vessels as the British Empire is about as profitable as it would be for them to exhort us to embrace and practice prohibition. At any rate, neither they nor we are prepared to do it.

The principle of equality of strength which was enshrined in the Washington agreements has, however, been accepted by both peoples in the broadest possible sense and without reservations. Any attempt therefore to interpret it as being conditional or dependent upon the ascertained relative "requirements" of the two countries, however fair and logical in theory, is necessarily doomed to failure and can only lead to dangerous misunderstanding in the matter of cruisers, however, arithmetical "parity" between England and America has little practical meaning. We might as well insist on parity of umbrellas as between London and California. Arithmetic is surely a poor basis for Anglo-American friendship, but if it is guide to us let it be by naval subtracton rather than addition.

The needs of each country are entirely different and in no sense antagonistic, and the more cruisers we have between us the safer will be the seas for civilisation and for all who upon their lawful occasions do their business in great waters. Indeed, I go further, and profoundly believe that whatever the relative strength of our two fleets their units would almost certainly be found alongside each other in any future world conflict co-operating in the defence of the liberties and common ideals of the English-speaking peoples.

Thirty years ago, when the German admiral at Manila Bay

steamed towards the advancing American squadron and the Spanish defending fleet, he called on Captain Chichester, commanding the British cruisers, and inquired: "What will you do if the Americans open fire ?" And the reply came promptly, "Only Admiral Dewey and myself know that." That was our naval relationship then. Why should it be any different to-day ?

There is another and more delicate aspect of the present controversy upon which I feel bound to touch because Mr. Coolidge himself hinted at it within the last few days. If he has been correctly reported (in the New York "Herald-Tribune"), he does not consider any "Franco-British" proposal for limitation of armaments as feasible under present conditions – but he "would not hesitate to hold the door completely open for any suggestion which might come from the British Government." That is a very significant distinction, and yet one which should cause no surprise to anyone who is familiar with American sentiment since the war and particularly since the Washington Conference of seven years ago.

We are close neighbours of the French, and our relations, I hope, may always be cordial. But in doing business with America England had better do it alone, unhampered by any embarrassing partnership. If we and the Americans are to have our disputes let us solve them without the assistance of any possible "tertius gaudens." England had a somewhat similar experience in 1903, when she joined hands with Germany in a perfectly legitimate attempt to bring naval pressure upon Venezuela to refrain from oppressing our respective nationals. America then objected—not because they suspected our intentions but because they distrusted the motives of Germany,—and we suffered from our association with a European Power of militaristic tendencies. It may not be a palatable act to our French neighbours, but neither they nor we shall gain anything by seeking to approach America arm-in-arm.

I am very unwilling to criticise the policy of our Foreign Office, particularly in the absence of its chief, but any idea of a preferential relationship with France or, indeed, with any Great Power in Europe is, believe me, as distasteful to our people here as it always will be detrimental to our relations with America. The truth is that we are not a European, and certainly not a Continental nation. We are neighbours only of the Continental Powers and not members of their "family." In many respects, of course, our interests are entangled with theirs and, for example, we have never tolerated the threat of military hegemony on the other side of the Channel. But our true position, as I have always conceived it, is that of an advance outpost in Europe of the English-speaking peoples, although are particular problems are complicated by the fact that only some 20 miles of sea instead of 3,000 separate our coasts and our capital from the possible perils of war. Equally,

the principal sphere of our navy is the "seven seas" rather than the narrow waters of Europe—and the main and fundamental condition of our continued existence is that we shall keep oven the sea lanes by which we move, live, and have our being.

"Parity" with America by all means-according to any intelligent and appropriate interpretation of the term. But let us discuss its application between ourselves. Mr. Coolidge has practically invited us to do so, and whilst this may not be the best moment for a fresh advance by us, I trust we shall not hesitate to respond on the first auspicious occasion.

Mr. Baldwin stated a great truth the other day, and one which is really a reproach to both nations when he said : "American statesmen do not know European statesmen, European statesmen do not know American statesmen. There is no personal intercourse." If he had said "British" instead of "European" it would have been more appropriate to the present situation, and it seems inconceivable that having recognised this truth such a state of things should be permitted to continue. Interchange of personal visits should be regarded as a cardinal duty of British and American Ministers, and the folly of long range oratorical tournaments, punctuated by the cheers or groans of the press of all countries should be abandoned now and for ever.

We English, I am sure, are glad to see Sir Austen Chamberlain extending his geographical knowledge by travelling in America. He is already quite sufficiently familiar with the Continent, and one visit to Washington at the present juncture might do more good than twenty trips to Paris or Geneva. Apart from this, America is not a member of the League of Nations, so our statesmen cannot meet there, and in any case the atmosphere of Geneva, which is too often a hot-bed of international intrigue, is not suitable for the heart-to-heart talks which are necessary between us and the United States.

This, at any rate, I firmly believe—that if this unfortunate and quite unnecessary naval controversy could be relegated to a committee of two—consisting, say, of Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Hoower, or of Lord Balfour and Mr. Hughes—which should meet either in Washington or London (unembarrassed by the pressure of naval experts) there is very little doubt that an agreement would be reached—not only "upon disarmament but even upon the vexed question of "freedom of the seas"——which would commend itself to our respective Governments and legislatures, and to the whole of the English-speaking peoples. Is it not at least worth trying ?

I now ask you to drink the health of the American Ambassador who, having flown away for a time from the British ark, has returned to us to-night bearing, I trust, a sprig of olive branch in his mouth. In short, I hope he comes back in the guise of a dove rather than an eagle

SPEECH OF PROFESSOR SALVADOR DE MADARIAGA, MANCHESTER, NOVEMBER 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian).

Señor Salvador de Madariaga, recently Director of the Disarmament Section of the League of Nations Secretariat at Geneva, and now Professor of Spanish at the University of Oxford yesterday addressed the members of the Manchester University League of Nations Society on the disarmament problem. Professor Gastner presided.

Señor de Madariaga said the problem of disarmament at first looked very simple, and the most simple-minded people, including the Russian Bolsheviks, believed it meant nothing more than just disarming. When one got closer to it one saw that it was not so simple as it looked, and that, in reality, it was quite a different problem from what it appeared to be. Armaments were wasteful and dangerous. But what would be the position if every nation got rid of them? Those nations with strong industrial, economic, and financial resources would be able easily to recreate them; those nations which had not the resources which could be immediately turned to the production of armaments would be at a disadvantage. The latter nations would really have disarmed; the others would still possess a war potential, by which he meant the capacity for rearming. To put it another way, some nations might destroy the eggs of armaments but would keep the hens. Thus the problem of security arose for solution, and the solution was to be found by pooling the war potential. To carry the argument farther, the problem to be solved was a problem of world organisation.

It might be said that it was not armaments that made war, but the fear of war that justified armaments, and that therefore we must not only do away with armaments but also with the causes of war. Well, there were as many causes of war as there were causes of quarrelling among individuals; there was no end to them. He believed the problem should be tackled by seeking what he would call the cause behind the causes of war. To do that they must consider the whole question as a world question. Things must be taken in hand by the whole world when the strains and tensions were beginning to manifest themselves and before they became too big to be handled. Thus, then, the problem of disarmament was a problem of security, and the problem of security turned out to be a problem of world organisation.

People might say "Let ust disarm". But is was not so simple even technically, as it might seem to be. How could you measure the armaments of a nation? To say a nation possessed so many ships, soldiers, guns, and so forth, would not do. If he said, for instance, that Great Britain had 100.000 soldiers, and

some small republic had 100.000 soldiers, it could not be said that the two nations were on the same plane. Armaments were not the same in quantity; they were a relative quantity. The complexity of the problem was increased when one considered the capacity of trained professional soldiers like the men of the British Army in comparison, say, with the men of Switzerland, who received about twelve days' training a year. Again, one could not compare 100 machine-guns in this country with 100 machine-guns, say, in Bulgaria, which had not the resources for maintaining and repairing such weapons. The fact was that there was no objective standard by which one could measure armaments.

Again, how could they measure the requirements of a nation ? He remembered having to compare the answers that a number of nations made to the question why they retained their armaments and why they did not reduce them. The nations gave a number of eloquent answers; all said they vere peace-loving and longed to disarm; but each said ; "I am surrounded by dangerous people." (Laughter.) They might laugh at this summarisation of the answers, but there was the fact, and it could not be banished by laughing at it. It would be a step forward to say that defensive armaments only would be permitted. But what were defensive armaments? This would all depend upon the policy which a nation pursued. If its policy were aggressive its armaments would be aggressive. If its policy were defensive its armaments would be defensive. Thus the problem, as be had shown before, was first a problem of security, then a problem of world organisation, and if the world were organised into a community to deal with the problem it would then be possible to deal with any nation that broke the common understanding.

To come to the real kernel of the problem, nations did not keep armaments to make war, but to use in case they were crossed. Nations liked to get what they could, and a little more. without war, which meant showing their armaments and saying. "If you don't concede what we want we will use them." He had noticed more than once at Geneva that nations which had strong armies and navies could afford to have stupid Foreign Secretaries (Laughter). The others could not. He did not say that all the nations with strong armaments had stupid Foreign Secretaries. His point was that if a nation had strong fighting forces it did not matter so much who was at is Foreign Office. Armaments were not so much instruments of war as instruments for carrying on that kind of war which we called peace. His conclusion, therefore, was that we could not expect real disarmament until we had evolved a realisation of the world which would no longer require armaments for its development.

The case of Russia illustrated this point. It was all very well to say that Soviet Russia was not sincere. He believed they were

sincere. But the Bolsheviks were the only people who had avolved an alternative policy requiring different instruments from armaments for its perfection and fulfilment. Their policy was to lead to a Marxist revolution every-where in the world. That did not need Russian armaments. Indeed, it would be easier for them if there were no other armaments. It was because their policy would do better without armaments that they favoured complete disarmament. Therefore their scheme was in complete logical agreement with what he had been saying.

We could not expect to have any degree of disarmament of a satisfactory kind unless we discovered an international policy for which armaments would not be necessary. What was this policy ? To replace international rivalry by international co opération ; to transform the present epoch of international anarchy into another era of international co-opération in which world problems would be treated as world problems by a world civilisation ; and to bring the whole of international life under one intelligent direction. If this were done we might expect a rapid evolution of disarmament. If it were not done it did not seem to him possible to expect disarmament.

The task, he believed, was in harmony with British genius. What had been the ousttanding features of British development? The King's peace and the common law. He could not see why what had been so helpful and so fertile in this country could not be extended to the whole world. That was why it seemed to him that the only solution for the problem of disarmament was one in which the English were privileged to be able to take the leadership. He hoped it would be so. He expected it.

SPEECH OF BISHOP CHARLES H. BRENT, CANTERBURY, NOVEMBER 25, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, November 27, 1928)

Dr. C. H. Brent, Bishop of Western, New-York, preaching in Canterbury Cathedral on Sunday, declared that the Kellogg Peace Pact should take precedence in the American Senate over everything else, and should be speedily ratified.

Mr. Baldwin's solemn injunction that the treaty would he valueless unless all the nations recognised that its signature must be honoured to the end of time should be taken to heart nowhere more than in America. The pact almost completed the formal arch of peace, but the keystone was missing, as there was no world recognition of a Supreme Court. He regretted that America recognised neither the Covenant of the League

nor the Permanent Court of International Justice, to which other nations would instinctively turn. The major portion of the task must rest on the ordinary citizen, who must recognise that God had made of one blood all nations, and learn to rejoice in the characteristics which distinguished and individualised them. This was not to deprecate but to glorify patriotism. Boatfulness was hateful, whether in the individual or the nation. If America rejoiced in the transportation of two million soldiers to France without loss, her joy should be increased by giving credit to the British Navy's safeguarding of the seas. If she congratulated herself that her armies knew no setback or defeat in her brief period of combat she must pay tribute to the nations that fought her battles for three years and prepared the way for victories readily won. If she emerged with financial resources unabated, enabling her to become the creditor nation of the world, she increased her honours by recognising the self-sacrifice of nations who bled themselves white in the common cause. Ought, he asked, America to boast that the war brought no accession of territory when she did not need it, or when extra-continental possessions were already her Achilles heel ?

"The third fundamental principle to be adopted and applied is the hardest of all-to make our larger loyalty to mankind and our lesser to our nation. For flabby internationalism I have no use. But I do believe that just as the individual lives for the family, the family for the community, the community for the nation, so the nation should live for mankind if it is to achieve its destiny. When that most tragic of all social misfortunes happens between nations, I mean misunderstanding, then is the opportunity of the citizen. He must recognise that whatever difference there may be it is a difference among friends which can be worked out happily only by an honest and dispassionate endeavour to understand. It is possible for peace to reign only among men of goodwill. Nothing breeds goodwill like understanding.

"I glory in the fact that an incomparable vision holds me in its gracious thrall. It is not so much that I possess it as that it possesses me. It is of a world in the here and now at peace and unity with itself. There is no change in the diversity which now obtains. That abides, but a unifying and illuminating spirit pervades the whole. There is one Church, binding man to God and man to man in a common life and purpose.

"Nation interlocks with nations in a unity of mutual service, and each brings its glory into the common fund. No longer hampered by war or the fear of war, undreamed-of human capacity and might are loosed and developed for the universal public good. If this vision seems so distant as to be impossible, yet it is a vision which inspires. He who now holds it with the embrace of faith and hope in his own soul already possesses the

reality, and hastens the éoming of that happy day when the affairs of this world will no longer be conducted by the whim of man, but according to the eternal purpose of God."

DISCOURS DE M. J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, PARIS, COMITE NATIONAL D'ETUDES SOCIALES ET POLITIQUES, LE 11 DECEMBRE 1928.

(Le Temps du 11 décembre 1928)

Depuis plusieurs jours la possibilité de venir vous voir à Paris est restée suspendue dans la balance. La maladie de notre souverain a éveillé dans le cœur de notre peuple une affectueuse anxiété qui est une des plus remarquables manifestations de notre époque. D'heure en heure nous avons guetté la publication des bulletins, et l'ombre qui se projetait sur le palais nous remplissait tous de sentiments d'appréhension et de crainte. Sans descendre des sereines hauteurs qu'il occupe, et sans que sa dignité eût à en souffrir, Sa Majesté était surtout, ces derniers jours, un être humain qui non seulement appelait l'hommage de notre respect, mais évoquait la sympathie populaire. Tous les gouvernants et les potentats de la terre pourraient, à juste titre, envier la place que le roi George occupe dans la pensée de toutes les classes de son peuple.

Et l'autre jour, lorsque les médecins se sont sentis en mesure de nous inviter à l'espoir, immense a été le soulagement de la nation et profondément sincère l'action de grâces qu'elle a offerte. Je suis sûr que vous ne vous méprendrez pas sur le sens de mes paroles si je vous dis que d'avoir pu venir ici aujourd'hui me cause un bonheur égal à celui que je ressens à me trouver au milieu de vous.

Je suis ici, cet après-midi, pour vous parler, non pas en qualité de politicien, mais comme un homme qui s'est efforcé à comprendre les courants de pensées et d'idéals que recouvre la surface des programmes politiques. Si, au cours de ce que j'ai à vous dire, je puis éveiller dans vos esprits le souvenir de quelques-uns de ces problèmes d'ordre pratique, particulièrement les problèmes internationaux, qui se posent aux hommes d'Etat et et dont s'occupent activement mes amis M. Briand, M. Stresemann ou sir Austen Chamberlain, croyez-moi, la dernière intention que je pourrais avoir à l'esprit serait d'intervenir en quoi que ce soit, en ce pays où je parle, ou dans un pays étranger, dans l'œuvre qu'ils sont en train d'accomplir. Ils portent un faix si lourd et ils ont à faire face à des situations si délicates qu'il siérait mal à qui que ce soit d'ajouter au poids de leur fardeau ou de rendre ces questions encore plus déli-

cates, plus épineuses encore. Si l'intérêt national oblige les hommes publics à intervenir, c'est dans leur propre pays, et de préférence devant leur propre Parlement qu'ils doivent le faire.

Je prends la parole devant un comité qui est une organisation d'études, et il me faut essayer de donner à ceux qui m'écoutent une idée de l'esprit et des perspectives d'avenir qui sont à l'heure actuelle ceux du deuxième parti politique en Grande-Bretagne. Mon expérience personnelle m'a enseigné que plus de la moitié des malentendus entre les peuples, et des reproches irrités et injustes qu'une nation adresse très souvent à une autre, proviennent du fait qu'un grand nombre de personnes ne se sont jamais entraînées, lorsqu'elles jugent les autres, à essayer de se mettre d'abord à leur place. Ce n'est pas que nous manquions d'intelligence logique et philosophique ; nous manquons d'esprit de sympathie, de pénétration et d'imagination. Un bon cœur est aussi essentiel qu'une bonne tête pour arriver à bien se comprendre. Personnellement, j'ai eu à subir plus de critiques et de jugements que la plupart des gens. Si les neuf dixièmes de ceux qui me critiquent savaient combien ils sont bêtes et me connaissent peu, certainement ils cesseraient. Il en est de même des nations et des rivalités qui règnent au sein des nations. Tant que les gens ne se sont pas compris mutuellement, ils ne se comprennent pas eux-mêmes, et leurs rapports ne peuvent reposer sur de solides fondements. C'est pourquoi j'ai accepté votre invitation, afin que vous puissiez apprendre quelque chose du parti à la tête duquel je me trouve en ce moment.

Le parti travailliste en face des problèmes d'ordre mondial a aussi une attitude qui lui est propre. La vieille politique d'isolement n'existe plus en Grande-Bretagne, elle a disparu non seulement devant le développement de l'armement moderne mais aussi devant l'extension de l'interdépendance économique et les expériences spécifiques de la dernière guerre. Une autre conception a également disparu. Le parti travailliste ne croit pas que la paix du monde puisse être assurée au moyen de l'équilibre des forces, ni par des traités bilatéraux ou des alliances sous quelque forme que ce soit. Il estime que la Société des nations doit être considérée comme une tentative de coopération dans laquelle chaque pays est enrôlé pour la recherche de la paix. On ne peut le faire que si chacun a confiance que sa cause, quelle qu'elle soit, fera l'objet d'un examen équitable et seulement lorsque, en réponse à cette confiance qu'elle ressent elle-même, cette nation à son tour traitera dans un esprit semblable la cause de toute autre nation.

Comme préliminaire de toute large politique de paix, se présente à nous la tâche de déblayer de la scène de l'Europe les derniers vestiges de la guerre. Je n'ai pas le temps de discuter ce point d'une manière détaillée, et en vérité ce n'est pas ici le

lieu de le faire, mais je puis cependant formuler une ou deux propositions générales qui indiqueront le point de vue du parti travailliste.

En premier lieu, notre parti ne donnera jamais son appui à une tentative faite par n'importe quel pays d'apporter par la force des armes des changements ou règlements établis par les traités de paix. En second lieu, il fera tout ce qu'il pourra pour accélérer la liquidation convenable des obligations temporaires imposées par le traité de paix et les assurances données avant la signature de ces traités. Il restera fidèle au principe des nationalités, et, comme les frontières politiques ne sauraient jamais marquer avec une exactitude absolue la division entre une race, une nation et une autre, il ne cessera jamais de rappeler aux Etats l'obligation qui leur incombe de traiter les minorités de telle manière que leur allégeance politique leur donne toute satisfaction.

Notre premier ministre, il y a quelque temps, a parlé du problème de la paix comme s'il dépendait de l'élimination de ce qui reste du tigre chez l'homme. Je ne suis pas d'accord avec ce sentiment. Ce n'est pas parce qu'il reste tellement du tigre dans la nature humaine que nous ne pouvons pas suivre les chemins de la paix, mais parce qu'il y a tellement de crainte dans nos cœurs et tant d'incertitude sur les conditions politiques de l'univers. Le problème de la paix est le problème de la confiance, et le problème de la confiance est le problème de la sécurité. Nous devons nous efforcer de créer un état de choses dans lequel les nations pourront avoir l'esprit à l'aise et sentir qu'elles sont protégées contre le mal. Jusqu'à présent elles ont cherché cette protection dans leurs propres armements — et elles ne l'ont jamais trouvée. Pouvons-nous les amener à éprouver ce même sentiment de protection que vous et moi nous ressentons comme citoyens de pays où règnent la loi et la justice ? La protection qu'on organise par ses propres moyens et même renforcée par une alliance, n'équivaudra jamais à une protection absolue. L'histoire ne montre que trop clairement qu'un essai particulier de protection adéquate a toujours amené la guerre, parce que les armes et les alliances nécessaires à la défense sont précisément les armes et les alliances qui inspirent aux voisins la crainte de l'agression. Moi, par exemple, je viens en France au milieu de vous en parfaite sécurité, et ma confiance ne provient pas du fait qu'individuellement je serais capable de me faire respecter, c'est-à-dire que si je rencontre un apache, je puis l'étendre à terre d'un coup de poing ou que, si je suis assailli, je puis abattre mon adversaire à coups de revolver. Si c'était de cette façon-là que je voulais assurer ma sécurité, je serais un véritable danger au milieu de vous. Mais mon sentiment de sécurité naît de l'assurance où je suis que vous êtes une communauté civilisée et que si ces attaques se produisaient, vous vous chargeriez de les régler. C'est dans la

création d'une pareille confiance, non seulement entre individus à l'intérieur des nations mais entre les nations par rapport les unes aux autres, que gît tout le problème de la paix. En 1924, à Genève, nous avons trouvé ce problème devant nous, et la Société des nations a donné une approbation générale à un projet d'instrument qui traitait cette question, et connu sous le nom de protocole. Cet instrument, dans certaines de ses stipulations et dans sa phraséologie, demande sans doute un examen très attentif, et c'est malheureusement ce qu'il n'a jamais obtenu. Depuis, différents événements se sont produits: le traité de Locarno a été signé et le pacte Kellogg a été approuvé. Ces accords ont quelque peu modifié la situation à laquelle il fallait faire face en 1924, mais nous sommes toujours à la recherche de la sécurité qui permettra aux conférences de désarmement d'arriver à des conventions, en partant de cette idée que la guerre a été rendue impossible plutôt que de la crainte qu'elle n'éclate : nous cherchons toujours des accords négociés par des diplomates représentant la vie politique de leur nation, plutôt que par des soldats et des marins qui font leur devoir en interprétant l'esprit des services combattants. Vous aurez remarqué que dans toutes les discussions qui ont eu lieu à la commission préparatoire du désarmement à la conférence navale de Genève, et dans notre tentative plus récente de trouver avec vous-mêmes un terrain d'accord, la possibilité de la guerre a été la pensée maîtresse, l'idée de derrière la tête de tous les négociateurs.

C'est une considération dont il vaut la peine de marquer l'importance. En supposant que nous abordions le problème de la paix par le seul moyen de l'arbitrage, nous trouvons aussitôt le sentiment chez une nation ou chez l'autre, même quand l'arbitrage est accepté, qu'il pût y avoir une nation qui mérite moins confiance que d'autres. Il peut surgir des mobiles ou des impulsions qui amèneront un pays quelconque à partir en guerre, et c'est cette crainte qui force les représentants des pays à ces conférences à déclarer : « Mais si on refuse le recours à l'arbitrage ou si on n'en respecte pas les décisions, qu'arrivera-t-il ? »

Ou bien considérons le pacte Kellogg. Les réserves qui y ont été apportées — non seulement par votre pays et le nôtre, mais par les Etats-Unis eux-mêmes — expriment ce même sentiment d'incertitude qui se déguise sous la forme de défense nationale. Mais on pourrait bien s'apercevoir que l'on n'a pas solidement fermé la porte qui peut livrer passage à la guerre générale.

C'est ainsi qu'au cours des discussions au sujet des accords internationaux relatifs au désarmement, les négociations ont toujours été menées en partant de cette hypothèse que la guerre défensive peut devenir nécessaire, et que le projet de désarmement qu'une nation quelconque peut accepter doit répondre à

ses besoins militaires au cas où la guerre éclaterait. La France doit faire face à ses besoins possibles au moyen de forces de terre ; pour nous, c'est la nécessité de protéger les grandes routes de l'océan. Pour les Etats-Unis, c'est l'intérêt qu'ils ont à maintenir la liberté des mers pour leur commerce en cas de guerre. Il en résulte que les différentes propositions qui ont été faites jusqu'à présent en vue d'accords sur le désarmement ont été inacceptables pour un groupe de nations ou pour un autre, parce que la stratégie militaire défensive diffère tellement suivant les cas. Si par une série de transactions on pouvait, sur ces bases, arriver à un accord, il ne réussirait pas réellement à nous rapprocher de la paix, mais il servirait plutôt à soulager les contribuables des divers pays. L'accord pourrait apporter une solution à certains problèmes qui se posent à nos ministres des finances, mais pas à ceux qu'ont à résoudre les ministres des affaires étrangères. Il ne donnerait pas ce sentiment de sécurité mutuelle dont seule peut surgir une véritable politique de paix ; il apporterait simplement aux nations l'assurance que, si une guerre devait éclater, elles la commenceraient sur un pied d'égalité vis-à-vis de leurs ennemis possibles.

De quelque manière que nous abordions le problème de la paix, nous nous trouvons tôt ou tard forcés à prendre en considération la sécurité. La recherche de la sécurité elle-même, toutefois, offre ses dangers, et il convient d'y pourvoir. Par exemple, la crainte existe qu'un accord de sécurité stéréotyperait à jamais les conditions actuelles avec leurs inégalités et leurs injustices. C'est une erreur de ce genre qui a amené la fin stérile de la Sainte-Alliance. Il y a aussi la peur qu'une nation, ayant obtenu la sécurité vis-à-vis d'autres nations, pourrait suivre une politique, qui à un moment donné, serait dangereuse pour la paix, et qu'alors elle se tourne vers les nations garantes et leur demande de se tenir à ses côtés, bien que ces autres nations pussent en toute raison lui donner tort de s'être laissé entraîner dans ces difficultés. C'est pourquoi la sécurité doit être sauvegardée d'abord et avant tout par un organisme qui sera sensible aux droits de la justice, de manière que les changements nécessaires puissent être effectués ; ensuite il faut que l'autorité internationale qui décidera si l'assistance doit être accordée ait le droit de juger à chaque étape si, en fait, les obligations qu'elle a contractées entrent réellement en jeu. Je crois que le mécanisme de la Société des nations répond entièrement à ces exigences, et tout ce dont il est besoin, c'est de lui donner la force requise pour pouvoir fonctionner de cette manière.

Ce qui est véritablement essentiel, c'est que par une entente sincère et grâce à un contact étroit, chacun de nous inspire et obtienne une foi et une confiance mutuelles. Le problème de la paix est à sa base psychologique. Il veut dire non seulement la diplomatie ouverte, mais la diplomatie parfaitement droite et

sincère : il veut dire une diplomatie qui s'acquittera de ses engagements avec un sens rigide de l'honneur. Il veut dire une diplomatie menée par des nations qui sont des coassociés indépendants au sein de la Société des nations ; libres de juger chaque cas d'espèce avec tout ce qu'il comporte, et dont la sympathie et l'appui peuvent toujours être escomptés en faveur des buts tels que la liberté démocratique vers lesquels ils marchent sans faiblir, et en raison des principes qui les inspirent.

Je pourrais rendre peut-être un peu plus claire la position prise par le parti travailliste si je vous dis de quel œil il considère la Société des nations. Il lui accorde son appui de tout son cœur et il acceptera en tout honneur et il exécutera fidèlement et effectivement toutes les obligations qui lui sont imposées par le pacte de la Ligue. Là où les stipulations du pacte sont vagues ou contiennent encore des fissures, il les amendera, parce qu'il n'a aucune intention quelconque, si une crise ou une autre se produisait, de s'abriter derrière l'excuse que sa signature fut donnée diplomatiquement à une obligation indéterminée qu'il ne lui convient pas de reconnaître. Il considère comme de la plus haute importance les contacts personnels et les amitiés que les hommes d'Etat représentant leur pays peuvent trouver dans les réunions de la Société. En même temps, il sait que les affaires internationales ne peuvent pas se traiter uniquement sur le terrain personnel, mais qu'elles doivent toujours suivre les grandes lignes de la politique nationale. La bonne volonté doit servir d'atmosphère à ces négociations, mais la raison et la justice doivent être ses influences directrices. Il considère la Société des nations comme un moyen de prévoir et d'empêcher les crimes, et il tirerait le plus grand parti possible de son conseil et de ses commissions aux fins de conciliation et d'arbitrage. Il voit dans la Société quelque chose qui se place entre une conférence politique et un corps judiciaire, ses membres constituant une cour de juges de conciliation plutôt qu'une réunion de chambres alliées. Il userait sans le moindre doute de son influence au sein de la Ligue pour appuyer les principes fondamentaux du gouvernement tels que ceux qui servent de mots d'ordre à votre pays : égalité, liberté, fraternité, ou, en d'autres termes : démocratie, régime constitutionnel et nationalité.

Toutefois, le parti ne se contente pas d'exprimer ses idéals et n'entend pas s'en remettre entièrement, pour se guider, à de platoniques déclarations. Il reconnaît les difficultés qui s'imposent immédiatement à l'attention des hommes d'Etat. Il sait qu'aujourd'hui nous avons à faire face à des problèmes de transition dont la nature délicate ne réside pas dans l'application de quoi que ce soit d'absolu, mais dans une manière qui nous permette, pacifiquement et rationnellement, d'écarter les malaises de l'heure en évitant de troubler l'esprit de l'Europe. La société est pareille à un organisme vivant qui se transforme, et

c'est pourquoi l'homme d'Etat ne doit pas être un moraliste prédicant, mais un créateur avisé dans un monde qui n'est pas encore ce qu'il voudrait, mais qu'il fait de son mieux pour le mener là où il le veut. Nos problèmes immédiats doivent donc se traiter par rapport aux circonstances actuelles aussi bien que par rapport aux rêves de perfection. En d'autres termes, le parti sait fort bien que l'homme d'Etat doit tout d'abord « créer » les conditions dans lesquelles il sera un agent libre, rationnel et moral.

C'est pourquoi le parti entretient des relations internationales aussi bien sur le terrain politique que sur le terrain industriel. Il espère autant du Bureau international du travail que du secrétariat de la Société des nations. Voilà pourquoi parallèlement à sa politique de paix, il poursuit aussi une politique internationale économique et industrielle, la coopération entre les gouvernements sur les questions de finances, de circulation de la monnaie, de marchés, de modèles, les lois sur le travail et sur l'administration. C'est pourquoi aussi il oppose ses étalons industriels et internationaux aux politiques vieillottes de tarifs nationaux.

Et c'est ainsi que ce soir je me suis offert le luxe, un peu égoïste, de considérer du dehors les bureaux de ces amis de Genève que je viens de nommer, et que pendant près d'une heure j'ai examiné objectivement l'apport que le parti travailliste doit fournir à la tranquillité domestique et au bien-être des nations, au problème de la paix, et à la façon de traiter les affaires diplomatiques. Et j'ai laissé attelés à la tâche les pauvres diplomates, qui ont à faire face, en hommes pratiques et responsables, aux questions journalières qui exigent une solution. Je vous ai traité comme si nous avions ensemble passé la soirée assis dans des fauteuils confortables au coin du feu, conversant en toute confiance, exprimant ce que nous pensons des problèmes capitaux qui retiennent, à l'heure actuelle, l'attention de l'univers et si, à la fin lorsque chacun de nous retournera sur son propre terrain d'action, il emporte la conviction sincère et l'assurance que nous reconnaissons avec sérieux et gravité l'importance considérable des choses dont nous avons parlé, notre brève rencontre n'aura pas été vaine.

SPEECHES OF FIELD MARSHALL SIR WILLIAM ROBERTSON, LORD CECIL OF CHELWOOD, PROFESSOR PHILIP BAKER, SIR HERBERT SAMUEL, PROFESSOR GILBERT MURRAY, ETC., LONDON, DECEMBER 5, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, December 6, 1928)

Field Marshal Sir William Roberston, who was making his first appearance on a League platform to-day, delivered a remarkable speech on the cost of war and its futility. "The principle of civil Ministerial control ", he said in one striking sentence, " in time of war applies equally to the control of armaments in time of peace. Naval and military considerations undoubtedly have their importance... but the question ultimately to be decided is essentially one of national policy, and that, of course, can only be laid down by the Civil Ministers of the Crown and on their own responsibility ".

Sir William Robertson introduced a discussion on the cost, burden, and danger of armaments at the opening of a two day's conference arranged by the League of Nations Union and held at the Institute of International Affairs on "Armaments and the Pact of Paris". Lord Cecil presided at the session when this subject was discussed.

"We are spending", said Lord Cecil, "something rather more than one-eighth of our total expenditure on armaments. Other nations are spending, I suppose, something approaching a similar fraction. It does seem deplorable at such a difficult time as this to sacrifice every year upwards of £100,000,000. Solely from an economic point of view it is hardly less harmful to sink those millions into the sea than to spend them on armaments.

"For all the nations to remain armed is not a measure of safety but a measure of danger. I have often thought that the comprehension of international affairs suffers because there is a kind of view that there is something extraordinarily mysterious about international affairs, and that they are governed by rules and regulations which only those highly trained can understand. I believe that is an entire delusion. International affairs are only the affairs of the nations, and the nations are individuals, and, bredly speaking, the feeling that governs nations in the end.

" It is all an inquiry into the nature of man, into his motives and actions. To allow individuals to go about armed is not to add to the general safety but to increase the danger. The same is true of nations ".

Sir William Robertson said that the problem of devising an acceptable scheme for reducing armaments was primarily a political rather than a military matter. In this country we were stilf spending on our armed forces about £116,000,000 a year, or nearly double the amount spent before the war : and although

the value of money had meantime depreciated the strength of the forces maintained had also decreased. The world would never know precisely what it had to pay for the last war. " Taking all the belligerents into account, the direct money outlay sems to have been nearly £40,000,000,000, while the indirect cost, such as destruction of property, loss of shipping, loss to agriculture and industry, decrease of birthrate, and race deterioration may be guessed at £30,000,000,000. as some £70,000,000,000 in all. The loss of life was about 10,000,000, which is double that caused by all the wars of the preceding 120 years, including the wars of the Napoleonic period. Besides the killed, there were probably not less than 20,000,000 wounded.

"The record is an appalling one, and it is intensified by the fact that 8,000,000 of the 10,000,000 deaths were caused by wounds received in action, whereas in the earlier wars by far the greater number of deaths were caused by disease ".

Expenditure on our army and navy alone added between £5,000,000 and £7,000,000 a day. During the last two years of the war we lost a million valuable lives and 8,000,000 tons of merchant shipping. In the three operations of Arras, Messines, and Paschendale in 1917 our preliminary artillery bombardment cost us over £52,000,000 while the total weight of artillery ammuintion expended in one of these operations reached the colossal total of 480,000 tons. Should another great war occur the loss of life and waste of wealth would exceed by many times the experiences of 1914-18, while the horrors which may be suffered by the civil population from air attacks, combined with the use of new chemical substances, would seem to be almost limitless.

We knew as a matter of history that with the exception of those undertaken for strictly defensive purposes, preparations for war were apt to precipitate war rather than to prevent it. Never were preparations so general, complete, and systematic as during the sixty years previous to 1914, and never were wars so frequent. Plotting and planning for the destruction or, at any rate, for the military domination of neighbouring States, was both universal and incessant. " This is not a fanciful picture, but represents what went on in many foreign countries in the years previous to 1914, as known to me when serving at Government headquarters, first at Simla and then in London. So far as land armaments were concerned. Great Britain undoubtedly made preparation than any other European Power, but the military authorities were expected, of course, as far as available means would permit and in accordance with the spirit of the time, to make ready for the 'next' war down to the proverbial ' last gaiter button". Distrust and jealousy still prevail, and the nations seem to have learnt little or nothing from the experiences of ten years ago. They still fail to see that war can never be the means of bringing lasting peace.

"Ever since 1918 the next great war has constantly been talked about as though it must necessarily come, and nothing could prevent it. France and Italy still consider the maintenance of large armies to be a national necessity. Germany also continues to keep up powerful forces. Germany is fretting at what she considers to be her defenceless position, and other Central European nations are strongly armed and are at daggers drawn. America, influenced by imperialistic tendencies, apparently means, whatever happens, to go on increasing her navy, and her official utterances on the question of armaments not infrequently bear a close resemblance to those claims that we were accustomed to hear made by Germany previous to the tragedy of 1914-1918. America may be fully entitled to take her own course without care or thought for the interests and opinions of other States, but it is nevertheless disquieting to reflect that she cannot attach much importance either to the League of Nations or to the Kellogg Pact or she would not be so anxious about her naval position.

"Progress towards disarmament must necessarily be slow because each Power has its own special strategical and political conditions and naturally asks for them to be given special consideration. We ourselves fall very definitely within this class, for our conditions have no parallel in the world. Our Empire is scattered about all over the face of the globe, its widely separated parts being conneted not by roads or railways, as in the case of most other Powers, but by the sea ; and if these sea communications were seriously interrupted the Empire might fall to pieces and Great Britain might starve. Obviously, therefore, they are as essential to our national and imperial existence as are land communications to the peoples of Europe and America, and consequently they must at all times be adequately safeguarded.

"It must not be inferred from these remarks that I regard the limitation of armaments as being solely, or even mainly, a matter for naval and military experts. About a year ago Marshal Foch was reported, with what truth I do not know, to have stated that another world war, on a vastly larger scale than the last one, would probably occur within the next fifteen or twenty years. Marshal Foch rendered invaluable service to the Allies during 1918, but he would not claim, I think, to speak with any special authority about the probability of the so-called 'next' war, for on that subject the opinion of soldiers is of no greater value than that of other people. Modern wars, involving as they do the employment of all the resources that can be made available—military naval, diplomatic, financial, industrial—are much more political in character both as to conception and execution than they used to be. Incidentally, I may observe that this radical change was recognised and acted upon by the Bristish authorities at a comparatively early period of the Great War, whereas the Central Powers more or less ignored it until late in 1918, and

thereby added greatly to their difficulties of management".

After the sentence given above, Sir William Robertson proceeded : "Finally, real progress in the limitation of armaments will not, I suggest, ever be materially assisted by mathematical calculations regarding the different classes of armament, or by the counting of heads, ships, and aeroplanes. Such comparisons are of little practical value, and lend themselves to innumerable misunderstandings and subterfuges. For example, the military effectives of one country may be more numerous than those of another, while the latter may be much more efficiently armed. Russia had millions of men on her mobilisation books in 1914, but owing to shortage of rifles, guns, and ammunition could not put more than tithe of them into the field. Or one country may be much better situated than another for raising and equipping new armies, or for building new ships and aeroplanes.

"The question calls for treatment of quite a different kind. A long and bitter experience shows that lasting peace will never be ensured either by a preponderance of force or by a balance of power, and it certainly cannot be securely established on a foundation of jalousy and hatred. Only by the infusion of a more generous, frank, and trustful spirit into the conduct of international affairs will the world be saved from dritting into another war. The assertion often heard that war has always existed and always will so long as human nature remains what it is should be rejected. The same statement was probably just as often made centuries ago when tribal warfare was the fashion, and later when England and Scotland were inveterate enemies, and it may now be regarded as being out of date to a very much wider extent.

"No doubt the object in view will take a long time to achieve, and it may be attended by many failures. But, given unfaltering faith on the part of all men of goodwill, we are surely justified in believing that eventually it will prove possible to devise some more sensible and useful way of composing international differences than the futile and disastrous policy employed in the past.

In the ensuing discussion Professor Philip Baker gave some interesting figures relating to the increased expenditure on armaments in European countries since the war. What was predicted by most people had begun to happen. At the end of the war there was a period of economic chaos, and now reviving prosperity was being drained off by increased expenditure on armaments.

The Conference was asked by Mr. R. S. Hudson, M. P., not to lose sight of the problems that would be created by disarmament. He thought it would have been better, instead of talking about the cost of armaments—he suggested that the burden of armaments was not really intolerable and as willingly borne by people who wer convinced that their security was in danger—

to concentrate upon the creation of confidence and goodwill. We should also not lose sight of the fact that a reduction of armaments would create a definite problem of unemployment.

Sir Herbert Samuel presided in the afternoon when the consequences of the pact were considered. "The signing of the pact", he said, "has been possible because of the advent of democracy, because the world is governed in the main by public opinion, and relations between peoples are no longer dependent on personal characteristics, strengths and weaknesses, Monarchs and Ministers of State, but by the trend of opinion throughout the nations, and it is always in the interests of the people to support any movement for peace. Hence it comes about that there is a new spirit abroad. War is no longer a gallant adventure, "a great game", as Napoleon called it. It is always an abomination and sometimes a crime. The masses of mankind are determined in future to controle their own destinies and are determined to control them for peace".

It was a small matter—a symbol and a gestrue,—but he suggested the time had come when we changed the name of the War Office. "Now that we have signed the Pact it is a wrong thing for a great country to retain a Department of State and a Minister of the Crown bearing a war title—incidentally, the title itself is a misnomer ". He suggested that the "Army Department" would be a much more suitable name.

Referring to possible harmful effects of the Pact, Sir Herbert said that it would be harmful if the Pact were thought in any way to be an alternative to the League of Nations. Because the Pact had been signed it must not be thought that nothing else need be done. Because the Pact was signed it must not be thought that the future was secure and that war had been abolished by general fiat and could not occur again. It was essential that there should be a completion and modification of international law with a settlement of the freedom of the seas question, and a perfection of machinery for the settlement of disputes—conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication—and, of course, disarmament.

Professor Gilbert Murray said the consequences of the Kellogg Pact were by no means assured, as they had hoped they would be some time ago. The situation was still exceedingly uncertain. Could we say from the bottom of our hearts that the signing of the Pact had really been beneficial? He looked for signs of that in vain.

"Since the signing of the Pact", said the Professor, "are relations between Germany and France better? No. Or between France and Italy? No, worse. Or between ourselves and America? It has not done the sort of thing we hoped it would.

"We must not live in a state of illusion. It is not the tiger within us we have to fight—there is hardly anyone who wants war,—but sloth, a lack of imagination and a lack of vigorous thinking. It is those things which will make us fall back upon

the old roads which led to 1914, and they still wreck our hopes of peace".

The discussion was continued by Dr. Lange, the secretary of the International Parliamentary Union, and Mr. Arnold Forster, whose argument that this country should renounce the rights of private blockade was contested by a speaker, who gave his name as Admiral Taylor, and whose speech, on behalf of Britain's right to the freedom of the seas, caused some impatience in the audience.

SPEECH OF MR. D. LLOYD GEORGE, MANCHESTER, DECEMBER 8, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, December 10, 1928)

After asking for indulgence on the ground that he was still a little husky, *Mr. Lloyd George* said that this was the inauguration of a Liberal campaign for peace, and he would like to tell them at once that he was prouder to take a lead (even a humble one) in a campaign for peace than ever he had been to lead in the campaign of war. Why, he asked, was it necessary to have a campaign for peace at all now ? He had no doubt a great many of them (he hoped all of them) had read the very remarkable speeches reported in the "Manchester Guardian" on Thursday delivered at a League of Nations meeting in London ; speeches by Field Marshal Sir William Robertson, Lord Robert Cecil, Professor Gilbert Murray, and, he thought, Professor Baker. They would give them the reason why it was necessary to have a campaign for peace. They breathed apprehension, misgiving, perplexity. They were all men of experience, each in his different way ; Sir William Robertson, with a great experience of war, Lord Robert Cecil, Professor Murray, and Professor Baker, all with a great experience in the tasks of peace. And the conclusion they had come to was one which should fill their hearts with anxiety with regard to the future.

Why should there be a danger to peace ? They had quite recent memories of a terrible war, the most terrible war this world had ever seen. Ten million dead, 20,000,000 mutilated the total cost, according to Sir William Robertson, direct and indirect, £70,000,000,000. And they wanted a campaign for peace. Had they not the Covenant of the League of Nations signed only nine years ago ? He almost preferred the French name for it : the Society of Nations. There they met and signed a solemn covenant—the representatives of all the great nations, including America—to declare that the nations were not going to lift up sword against nation again. But they did not decide to beat

their swords into ploughshares. Four years ago, he went on, there was a Locarno Pact when they all said : Let all of us guarantee ourselves against each other, and guarantee each other against ourselves, so that everybody may feel secure against everybody (Laugter). And they had banquets to celebrate that, banquets at Locarno, banquets in Paris, and several banquets in London. And the clinking of the glasses was like joy bells. Four years ago !

Then this year—this summer—they signed the Kellogg Pact, in which they outlawed war—hurled it into the bottomless pit of infamy. What more was left except to sing the Hallelujah Chorus and to go on building Jerusalem in England's green and pleasant land ? That was how it ought to be. That was how it was intended to be. But that was not how it was. Let them listen to this category, and let anyone challenge it !

Since the Covenant and since Locarno, since the Kellogg Pact, a few months ago, armaments—the machinery of slaughter—had been steadily growing. The Kellogg Pact was signed at Paris. So was the Anglo-French Pact, at the same time, the same summer. But one pact was signed in the front room, and the other in the back room. The back-room pact was the effective one. The Kellogg Pact outlawing war ; the Anglo-French Pact—unlimited cruisers, unlimited submarines (of 600 tons) for the Channel, for the trade routes of our country, unlimited submarines and cruisers, and gigantic reserves, running into millions, and an agreement that we should back up France in making it impossible for these reserves even to be mentioned in the Disarmament Commission. The Kellogg Pact in the front room ; the Anglo-French Pact in the ante-room. And the French war budget, within the last three weeks, had increased to 900,000,000 of stabilised francs.

Mr. Kellogg, Mr. Lloyd George proceeded, was a Secretary of State under President Coolidge, who had decided to postpone the passage of the Kellogg Pact until first of all he had secured his Naval Bill for the construction of 15 additional cruisers with 8-inch guns. The first great dreadnought that made the war very largely had only 6-inch guns. Fifteen new cruisers with 8-inch guns, however, must be passed throught the House of Representatives and the Senate before the Kellogg Pact for outlawing war was introduced. He trusted more in 8-inch guns than he did in his Secretary of State. "Thou shalt not kill. That was the Kellogg Pact. But they stuck their waistbands full of knives and pistols so as to be ready to kill.

This week (he continued) some had ventured to express a doubt that after the Kellogg Pact it was hardly necessary to spend tens of millions on naval bases in the Pacific. The Government said, "Who ever suggested such a thing ?" But it is going on. Our relations with Germany are worse. What are these discussions in subdued tones about our relations with the United

States ? What is all this "Hush, don't say anything, will it make things worse ?" Why should our relations be bad ? They were not bad a few years ago. In 1922 we met in Washington and set an example to the world how to disarm, not by passing resolutions but by cutting down our navies. Now we are discussing relations between the United States and this country. And then there was the interchange of Franco-Italian acrimonies. No. The Hallelujah Chorus must be put off. The wine of Locarno is already sour and there is a bad leak in the Kellogg Pact, and neither of them is being served at Tory banquets just now.

But surely there can be no danger to peace ? Well, I agree with what Professor Gilbert Murray said. We must not live in a state of illusion. We must fight sloth and lack of imagination by vigorous thinking. It was because we did not face realities before August, 1914, that we had the greatest war on earth. As things are now the nations of the world are heading straight for war ; not because anyone wants it, but because no one has the courage to stop the runaway horses in the chariots of war. What have the nations go to quarrel about ? Mankind has many times lacked bread but it has never been short of quarrels. The world is full of contentions between peoples to-day. I have watched this thing closely for years and I have been very uneasy about certain things in Europe.

The vanquished nations, he continued, were naturally sore. The territories to which they attached importance had been taken away. It would have been wiser of the conquerors to let that sore heal. They had probed deep. They had kicked it. Let them look at the story of the occupation of the Rhineland. Let them look at the eastern frontiers of Germany ; he was referring more particularly to the Silesian frontier, which was full of menace. There were the western frontiers of Russia full of danger. There was the dispute between Poland and Lithuania about the forcible annexation of Vilna against the protests of the League of Nations ; there was the question of the conquest of Galicia against the will of three-fourths of its population by Polish armies. The jealousies of the Balkan States were always with us. There were the rivalries of France and Italy, and there was the occupation of Fatherland of Germany by foreign troops with all its inevitable incidents, and there were the old racial antipathies ready to flame up again at any time under the slightest provocation, and there was every national cellar being crommed with gunpowder. Unless the nations were prepared to accept soon a possible means of settling disputes. God alone could save us from a calamity of a more terrible war than any.

It was really incredible that it should be possible. Most people had refused to believe it in 1914, and he was not ashamed to admit that he was one of those. War came not from desire but from the fear of brave men. There was nothing more terri-

ble than the fear of a brave animal ; it attacked first. There were few who wanted war, but the criminal class was not merely a low class. It was sometimes found in high places. There was only one way to pervent wars, and that was to persuade the nations to trust in the machinery of peace rather than the machinery of war.

These gigantic war preparations for defence before 1914 made war, and they would make it again. The men who called attention to these facts were denounced as mischief-makers. A person who pointed the rocks ahead in front of the ship was a wrecker. (Laughter). The men who steered at full speed towards those rocks were navigators. (Renewed laughter and cheers). Otherwise statesmen. (More laughter). France and, to a large extent, ourselves, were looking at Germany not as she was, disarmed, but at the great military autocracy, and the whole of their policy was fashioned in reference to that. They were just like man who stood at the whell to steer, looking astern. There was no real security in armaments. There was no real security even in equality. Sir William Robertson, a great experienced soldier, had pointed that out very clearly, and they had only to look at the facts of history. A brilliant general would make all the difference of several divisions and more. The battle had not always been too the strong. A great statesman and adroit diplomat made all the difference. At the beginning of the war you could not tell what the other nations were going to do. There was no security in these nice adjustments with regard to the number of guns and ships and machine-guns and troops. They must trust in the machinery of peace if they wanted peace (Cheers).

France knew that, so France said, "No, you can't trust to equality, you must therefore have overwhelming force". Yes, but that meant insecurity for everybody else, and in the long run it meant disaster for the country with the overwhelming force. (Hear, hear). In the lesson of history there was no country that had overwhelming force and abused it that did not provoke a combination that in the end pulled it down. A nation with overwhelming force postponed the day of reckoning, and that was what would happen if France trusted to overwhelming force.

He was glad to find there was a Liberal revolt in France against these great armaments. The French Liberal leader had said that out of every 100 francs raised in taxation, 57 francs went in payment of war debt and war pensions ; 24 francs went in military defence, and 55 sous went for social measures— health, provision for old-age, provision for unemployment ; one penny out of 100 francs, that was what overwhelming force meant for a country. (Cheers, and a Voice : "Where does the League of Nations come in, Mr. Lloyd George ?")

"I know", replied the Liberal leader, "but unless you get

somebody at the League of Nations who will fight for disarmament and not enter into agreements to say you are not even to allude to these great reserves, what is the good of the League of Nations ?" (Cheers.) The real conclusion, he proceeded, was to put in a Liberal Government whose first business would be to send a man to the League who would demand that our treaty obligations to reduce armaments in Europe to the level of Germany would be honourably carried out. (Loud cheers). That was why he considered the present Government a menace to peace. They put peace back. He never thought thy could establish it in the twinkling of an eye, for it took a long time to get nations, like men, out of a habit of mind. They had to be led, and perhaps led gently, but they ought to be led always in the same direction. (Hear, hear.) These men were leading them backward to the hell of war.

Look at their relations with America, he proceeded. The first thing any Government has to do is to re-establish terms of cordiality and goodwill with the United States. Without that, disarmament and arbitration is impossible. With it, it will be irresistible. There is a trained public conscience in America, especially in the middle-west, which means peace on earth and goodwill amongst men. We have alienated that. (Hear, hear). You must wipe that out, but you must wipe this Government out first. (Loud cheers). I blame this Government for manœuvring us into this attitude towards America. It is vital to the peace of the world that we should work together.

Mr. Lloyd George went on to say that the present Government had made three cardinal mistakes in their dealings with America. The first was in 1923 with the one sided settlement of the debt with America, done by Mr. Poincaré and Mr. Baldwin. One of the last things Mr. Bonar Law told him was that he was opposed to it, and that he contemplated resigning when he heard it. The relations of debtor and creditor did not conduce to goodwill, and especially if you had to go on paying for sixty years. Your heirs would certainly not appreciate it. What ought to have been done was what they proposed in 1922—namely, wipe out all these debts. If this had been done, the world could have been started afresh, and they would have done more for peace than by all the Kellogg pacts that had ever been signed. (Loud Cheers).

The second blunder was the failure of the Geneva Naval Conference. A conference that failed always left things worse. It left a sort of feeling of misunderstanding, of suspicion. They said, "What are they up to ?" We said the same thing, and this was the most fatal question that could be asked between two men, two women, two nations, or a combination of both. Then there was the Anglo-French Pact when they agreed that the cruisers and submarines which France and ourselves wanted could be built in an unlimited number, but that the kind of

cruisers that America wanted should be limited. Could they imagine anything more insane being done in a back parlour ? (Laughter).

Then there was that terrible arrangement by which we agreed that when we came to the Disarmament Commission we were not to allow the French reserves, which numbered 4,000,000, and the Italian reserves, which numbered 3,000,000 or 4,000,000 even to be mentioned. It compromised our safety to begin with-unlimited submarines on our trade routes. It compromised our good relations with America. It compromised our honour by making us go back upon the covenant we had previously signed that we would reduce our forces-naval, military, and air forces-to the lowest figure compatible with safety. Compromise was a good name fort it.

What was the next thing we had to do after securing better relations with America ? We must have strict impartiality in our relations with European Powers. He was all in favour of good relations with France—all in favour of cordial relations with France. The idea that he was anti-French was stupidity. He was the man who faced prejudices and very nearly the overthrow of the Government during the war in order to put the British army under a French Commander-in-Chief. He considered the safety of the world depended upon that at the time. He considered the safety of the world now depended upon our being rigidly, strictly impartial and fair between all nations. (Cheers).

We must restore the British reputation for fair play ; fair play to France, fair play to Germany fair play to Italy—fair play all round. What was just, what was fair, what was right, what was best for humanity was the whole question. (Cheers). God had not planted us in the sea merely in order to get entangled in warlike combinations. We had always turned an eye towards what was going on in Europe, and when we saw the oppressor gathering strength and might, using his talons to plant them in the flesh of the weak, then, Britain from its stronghold in the seas had come forth. (Cheers). Let us restore the great old traditions of Britain in that respect. What was our position now ? We were tied to the apron-strings of France. Sir Austen Chamberlain was just an elegant ditto to M. Briand. We had not been so tied to France since the days of Charles II. And that was a bad omen. The Kellogg Pact was rendered nugatory by reservations in regard to self-defence, which each nation was left to interpret for itself. If France, for instance, thought Germany was lifting up her hand, she said : "Ah, she means to hit". She said that was self-defence. Well, that rendered the Pact against war completely nugatory. We must have an impartial tribunal to judge, and not let those concerned be judges in their own cause.

Referring to the Locarno Pact, Mr. Lloyd George said it had

twice been nearly upset. The first time when Germany was refused a seat on the League of Nations, after we had agreed to give it to her, unless she also agreed to Poland having a seat. That nearly upset the whole business, and Brazil, a bigger country than Poland, retired from the League of Nations. And now we were making the evacuation of the Rhineland dependent upon what was paid by Germany in respect of reparations. He did not care what the technical interpretation was of the clause in question, or whether Sir Austen Chamberlain had lawyers to tell him that Germany was not legally in the right. He himself was a lawyer, and knew that he could never give a legal opinion which would not be contradicted by another lawyer. Lawyers had to live. (Laughter). The various courts of appeal in this country were not settling questions of fact ; they were settling differences between lawyers as to the interpretation of the statutes. That was what they were there for, and when Sir Austen Chamberlain told him that a lawyer had told him...

The rest of Mr. Lloyd George's sentence was lost in the laughter that it provoked.

Proceeding, he said that it was the real intention of the treaties that mattered, and he had no doubt at all, if they considered what happened at the time, that it was intended the moment Germany disarmed completely—the moment she gave the necessary guarantees for reparations—and she had done both —they were to clear out of the Rhineland. Sir Austen Chamberlain was a man of honour—a man of unimpeachable honour. All he asked him was that he should be as careful, as scrupulous, about the honour of this country as he would be about his own private affairs. If this were a bargain between Sir Austen Chamberlain and somebody else in business he would not now be standing upon technical interpretations. He would say at once, as a man or honour : This is what I meant, and I mean to stand upon it.

Occupation, Mr. Lloyd George insisted, was a danger—a real danger, a growing danger. There was the danger of some incident taking place that might swiftly light up the whole skies. There was the danger of fostering the Nationalist spirit in Germany. And they had a powerful leader. It was that part of Germany which had ultimately dominated the race. Don't strenghen it, don't excite it ; don't give it an opportunity of saying : "We told you not to trust these western Powers, but your own strength".

We had been dealing with a prostrate Germany. We were now dealing with a prosperous Germany. That country would not stand the same humiliations. They must not be driven to despair. Whatever the letter of the treaty might be, it was essential in the interests of peace that we should carry out what was known a the spirit of Locarno. Germany had agreed to shake hands ; let us break the handcuffs.

There was only one other question and that was the reserves. He did not believe that the importance of these had yet skun into the public mind. The peace reserve of France were said to be 650,000 or 700,000. But what matters in war, Mr. Lloyd George said, is what reserves you have that you can call to the army, and have you got rifles for them, guns for them, machine-guns for them, aeroplanes, officers. France at the present moment has about 4,000,000 reserves. She has got rifles for them all ; she has got four times the guns Germany had for her army of 1914 ; three time the machine-guns that Germany had for the army that terified Europe. She has something Germany had not got. She had between 1,200 and 1,500 tanks, and poison gas ; all for an army of four or five millions. And we have entered into an agreement with them that not only will we not attempt to cut it down, but that we will not permit discussion of the reserves in the Disarmament Commission. In these circumstances it is not a Commission but a conspiracy. (Cheers).

M. Painleve, who was a friend of his, was a very able man and a very wellmeaning man. All those men who went wrong were generally well-meaning. M. Painleve said that they must have this great army in order to back up M. Briand at the League of Nations. M. Briand was the most eloquent man in Europe and the most seductive ; but it appeared that his arguments would not carry weight except at the point of the bayonet. That was a new argument with the League of Nations. We must stand by the Treaty of Locarno and the Kellogg Pact.

Yes. But neither would be the slightest use, unless we stood by the Covenant of the League of Nations that bound us to reduce our armaments to the lowest point compatible with security. The signatories had told Germany that if she disarmed the signatories would follow. But we had not started yet. France said, "What about Italy" ? Mussolini had written that Italy would disarm to the lowest point to which any other country would go. What more did anyone want ? If Italy, England and America were prepared to reduce, then France could not help reducing. We needed a Government in this country that would agree with Italy to reduce and would then go to France. We must have an end of the system by which each nation regarded every other as a microbe preparing to attack. If we wished to ensure peace we must folow the sequence of the Hebrew prophet and first set up a judgment for the settlement of all disputes, and then break up our arms into plough-shares and pruning hooks, and finally abandon training for war, and then we should see the splendour of the prophet's vision of good will amongst men.

Mr. Lloyd George sat down amid prolonged cheering.

SPEECH OF LORD CECIL OF CHELWOOD, LONDON, DECEMBER 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, December 1928.)

Addressing a meeting of the League of Nation Parliamentary Committee at the House of Commons last night, under the chairmanship of Sir Ellis Hume-Williams, Lord Cecil of Chelwood indicated the lines on which he believed a naval agreement with the United States might still be reached.

The first step to any general disarmament agreement, he said, must be an accord between this country and the United States on naval armaments, and for his part he failed to understand why such an accord should be impossible. The United States offered or, as we sometimes put it, demanded absolute parity. In his view it was manifestly to our interest to accept that offer, or that demand, without reserve.

He was in favour of absolute complete mathematical equality, both in tons and in guns, for the question of guns was quite as important as the question of tonnage, and he believed that on that basis full agreement could still be reached. It was true that the Americans might prefer to base the agreement on total cruiser tonnage, whereas he (Lord Cecil) felt that the more classes could be subdivided the more completely equality could be ensured. But that was not an issue of sufficient importance to allow it to wreck an agreement.

It was quite probable, continued Lord Cecil, that at this juncture America might desire to raise the question of what was known as the freedom of the seas. In regard to that his own view was that acceptance of the principle of the freedom of neutrals to trade with belligerents, subject to the old rules of blockade, would on the whole be advantageous to this country rather than otherwise.

We should be prepared to come to terms on that point, provided America was prepared to join in inforcing the principles when once they were accepted. That, of course, applied only to the old form of "private" war—the attempt of one country to impose its will on another. If there were ever an "international" war against a proved aggressor there would, of course, be no neutrals, and the international authority should exercise pressure in any way it chose. If, as he believed, an agreement could be reached with the United States on this basis there was no question that Japan would fall in with it, and he would then be prepared to go some way to meet the French demand for limitation by total tonnage, provided France maintened the offer she had already made to notify in advance any chances in her naval programme to other Powers.

DECLARATIONS OF MR. D. LLOYD GEORGE, LONDON, DECEMBER 12, 1928.

(The Manchester Guardian, December 13, 1928.)

Mr. Lloyd George was the guest of American journalists in London at the Savoy Hotel yesterday.

"I am sometimes subjected to criticism which I resent," he said. "There is a gentleman named Lord Cushendun, who has been attacking me with a crude violence which is rather characteristic. He is, I understand, associated with the Foreign Office, and he has given an example of his diplomatic efforts.

"There are three methods of criticism. One is insolence, the second is fisticuffs, and the thirds is thrusting out your tongue. Lord Cushendun is an adept at all three.

"Some years ago he did something which is the only historic thing which is associated with his name. He threw a Blue-book in the House of Commons at Mr. Winston Churchill and hit him on the eye. He had no personal quarrel with Mr. Churchill, but simply disagreed with him on Irish Home Rule. That was his method of expressing emphatic dissent (Laughter.)

"I have met people who were at Geneva when Lord Cushendun was in charge there, and they were unanimous in their expression of despair when they contemplated his handling of affairs there.

"I have always favoured good relations with France, and that does not mean that we should subordinate our views on vital questions of policy to the Government, French statesmen or of backing up France even to the extent of an agonising opinion in the United States.

"The British Empire is an independent commonwealth, and we have a line of our own which it is essential British statesmen should pursue. It is to establish the peace of the world by the only three steps by which it can be achieved. First, the reference of disputes between nations to possible arbitrament ; second, all-round disarmament ; and third, to establish conditions of friendship and goodwill and complete understanding between the nations of the world."

If the United States and Britain worked together for peace they would be irresistible in their influence and example. The Anglo-French Pact was mischievous and pernicious, but the most striking fact about it was the unanimous repudiation of it by British public opinion the moment it was made public. There was no class, creed, or party prepared to defend it. The moment it was discovered that it had a point which looked like being hostile to the United States British sentiment was quite unanimous in throwing it. (Hear, hear).

The mass of the people in this country was determined to be friendly with the United States. They would not tolerate though of a serious disputes, and would make any sacrifice to avoid the horror of such a possibility.

A PROGRAMME OF PEACE, BY PROFESSOR DR. NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER.

(The Arbitrator, January 1929)

The Pact of Paris, signed August 27th, 1928, renouncing war as an instrument of national policy, marks the longest step forward since the noble movement to lift civilised nations above the barbarity and cruelty of international war began. The Pact was signed by fifteen governments and has been subsequently adhered to by nearly every stable and responsible government in the world. This means that in their international relations and in their international business none of these governments will hereafter contemplate war, talk of war, or prepare for war. From this time on war, if it comes, will be a symbol of broken faith and shattered ideals.

The Pact of Paris rests not upon the artificial agreement of governments, but upon the moral conviction and determination of self-governing peoples who bend governments to their will. Its weight and its value in fixing national ideals and in shaping national policies cannot be over-estimated.

The Pact of Paris opens wide the gate to international peace. To enter at that gate and to travel the path to peace there are several things which the responsible leaders of civilisation should quickly do. These constitute a veritable Programme of Peace. They are:

1. To substitute for Departments or Ministries of War, Navy, and Aviation a single Department or Ministry of National Defence, with sub-divisions for the Army, the Navy, and the Air Forces. The Irish Free State has already led the way in substituting a Minister of Defence for the conventional Minister of War, and in France M. Painlevé, Minister or War, has suggested that the same step be taken. The economic gain by taking this action would be considerable, the administrative gain would be still greater, and the psychological gain would be greatest of all. There is no longer room for the word war in the permanent organisation of any government signatory to the Pact of Paris or giving its adherence thereto.

2. To abolish compulsory military service and to reduce the armies of the world to police forces and skeletons of an emergency organisation, as is now the case in Great Britain, Germany,

and the United States. The last word on army organisation and use in a peace-loving democracy was spoken by Elihu Root in his five classic reports as Secretary of War, followed in like spirit by the late Viscount Haldane when Secretary of State for War in the Government of Great Britain. These statesmen have pointed the way.

3. To get rid of battleships, destroyers, submarines, and like instruments for the destruction of life and property, and to maintain navies of peace. These will doubtless consist of cruisers of an agreed number, tonnage and equipment for purposes of police and relief work, and for sea patrol. Competitive navy building is a provocative scandal.

4. To develop speedily a controlling body of international law and a code of international conduct. The more closely these follow the evolution of the common law of England, doubtless the sounder and the safer they will be, but much material is now ready to be cast in code or statutory form.

5. To strengthen the authority of the Permanent Court of International Justice at The Hague, as well as that of the Permament Court of Arbitration there, ond to build up other institutions for conciliation and arbitration, as needed, for use when the ordinary processes of diplomacy halt or fail.

6. To increase the prestige and uphold the authority of the League of Nations.

7. To move toward the quick carrying out of the plan projected by Secretary Blaine nearly half a century ago, and to bring the Governments of the American Continent into stated and formal co-operation, without dictation or overlordship on the part of any one of them.

8. To develop, in co-operation with the League of Nations or otherwise, a plan for safeguarding the peoples of the Orient and for protecting them from exploitation by any people, government, or private interest.

9. To maintain and multiply those contacts, intellectual, moral, and spiritual, which so greatly promote international sympathy and understanding, and which at the same time advance national pride and satisfaction. Science, literature, the fine arts, together with visits by representative and guiding personalities, are the most potent instruments with which to develop and to safeguard the International Mind.

All this the Pact of Paris suggests and makes possible. It is a Programme of Peace for the constructive statesmanship of today and to-morrow.

L'UNION ECONOMIQUE EUROPEENNE DANS LE CADRE DE LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS, RAPPORT PRESENTE AU XVI[e] CONGRES UNIVERSEL DE LA PAIX PAR M. DELAISI.

(Le Mouvement Pacifiste, décembre 1928)

Pendant trois siècles, les relations extérieures des peuples du Continent ont été dominées par l'idée de l'*Equilibre européen*, équilibre entre des forces militaires toujours variables, et qui ne pouvait donner qu'une paix précaire.

Aujourd'hui une notion nouvelle tend à s'y substituer : celle de l'*Equilibre économique*. C'est un problème nouveau que nos pères ne pouvaient connaître. Autrefois le paysan mangeait le blé de son champ, la ménagère filait la laine de ses moutons, l'artisan ne travaillait que sur commande ; les échanges ne dépassaient guère les limites de la province ; et les nations n'importaient guère que des produits de luxe (épices, soies, etc.) dont elles pouvaient facilement se passer. Aussi l'équilibre de la production et de la consommation se faisait en quelque sorte automatiquement.

Mais le prodigieux développement du cheval-vapeur, dans la seconde moitié du XIX[e] siècle, a changé tout cela. Aujourd'hui tous les pays industriels sont obligés d'importer du dehors une grande partie des matières premières nécessaires au travail de leurs usines, et des denrées indispensables à la nourriture des cités surpeuplées. Ils ne peuvent les payer qu'en vendant au dehors une partie de plus en plus grande de leurs produits fabriqués.

Si leurs exportations sont entravées, ils peuvent connaître à la fois le chômage et la vie chère. Pour éviter une crise intérieure, ils peuvent être tentés d'étendre leurs exportations au détriment de leurs concurrents, même par la force. Et c'est ainsi que la paix sociale et la paix extérieure sont également suspendues à l'équilibre économique des peuples.

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De cette situation, une première conclusion se dégage : il n'est plus possible aujourd'hui à une seule nation de réaliser son équilibre économique à l'intérieur de ses frontières. La *Conférence Economique Internationale* de 1927 réunie par la Société des Nations a condamné unanimement le dogme de l'*autarchie*, c'est-à-dire l'idée qu'une nation peut se suffire à elle-même.

Est-ce à dire que le problème comporte une solution universelle, la même pour tous les peuples ? Sans doute un nègre, un musulman et un chinois sont des hommes au même titre que les Européens. Mais cette vérité philosophique n'est pas une réalité économique. Car par suite de la différence des climats, ils n'ont pas les mêmes besoins. L'Européen, pour obtenir le

caoutchouc ou le thé, ou le coton qui lui sont indispensables, est obligé de recourir à la main-d'œuvre de l'indigène. Mais il ne peut la payer le plus souvent qu'avec des produits fabriqués sous un autre climat, pour d'autres besoins. L'indigène alors produit peu et irrégulièrement. Et comme l'industrie a besoin d'approvisionnements abondants et réguliers, on a recours à la contrainte, déguisée sous diverses formules fiscales ou juridiques. C'est ainsi que l'Européen a été amené, chez tous les peuples exotiques, à appuyer l'exploitation économique par la domination politique : colonies, protectorats, zones d'influence, etc... Ce système de contrainte a provoqué chez tous les peuples de couleur, sous prétexte de nationalisme, un mouvement de révolte quasi universel, qui constitue un des plus grands dangers du proche avenir.

Pour y parer, il ne suffira point de proclamer l'égalité théorique des droits entre les hommes de toutes couleurs : elle aboutira pratiquement à la suppression immédiate de la plupart des approvisionnements de l'Europe en matières premières et denrées exotiques. Il faut trouver une formule nouvelle des échanges avec l'indigène, qui les ramène à l'échange *volontaire* et également profitable aux deux parties. C'est là un problème difficile, urgent, et sur lequel il convient d'attirer l'attention des services économiques de la Société des Nations.

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Pour les Européens, cette difficulté n'existe pas. A Belgrade comme à Valence, à Kief comme à Toulouse, et même à Québec ou à Melbourne, n'importe quel paysan est disposé à échanger son blé ou son bétail contre des vêtements de drap ou des souliers de cuir et tous les autres produits utiles ou futiles de l'industrie. Et il sera le premier à souhaiter la construction d'un chemin de fer local parce qu'il sait que cela facilitera la vente de ses produits. Ici il n'est point besoin d'oppression politique pour stimuler l'échange : l'uniformité des besoins crée la condition essentielle de l'équilibre économique. Il y a donc un problème spécifiquement européen.

Comment se pose-t-il ?

Si l'on trace une ligne passant par Stockholm, Dantzig, Cracovie, Budapest, Florence, Barcelone, Bilbao, puis contournant la France et passant entre l'Irlande et l'Angleterre, pour rejoindre Bergen et Stockholm, on constate qu'elle sépare deux régions bien différentes.

A l'intérieur du cercle, se trouve une population d'environ 230 millions d'hommes, très dense (92 habitants au kilomètre carré en moyenne), abondamment munie d'usines, de chemins de fer, où la population urbaine prédomine, et où l'agriculture même est industrialisée (machines, tracteurs, engrais chimiques). C'est l'Europe du cheval-vapeur.

En dehors du cercle s'étendent de vastes régions comprenant une population aussi nombreuse (230 millions d'habitants), mais beaucoup moins dense (32 habitants au kilomètre carré), presque exclusivement agricole, où les chemins de fer et les routes sont rares, où l'outillage mécanique dans les campagnes fait presque complètement défaut, et où l'on en est encore au régime de l'énergie animale, celle de l'homme aidé du cheval ou du bœuf.

De ces deux Europes, la première n'a pas assez de denrées pour se nourrir, la seconde manque d'outillage et du plus élémentaire confort. Toutes deux sont complémentaires, et comme leur population est sensiblement égale, on pense naturellement qu'elles peuvent réaliser, à elles deux, un équilibre économique européen.

En fait, il n'en est rien.

Si l'on étudie avec soin les statistiques établies par la Société des Nations pour 1925, on constate que l'Europe du cheval-vapeur a exporté cette année-là pour 7.400 millions de dollars de marchandises.

Là-dessus l'Europe agricole n'a absorbé que 2,033 millions de dollars, soit seulement un peu plus du quart (27,5 %). En 1913, elle en absorbait encore un peu moins (26,8 %).

Cela tenait principalement au régime social qui faisait que dans toute l'Europe orientale et méridionale, le grand propriétaire se souciait rarement d'accroître le rendement de ses terres, et que le paysan, dans un état voisin du servage, n'avait aucun intérêt à le faire.

Alors l'Europe industrielle a cherché son équilibre économique dans les pays d'au delà des mers. Pendant trois quarts de siècle elle a transporté à grands frais des millions d'émigrants sur des terres où ils trouvaient sensiblement le même sol, le même climat que chez eux : au Canada, aux Etats-Unis, dans l'Argentine, au Cap, en Australie, en Nouvelle-Zélande. Mais de plus elle leur a construit des chemins de fer, des ports, fourni des machines, des outils. Et comme ils ne pouvaient payer tout cela, elle leur a livré tout cela à crédit à l'aide d'emprunts émis à Londres, Paris, Amsterdam, Francfort, etc. Le résultat, c'est que ces petites Europes d'outre-mer envoient aujourd'hui à l'Europe industrielle plus de denrées et de matières premières que la partie agricole du vieux continent. Et par voie de conséquence elles lui achètent une plus grande quantité de ses produits.

En 1925, les 140 millions de colons européens d'outre-mer en ont pris pour 2,845 millions de dollars. Cela représente une moyenne de £20,3 par tête. Alors que les 230 millions d'hommes de l'Europe agricole n'ont acheté que 2,033 millions de dollars soit seulement, £8,8 par tête.

En somme en 1925 les exportations de l'Europe industrielle ont été ainsi réparties :

38,4 % aux pays européens d'outre-mer ;
34 % aux pays exotiques, à main-d'œuvre indigène, et
27,5 % seulement à l'Europe agricole.

Ainsi l'équilibre économique de l'Europe industrielle dépend pour les trois quarts (62,4 %) des pays situés hors du vieux continent.

Mais cette situation ne peut durer.

D'abord les Etats-Unis avant la guerre étaient le pays d'outremer qui absorbait le plus d'hommes, de marchandises et de capitaux provenant de l'Europe. Aujourd'hui, par suite de son rapide développement industriel stimulé par la guerre, ils repoussent les émigrants de l'Europe agricole et écartent le plus possile les produits manufacturés de l'Europe industrielle (tarif Fordney). Bien mieux, ils sont devenus à leur tour exportateurs de marchandises et de capitaux, et ils gagnent maintenant du terrain sur tous les marchés extérieurs.

Alors que, depuis 1913, les divers pays du monde n'ont accru leurs importations que de 337 millions de dollars (en dollars 1913), les Etats-Unis ont augmenté leurs importations de 785 millions de dollars, ce qui prouve qu'ils ont enlevé pour 448 millions de dollars de commandes à leurs concurrents de l'Europe industrielle.

La Grande-Bretagne marque un recul de 160 millions de dollors (en valeur 1913), alors que du fait de la guerre, son outillage industriel s'est considérablement développé. Ce décalage a produit chez elle le chômage permanent qui est pour elle à la fois un « handicap » économique et un danger social.

Quant au continent, il a reculé bien plus encore, perdant 288 millions de dollars (valeur 1913) (environ 11 milliards de francs actuels). Si jusqu'ici il n'a pas encore été trop cruellement atteint, c'est que, grâce à la dépréciation générale de ses diverses monnaies, il a pu pendant longtemps vendre à l'extérieur au-dessous de ses prix de revient réels. Mais aujourd'hui que toutes les monnaies du continent industriel sont désormais stabilisées, cette prime à l'exportation va disparaître à mesure que les prix-or tendront à s'élever au niveau des prix mondiaux.

Alors on peut s'attendre à une grave réduction des exportations, avec chômage dans les usines, réduction des approvisionnements en denrées d'importation, et crise de vie chère.

Si le continent industriel (et aussi l'Angleterre) veulent éviter ce danger il faut à tout prix qu'ils trouvent un nouveau débouché.

Ce débouché, ils ne peuvent plus, comme avant la guerre, l'attendre des pays européens d'outremer. Car les Etats-Unis sont devenus exportateurs de produits fabriqués. A leur exemple, le Canada, l'Afrique du Sud et l'Australie développent leur industrie, et ont tendance à fermer leurs marchés.

Ils ne le trouveront pas davantage dans les pays exotiques,

où la différence des besoins ne permet pas la diffusion indéfinie des produits fabriqués de l'Europe. Au reste tous ces pays, musulmans, indiens, chinois sont en état de révolte plus ou moins ouverte contre l'Europe. Et cette tension n'est pas pour faciliter le développement des affaires.

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Pour assurer son équilibre économique et social il ne reste à l'Europe industrielle qu'un seul marché où elle puisse s'étendre, c'est l'Europe Orientale et méditerranéenne (au delà de la ligne Dantzig-Bilbao).

Cette extension est-elle possible?

Théoriquement oui! puisque des deux côtés de la ligne, ce sont des hommes de même race, ayant la même culture et les mêmes besoins.

Pratiquement oui: car il n'y a pas de raison pour que les paysans de l'Ukraine, ou de la Valachie, ou du Portugal, s'ils sont bien outillés, travaillent et produisent moins que leurs frères ou neveux émigrés sur des terres et sous des climats tout semblables au Canada, dans l'Illinois, en Argentine ou en Australie.

L'obstacle social qui pendant un siècle, les a paralysés est aujourd'hui disparu: les paysans russes, polonais, roumains, etc. ont maintenant très largement accès à la petite propriété. S'ils n'ont pas encore accru leur production. c'est uniquement parce qu'ils manquent des outils, tracteurs, et de moyens de transports qu'ils réclament avec une insistance parfois violente.

Supposons qu'on les leur procure, leur production et par conséquent leur capacité d'achat en produits industriels s'élèvera rapidement au niveau de celles de leurs frères d'outre Atlantique, soit £2o,3, au lieu de £8,8 actuellement.

De ce fait, les achats de l'Europe agricole s'élèveront pour 230 millions d'habitants à £20,3 × 230 soit. . £4, 670 millions
alors qu'ils sont actuellement de . . . . . £2, 033 millions
soit une augmentation annuelle de . . . . £2, 637 millions

Si l'on se rappelle que le total des exportations de l'Europe industrielle (Grande-Bretagne comprise) s'élève à 7.400 millions de dollars, cela représente une augmentation de commandes de 35 %.

Du coup, non seulement les usines du continent et de l'Angleterre travailleraient à plein rendement, provoquant la hausse des salaires; mais encore il faudrait faire appel sans doute aux usines américaines.

Ainsi se trouveraient résolues à la fois, la crise industrielle dans l'Europe du cheval-vapeur, et la crise agraire dans l'Europe à économie animale

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Pour atteindre ce but, quelles conditions sont nécessaires?

1° D'un côté de la ligne Dantzig-Bilbao, les usines sont toutes prêtes et n attendent que des commandes. De l'autre les hommes sont sur place et n'attendent que de l'outillage. Mais ceux-ci sont trop pauvres pour les payer, il leur faut des crédits.

Pendant trois quarts de siècle, l'épargne européenne a souscrit par dizaines de milliards les emprunts nécessaires pour équiper les 140 millions d'Européens émigrés par delà l'Atlantique. Mais aujourd'hui, ruinée en partie par l'inflation, elle ne peut plus fournir un pareil effort. Il ne reste plus guère que deux grands réservoirs de capitaux, Londres et surtout New-York. Il faut que le fleuve d'or qui, avant et pendant la guerre, a coulé régulièrement de l'Europe vers l'Amérique reflue maintenant de l'Amérique vers l'Europe.

Les capitaux anglais et surtout américains peuvent seuls financer l'équipement de l'Europe agricole. Et cela montre combien il serait insensé de concevoir une Union Economique européenne dirigée contre la Grande-Bretagne et surtout les Etats-Unis.

Au reste le reflux a déjà commencé : c'est lui qui a permis le relèvement de l'Allemagne depuis la signature du plan Dawes. Et la stabilisation générale des monnaies va lui permettre une nouvelle expansion.

2° Mais pour cela une deuxième condition est indispensable: la sécurité. Le capitaliste américain n'a pas confiance dans l'Europe : il se la représente comme un vaste *building* où les 17 Etats co-propriétaires sont en disputes continuelles à propos de « couloirs » de « corridors », et où chacun d'eux est prêt à mettre le feu à l'immeuble pour agrandir son appartement. On conçoit qu'il ait peu d'envie de souscrire les obligations d'une pareille société immobilière. Il sait que le moindre conflit en Europe amènerait l'effondrement immédiat des titres qu'il aurait souscrits.

Pour qu'une large politique d'emprunts à longue échéance puisse réussir, il faut lui donner l'assurance qu'en aucun cas la paix ne sera troublée. Le gouvernement américain l'a compris, et c'est pourquoi il vient d'obtenir des principaux gouvernements européens la déclaration solennelle qui met la guerre « hors la loi ».

Mais il importe que ce pacte Kellog soit autre chose qu'un prospectus d'émission. Il faut qu'il inspire et domine effectivement la politique des gouvernements et s'impose aux intrigues des Cabinets. Il ne sera pris au sérieux par les diplomates que dans la mesure où l'opinion européenne le leur imposera comme un impératif catégorique.

Et c'est ici qu'apparaît dans toute son importance l'action des Sociétés de la Paix. Jusqu'ici on a affecté dans certains

milieux d'hommes d'affaires et d'hommes d'Etat de les considérer comme des groupes d'utopistes à la poursuite d'un idéal chimérique. Or voici que mainteant les pouvoirs officiels, et les grandes forces de l'économie nous empruntent nos formules et nos buts et proclament même la « mise de la guerre hors la loi ».

Nous ne pouvons que nous réjouir de cette collaboration inespérée. Mais ces hommes risquent fort de rencontrer dans leurs propres milieux le scepticisme qu'ils y ont semé. Pour imposer aux peuples la confiance réciproque, peut-il être de meilleurs avocats que les hommes qui depuis toujours, de chaque côté des frontières, sans arrière-pensée de profits ou d'honneurs, ont voué leur vie à la propagande de la Paix ?

Au moment où les forces mêmes qui nous combattaient commencent de nous donner raison, au moment où nous touchons le but nous devons redoubler d'efforts. Car c'est notre effort surtout qui peut faire naître dans l'âme des masses encore frémissante de la guerre, la confiance, sans laquelle il n'est point de crédit, et partant point de reconstruction de l'Europe. C'est nous maintenant les « réalistes », les « utopistes » sont ceux qui prétendaient fonder une politique de relèvement économique sur la défiance et l'inquitude armée.

Cependant, pour faire converger tant d'efforts complexes, un organe de coordination est nécessaire.

Ce ne peut être que la Société des Nations. Là seulement peuvent se poursuivre dans une atmosphère d'entente internationale, et sous le regard de l'opinion publique, des négociations souvent délicates pour orienter les grands intérêts particuliers ou nationaux vers l'intérêt commun.

Déjà dans de nombreuses occasions (emprunts autrichien, grec, bulgare) les services financiers de la Société des Nations ont montré leur utilité et acquis une véritable autorité en matière financière.

En particulier, il convient de rendre hommage aux services d'études économiques. C'est grâce aux données statistiques qu'ils ont recueillies qu'on a pu établir les chiffres si frappants indiqués ci-dessus. Leur labeur obscur, aride mais prodigieusement utile, doit être encouragé et développé au maximum. Aucune action féconde n'est possible si elle n'est appuyée sur des informations précises. C'est parce qu'on a refusé longtemps de regarder les faits économiques sous l'angle international qui leur est propre, que tant d'erreurs dangereuses et coûteuses ont été commises. De leur étude sortira nécessairement la notion d'une communauté d'intérêts entre les peuples, première condition nécessaire d'une conscience européenne.

Sans doute de grands efforts ont été tentés pour limiter l'action de la Société des Nations sur le plan politique, et décourager les espoirs qu'elle a suscités.

Mais il est remarquable que, chaque fois qu'elle agit sur le

plan économique, les gouvernements mêmes qui refusent de la reconnaître officiellement (comme les Etats-Unis ou l'U. R. S. S.) s'associent à ses travaux.

C'est pourquoi nous ne concevons l'Union économique européenne que dans le cadre de la Société des Nations.

LE DÉSARMEMENT, PAR M. LE PROFESSEUR GEORGES SCELLE.

(Le Progrès Civique du 29 septembre 1828)

On ne saurait dire que la troisième semaine de Genève nous apporte une désillusion. Mais elle la confirme.

On savait en effet qu'il n'y avait pas grand'chose à attendre de l'Assemblée en ce qui concerne la limitation des armements. On ne pensait pas cependant que les négociations prendraient aussi mauvaise tournure.

Depuis l'abandon du protocole, la solution du problème paraît plus lointaine que jamais. Toutefois, il ne faut pas déplacer les responsabilités. La faute est imputable non pas à la Société des Nations, mais à la politique des gouvernements : à la méfiance invétérée des uns, à l'impérialisme des autres.

Il nous souvient que, lors de la Conférence de la Paix à La Haye, en 1907, la question du désarmement faillit provoquer une rupture entre les Etats participants, l'Allemagne ayant mis un veto absolu à ce que la question fût même abordée. La course aux armements engendra la guerre de 1914. Le pacte wilsonien reconnut que les armements à outrance étaient en effet une cause de guerre. On désarma les vaincus, et l'on fit de ce désarmement le prélude d'une limitation générale des armements prévue à l'article 8 du Covenant.

L'Allemagne et ses alliés ne sont pas fondés à prétendre que le désarmement leur est dû juridiquement, car l'article 8 ne prévoit qu'une limitation conventionnelle et volontaire des armements. Mais M. Briand a déclaré à la tribune de l'Assemblée, cette année, même que la méconnaissance de l'article s'entacherait l'honneur des puissances. C'est dire qu'il y a là une obligation morale indiscutable.

A notre avis, il y a plus : une question de paix ou de guerre, c'est-à-dire de vie ou de mort, pour la civilisation occidentale.

M. Briand a affirmé que la course aux armements était aujourd'hui arrêtée, sauf en ce qui concerne la Russie soviétique. Nous voudrions le croire sur parole. Mais it suffit de songer à ce qui se passe à Rome et à Washington pour se convaincre qu'il a eu une défaillance de mémoire. D'ailleurs, même si l'on se trouvait

dans un état de stabilisation de fait, la faillite du désarmement entraînerait à bref délai un nouveau rush de réarmement intensif.

On a pourtant beaucoup travaillé à Genève depuis 8 ans. Aucun problème n'y a été aussi fouillé et n'a donné lieu à la constitution d'autant de commissions. sous-commissions et organismes scientifiques, économiques et politiques. Cela a permis d'atteindre un résultat positif. On sait aujourd'hui, contrairement à l'avis jadis prépondérant des militaires, qu'une limitation des armements est techniquement possible et contrôlable. C'est quelque chose.

Malheureusement, dans cette affaire, le politique tient le technique en état. Lorsque les circonstances politiques le permettront une convention de limitation pourrra intervenir mais les circonstances politiques les permettent de moins en moins. C'est là, précisément, l'inquiétant pour la paix future.

La Conférence de Washington, en 1922, a réalisé un début de désarmement naval limité aux capitalships. Le protocole de Genève de 1924 avait été élaboré tout entier pour réaliser la sécurité par l'arbitrage et permettre une Conférence de désarmement dans le courant de l'année suivante.

Le protocole est aujourd'hui lettre morte.

Pourtant, la sécurité matérielle semble s'accroître. On a signé les pactes de Locarno ; on a signé le pacte Kellogg ; le Comité d'arbitrage et de sécurité de la S. D. N. vient de faire approuver par l'Assemblée des modèles de traités d'arbitrage et de sécurité.

Mais la sécurité n'est pas seulement une organisation matérielle et diplomatique. Elle est surtout un état psychologique. Et si les peuples sont à peu près rassurés sur le présent, ils sont inquiets de l'avenir.

M. Briand a déclaré à M. Müller que, malgré le désarmement de l'Allemagne, il craignait pour demain son « potentiel de guerre ». Les Balkans sont profondément troublés par la politique italienne. Tous les voisins de la Russie, sont inquiets. Tous les voisins de la Hongrie ont l'oreille au guet. L'Angleterre craint l'Amérique. Le Japon observe en silence les orages qui s'amoncellent sur le Pacifique.

Dans ces conditions, tout effort pour aboutir à une limitation conventionnelle des armements, se mues en combinaisons astucieuses *pour obliger le voisin à se démunir tout en ne consentant soi-même qu'à des sacrifices apparents.* Les négociations de la Commission préparatoire du désarmement ressemblent à une partie d'échecs où chacun proclame la nécessité d'un équilibre de puissance, tout en s'efforçant de faire pencher la balance à son profit.

A jouer au plus fin, jamais on n'aboutit.

*
* *

La difficulté se complique de ce qu'il est impossible de réaliser une limitation des armements équitable sans le faire à la fois sur terre, sur mer et dans les airs. L'Angleterre avait bien proposé de sérier les difficultés et de réaliser d'abord un désarmement terrestre. Elle y voyait l'avantage d'affaiblir définitivement les puissances continentales tout en gardant sa suprématie maritime.

A l'inverse, lorsqu'en 1924 les puissances navales ont tenté de réunir à Genève une Conférence à trois pour parachever l'œuvre de Washington, les puissances continentales, la France et l'Italie notamment, se sont dérobées, estimant qu'elles avaient fait déjà, à Washington, en 1922, les sacrifices suffisants. Au surplus la Conférence à trois n'aboutit qu'au plus piteux échec.

La Commission préparatoire de la S. D. N. lorsqu'elle s'est efforcée de reprendre globalement le problème, n'a pas eu plus de succès : elle n'a pu que mettre sur pied le cadre d'un projet type de convention dans lequel on a laissé en blanc les chiffres à inscrire, c'est-à-dire les engagements à prendre. Ce projet n'a pas encore eu l'honneur d'une seconde lecture.

Cette année, l'Assemblée nous assure qu'il va l'avoir. La résolution de la troisième Commission, qui vient d'être entérinée en séance plénière, affirme que la Conférence préparatoire se réunira *en tout cas* au début de 1929, mais on ne nous promet pas, et pour cause, qu'elle réussira à mettre sur pied un projet de convention.

La résolution n'a même pas pu réunir l'unanimité. L'*en tout cas* est une concession à l'Allemagne. Pourtant, le comte Bernstorff, suivi de la Hongrie, s'est abstenu en Commission. Ce n'est pas en effet une réunion de la Commission préparatoire que réclame le gouvernement allemand, mais une réunion de la *Conférence*.

La délégation française, par la voix de Paul-Boncour, qui, les années précédentes, réclamait elle aussi la réunion d'une Conférence dans l'espoir d'aboutir tout au moins à une stabilisation du niveau actuel des armements a dû faire machine en arrière, car elle a conscience que cette Conférence serait un échec.

M. Loudon, le distingné ministre des Pays-Bas, président de la Commission préparatoire, dont l'objectivité en la matière n'est pas douteuse car la politique des Pays-Bas est très résolument favorable à un désarmement rapide, ne croit pas même à la possibilité d'un succès de la Commission préporatoire. Il a fait une proposition tendant à réunir au préalable les délégués des grandes puissances sans l'accord desquelles aucun résultat n'est possible. Or, cette suggestion a été froidement accueillie.

On conçoit très bien que l'Allemagne envisage sans angoisse l'échec vraisemblable de la Conférence du désarmement. De

l'impossibilité de faire jouer l'article 8 du pacte, elle tirerait incontinent la conclusion que le désarmement général étant impossible, elle ne peut rester désarmée au milieu de voisins armés. Mais les puissances, qui tiennent à ce que la Conférence réussisse et redoutent le découragement définitif de l'opinion, ont fait la dernière concession possible en se bornant à promettre une nouvelle session de la Commission préparatoire, c'est-à-dire une simple tentative.

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La cause fondamentale de cet état de choses est, pour le moment, imputable aux Etats-Unis.

Ils ont sur le cœur l'échec de la Conférence à trois ; mais cet échec est dû en grande partie à leur politique impérialiste. En refusant à l'Angleterre, qui en a un urgent besoin, les petits croiseurs et la marine auxiliaire nécessaires à protéger ses colonies, son domaine impérial et ses immenses communications, ils la menacent en réalité dans sa sécurité. En réclamant vis-à-vis d'elle une égalité absolue dans le chiffre des unités, leur armement et leur rayon d'action, ce qu'ils exigent en fait c'est la supériorité incontestable. Inexpugnable dans leur continent, ils visent la suprématie définitive. Leur programme naval est formidable.

On s'en est aisément aperçu à l'accueil qui a été fait par Washington à l'accord naval franco-anglais. Pour faciliter la reprise des négociations de désarmement, la France a consenti à abandonner son principe de la liberté de construction des types d'unités à l'intérieur du tonnage global qui lui serait réservé. Elle admet la limitation des grands croiseurs et des sous-marins à long rayon d'action. Elle ne réclame plus la liberté qu'en ce qui concerne les petits croiseurs nécessaires à la défense des communications et des colonies et des petits sous-marins de 600 tonnes, armes purement défensives, Sur cette base, elle a pu réaliser son accord avec l'Angleterre en lui laissant la supériorité des grosses unités et toute latitude en ce qui concerne les petits croiseurs et la marine auxiliaire.

C'en est assez pour que les Etats-Unis en aient conclu à une sorte de collusion entre Paris et Londres destinée à faire échec à leurs plans et à les obliger à accepter le point de vue anglais en ce qui concerne les petites unités. Jamais effort de bonne volonté n'a été accueilli par une telle suspicion. L'impression est décourageante, car il n'est pas douteux que le gouvernement français a dû faire pression sur l'état-major naval pour arriver à cette entente qui devait faciliter la reprise du travail de désarmement.

Mais dans ce domaine, comme dans beaucoup d'autres, hélas ! les Etats-Unis « invisibles et présents » disposent de la réussite ou de l'échec des efforts que l'on fait à Genève. C'est en vain

que l'Assemblée a attendu la réponse de Washington au sujet de l'accord franco-anglais. S'il est actuellement impossible de songer à des réalisations effectives, c'est qu'on exige à Washington que, jusqu'en 1931, rien ne soit modifié aux accords de 1922, et que la Maison Blanche se réserve de convoquer une nouvelle Conférence chargée d'enregistrer l'hégémonie américaine.

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Et pourtant l'opinion s'émeut.

Le président de l'Assemblée a reçu, au début du mois, une délégation de l'Union des Associations pour la Société des Nations. Cette semaine, il a reçu le Comité international de coordination des forces pacifistes conduit par le président du Bureau International de la Paix, le sénateur Fontaine. Les deux délégations ont insisté avec énergie sur la nécessité d'aboutir en matière de désarmement. Le président Zahle n'a pu qu'avouer en mots voilés, comme il convenait, l'impuissance de l'Assemblée et rappeler les efforts méritoires de la S. D. N.

On se trouve indéniablement dans une sorte d'impasse et l'on ne saurait dire si le moyen d'en sortir sera trouvé avant que recommence la course aux armements, prélude plus ou moins durable, mais trop certain, d'une nouvelle catastrophe mondiale.

LE BUDGET MILITAIRE DE LA FRANCE ET LE DÉSARMEMENT, PAR M. JULES PRUDHOMMEAUX.

(Les Cahiers des Droits de l'Homme, du 10 décembre 1928)

Contre les tristesses, les gaspillages, les laideurs et les dangers du militarisme déchaîné, notre protestation doit être inlassable. Pour qu'elle soit efficace, donnons des textes et des chiffres.

I. — Ce qui devrait être : le désarmement, conséquence des promesses et des garanties échangées.

I. — Les textes, d'abord. Voici le préambule de la partie V du Traité de Versailles, ce monument dont il n'est pas une ligne qui ne porte, dit-on, la griffe royale du Tigre, dont il n'est pas une clause (que de fois M. Poincaré ne l'a-t-il pas affirmé sur la tombe des morts ?) qui ne doive être tenue pour intangible et sacrée.

« *En vue de rendre possible la préparation d'une limitation générale des armements de toutes les nations*, l'Allemagne s'engage à observer strictement les clauses militaires, navales et aériennes ci-après stipulées ».

Suivent les articles 159 et 160 qui ordonnent que « la totalité des effectifs » de l'armée allemande « ne devra pas dépasser 100.000 hommes, officiers et dépôts compris... l'effectif total des officiers, y compris le personnel des états-majors ne devant pas dépasser 4.000 ».

Au mois de mai 1919, le gouvernement du Reich, tout en approuvant l'idée d'un désarmement général, protestait auprès des gouvernements vainqueurs contre le caractère unilatéral des conditions militaires imposées aux vaincus. Le 16 juin 1919, M. Clemenceau, répondant au nom des alliés, prenait à la face de l'Allemagne et des peuples vaincus l'engagement solennel suivant :

« Les puissances alliées et associées tiennent à proclamer que leurs exigences relatives aux armements allemands n'ont pas seulement pour but de mettre l'Allemagne dans l'impossibilité de reprendre sa politique militaire d'agression. *Ces exigences sont, en même temps, le premier pas vers une diminution et une limitation générales des armements qu'elles cherchent à réaliser comme devant être l'un des résultats les plus utiles de la guerre et que la Société des Nations considérera comme un de ses premiers devoirs de favoriser...* »

L'indomptable patriote, celui qui « avait fait la guerre », disait vrai. Presque au même moment, la charte de la Société des Nations était révélée au monde, et les peuples qui, jusqu'alors, avaient entendu des milliers de fois les Gouvernements affirmer qu'il n'y avait de garantie sérieuse pour la paix que dans le renforcement illimité des armements nationaux, enregistraient avec stupeur et ravissement le démenti brutal que ces gouvernements, enfin pris de remords, s'infligeaient à eux-mêmes par les premières lignes de l'article 8 du Pacte ainsi conçu :

« Les membres de la Société reconnaissent que le *maintien de la paix exige la réduction des armements nationaux* au minimum compatible avec la sécurité nationale et avec l'exécution des obligations internationales imposées par une action commune ».

Le même article confiait au Conseil le soin de préparer immédiatement « les plans de cette réduction en vue de l'examen et de la décision des divers gouvernements ». Il imposait aux gouvernements l'obligation « d'échanger, de la manière la plus franche et la plus complète, tous renseignements relatifs à l'échelle de leurs armements, à leurs programmes militaires et navals et à la condition de celles de leurs industries susceptibles d'être utilisées pour la guerre ».

L'article IX, enfin, prévoyait la constitution immédiate, par la Société des Nations, d'une Commission permanente chargée « de donner au Conseil son avis sur l'exécution des dispositions des art. 1 et 8 et, d'une façon générale, sur les questions militaires et navales ».

Désormais, des événements se succèdent qui, tous, comportent logiquement, nécessairement la limitation, puis la réduc-

tion des armements de la France et du monde. Ce sont les accords de Locarno (16 octobre 1925), l'entrée de l'Allemagne dans la Société des Nations (septembre 1926), le Pacte Briand-Kellogg (27 août 1928).

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II. — Du pacte franco-allemand de Locarno, il suffira de citer ces quelques lignes pour la magnifique promesse de désarmement matériel et moral qu'elles impliquent. Le préambule d'abord : si sept nations ont, à Locarno, donné leur signature, c'est « en vue de rechercher d'un commun accord les moyens de préserver du fléau de la guerre leurs nations respectives et de pourvoir au règlement pacifique des conflits de toute nature qui viendraient éventuellement à surgir entre certaines d'entre elles ».

Les articles I et II proclament qu'entre les deux pays l'ère maudite des égorgements est enfin close.

« Article 1er. — Les Hautes Parties contractantes garantissent individuellement et collectivement, ainsi qu'il est stipulé dans les articles ci-après, *le maintien du statu quo territorial résultant des frontières* entre l'Allemagne et la Belgique et entre l'Allemagne et la France et *l'inviolabilité desdites frontières*, telles qu'elles sont fixées par le ou en exécution du Traité de paix signé à Versailles, le 28 juin 1919, ainsi que l'observation des dispositions des articles 42 et 43 dudit traité, concernant la zone démilitarisée ».

L'article II tire du principe la conséquence :

« L'Allemagne et la Belgique et, de même, l'Allemagne et la France s'engagent *à ne se livrer, de part et d'autre, à aucune attaque ou invasion et à ne recourir de part et d'autre en aucun cas à la guerre* ».

Et les deux nations reconnaissent, dans la suite de l'article, qu'elles s'interdisent tout emploi de la force, sauf en cas de légitime défense résultant d'une agression caractérisée ou d'un ordre donné par la Société des Nations comme sanction nécessaire d'une violation du Pacte.

III. — Par son entrée dans la Société des Nations, en septembre 1926, l'Allemagne s'engage à en observer les lois, en même temps qu'elle entend bien en revendiquer les privilèges et les avantages. Son admission implique, aux termes de l'article I, qu'elle « se gouverne librement » et qu'elle a fait la preuve « de son intention sincère d'observer ses engagements internationaux ». Depuis son entrée dans la famille des nations, aucune plainte n'ayant été déposée contre elle, à Genève ou ailleurs, elle est fondée à soutenir qu'elle a exécuté loyalement les clauses relatives à son désarmement, ainsi que celles qui, aux termes du plan Dawes, lui imposent de lourdes obligations financières. Et c'est un fait que son exactitude à *payer* et à *désarmer* n'est

contestée aujourd'hui que pour les besoins des polémiques de parti.

IV. — Et voici enfin le pacte Kellogg qui signé par l'Allemagne avec le même empressement que par la France, déclare dans son préambule que les contractants ont « le sentiment profond des devoirs solennels qui leur incombent de développer le bien-être de l'humanité », et qu'ils croient « le moment venu de procéder à une franche renonciation à la guerre comme instrument de politique nationale, afin que les relations pacifiques et amicales existant actuellement entre leurs peuples puissent être perpétuées ». Quant au pacte proprement dit, il enregistre la décision solennelle des gouvernements traitant « au nom de leurs peuples respectifs », de « *condamner le recours à la guerre pour le règlement des différends internationaux* » et d'y « *renoncer en tant qu'instrument de potitique nationale dans leurs relations mutuelles* ». Il décrète en conséquence que « *le règlement ou la solution de tous les différends ou conflits, de quelque nature ou de quelque origine qu'ils puissent être, ne devra être jamais cbercbé que par des moyens pacifiques* ».

II. — Ce qui est : le budget français de la guerre pour 1929.

Tels sont, signés avec des plumes d'or massif et proclamés à la face du monde, les engagements pris depuis dix ans par les gouvernements responsables.

— Qu'en est-il résulté à l'égard du problème capital qui angoisse les peuples, celui du Désarmement ?

— Rien.

I. Le problème psychologique de la sécurité.

Parce qu'il existe encore (et comment, dix ans après le cataclysme sans nom, n'en existerait-il pas ?) des litiges déclarés ou en puissance, des points névralgiques, des ambitions inassouvies, des rancunes toujours à vif : la Rhénanie, le conflit polono-lithuanien, les prétentions italiennes dans la Méditerranée, les revendications des minorités, l'Anschluss, le règlement des dettes, etc. — l'énumération pourrait durer longtemps — il est entendu que ce qui a été fait *ne compte pas*, que ce qui reste à faire est *tout*. Chose plus grave : il apparaît à nos éternels adversaires que, dans l'état d'instabilité de l'Europe et d'inertie des masses, l'heure est favorable pour ce glissement vers la désastreuse politique d'avant-guerre — celle des alliances à fins hypocritement offensives et des surenchères d'armements — dont nous constatons aujourd'hui le dangereux retour. Et ce qui est plus douloureux encore pour les serviteurs de la paix que nous sommes, c'est la crainte, dont nous n'arrivons plus à nous défendre, que ce problème du désarmement soit décidément insoluble, parce que les ennemis de notre cause ont eu l'habileté — ne les y avons-nous pas complaisamment aidés ? — d'en lier la solution à la réalisation d'une *sécurité* qui, reposant non sur la

constatation objective des faits, mais sur l'attestation, par les intéressés, d'un état d'âme tout subjectif, demeure éternellement fuyante.

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Oui, nous le voyons aujourd'hui : les états-majors qui luttent désespérément pour leur existence, les journalistes de réaction ou d'affaires, les césarions des pays de facisme et de dictature ont trouvé l'argument sans réplique : des chefs d'Etats bien intentionnés auront beau entasser les pactes Kellogg sur les pactes de Locarno, et demain peut-être, en reprenant, par exemple, le Protocole de Genève, établir pour le règlement des conflits ou la sanction des arbitrages les plus savantes procédures, toujours la troupe des ennemis sournois de la paix protestera, la main sur son cœur, qu'elle ne parvient pas, malgré son vif désir, à éprouver ce sentiment délicieux, mais insaisissable, qui s'appelle la *sécurité*. En conséquence, n'y eût-il qu'un cent-millionième de chance pour une aggression brusquée, on maintiendra qu'il est nécessaire de s'armer et de s'armer encore, suivant la méthode éprouvée qui renouvellera pour nous à brève échéance, tout l'indique, les joies enivrantes des années 1914-1918... Et c'est ainsi que les peuples qui s'abandonnent ont d'atroces réveils.

Ah ! ça, braves gens de tous les pays, quand donc vous déciderez-vous à signifier à vos maîtres, brutalement, qu'à défaut de la « *sécurité-condition* », qui s'obstine à fuir l'âme inquiète de nos surpatriotes, vous tenez, vous, une belle et bonne certitude : c'est que *tout* vaut mieux que le présent et l'avenir qu'ils vous préparent, et qu'ainsi vous êtes bien résolus, dans le double intérêt de votre *bourse* et de votre *peau*, à exiger d'eux ce désarmement progressif et général qui réalisera, lui, de façon indiscutable, *la sécurité-conséquence*.

2. La France surarme : le rapport Montigny.

En attendant, car il faut revenir aux réalités et aux documents, les dépenses militaires de notre budget national ne cessent de s'accroître. Un député a eu le courage de jeter enfin le cri d'alarme. Il se nomme M. Jean Montigny ; il représente la Sarthe au Parlement et il appartient — constatation qui n'offre pour nous aucun intérêt, car les faits seuls nous importent — au parti radical-socialiste. A-t-on contesté les chiffres alignés par lui ? L'a-t-on convaincu d'ignorance ou de mauvaise foi ? Nous entendrons sur ce point l'homme dont l'affection des masses populaires, bien avant le Congrès d'Angers, s'était détournée avec tristesse : M. Painlevé, ministre de la Guerre.

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Donnons d'abord la parole à l'accusateur :

« Emu par les conséquences d'ordre international et d'ordre fiscal des augmentations des dépenses militaires qui figurent dans le projet de budget de 1929, j'ai été amené, écrit M. J. Montigny, à examiner de près la cause de ces augmentations et les conséquences pécuniaires à attendre de la pleine application des récentes lois militaires.

« En 1928, les dépenses militaires ont atteint *8 milliards 500 millions* de francs environ, dont 6 milliards pour la guerre et 2 milliards 500 millions pour la Marine.

« En 1929, les deux Ministères de la Guerre et de la Marine ont demandé des augmentations de *4 milliards*, ce qui aurait porté le budget de la Défense nationale à 12 milliards passés, si M. Poincaré n'avait pas comprimé ces demandes d'augmentations à *1 milliard* 300 millions, déclarant que le surplus était « ajourné ».

« Quel est cependant *le total des dépenses militaires* que supportera le pays en 1929 ? En additionnant les chiffres des crédits demandés pour la Guerre et la Marine, on arrive à un total de 9 miliards 774 millions ; mais pour des raisons précisées ci-dessous, l'effort financier du pays dans le domaine militaire s'élèvera, en réalité, à 11 milliards 373 millions soit, en valeur or à 2 milliards 274 millions, savoir :

Budget de la Guerre	6.814.781.140 fr.
Budget de la Marine	2.960.111.513 »
Entretien de l'armée du Rhin (prélevé sur les paiements de l'Allemagne)	508.000.000 »
Contribution aux dépenses d'entretien de la Gendarmerie (budget de l'Intérieur)	351.000.000 »
Contribution aux dépenses d'entretien de la Garde Républicaine	15.000.000 »
Contribution aux dépenses de la Ville de Paris	25.000.000 »
Contribution aux dépenses militaires de la Métropole (Colon.)	46.000.000 »
Entretien des troupes coloniales aux colonies (budget général des Colonies)	490.000.000 »
Produit de l'aliénation des immeubles et matériels	164.000.000 »
TOTAL	11.373.000.000 fr.

« Par rapport à l'ensemble du Budget, 11 milliards 500 millions étant consacrés à la préparation de la guerre et 21 milliards consacrés au service de la dette (emprunts de guerre et pensions), il ne reste, dans un budget de 45 milliards, que 12 milliards 500 millions pour les œuvres de vie.

« Le plafond des dépenses militaires est-il cependant atteint ? — Nullement, les 3 milliards d'augmentation ajournés par M. Poincaré hypothéquant déjà les prochains budgets ».

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Comparons les dépenses actuelles avec celles de l'avant-guerre ; comparons également les effectifs, en rapprochant les chiffres officiels de 1913 et ceux de 1929. Voici le tableau (1), après réduction, pour répondre à une objection facile, de tous les chiffres à l'étalon-d'or :

Budget des dépenses militaires. — 1913 : 1.598 millions-or ; 1929 : 2.326 millions-or (11 milliards 273 millions-papier).

Budget de l'armée. — 1913 : 1.088 millions-or ; 1929 : 1.682 millions or (8 milliards 413 millions-papier).

Effectifs de l'armée. — 1913 : 582.990 officiers et hommes ; 1929 : 601.024 officiers et hommes.

Militaires de carrière. — 1913 : 96.990 officiers et hommes ; 1929 : 255.458 (en 1930 : 400.000 hommes).

3. Inquiétantes perspectives.

Ainsi, augmentation énorme, et augmentation portant à la fois, ce qui est intolérable, sur les effectifs et sur les dépenses ! Car il va de soi qu'à un accroissement des dépenses rendu, dans une certaine mesure, nécessaire par le renchérissement de la vie aurait dû correspondre une réduction sévère du nombre des unités « dépensantes ». O prodige, ô scandale ! En 1913, la France a en face d'elle une Allemagne à l'apogée de sa force productrice et de sa puissance guerrière, et elle estime que 582.990 hommes et 1.598 millions-or représentent le maximum réalisable de son effort défensif. En 1929, en face d'une Allemagne vaincue, obligée désormais de payer chaque année un tribut de 2.500 millions de marks-or, amputée de plusieurs provinces, privée de tout son matériel et de toutes ses usines de guerre, partiellement occupée, réduite à un effectif militaire de 100.000 hommes dont 4.000 officiers, la France victorieuse, épaulée par des nations qui sont ses alliées et ses clientes — la Grande Pologne, la Grande Roumanie, la Grande Yougoslavie — certaine de son ascendant à Genève, sûre de pouvoir appeler à son secours ses alliés de jadis, plus puissants que jamais, si le pacte de Locarno et le pacte Kellogg étaient violés à son détriment, la France déclare à l'univers goguenard et irrité qu'elle se meurt de peur et qu'il lui faut, pour apaiser sa tremblote, non seulement consacrer le quart du budget qui écrase ses contribuables à ces dépenses militaires dont elle a pu mesurer jadis la navrante inutilité, mais encore livrer chaque année au *far niente* abrutissant de la caserne plus de 600.000 de ses enfants !

Dans son aberration, elle consent à encourir à nouveau cette

réprobation des peuples dont déjà la menace avait pesé sur elle au moment de la Ruhr ; elle se dérobe — je l'ai montré plus haut — aux engagements inscrits par elle dans les traités de 1919, et elle dément si bien les déclarations et les promesses de ceux qui, en son nom, se faisaient à Genève les animateurs du désarmement que ceux-ci (n'est-ce pas, Paul-Boncour, n'est-ce pas, Jouhaux ?) démissionnent, humiliés et attristés... (1).

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— Oui, j'entends bien : les recrues qui, en 1930, serviront de « matériel humain » aux 30.000 officiers (2) et aux centaines de généraux chargés de préparer la vraie « dernière », ne feront qu'un an de service. Mais comme on ne veut pas *renoncer au nombre,* comme on maintient qu'il faut six soldats français pour tenir en respect un soldat allemand, bref, comme il s'agit pour l'état-major de *donner* tout en *retenant* et de s'opposer à la volonté du pays tout en paraissant s'y conformer, la Rue Saint-Dominique nous cuisine une armée qui, en 1929, affirme M. Montigny, ne comptera pas moins de 255.458 militaires professionnels (celle de 1913 n'en comptait pas 100.000) et qui, en 1930, lorsque le système fera son plein, sera « riche » de 400.000 « rempilés » et de 30.000 employés civils. Noble et réconfortant spectacle que celui de ces quatre cent mille professionnels du sabre, habillés de drap fin, bottés, éperonnés, galonnés, médaillés, soutachés de la tête aux pieds, promenant dans nos villes, sous les yeux des « cochons de payants » éblouis, leur martiale paresse ou caracolant, aux jours des retraites militaires (que nous rendra, n'est-il pas vrai ? un nouveaux Millerand) sur les 233.000 chevaux qui, en l'an de grâce 1928, servent encore « sous les drapeaux » ! (3) Et comme ils ne pèseront pas lourd, ainsi encadrés et dressés par ces brisquards redoutables, les 200.000 bleus de vingt ans qui, chaque automne, viendront pendant douze mois, jouer à la caserne le rôle piteux de figurants de l'armée démocratique !

Imaginez — la supposition n'a hélas ! rien d'absurde — un des discoureurs de Magic-City entreprenant quelque jour, à la manière mussolinienne, une marche sur Paris... et sur le Palais-Bourbon : quelle facilité, pour l'aventurier, si les mitrailleuses chargées de mâter les civils ont été au préalable livrées aux 400.000 spécialistes du militarisme par les soins de l'indéfectible républicain qui a nom Paul-Imprudent Painlevé !...

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(1) Lire le robuste discours de M. Daladier à la Chambre, séance du 28 novembre.

(2) Une loi, votée en 1920, avait décidé que leur nombre serait ramené à 21.000.

(3) Le Ministre, il faut le reconnaître, a déclaré que 106 000 seulement de ces rengagés tiendront garnison en France ; 190.000 seront des indigènes et serviront aux Colonies.

3. La réponse du Ministre. Conclusion... provisoire.

Aussi bien, celui-ci se défend-il d'avoir jamais nourri d'aussi noirs desseins, ce qui lui est accordé d'avance par tous les républicains de bonne foi, attentifs à ne pas confondre l'imprévoyance et la trahison. Il conteste aussi quelques-uns des chiffres publiés par son contradicteur, mais, sur ce point, il faut reconnaître que la thèse du député de la Sarthe demeure singulièrement forte. Des explications fournies par M. Painlevé le 24 novembre, aux représentants de la presse, il résulte qu'en 1913, l'effectif de l'armée de *métier* incorporée dans l'armée nationale s'élevait, non à 97.000 hommes, mais à 276.000 hommes, si l'on tient compte de tous les éléments que M. Montigny fait intervenir dans son calcul pour 1929. — Passons sur cette controverse, reprise à la Chambre le 28 novembre, et aboutissant à un terrible embrouillamini de chiffres qui suffirait à lui seul à déshonorer la comptabilité militaire : elle n'offre, en somme, qu'un intérêt rétrospectif.

Le ministre de la Guerre, et cela seul importe, admet le total des effectifs et des dépenses qui a été donné pour 1929, mais, dit-il, si le budget semble être en augmentation, sur celui de 1928, de 1.400 millions, c'est parce que, dans le montant invoqué pour 1938 par M. Montigny (8 milliards 500 millions), ne figurent pas certaines dépenses (armée du Rhin, gendarmerie, troupes des colonies, etc.) incorporées par lui dans le chiffre global de 1929. Si l'on fait la rectification, la différence entre les deux budgets n'est plus que de 500 millions. — Soit, mais qu'en conclure, sinon que le chiffre indiqué pour 1928 était vicié par sous-estimation et qu'il s'élevait en réalité à 10 milliards 873 millions ? C'eût été une raison de plus pour ne rien ajouter, en 1929, à ce total déjà formidable, et pour ne pas l'accroître de 500 millions.

Le ministre déclare, il est vrai, qu'il est « conforme à l'usage international » de ne pas englober dans les dépenses du budget de la guerre les dépenses des armées d'occupation, des effectifs « stationnés hors du bassin méditerranéen », des troupes coloniales, etc. — Sur ce point, notre protestation ne saurait être qu'énergique. Un budget de la guerre *loyal* doit comprendre *toutes* les dépenses qui, disséminées dans tous les recoins et tiroirs du budget national, ont pour cause l'existence de la machinerie militaire sous toutes ses formes. Pour ne citer qu'un exemple, entre cent, il est juste, il est *loyal* d'inclure dans le budget de la guerre les primes aux éleveurs de chevaux d'armes qui relèvent, en apparence, du budget de l'Agriculture. Envisagé de ce point de vue, qui pourrait affirmer que le total invoqué par le rapport Montigny pour 1929 (11 milliards 373 millions) n'est pas inférieur à la réalité ?

Ainsi, de l'aveu du ministre intéressé, les conclusions du rapport Montigny subsistent dans leurs données essentielles. Elles ne portent, on l'a vu, que sur le budget militaire proprement

dit. Mais le débat du 28 novembre nous a révélé, grâce à l'intervention lumineuse de M. P. Cot, qu'un autre péril menace le pays : on sait que l'Etat-Major, insatiable, exige sur nos frontières du nord et de l'est la construction immédiate de fortifications souterraines et d'abris bétonnés « sortes de cuirassés enfoncés sous la terre », dont les estimations les plus modestes évaluent le coût à *sept milliards de francs*. Ce projet s'est révélé d'emblée techniquement si absurde et financièrement si désastreux que le ministre, après avoir exigé et obtenu les 180 millions qui permettront de construire *trois* de ces monstres immédiatement, a dû promettre de surseoir pour étude à l'exécution des autres.

Mais cela, c'est une autre histoire. Ménageons pour l'instant les nerfs des lecteurs des *Cahiers*, que tant de stupidité militaire pourrait rendre enragés. Nous en reparlerons : à chaque jour suffit sa peine.

LE MALAISE EUROPEEN, PAR M. VICTOR BASCH, PRESIDENT DE LA LIGUE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME.

(Les Cahiers des Droits de l'Homme, du 20 décembre 1928)

I. — Après Genève.

Il serait vain de se dissimuler que l'atmosphère politique mondiale, après les assises de Genève, est lourde et chargée de nuées d'orage.

L'œuvre de paix, à laquelle le Conseil et l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations s'étaient attelés avec une si optimiste alacrité, subit un temps d'arrêt.

Cet arrêt ne date pas de la neuvième session de l'organisme de Genève qui vient de prendre fin. Il remonte à cette conversation de Thoiry sur laquelle la France et l'Allemagne, sur laquelle l'Europe tout entière avaient fondé de si grandes espérances et qui, de par la faute des circonstances plutôt que par celle des hommes d'Etat, n'avait porté aucun des fruits trop vite et trop légèrement escomptés.

Mais cet arrêt n'est apparu clairement à tous les yeux que lors des récentes discussions de Genève. La transaction franco-allemande à laquelle on a fini par aboutir offre, sans doute, de fécondes perspectives d'avenir. Mais à une condition : c'est que les deux parties qui ont engagé la négociation à longue portée sur l'évacuation, sur les réparations et sur les mesures de sécurité à organiser sur le Rhin, se mettent à l'œuvre avec la volonté et avec l'espoir d'aboutir.

Or, l'accueil fait en Allemagne au compromis Müller-Briand est décidément hostile. Toute la presse de gauche, journaux

socialistes compris, n'insistent que sur l'amère déconvenue éprouvée par l'Allemagne. L'imprudent optimisme dont avaient témoigné les partis de gauche, optimisme que rien ne présageait ni ne légitimait, a fait place, après la nécessaire mise au point apportée par le dicours de M. Briand, à un pessimisme tout aussi injustifié. Et les partis de droite, profitant de cet état d'esprit, ont pris nettement l'offensive. Ils ont jeté le masque que la présence de quatre des leurs dans le ministère de coalition bourgeoise leur avait imposé. Ils ont répudié la politique de résignation au rapprochement franco-allemand à laquelle leurs leaders, en échange de leur participation au gouvernement, s'étaient obligés. Dans de grandes assemblées populaires, le comte Westarp a proclamé, avec la faillite du système Stresemann, celle de la politique étrangère tout entière de la République et a protesté que seule la restauration de la monarchie pourrait valoir au Reich un retour de fortune.

Il ne faut sans doute pas attribuer trop d'importance à ces manifestations. Mais il ne faut pas non plus en sous-estimer la portée. Un malaise certain plane aujourd'hui sur l'Allemagne et, non seulement sur elle, mais sur l'Europe et même sur le monde. Il faut essayer d'en démêler avec précision les causes et d'en mesurer la gravité.

Il est hors de doute que la cause la plus apparente de ce malaise est ce que j'ai appelé l'offensive allemande à Paris et à Genève. Cette offensive, à y réfléchir un peu sérieusement, était inévitable. Nous avons oublié qu'en dépit de l'égalité absolue de tous les membres de la Société des Nations qu'implique le *Covenant*, il y a, en réalité, à Genève, d'une part, les nations victorieuses, d'autre part les nations vaincues et, entre les deux, les nations neutres. L'une des nations vaincues, l'Allemagne, s'était, par un effort d'une magnifique énergie, redressée, avait, après une catastrophe financière dont il semblait qu'il lui serait impossible de sortir indemne, rétabli sa monnaie, recouvré sa vigueur économique, reconquis la conscience de ses prodigieuses forces vitales. Cette nation avait été obligée de signer un traité par lequel elle avait été non seulement diminuée, non seulement soumise à une sorte de servage économique, mais profondément humiliée. On l'avait contrainte, par une disposition qui jamais ne figura dans aucun traité de paix, à proclamer, sous la menace d'une invasion à laquelle elle ne pouvait résister, sa culpabilité, sa seule culpabilité. Quoi d'étonnant si, dès qu'elle s'est sentie reconvalescente, elle s'est posée en face de ses anciens adversaires en demanderesse?

C'était là une attitude naturelle, un réflexe auquel il fallait s'attendre, et qu'une politique avisée aurait dû prévenir. Le problème de l'évacuation, qui ne pouvait pas ne pas se poser, aurait dû être amorcé par une négociation diplomatique avant que M. Hermann Müller l'entamât avec sa gauche brutalité.

De même encore, il aurait fallu songer à réétudier la question des réparations et faire savoir enfin au Reich le montant de la somme qu'on lui demandait, avant que le gouvernement allemand eût l'occasion de saisir du problème la conscience des peuples. De même, enfin, il aurait fallu, puisque l'occupation devait prendre fin, partie en 1930, partie en 1935, que les deux gouvernements s'entendissent à l'avance sur les mesures de sécurité à prendre, au cas où une évacuation anticipée deviendrait possible, et même au cas où les délais fixés par le traité seraient observés.

L'habitude prise par les ministres des Affaires étrangères de se rencontrer périodiquement à Genève et d'y traiter verbalement des questions pendantes entre les Etats qu'ils représentent a, sans doute, de grands avantages, surtout quand ces ministres sont des esprits souples et plastiques comme M. Briand et M. Stresemann. Mais elle a aussi de graves inconvénients quand l'un des interlocuteurs a l'inflexible raideur de M. Hermann Müller. Des inconvénients même en dehors des personnalités des interlocuteurs, parce que la Société des Nations est un théâtre trop vaste et à résonances trop amples pour des négociations délicates, que tout y prend des proportions mondiales et qu'un échec ou un quasi-échec y apparaît comme un désastre. Genève devrait être le lieu où des négociations longuement et minutieusement préparées par les voies diplomatiques ordinaires reçoivent comme une sanction internationale.

Il aurait fallu éviter les duels Müller-Briand et Paul-Boncour-Bernstorff et épargner ainsi aux opinions publiques des deux pays, encore trop sensibles, des chocs trop rudes. Dans le malaise, donc qui s'est propagé de Genève à Berlin, à Paris et dans les autres capitales, notre gouvernement a sa part de responsabilité. Mais l'impartialité la plus scrupuleuse ne peut pas ne pas dénoncer aussi les torts de l'Allemagne.

J'ai dit plus haut les circonstances atténuantes qu'on peut faire valoir en faveur du Reich. Mais il faut dire maintenant que, tout compte tenu de ces circonstances, il est impossible de ne pas reconnaître que l'Allemagne est très loin d'avoir acquis l'esprit européen et que c'est avec une sorte de cynisme, non exempt de naïveté, qu'elle affirme n'être allée à Genève que pour essayer d'obtenir des avantages pour elle, et que le jour où elle s'apercevra qu'elle ne peut pas tirer de la Société les profits qu'elle avait escomptés, elle la quittera en claquant les portes.

C'est l'un des délégués officiels du Reich, à Genève, le baron de Rheinbaben qui, dans le cahier 7 des *Colloques européens*, édités par le professeur Mendelssohn-Bartholdy, écrit « que l'Allemagne n'a pas su tirer (*herausholen*) du pacte de Locarno ce qu'elle aurait pu en extraire » et qui ajoute que « sans doute l'Allemagne désire éviter aussi loyalement que toutes les autres nations toute guerre même dans un avenir lointain,

mais que, avec l'avènement d'une jeunesse qui n'a pas connu les horreurs de la guerre mondiale et qui est éprise de la grandeur de l'Allemagne, celle-ci se vouera de toutes ses forces à une modification de la situation créée par le traité de Versailles là où l'injustice crie au ciel : dans l'Est allemand ».

Que ces paroles aient pu être écrites par un délégué officiel de l'Allemagne à Genève, cela révèle un état d'esprit qui est de nature à inspirer des inquiétudes aux observateurs les plus équitables et les moins enclins au découragement. Des manifestations de ce genre, comme il s'en multiplie en Allemagne depuis la grande « déception » de Genève, même dans les partis de gauche, sont l'une des causes certaines du malaise que j'essaie de caractériser. Il en est d'autres que je vais signaler.

II. — **Le Problème du Désarmement.**

De toutes les causes de l'incontestable malaise qui pèse sur l'Europe et le monde, la plus patente est celle qui réside dans l'inextricable problème du désarmement.

Sans doute, la manière brusque et par trop directe dont l'a abordé à Genève le chancelier allemand a pu paraître choquante. Nul, en effet, d'entre les diplomates présents n'ignorait les efforts désespérés faits par l'Allemagne des Gessler et des von Seeckt pour accroître, par des machinations secrètes et incontestablement illégales, les forces militaires du Reich. Nul d'entre eux ne pouvait se soustraire à la pensée que le chef d'un gouvernement qui venait, malgré l'opposition de toutes les forces de gauche de son pays, d'acquiescer à la construction d'un nouveau croiseur-cuirassé, était mal venu de plaider avec tant de virulence la cause du désarmement. Tous savaient pertinemment que les partis qui, en Allemagne, s'élèvent le plus violemment contre le retard apporté par les Alliés à l'exécution de l'article 8, sont beaucoup moins préoccupés d'obtenir le désarmement des anciens Alliés que l'autorisation pour le Reich de pouvoir rivaliser désormais, sans entraves, en fait de préparation militaire, avec les puissances hier victorieuses.

Mais pour avoir été présentée sans nuances et sans art, en elle-même la revendication de M. Hermann Müller était parfaitement fondée. Et que si cela avait été un représentant de ces Etats scandinaves, lesquels, comme, par exemple, le Danemark, étaient entrés dans la voie du désarmement, qui s'en fût fait l'avocat, la cause défendue par le chancelier allemand aurait paru entièrement légitime.

Oui, les peuples ne comprennent pas que la Société des Nations, créée expressément pour organiser la paix et pour mettre fin à cette course aux armements dont l'issue ne peut être que la guerre, n'ait pas réussi, après tant de réunions, de pourparlers et de discussions. à mettre debout un projet de

désarmement. Oui, les peuples ne comprennent pas que, après Locarno et Thoiry, la France, l'Angleterre, les Etats-Unis, la Pologne, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Roumanie, la Russie, la Turquie consacrent le meilleur de leur effort et la majeure partie de leur budget à accroître leurs armements. Oui, les peuples ne comprennent pas qu'au moment même où, à Genève, la France offrait à l'Allemagne d'essayer de liquider définitivement toutes les questions laissées encore ouvertes par la guerre et l'après-guerre, elle ait permis aux troupes d'occupation de faire des manœuvres en Rhénanie. Et il est logique que les peuples commencent à se demander si les diatribes des Bolchevicks et de leurs zélateurs européens contre la Société des Nations ne sont pas méritées, et si celle-ci n'est, en effet, qu'un paravent permettant aux nations hier victorieuses, tout en ayant l'air de se prêter à l'œuvre de paix, de continuer à se vouer, tout comme la catastrophe mondiale, aux œuvres de guerre.

Je ne suis pas de ceux — nos lecteurs le savent — qui croient possible de procéder, dès maintenant, au désarmement total et immédiat. Je ne suis pas de ceux qui s'imaginent qu'il suffise de décréter le désarmement pour qu'il se réalise. Je ne suis pas de ceux qui se persuadent que certaines nations, comme la nôtre, puissent désarmer sans garanties de sécurité. Je ne suis pas de ceux enfin qui ignorent à quelles extraordinaires diffités se heurtent toutes les tentatives faites à Genève, avec énergie et bonne foi, pour faire entrer l'œuvre de désarmement dans la voie des réalisations.

Mais il n'en reste pas moins vrai, que les lenteurs, les hésitations, les timidités, les perplexités des puissances qui délibèrent à Genève sur le problème du désarmement sont infiniment décevantes. Notre ami Paul-Boncour, qui n'a pas l'habitude d'être pessimiste et qui, en dépit des attaques dont l'accablent les extrémistes de tous les pays n'en a pas moins été le bon ouvrier d'une tâche infiniment difficile et délicate, vient de prononcer à Genève des paroles lourdes de sens et presque de menace. Oui, *il faut* que les puissances, qui se sont attelées ou ont paru s'atteler à l'œuvre de désarmement, aboutissent, qu'une première étape soit franche, qu'il y ait au moins un arrêt dans la course néfaste et que les peuples, succombant sous le faix des charges que leur imposent les budgets militaires, reçoivent un commencemnt de satisfaction.

Paul-Boncour n'a pas dit et n'a pas pu dire quel est le grand responsable des atermoiements de Genève. Mais, nous, qui n'avons pas de précautions à prendre et qui avons le droit de proclamer hautement ce que nous pensons, nous pouvons dire et nous disons que la faute de toutes les carences genevoises incombe au gouvernement convervateur de l'Angleterre. C'est l'Angleterre conservatrice qui s'est opposée à l'acceptation de ce Protocole qui eût donné non seulement à la France, comme on se plaît à le répéter, mais à tous les pays du monde ces garanties

de sécurité, sans lesquelles, à tort ou à raison, un grand nombre d'Etats européens ne peuvent pas ou n'osent pas consentir à un désarmement. C'est l'Angleterre conservatrice qui a soutenu criminellement cette Italie de Mussolini qui constitue aujourd'hui le grand, l'imminent danger de guerre, sans parler de la Hongrie de Horthy et de Bethlen qui, elle aussi, constitue dans l'Europe Centrale un foyer incandescent. C'est l'Angleterre conservatrice, enfin, dont les ambitions maritimes opposent irréductiblement les intérêts européens aux intérêts américains et empêchent les Etats-Unis de joindre leurs efforts de paix aux nôtres.

Je sais bien qu'il est difficile de supporter la mégalomanie américaine et que, depuis que l'Oncle Sam est devenu le banquier du monde, son outre cuidante soif de domination n'a fait que s'accroître et s'exaspérer. Mais cette situation étant ce qu'elle est et ne pouvant se modifier pour l'heure, il est incontestable que l'arrangement naval franco-anglais et surtout la manière dont il a été préparé dans l'ombre des chancelleries ont été la plus lourde des fautes et ont contribué à accentuer et à épaissir le malaise qui plane sur le monde.

La plus lourde des fautes parce qu'il était évident que les Etats-Unis n'accepteraient jamais un arrangement qui était tout entier dirigé contre leurs vœux tant de fois et si clairement spécifiés. La plus lourde des fautes, parce que le mystère avec lequel ont été menées les négociations n'a pu qu'intensifier les méfiances américaines. La plus lourde des fautes parce qu'il était enfantin de croire qu'un secret, connu par des centaines le personnes, pourrait être gardé et qu'une fois révélé, il a obligé les deux gouvernements à des explications confuses et embarrassées et il a appris au monde, ce dont celui-ci se doutait, que ce n'en était pas fait de cette diplomatie secrète que le président Wilson avait dénoncée, avec raison, comme l'une des causes les plus certaines des guerres.

Pourquoi la France s'est prêtée à ce jeu dangereux ? Parce qu'elle a besoin de l'Angleterre pour déjouer les intrigues et les menaces de Mussolini, parce qu'elle estimait nécessaire de la détacher de l'emprise italienne, parce qu'elle voit dans l'Entente cordiale la seule sauvegarde de cette paix à laquelle elle est passionnément attachée.

C'est là ,il me semble, la clef de l'invraisemblable roman dont Léon Blum s'est efforcé de démêler l'intrigue. Mais que la clef que j'en ai donnée soit ou non la bonne, le roman de l'arrangement anglo-français n'est qu'un roman de la portière, mal conçu, pauvrement mis en œuvre et, en tout état de cause, indigne de la France démocratique.

III. — La Menace Italienne.

Parmi les causes du malaise qui plane sur l'Europe, la plus pressante, sans aucun doute, et la plus grave est la menace que constitue pour la paix l'Italie fasciste.

Ce n'est pas seulement l'existence, au milieu des démocraties occidentales, d'une barbarie tyrannique telle que le monde n'en vit pas de pareille depuis le régime imposé aux cités italiennes par les condottières de la Renaissance. Ce n'est pas seulement tout un peuple bâillonné et enchaîné par la force brutale d'une soldatesque fanatiquement dévouée au chef de bande qui l'a formée. Ce n'est pas seulement la justice mise au service des passions et des rancunes du Dictateur, cette justice qui vient de condamner à des trentaines d'années de prison les parents du petit martyr dont il est certain aujourd'hui que ce n'est pas lui qui a attenté aux jours de Mussolini. Ce ne sont pas seulement les forces vives de tout un pays : forces politiques, forces économiques, forces militaires soumises à un Grand Conseil, sorte de Conseil des Dix élargi, se composant des complices les mieux domestiqués du Duce, et auxquels doit obéissance le Roi lui-même, puisque c'est ce Conseil qui lui prescrira désormais le choix de son premier ministre. Ce ne sont pas seulement toutes les libertés confisquées et, avant tout, toute liberté de la presse supprimées, ou du moins, comme vient de l'expliquer Mussolini dans un discours d'un extraordinaire cynisme, toute liberté de la presse subordonnée à cette « unité » dans la soumission à l'idéal fasciste qui apparaît au tyran comme l'épanouissement même de l'indépendance. Ce n'est pas seulement la représentation nationale abandonnée au choix de ces corporations dans lesquelles ont été enfournées toutes les manifestations du travail et de la pensée, choix, qui, comme tout choix, présenterait un simulacre de liberté, s'il n'était, lui aussi, subordonné à l'agrément de l'organisation centrale fasciste. Ce n'est pas seulement qu'il est impossible que ce grand peuple, frémissant sous le joug qui lui a été imposé, ne se réveille un jour de ce cauchemar, ne se redresse, ne se jette sur ses bourreaux et, dans la fureur des représailles, n'allume au centre de l'Europe un bûcher de révolte dont les flammes menaceront d'embraser des Etats n'ayant aucunement trempé dans les crimes du fascisme, mais dans lesquels l'iniquité sociale maintient sous les armes une armée de rebelles toujours prête à la bataille. Il y a là, à n'en pas douter, un danger pour l'Europe, comme constitue un danger dans tout organisme un élément aberrant.

Mais ce n'est pas là la menace la plus grave et la plus patente que suscite le fascisme italien. Cette menace — tout le monde le sait, mais nul parmi les diplomates responsables de l'Europe n'ose le proclamer ouvertement — c'est la menace contre la paix.

L'Italie — le Duce et ses journaux ne cessent de l'affirmer toujours à nouveau — est sortie de la guerre insatisfaite. Les sacrifices qu'elle prétend avoir faits à la cause commune, n'ont pas été payés. La reconnaissance que, paraît-il, lui doit avant tout la France, ne lui a valu que notre ingratitude. Aussi la haine jalouse qu'elle a vouée à sa voisine éclate-t-elle à tout propos. Elle, dont les berceaux fleurissent et qui étouffe dans ses frontières étroites, n'a que des colonies dérisoires, tandis que sa rivale, trop affaiblie par l'âge pour enfanter, a un Empire colonial qui ne prospère que grâce au travail italien. C'est la France caduque qui joue sur le théâtre européen le grand rôle que la justice devait ménager à l'Italie. Partout où elle voudrait étendre ses mains avides, elle se heurte à sa concurrente abhorrée.

Pendant le cours de ces dernières années, elle a pu se flatter d'intéresser à ses rancunes l'Empire britannique. Les entrevues amicales entre le Dictateur et M. Chamberlain avaient paru favoriser ses ambitions démesurées. L'Italie allait avoir les mains libres dans les Balkans. l'Italie allait devenir la maîtresse dans cette Méditerranée qu'elle a toujours considérée comme sienne.

Et voici que le pacte naval franco-anglais semble avoir mis fin à ces illusions. Ce pacte, les journaux italiens l'affirment, n'est pas seulement un arrangement naval conforme au vœu émis par la commission du désarmement. C'est une véritable alliance offensive et défensive qui fera de la France la gardienne de la Méditerranée, cependant que l'Angleterre pourra, sur l'Atlantique et le Pacifique, rivaliser avec les forces navales des Etats-Unis.

Une fois de plus, la pauvre Italie a été dupée. Mais une fois de plus, elle fera front et exigera que sa marine soit égale à celle de la France, quels que puissent être les besoins qu'impose à celle-ci son Empire colonial. Ces colonies ne sont-elles pas peuplées surtout d'Italiens? Et l'Italie n'a-t-elle pas besoin, pour communiquer avec ses émigrants répandus sur tous les points du globe, d'une flotte aussi puissante que celle de la France?

D'ailleurs, la déconvenue de l'Italie ne décourage pas ses hommes politiques. Que si elle est exclue de la faveur anglaise, d'autres constellations politiques s'ouvent à elle. Pourquoi les nations vaincues ne se joindraient-elles pas à cette Italie que la victoire a déçu? Déjà, elle a attiré dans ses rets la Hongrie, la Bulgarie, la Roumanie. Voici que Venizelos-le-Subtil a scellé avec elle un pacte d'amitié et a commencé par Rome ce voyage à travers l'Europe par lequel le grand homme d'Etat hellène, tout en prétendant accomplir une œuvre de paix, n'en tentera pas moins — on peut en être assuré — de regagner pour la Grèce quelques lambeaux de cet Empire que les rancunes des Alliés contre Constantin lui ont fait perdre. Pourquoi l'Allemagne ne suivrait-elle pas cet exemple? Il y a, sans doute,

entre l'Allemagne et l'Italie la question du Tyrol et le problème de l'*Anschluss*. Mais puisque la politique de Locarno a donné au Reich si peu de satisfactions et puisque, en tout état de cause, la question de l'*Anschluss* ne peut se poser en ce moment, pourquoi l'Allemagne et l'Italie ne chemineraient-elles pas ensemble et n'uniraient-elles pas leurs forces contre leur ennemie commune qui est la France. Déjà des transactions ont été amorcées entre des représentants de la droite allemande et les hommes de confiance du gouvernement italien, transactions sur lesquelles notre ami Sauppe, le député socialiste de Leipzig, a, il y a quelques mois, fait dans la presse socialiste de l'Allemagne de retentissantes révélations. Et pourquoi enfin la Russie soviétique ne se joindrait-elle pas aux conjurés et ne formerait-elle pas, avec l'Italie et l'Allemagne, un bloc contre le bloc franco-anglais?

Ce sont là, sans doute, visions qui se heurteront, on peut l'espérer, au bon sens allemand. Mais il n'est pas moins vrai que cette inimitié ouverte, que cette haine jalouse qui, incessamment et brutalement se manifeste, constitue une atmosphère de méfiance contraire à ces sentiments de concorde et d'harmonie qu'a voulu créer la Société des Nations. Si, aujourd'hui, la constitution des Etats-Unis d'Europe devenait possible, c'est l'Italie qui s'y opposerait. Et le scandale, c'est que cette même Italie, dont tout le monde connaît les visées, fait partie de la Société des Nations, qu'elle signe des traités d'arbitrage qu'elle est prête, sans s'en cacher, à violer dès qu'elle y aura intérêt, c'est que, loup résolu à jouer son rôle de loup vis-à-vis des nations qu'elle jalouse, elle est admise dans la bergerie.

Il est, sans doute, contraire aux usages diplomatiques en honneur à la Société des Nations de dénoncer ouvertement les fauteurs de discorde qui font partie de l'organisme de Genève. Mais il nous est permis de souhaiter qu'un de ces enfants terribles de la Société, comme il s'en est révélé parmi les représentants de la Scandinavie, empoigne le délégué italien, lui demande compte de la politique de son gouvernement et stigmatise celui-ci, ouvertement et énergiquement, comme l'ennemi du genre humain.

IV. — L'Anschluss.

Le problème de l'*Anschluss*, difficile et délicat en lui-même, vient de se compliquer encore, en créant entre l'Autriche et la Hongrie un différend qui, sans doute, se dénouera, facilement par les voies diplomatiques ordinaires, mais qui a donné l'occasion à la Hongrie d'évoquer, pour la première fois, d'une façon officielle, ses revendications.

Le président Lœbe, lors de son malencontreux voyage de propagande, s'était rendu dans le Burgenland et y avait, paraît-il, revendiqué pour la future grande Allemagne, non seule-

ment le Burgenland même qui a attribué à l'Autriche, mais les districts, notamment celui de Sopron, qu'un plébiscite avait conservés à la Hongrie.

Le comte Bethlen qui, depuis quelque temps, multiplie les manifestations oratoires, avait protesté énergiquement contre les prétentions allemandes et s'était ainsi joint aux adversaires du rattachement.

Le chancelier Seipel a relevé le gant et demandé des explications au ministère des Affaires étrangères de Budapest.

Et c'est ainsi que le problème, depuis que M. Briand, dans sa fameuse harangue de Genève, l'avait abordé à propos de la question des minorités, a rebondi et est devenu actuel.

On peut, sans doute, comme l'a fait M. Georges Scelle, dans un récent article des *Cahiers des Droits de l'Homme* (p. 531) nier cette actualité, affirmer « que la solution pratique et actuelle de l'*Anschluss* n'a pas à être recherchée parce que le problème ne se pose pas, qu'il n'est qu'un accessoire diplomatique, que nous faisons le jeu de tous les pêcheurs en eau trouble en nous en préoccupant et que ce que la presse française a de mieux à faire, c'est de ne pas agiter ce problème ».

On peut au contraire, comme l'a fait le docteur Friedrich Hertz, dans les mêmes *Cahiers* (p. 580) essayer de montrer que les dangers qu'entrevoient les grandes puissances et les voisins de l'*Anschluss* sont illusoires ; que, loin de menacer la paix du monde, l'accession de la pacifique et socialiste Autriche au Reich raffermirait cette paix ; que la principale adversaire du rattachement, la Tchécoslovaquie, ne considère pas, en réalité, l'*Anschluss* comme une menace pour sa sécurité, mais a conscience que si, dans des négociations de traités de commerce, elle trouvait en face d'elle, avec les délégués autrichiens, les délégués allemands, les intérêts économiques d'Autriche ne seraient plus, comme aujourd'hui, sans défense et il deviendrait impossible de maintenir celle-ci dans un perpétuel servage économique.

Pour mon compte personnel, voici comment se pose le problème. Avant tout, il faut rappeler énergiquement que, pour tout démocrate, la libre disposition des peuples par eux-mêmes n'est que la stricte application du premier des droits de l'homme aux droits des peuples. On a beau alléguer que ce droit de libre disposition ne se trouve mentionné nommément ni dans le Covenant ni dans les traités de paix. Mais c'est là de la pure duplicité et de la révoltante hypocrisie. C'est la lutte pour la libre disposition des peuples par eux-mêmes qui a été le fondement idéologique de toute la guerre mondiale. C'est là-dessus, et là-dessus seul, que s'est fondée la France pour demander le retour de l'Alsace-Lorraine à la mère-patrie, que se sont fondées les grandes puissances pour arracher à l'Allemagne la Pologne et le Schleswig, pour démembrer l'Empire des Habsbourg et enrichir de ses dépouilles l'Italie, la Rouma-

nie, la Yougoslavie et la Tchécoslovaquie. Si ce n'est pas pour réaliser le droit des nationalités que la guerre a été menée, il n'y a pas d'ombre de justice et de raison dans les choses humaines et les dix-millions de victimes sont tombées pour rien.

Ce droit inaliénable étant posé, il est incontestable que le vœu de l'immense majorité des Autrichiens semble aller vers une union avec l'Allemagne. Que cette union ne soit pas désirable ; qu'elle aille contre les intérêts économiques les plus évidents de l'Autriche ; que l'industrie de celle-ci sera absorbée en un clin d'œil et comme engloutie par les immenses forces de l'industrie allemande, que l'incomparable foyer de culture et d'art que représente Vienne, même au sein de la petite Autriche, s'éteindra et que l'exquise capitale de la marche méridionale de la Germanie descendra au rang d'une ville de province ; qu'il ne soit pas facile à l'Allemagne de s'incorporer un Etat profondément catholique avec une minorité socialiste si forte qu'elle a été majorité et qu'elle pourra le redevenir — cela est possible, mais cela ne regarde que l'Autriche. Si l'Autriche estime que le traité de Saint-Germain a rendu son existence impossible et que, pour subsister, il ne lui reste pas d'autres moyens que de renoncer à son indépendance, les grandes puissances n'ont pas le droit de lui interdire ce qui leur apparaît comme un suicide, mais ce qui, pour la majorité des Autrichiens, semble être une résurrection.

Mais, d'autre part, le droit de libre disposition des peuples par eux-mêmes, pour absolu qu'il nous paraisse, pour absolu qu'il soit, se heurte cependant à un droit supérieur qui est celui, pour tous les peuples, de ne pas laisser mettre en péril la paix.

Or, certains des voisins de l'Autriche, l'Italie et la Tchécoslovaquie en première ligne, menacent de faire de l'*Anschluss* un *casus belli*. C'est là, disons-le hautement, un argument de force contre lequel tout démocrate a le devoir de s'élever. Il est monstrueux d'interdire à un peuple de réclamer le droit d'organiser sa vie de la manière qui lui semble la meilleure, en dressant contre lui des forces militaires supérieures. C'est là la méthode de violence que la propagande alliée a si amèrement reprochée à la Prusse. C'est là la méthode que les gouvernements alliés, en s'associant à ces menaces, font la leur.

Mais ce sont là des faits contre lesquels les vrais démocrates se trouvent encore impuissants. Ils ne peuvent, ces démocrates, qu'émettre l'espoir qu'avec l'affermissement de la paix, la consolidation du rapprochement franco-allemand, la conscience avivée de la solidarité européenne, le moment arrivera où le rattachement de l'Autriche à l'Allemagne — à la condition que l'Autriche, par un plébiscite, et, après le plébiscite, par une demande adressée au Conseil de la Société des Nations, en manifeste expressément le désir — ne sera plus considéré par les puissances comme un danger pour la paix du monde.

Actuellement, ces démocrates ne se lasseront pas de procla-

mer hautement le droit de l'Autriche à demander l'*Anschluss*, si tel est vraiment le vœu de la majorité des Autrichiens.

Mais ils lui demandent, dans l'intérêt suprême de la paix, de ne pas multiplier les bruyantes et vaines manifestations. Ils demandent à l'Allemagne, dans le même intérêt, de ne pas participer officiellement à ces manifestations et surtout de ne pas les susciter. Ils demandent, d'autre part, aux grandes puissances et aux voisins de l'Autriche de ne pas brandir contre un droit proclamé par un peuple des menaces de guerre. Ils demandent enfin à l'Europe de travailler énergiquement à se constituer en ces Etats-Unis qui lui permettraient la réparation de toutes les injustices et de toutes les erreurs des traités de paix et qui, faisant de l'Europe un seul grand Etat confédéré, résoudraient, en même temps que le problème autrichien, tous les problèmes laissés ouverts par la guerre et l'après-guerre.

V. — **Les revendications hongroises.**

Si naguère ce sont les Etats balkaniques qui constituaient la partie malade de l'Europe et dans lesquels s'accumulaient d'incessantes menaces de conflits d'où a fini par jaillir la guerre mondiale, aujourd'hui, c'est l'Europe danubienne, et dans cette Europe danubienne, singulièrement la Hongrie dont l'état de fermentation crée de légitimes inquiétudes à la diplomatie des démocraties occidentales.

Ce qu'il y a de caractéristique dans le cas de la Hongrie, c'est que, loin de dissimuler sa ferme intention de briser les chaînes du traité de Trianon — fût-ce au prix d'une nouvelle guerre — cette intention, ces hommes d'Etat la clament à travers le monde.

Sans doute, le très subtil comte Bethlen qui peu à peu s'est emparé de la toute-puissance et dont le régent, l'amiral Horthy, n'est qu'un double purement représentatif, sait, au sein de cette Société des Nations de l'appui financier de laquelle la Hongrie ne peut se passer, mettre une sourdine à sa tenace volonté de reconquérir pour son pays ce que la défaite lui a fait perdre.

Mais dès qu'il est rentré de Genève il fait valoir ouvertement dans des discours qu'il multiplie les revendications de la Hongrie. Il ne cache pas à ses concitoyens que le moment n'est pas venu pour donner à ces revendications une sanction matérielle. Mais, ce moment, il l'attend, et il fait plus que de l'attendre, il le prépare.

Ce n'est un secret pour personne que la Hongrie a partie liée avec l'Italie fasciste. Dans le jeu que combine Mussolini et dont le résultat ne peut être qu'une nouvelle guerre mondiale, destinée à donner à l'Italie la place que sa politique de 1914 n'a pas su lui ménager, la Hongrie, constitue la maîtresse-pièce. Entre la Hongrie et l'Italie, il n'y a pas seulement échange de

compliments et échanges de visites auxquelles l'art de la mise en scène où excellent les Magyars, comme d'ailleurs les Italiens, donne un éclatant retentissement. Il y a envois de la part de l'Italie de canons, de mitrailleuses, d'armements de toute sorte, que l'affaire dite de Saint-Gotthart a mis en pleine lumière. La Société des Nations a jeté un voile pieux sur cet incident dont la gravité n'a échappé à aucun de ceux que préoccupe la paix du monde. Elle a, pour le dire avec franchise, fait preuve dans cette affaire, comme dans toutes les affaires où l'Italie est partie, d'une lamentable faiblesse. Elle aurait dû profiter de l'enquête qu'elle n'a pas pu ne pas ouvrir, mais qu'elle n'a pas osé poursuivre, pour révéler une bonne fois, et pour stigmatiser les criminelles intrigues ourdies contre la paix par l'Italie fasciste et par sa complice, la Hongrie fasciste. L'atmosphère de l'Europe aurait été singulièrement purifiée par la mise en accusation de cette bande de dictateurs qui se rient de la Société des Nations, qui ouvertemeut conspirent contre la paix que cette Société a la mission de sauvegarder, et qui, par un extraordinaire paradoxe, continuent à en faire partie.

Nous n'avons ici, ai-je besoin de le dire ? nulle sympathie pour la Hongrie de Horthy et de Bethlen, pour cette Hongrie fasciste dont nous n'avons cessé de dénoncer les crimes, pour cette Hongrie qui, sans doute, aujourd'hui, n'épouvante plus le monde par des assassinats, par les répressions féroces contre tous les bons citoyens qui refusent de s'incliner devant les bourreaux, contre les socialistes, les juifs et les penseurs libres, mais qui n'en reste pas moins prête, dès que surgirait le moindre mouvement contre le régime abject qui l'opprime, à revenir à ses méthodes de meurtres et de noyades. Et je n'ai pas besoin de dire non plus combien la menace contre la paix que constitue la Hongrie, « brillant second » de l'Italie, me paraît grave et devrait, à notre sens, être conjurée par une énergique contre-offensive de la Société des Nations.

Mais cela rappelé, nous devons, pour juger de la légitimité des revendications de la Hongrie, faire abstraction du régime que la force brutale lui a imposé et examiner ces revendications en elles-mêmes.

Que si on se penche sur ce problème et que si on repasse dans l'esprit la manière dont les Alliés ont résolu la question hongroise, on est obligé de convenir que tout dans les réclamations de la Hongrie n'est pas injustifié.

Cela a commencé par un acte de mauvaise foi. Le 2 novembre 1918, un armistice est conclu à Padoue entre l'autorité militaire austro-hongroise et le général Diaz, représentant les Alliés, armistice qui laissait intacte la frontière sud de la Hongrie. Quelques jours après, le comte Karolyi est convoqué par le maréchal Franchet d'Espérey à Belgrade, où il lui est intimé, sous la menace d'une marche des troupes alliées sur Budapest, de signer un armistice nouveau, armistice dit hypocritement mili-

taire et non politique, infiniment plus désavantageux que le premier.

Ce fut ensuite, après la crise communiste, l'autorisation donnée à la Roumanie d'aller rétablir l'ordre en Hongrie, autorisation dont l'armée roumaine usa avec une si cupide férocité que les Alliés lui interdirent de continuer ; la Roumanie ne tint, d'ailleurs nul compte de l'interdiction et les Alliés n'eurent pas l'énergie de faire valoir leur décision.

Ce fut enfin le traité de Trianon, traité aussi draconien, traité plus draconien que le traité de Saint-Germain. On enlève à la Hongrie tout ce qui fait sa prospérité économique : le blé du Banat, le charbon et surtout les immenses forêts de la Slavonie, de la Slovaquie, de la Transylvanie. On lui enlève l'accès à la mer et si, depuis, les facilités qui lui ont été ménagées à Fiume lui permettraient de reprendre ses exportations, ces facilités sont vaines puisque ce bois, qui constituait la majeure partie de ses exportations, elle ne l'a plus. Sur dix millions de Hongrois, trois millions ont été incorporés à la Tchécoslovaquie, à la Yougoslavie et à la Roumanie. Est-t-il étonnant vraiment que les Hongrois se sentent désespérés et qu'ils crient leur détresse ?

Sans doute, étant donné l'inextricable mélange de nationalités dans ce coin d'Europe, étant donné la nécessité de faire de la Tchécoslovaquie un Etat d'un seul tenant et de tenir compte des revendications des Yougoslaves et des Roumains fondées sur la communauté de langue et de culture, il était impossible de faire droit aux vœux de ces peuples pendant des siècles opprimés et de faire, en même temps, de la Hongrie un Etat viable.

Mais il ne serait cependant pas impossible de tenir compte de ce qu'il y a de légitime dans les appels faits par la Hongrie à l'esprit de justice de ses anciens adversaires. Telles parties de l'ancienne Hongrie, étant incontestablement de langue hongroise, ayant été enrichies par la culture hongroise, pourraient lui être restituées, sans que les Etats, qui consentiraient ces restitutions, en soient diminués ou appauvris.

C'est ainsi que le Kiralyhago avec Komarno (l'ancien Komorn) ; c'est ainsi que la Ruthénie qu'aucun lien réel ne réunit à la Tchécoslovaquie ; c'est ainsi que la partie du Banat entre le Danube et la Tisza avec la ville si hongroise de Sabouca (autrefois Szabadka) ; c'est ainsi enfin que la plaine de l'est jusqu'aux montagnes de Transylvanie pourraient et peut-être devraient en toute justice revenir à nouveau à la Hongrie.

Mais ce ne sont pas, en réalité, ces restitutions de territoires qui seraient le remède vraiment efficace à la détresse hongroise. Le vrai remède, ce serait une union douanière entre la Tchécoslovaquie, la Hongrie et la Yougoslavie avec, si l'Autriche renonçait de son propre gré à l'Anschluss, l'Autriche. Toute la constitution physique et toute l'organisation économique de ce con-

glomérat d'Etats poussent vers leur union. Toutes les vallées, toutes les lignes de chemin de fer vont du nord à l'Adriatique. Une union de cette sorte créérait au centre de l'Europe un tout économique et même politique qui permettrait à des pays actuellement agonisants de reprendre vie et force, et qui non seulement ne menacerait personne, mais encore serait une puissante sauvegarde de la paix.

VI. — Le problème du « Corridor ».

Parmi les causes de l'inquiétude qui hante l'esprit des amis de la paix, il n'en est pas de plus grave que le problème du « Corridor ».

Je ne me pose pas ici la question de savoir jusqu'à quel point la création de l'Etat polonais, tel qu'il a été constitué par les Alliés, tel qu'il s'est élargi par des initiatives contraires aux trop timides injonctions de la Société des Nations, est un bien ou un mal pour l'équilibre européen et, singulièrement, pour la France.

Je ne m'occupe pas, pour l'heure, de la politique suivie par la Pologne à l'égard des Ukrainiens et des Blancs-Russiens ni du *numerus clausus*, dont les Polonais nient l'existence, qui, en effet, n'est pas inscrit dans la loi, mais qui, néanmoins, pèse sur les Juifs que le malheur a fait naître sur les bords de la Vistule.

Ce sont là questions qu'à différentes reprises j'ai abordées dans ce journal et que vient d'exposer, avec un excès de virulence, mais avec un très grand nombre de documents irréfutables et effarants, M. René Martel dans son récent volume sur *La Pologne et Nous*.

Je ne veux, dans cette série d'articles, où je me suis proposé de signaler les points névralgiques de l'Europe, m'occuper, à propos de la Pologne, que d'une seule question, celle qui, dès aujourd'hui, préoccupe toutes les chancelleries, et qui, à mesure qu'avec les années à venir l'Allemagne reprendra une conscience de plus en plus vive de ses forces reconquises, deviendra de plus en plus menaçante, à savoir la question du « Corridor ».

Il est incontestable que l'Allemagne tout entière, sans distinction de partis, est convaincue que le « Corridor » ne pourra être maintenu, qu'il constitue une écharde dans la chair de la partie allemande, et que l'Allemagne, quel que soit son gouvernement, n'en reconnaîtra jamais sa légitimité. Les partis de droite comptent sur la force, les partis de gauche sur des négociations pour modifier une situation qui leur paraît intenable, mais les uns et les autres sont fermement résolus à tout mettre en œuvre pour obtenir cette modification. Je n'en veux pour preuve que les récentes déclarations de M. de Rheinbaben que j'ai eu l'occasion de citer dans l'un de mes derniers articles, de M. de Rheinbaben, délégué officiel du Reich à la Société des Nations, pas-

sant pour un sincère ami de la paix, appartenant au parti dont M. Stresemann est le chef et qui n'en proclame pas moins ouvertement que la mission la plus sacrée que devra se donner la génération qui point, c'est de mettre fin à la situation humiliante que crée pour l'Allemagne l'existence du « Corridor ».

D'un autre côté, il est tout aussi incontestable que la Pologne est fermement résolue à ne pas permettre que soit touché à ses frontières, telles que les ont établies les traités. Là-dessus tous les partis, depuis les nationalistes jusqu'aux socialistes, sont unanimes. Lorsque l'on s'entretient avec les Polonais les plus modérés, les plus pacifiques, les plus pacifistes, des rapports de leur pays avec l'Allemagne et qu'on insiste sur les périls que présentent pour la paix les différends qui séparent les deux Etats voisins, ils vous arrêtent dès qu'on aborde la question du Corridor. Plutôt la guerre que de renoncer au libre accès à la mer. Toutes les atténuations que peuvent demander raisonnablement les Allemands à une situation dont on veut bien convenir qu'elle est difficile et délicate, oui ! Mais une modification réelle du *statu quo*, jamais.

Il y a là ce que j'ai appelé, dans la conférence que j'ai faite à Berlin le 11 mai et qui a soulevé tant de controverses, une antinomie. Comment se formule-t-elle à des pacifistes qui n'étant ni allemands ni polonais et qui se voulant Européens uniquement préoccupés de la justice et de la paix, ont quelques titres à prétendre à l'impartialité.

Pour nous, la question du « Corridor » se pose absolument dans les mêmes termes que la question de l'*Anschluss*. Nous croyons profondément que le droit des peuples à disposer librement d'eux-mêmes n'est que la stricte application du premier et essentiel des droits de l'homme aux droits des peuples.

Cela étant, la seule question qu'il s'agit de résoudre est de savoir si la majorité des babitants du « Corridor » est allemande ou polonaise ?

La réponse ne me paraît pas douteuse. Certes, il aurait été conforme aux principes wilsoniens de faire résoudre la question par les populations du « Corridor » elles-mêmes au moyen d'un plébiscite. Mais à défaut de ce plébiscite, d'ailleurs difficile à instituer, nous avons pour nous gnider les cartes et les statistiques allemandes antérieures à la guerre, sans compter le fait que les populations du « Corridor » ont toujours envoyé au Reichstag des députés protestataires.

J'ai devant mes yeux une carte démographique de l'Allemagne datée de 1913. Dans cette carte, les différentes populations habitant le « Corridor » sont clairement distinguées par des colorations différentes. Au premier coup d'œil, on ne peut pas ne pas s'apercevoir que c'est la population polonaise qui prime. Partant, tout démocrate, partisan du principe des nationalités, doit être convaincu que c'est à juste titre que le « Corridor » a été attribué à la Pologne.

Sans doute, les Allemands, depuis la guerre, ont tenté d'interpréter tendancieusement leurs cartes et leurs statistiques.

Tout d'abord, ils ont voulu distinguer entre les habitants du « Corridor » parlant polonais et ceux qui parlent la langue kachoube, langue slave, il est vrai, mais pas identique au polonais.

En second lieu, même si l'on ajoute les Kachoubes aux Polonais, on n'obtient que 4 % de supériorité pour l'élément slave. Et si l'on se rappelle que nombre d'habitants du « Corridor », parlant une langue slave, étaient étroitement attachés au point de vue politique, économique et « culturel » à l'Allemagne, comme on peut le supposer par analogie avec ce qu'a donné le plébiscite en Haute-Silésie, dans la Prusse Orientale et dans les quatre cercles de la Prusse de l'Ouest, il convient de conclure que, même en se posant au point de vue du principe des nationalités, le rattachement du « Corridor » à la Pologne a été une injustice.

Mais ce n'est pas sur cette argumentation, dont beaucoup d'Allemands sentent eux-mêmes la fragilité, que s'appuie l'Allemagne pour revendiquer le « Corridor ». On n'a qu'à regarder une carte pour s'apercevoir que cette déchirure dans la chair d'un grand pays, que cette séparation du gros du pays avec l'une des provinces des plus profondément allemandes du Reich est une anomalie dont il faut comprendre que les Allemands, attachés à leur ancienne idéologie nationale, souffrent cruellement et qu'ils la considèrent comme une humiliation impossible à supporter. On a beau alléguer que ce sont là des phantasmes, que les séparations par des frontières sont une chose factice ; que cela n'existe, comme l'a si bien dit un philosophe dont les Allemands ne rejetteront pas le témoignage, le noble Fichte, que sur les cartes géographiques et que c'est une folie à nulle autre pareille que d'imaginer des hommes s'entretuant, s'entremassacrant pour des différences de colorations dessinées sur des atlas.

Mais, hélas ! les hommes et les peuples sont encore en proie à cette folie du prestige que Fichte dénonce et stigmatise. C'est un fait humiliant pour la raison humaine, mais qu'il est impossible de méconnaître.

La situation réciproque de l'Allemagne et de la Pologne, étant ce que j'ai dit, comment faut-il conclure ? Il faut conclure que, si quelques raisons militent pour la thèse polonaise et pour la thèse allemande, il y a une chose que l'Europe ne permettra pas, c'est que, même pour la réalisation de la plus juste des deux thèses, une nouvelle guerre éclate. Cette nouvelle guerre, les pessimistes, comme mon grand ami Fœrster, la prévoient et la prédisent. Cette nouvelle guerre, des optimistes comme j'en suis un, l'affirment impossible. Impossible, parce que les peuples ne la permettront pas ; parce que les Français sont décidés à ne pas aller à la boucherie, fût-ce pour assurer à

la Pologne ce « Corridor » qui lui revient ; parce que la majorité des Allemands eux-mêmes hésiteront, au dernier moment, à susciter la catastrophe pour reconquérir le « Corridor », et parce que, enfin, la constitution des Etats-Unis d'Europe, pour lesquels il faut travailler sans relâche, et dont nous obtiendrons la réalisation, si nous la voulons assez fortement, rendra dérisoire toute explication entre peuples par les armes pour une misérable question de frontières.

VII. — L'énigme russe.

Plus pressant que le problème du « Corridor », que tous les problèmes que nous avons abordés jusqu'ici pour caractériser le malaise qui pèse sur l'Europe et le monde, est le problème russe.

En dépit de tous les moyens découverts par la science pour rapprocher les peuples et les hommes, il semble que nous soyons séparés de la Russie par un abîme que les meilleures volontés et les intelligences les plus lucides ne parviennent pas à franchir. Même alors que les liens les plus étroits d'une alliance, à laquelle avait adhéré de raison et de cœur la majeure partie de nos concitoyens, nous unissaient à elles, il planait sur la terre russe et sur l'âme russe un mystère que nous avions conscience de ne pouvoir percer. Il y avait entre notre façon de nouer les idées et de grouper les sentiments et celle de nos amis slaves des divergences si profondes que les sympathies les plus ferventes ne parvenaient pas à les vaincre.

Ce mystère, depuis que la révolution bolcheviste a si profondément transformé la Russie, n'a fait que s'épaissir. Nous avons beau lire les livres que voyageurs français, anglais, américains allemands, écrivent sur la Russie soviétique; nous avons beau étudier l'organisation judiciaire, l'organisation politique, l'organisation économique de la République socialiste russe ; nous avons beau nous entretenir avec les voyageurs amis que des Académies ou des Universités russes ont appelés à Moscou et à Leningrad : le mystère persiste, l'énigme demeure. Entre la Russie et nous, il y a comme une épaisse nuée. Nous ne savons pas ce qui s'y passe vraiment, nous ne comprenons pas ce qui s'y passe. Et cette incompréhension est la première et peut-être la plus essentielle cause d'inquiétude que suscite en nous la Russie, en nous qui, en bons cartésiens que tous nous sommes peu ou prou, avons besoin, pour nous rendre compte des choses de les voir clairement et distinctement et qui, si nous concevons le mystère dans les sphères du sentiment, de l'art, de la religion ne les admettons pas dans le domaine de la politique.

Voilà placé entre l'Europe et l'Asie un immense Empire qui, en dépit des mutilations que lui a fait subir la grande guerre, n'en compte pas moins encore une superficie de 4.600.000 kilomètres carrés et une population qui ne doit pas être loin de

150 millions d'âmes. Cet immense conglomérat de terres et d'hommes est régi par une petite minorité de citoyens qui ont su, grâce à l'indomptable énergie de leurs chefs et par les moyens les plus cruellement tyranniques, s'emparer du pouvoir, transformer le vieux pays autocratique en une République socialiste et maintenir cette République socialiste contre les assauts donnés par l'unanimité des Etats du monde.

Cette République socialiste, fidèle à la maîtresse doctrine de tout socialisme, proclame incessamment sa haine inassouvissable de la guerre et, tout récemment encore, a préconisé, du haut de la Société des Nations, un radical projet de désarmement total et immédiat.

Et, en même temps, nous apprenons par les sources les plus certaines que la Russie soviétique travaille fiévreusement à faire de l'Armée Rouge un incomparable instrument de guerre, que femmes et enfants sont astreints au service militaire et que les chefs de l'armée recourent périodiquement aux lumières et à l'expérience d'officiers allemands pour enseigner à leurs officiers à eux les secrets de la tactique et de la stratégie.

Il y a là une première et essentielle contradiction entre les intentions promulguées et les réalités, qui trouble notre raison et qui inquiète légitimement tous les amis sincères de la paix.

Car, enfin, si les maîtres de la Russie soviétique sont si profondément convaincus de la possibilité et de la nécessité du désarmement immédiat et total, pourquoi ne tentent-ils pas ce que nos pacifistes extrémistes demandent à la France de tenter et ce qui serait si beau, en effet, qu'un grand Etat osât tenter? Pourquoi n'est-ce pas la Russie soviétique qui donne le signal du désarmement? Ce grand risque, ce beau risque, qui, si ce n'est l'Union des Républiques Socialistes Soviétiques, pourrait, devrait le courir?

Ce risque, la Russie ne peut le courir, répondraient les Bolcheviks et répondent leurs amis français, parce que, de toutes parts elle est entourée d'un monde ennemi, et que ce monde, si elle ne se gardait farouchement, se jetterait sur elle pour assouvir sa haine inexpiable et la dépecer.

C'est là la réponse que nous donnons, nous, radicaux timorés, socialistes embourgeoisés, pour expliquer qu'en dépit de la ferveur de notre pacifisme, nous n'osons pas préconiser pour notre pays le désarmement total immédiat et non simultané. Mais cette réponse ne saurait prévaloir pour vous, socialistes intégraux, marxistes et sur marxistes de la plus stricte observance qui, de même que vous avez osé, contre vents et marées, déclarer le socialisme au monde, vous devriez déclarer la paix au monde, autrement que par d'anodines propositions faites à Genève dont vous saviez pertinemment qu'elles ne seraient pas acceptées.

Est-il vrai, d'ailleurs, que la Russie est menacée et que, si elle désarmait, le monde se jetterait sur elle? Menacée par qui? Par

l'Empire britannique? Mais c'est là un conte pour petits enfants qu'il est possible de faire accroire à d'incultes moujiks, mais dont des hommes d'Etat aussi subtils que M. Tchitcherine, aussi astucieux que M. Litvinof n'ont pu être dupes un seul instant.

Sans doute, l'Angleterre conservatrice professe pour la Russie soviétique l'horreur que professent pour elle tous les Etats capitalistes sans exception. Mais jamais les plus jingos d'entre les jingos, jamais les plus impérialistes d'entre les impérialistes anglais n'ont songé à une expédition militaire contre la Russie. Ce sont là folies qui ont pu hanter le cerveau troublé d'un Ludendorf, mais dont la froide raison mercantile d'un M. Baldwin est incapable.

Menacée par la Pologne? Certes, nous n'avons pas une confiance illimitée dans l'esprit pacifique du maréchal Pilsudski et des nationalistes polonais. Mais la vérité nous oblige à constater qu'il n'est pas un homme représentatif ni un seul parti en Pologne qui médite une agression contre sa voisine.

Le vrai est que ce sont les voisins de la Russie qui, à juste titre, peuvent concevoir des craintes relativement à une agression de la Russie, que celle-ci n'a pas renoncé à recouvrer la Bessarabie dont il faut dire qu'elle lui a été arrachée injustement, qu'elle n'a pas renoncé à joindre à l'Ukraine soviétique l'Ukraine polonaise dont il faut dire que les habitants sont privés par le gouvernement polonais des droits élémentaires garantis par les traités aux minorités nationales.

C'est donc la Russie soviétique et non les Etats qu'elle dénonce qui apparaît comme une menace de guerre aux pacifistes qui ne se laissent pas prendre aux vaines cantilènes de M. Litvinof.

Ajoutons que la politique extérieure de la Russie, telle que la mènent l'énigmatique M. Tchitcherine et son souple adjoint, n'est pas de nature à inspirer confiance aux amis de la paix. Tour à tour, la Russie a tenté de flirter avec l'Angleterre, la France, l'Italie et surtout l'Allemagne, et, ce qui apparaît comme proprement scandaleux, avec les partis de droite et les associations nationalistes d'extrême-droite. Aujourd'hui, c'est aux Etats-Unis que vont les sourires de M. Tchitcherine qui compte que les liens économiques de plus en plus étroits noués entre l'Amérique et la Russie vaudront à celle-ci, dans un délai plus ou moins long, la reconnaissance *de jure* de la part de Washington.

Car, et c'est la seconde grande contradiction interne de la politique russe : D'une part la Russie proclame que sa mission consiste à déchaîner la révolution mondiale, que ce n'est qu'à ce prix qu'elle pourra maintenir le régime soviétique et, ouvertement ou secrètement, elle met tout en œuvre pour susciter des mouvements révolutionnaires ou pour entretenir ceux qui existent dans les différents Etats européens. Et, d'autre part, toute sa politique extérieure tend à se faire reconnaître et légi-

timer par ces mêmes Etats dont elle s'efforce de miner, de détruire, par tous les moyens, les gouvernements.

Nous ne faisons pas ici métier de prophète. Nous sommes de plus de ceux qui ne peuvent laisser espérer que la Russie, renonçant aux méthodes fascistes qui déshonorent l'idéal socialiste qu'elle prétend incarner, évoluera, tout en conservant et en renforçant son régime économique socialiste, vers le régime démocratique, seule sauvegarde de la liberté des individus et des peuples.

Mais nous sommes obligé de constater qu'à l'heure où nous sommes, la Russie, telle du moins qu'elle apparaît à notre connaissance imparfaite de ce qu'elle est véritablement, constitue un grave danger pour cette organisation de la paix dont l'accomplissement est le grand devoir, le seul devoir qui s'impose au monde.

VIII. — **L'impérialisme américain.**

Le malaise dont je tente, dans cette série d'articles, de diagnostiquer les symptômes n'est pas seulement — je l'ai dit — européen, mais mondial.

Alors qu'après l'immense cataclysme qui s'est abattu sur l'univers, toutes les nations, même celles qui furent à l'abri de la catastrophe, éprouvèrent le besoin de s'unir pour se garer contre le retour de l'effroyable fléau de la guerre et de créer ainsi une vivante solidarité entre tous les Etats, les grands comme les petits, il est naturel que les discordes qui déchirent les plus lointains d'entre eux retentissent sur l'ensemble et que, par exemple, les dissensions intestines de la Chine et les réactions divergentes qu'elles ont suscitées en Europe et en Argentine soient l'un des éléments de la dépression qui paralyse les forces vives du présent.

C'est ainsi encore que le rôle de plus en plus prépondérant que, depuis la fin de la guerre, ont assumé les Etats-Unis sur le théâtre international a troublé profondément l'équilibre mondial et contribué à désaxer les ressorts de la politique européenne.

Le récent discours du président Coolidge, qui a produit une impression d'autant plus profonde que, jusqu'ici, le maître de la Maison-Blanche avait été d'une proverbiale taciturnité, a révélé à tous le grave malentendu qui règne entre l'Europe et les Etats-Unis.

La thèse du président Coolidge, qui est celle de l'Américain moyen et à laquelle se refusent seuls quelques progressistes et quelques socialistes, le parti démocratique étant là-dessus, en immense majorité, du même avis que les républicains, est que les Etats-Unis, loin d'avoir profité de la guerre, ont fait à la cause commune autant de sacrifices que les autres Alliés, que leur prospérité à eux était due à leur seul effort et que la pénu-

rie dont se plaignent la plupart des Etats européens est, en majeure partie, sinon totalement, la conséquence de leur folie. Que s'ils renonçaient à l'insane course aux armements, dans laquelle, malgré la terrible expérience de la guerre, ils se sont engagés de nouveau, ils recouvreraient leur prospérité d'antan, donneraient un fondement solide à la paix et pourraient espérer de la part des Etats-Unis un allègement au fardeau des dettes qu'ils ont contractées envers l'Amériqne, dettes dont celle-ci a le droit absolu d'exiger le paiement intégral.

Il y a — M. René Marchand l'a montré excellemment dans un article récent — une part de vérité dans la thèse de M. Coolidge.

Il n'est pas vrai que ce sont des motifs cupides qui ont amené les Etats-Unis à la coopération avec les Alliés. Tous ceux qui, comme l'auteur de ces lignes, ont séjourné aux Etats-Unis en 1915 et 1916 savent que c'est un puissant mouvement de solidarité humaine qui, peu à peu, a amené les Etats-Unis à entrer dans la guerre ; que l'idéalisme de M. Wilson avait germé dans l'âme de ses compatriotes et que c'est vraiment l'amour du droit ou — faisons toutes les concessions à ceux qui là-dessus ne pensent pas comme nous — que c'est l'amour de ce qu'ils croyaient être le droit qui leur avait mis les armes à la main.

Il est vrai encore que les dettes des Alliés envers les Etats-Unis sont une obligation à laquelle ceux-ci n'ont pas le droit de se soustraire : qu'ils n'ont pas le droit de faire dépendre le paiement de ces dettes des paiements de l'Allemagne ; que les Chambres françaises ont l'impérieux devoir de ratifier la convention Bérenger-Mellon et qu'il est incompréhensible que les mêmes hommes qui, chez nous, exigent le paiement intégral des dettes de l'Allemagne sans permettre que compte soit tenu de possibilités financières, demandent aux Etats-Unis de tenir compte des possibilités financières de la France. Sans doute ici ce sont d'anciens alliés ou associés. Mais, dans les affaires, il n'y a ni alliés ni ennemis, il n'y a que des créanciers et des débiteurs. Quand on est dans le cruel plan de l'argent, il n'y a plus place pour les sentiments, mais il n'y a que des intérêts. Et c'est, à mon sens, une situation humiliante que celle où se met un pays comme la France quand, au lieu de payer ce qu'elle doit, elle fait appel à une générosité qui n'a de valeur que quand elle est spontanée.

Il est vrai enfin que les Etats-Unis ont raison d'alléguer que les contribuables américains n'ont pas à faire des sacrifices pour permettre à leurs anciens associés de dépenser des milliards, non seulement pour se défendre contre des attaques éventuelles, mais pour pratiquer une politique de prestige, pour financer les armements de leurs Alliés et pour persévérer ainsi dans une politique à laquelle il semblait que l'instauration de la Société des Nations eût dû mettre fin définitivement.

Voilà ce qui nous paraît vrai dans l'acte d'accusation dressé par M. Coolidge contre l'Europe.

Voici ce qui nous y paraît contestable.

Oui, ce n'est pas l'intérêt qui a entraîné les Etats-Unis dans la guerre. Mais cette guerre et ce qui s'en est nécessairement suivi a puissamment contribué à donner aux Etats-Unis l'hégémonie économique et financière du monde. Quoi qu'en ait dit M. Coolidge, il est incontestable que l'extraordinaire prospérité des Etats-Unis — cette « prosperity » que le parti républicain s'est targué d'avoir suscitée, et qui a valu la présidence à M. Hoover — est due en première ligne à la ruine des belligérants européens. Le vrai est — comme me le disait récemment un remarquable économiste allemand — que les Européens sont devenus les coolies de l'Amérique. C'est, en dernière analyse, pour l'Amérique qu'œuvrent les usines, que créent les ingénieurs, que suent les ouvriers de notre continent. Le vrai est que si l'Etat américain a subi du fait de la guerre de lourdes charges, celle-ci a fantastiquement enrichi banquiers, industriels, actionnaires et obligataires du Nouveau Monde.

De même l'Amérique a raison de reprocher à l'Europe ses folles dépenses d'armements. Mais pour que la leçon de M. Coolidge profitât aux nations auxquelles elle s'adresse, il faudrait que les Etats-Unis prêchassent d'exemple. Que si les Etats-Unis, loin de s'arrêter dans leur effort d'armement naval, disent et répètent qu'ils ont besoin d'une marine puissante pour protéger leurs côtes et qu'avant même de faire ratifier par le Congrès le pacte Kellogg dont il est si fier, le gouvernement lui demande de voter les crédits nécessaires à la construction de quinze croiseurs nouveaux, il faut qu'ils comprennent que l'Angleterre, elle aussi, a besoin d'une puissance marine pour protéger ses communications avec ses colonies et pour se garer, en cas de conflit, de la famine, et que la France a besoin d'une solide armée de terre pour protéger ses frontières contre l'agression possible d'un ou de plusieurs de ses voisins. La politique de prestige contre laquelle les Etats-Unis, quand c'est un Etat européen qui la pratique, s'élèvent et ont raison de s'élever, Washington ne l'ignore pas plus que Londres, Paris ou Rome. Les Etats-Unis réclament l'empire des mers qui n'est pas plus respectable que l'empire des terres. Et si le contribuable américain n'est pas exonéré comme semblerait devoir le permettre la prospérité de l'Etat, cela est moins dû à la carence de la France qu'à l'impérialisme naval de l'Amérique.

Et cet impérialisme ne se manifeste pas seulement de par la fièvre des armements. Il se manifeste plus odieusement encore par les agressions auxquelles se livre le colosse nord-américain sur des petits Etats de l'Amérique Centrale, incapables de se défendre. La discrète protestation qu'a fait entendre la République de Costa-Rica à la Société des Nations, en demandant à celle-ci de définir la doctrine de Monroë, avec combien de raison le

Haïti, le Panama et l'admirable petite République du Nicaragua pourraient-ils la faire leur. C'est hier que les journaux nous ont appris que Washington veut établir un véritable protectorat financier et militaire sur le Nicaragua, que la garde nationale nicaraguayenne sera désormais placée sous les ordres d'officiers américains de fusiliers marins, que la majorité des fonds d'Etat de la Banque du Nicaragua sera vendue aux banques américaines et que ses douanes seront administrées par un directeur américain.

Les Américains, fortement attachés à la Bible, aiment les paraboles. Qu'ils nous permettent de leur recommander celle de la paille et de la poutre. Pour protester légitimement contre les impérialismes, il faut n'être pas soi-même atteint de ce mal abject. Et pour être économique et financier, au lieu d'être militaire ou plutôt, pour être à la fois économique, financier et naval, l'impérialisme américain n'est pas plus sympathique et moins périlleux pour la paix que les impérialismes européens.

LES REMÈDES AU MALAISE

I. — Le désarmement.

J'ai dit, dans une série d'articles, le lourd malaise qui pèse sur l'Europe et le monde. Je n'ai insisté que sur les causes les plus alarmantes qui l'ont suscité et n'ai parlé ni du conflit polono-lituanien qui périodiquement, est évoqué à Genève sans qu'une transaction satisfaisante soit jusqu'ici entrevue ni de cette passion macédonienne qui constitue une cause permanente de troubles dans les Balkans et à laquelle il faudra bien que la Société des Nations, saisie expressément par les grandes puissances, prétendues gardiennes de la paix, tente de trouver une solution définitive.

Mais je crois avoir attiré l'attention du lecteur sur les principaux point névralgiques de l'Europe. Il s'agit maintenant de conclure et de nous demander quels remèdes il est possible d'entrevoir au mal que j'ai signalé.

Il est clair, avant tout, que le malaise réside, en dernière analyse, dans la crainte légitime qu'éprouvent les peuples de voir se renouveler l'atroce catastrophe qui a coûté au monde plus de 10 millions d'innocentes victimes et d'irrécouvrables richesses ; que la situation réciproque des différents Etats est si précaire que, de toutes parts, l'on voit s'accumuler les menaces de guerre ; que tout naturellement, les Etats, pour assurer leur sécurité, recommencent à se livrer à cette course aux armements dont l'issue a toujours été et sera toujours la guerre et que même cette libération des nationalités asservies que l'on peut considérer comme la seule justification possible de la gigantesque tuerie de 1914-1918, a accru et multiplié, au lieu de les diminuer, les risques d'une conflagration nouvelle.

Contre ce danger essentiel, il semble qu'il n'y ait qu'un remède : *le désarmement*, et que ce remède, ce soit le gouvernement des Soviets qui, par la bouche de M. Litvinoff, a eu le mérite de le préconiser, du haut de la tribune de Genève.

Les puissances faisant partie de la Société des Nations et notamment les anciens Alliés et parmi eux, en première ligne, la France et l'Angleterre, l'une, la plus grande force militaire, l'autre la plus grande puissance navale de l'Europe, ont-ils eu tort de ne pas accepter la proposition russe et de ne pas même consentir à la discuter sérieusement ?

Etant donné la situation générale de l'Europe que j'ai essayé d'esquisser, il est certain que la proposition russe n'avait aucune chance de se cristalliser dans la réalité et que, par conséquent, elle ne pouvait être considérée que comme une manifestation vaine.

Le désarmement ne peut devenir une réalité que s'il est simultané. Or, à supposer que la France se sentant garantie par le pacte de Locarno du côté de l'Allemagne — sentiment que la majeure partie des Français n'éprouvent pas et que les manifestations des nationalistes allemands, trop puissants encore, ne permettent pas d'éprouver légitimement — peut-elle se sentir garantie du côté de l'Italie et croit-on vraiment que la mégalomanie impérialiste de Mussolini adhérerait à un projet de désarmement ? Croit-on, de plus, qu'il soit possible à l'Angleterre, même en dehors de toute rivalité avec les Etats-Unis, de se démunir d'une flotte puissante, alors que seule cette flotte assure ses communications avec ses colonies et l'empêcherait en cas d'une agression, d'être, au bout de peu de jours, acculée à la famine ?

Ce sont là des faits contre lesquels la ferveur pacifiste la plus passionnée est impuissante. Trop de nos amis s'imaginent qu'il suffit de déclarer la guerre à la guerre et de protester contre les armements pour rendre l'une impossible et les autres dispensables. Encore un coup, il ne peut y avoir désarmement que s'il est simultané et espérer réaliser, dès maintenant, cette simultanéité est de l'utopie ou de la démagogie.

Quelques-uns de nos amis pensent que c'est une énergique propagande en faveur de l'*objection de conscience* qui serait capable de permettre au désarmement universel, qui apparaît à tous les pacifistes comme le grand remède au mal de la guerre, comme le grand remède de l'iniquité sociale, de s'accomplir. Là encore, je ne puis pas ne pas être sceptique. Là encore le remède ne serait opérant que s'il était accepté par toutes les nations à la fois, et si, au moins chez quelques-unes des nations qui n'ont pas renoncé à s'armer — et aucune d'entre elles n'y a renoncé vraiment — l'élan vers l'objection de conscience était irrésistible.

Or, en est-il ainsi ? En France, c'est une poignée d'hommes qui luttent pour l'objection de conscience. Il en est de même en

Allemagne, malgré l'admirable campagne menée par nos amis de Westphalie. Et je ne connais pas d'objecteur de conscience dans la Hongrie fasciste, dans l'Italie fascite, dans la Pologne pilsudskisée, en Roumanie, en Tchécoslovaquie. Je ne puis donc pas ne pas voir ceci. C'est que, dans tous ces pays, il y a un certain nombre d'hommes admirables, prêts à subir les châtiments les plus sévères, prêts même à se faire tuer plutôt que de tuer eux-mêmes. Au cas où une guerre nouvelle éclaterait, à cette petite troupe sacrée, agissant vraiment par conviction intime et inébranlable, s'agrégeraient des hommes uniquement mus par le soin de conserver leur vie et non par celui de ne pas ravir celle de leurs frères en humanité, qui laisseraient à l'immense majorité de leurs concitoyens la tâche périlleuse de lutter pour la sauvegarde de leurs foyers alors qu'eux-mêmes resteraient à l'abri. Au risque d'être traité, une nouvelle fois, de militariste par les amis extrêmes de la paix, je confesse hautement que je ne crois pas à l'efficacité, au moment où nous sommes, de la propagande en faveur de l'objection de conscience.

La *grève générale* déclenchée devant une menace de guerre, est-elle un moyen plus efficace d'empêcher celle-ci ? Oui. Voilà un remède vrai. L'exemple donné par le prolétariat allemand, au moment du putsch Kapp, démontre ce qu'une grève générale, énergiquement menée, est capable de produire. Que si les prolétariats européens solidement unis, s'organisaient en vue d'une grève générale en cas de menace de guerre et parvenaient à la déclencher, la paix serait sauvegardée. Tout effort fait en ce sens doit être hautement encouragé : il n'y aura plus de guerre, il n'y aura plus d'armements dès que les prolétariats de l'Europe et des Etats-Unis ne le permettront plus.

Mais les prolétariats des différents pays sont-ils assez solidement organisés, sont-ils, avant tout, assez solidement unis, pour que le grand espoir d'une grève générale en face d'un danger de guerre nous soit permis ? Il serait illusoire de le penser. Tant que les prolétariats seront aussi profondément divisés qu'ils le sont depuis l'avènement du communisme, tant que certains d'entre eux, comme celui de l'Italie, seront opprimés et asservis par des organisations militaristes, et que d'autres, comme le prolétariat des Etats-Unis, aura perdu toute conscience de classe, il est impossible de compter sur la grève générale comme moyen d'éviter la guerre et d'arrêter la course aux armements.

Ces constatations pessimistes faites, faut-il se résigner au lamentable état présent ? Faut-il renoncer à lutter contre la folie des armements ? Faut-il accepter la thèse de notre gouvernement qui croit être entré dans la voie du désarmement parce que, comme il le prétend, le budget militaire de 1929 n'est pas supérieur à celui de 1914, parce que le fardeau des charges militaires est aussi lourd aujourd'hui, qu'alors où nous étions

sous la menace allemande, qu'alors où nous n'avions pas remporté la victoire, qu'alors où l'Allemagne n'était pas désarmée, qu'alors où il n'y avait pas Locarno et où notre sécurité n'était pas garantie par l'Angleterre ?

Non, mille fois non. Les grands Etats, dits pacifiques, ont un premier devoir : c'est de comprimer leurs budgets de la guerre et de la marine, au lieu de les maintenir au niveau de 1914 ou de les élever au-dessus de ce niveau.

Et ils ont un second devoir. France, Allemagne, Angleterre — pour ne nommer que ceux-là — veulent sincèrement la paix, sont convaincus que, sans le maintien de cette paix, l'Europe est condamnée à la dissolution, à l'anarchie, à la barbarie. Ces mêmes Etats savent que toute saine économie, que toutes finances prospères sont impossibles avec l'actuel fardeau imposé aux budgets par les dépenses militaires et navales, que c'est ce fardeau qui rend impossible toute réforme sociale organique, toute lutte sérieuse contre la maladie, contre le taudis, contre l'ignorance.

Cela étant, pourquoi ces trois grands Etats ne tenteraient-ils pas d'esquisser et de réaliser un plan de désarmement progressif et simultané, de désarmement vrai, sincère, matériel et moral ? Rien que l'annonce de cette tentative serait un immense apaisement pour les peuples. Sans doute, il faudrait, pour que cette tentative fût faite, que les hommes d'état, qui en prendraient l'initiative, passassent par-dessus les rites de la diplomatie coutumière, passassent par-dessus la résistance certaine et acharnée des Etats-Major, des industriels de guerre, des fabricants d'avions et ne comptassent que sur l'appui des prolétariats, las d'être menés à la boucherie, las de travailler pour payer les instruments destinés à les décimer, eux et leurs frères.

Voilà une tâche digne de couronner la carrière d'Aristide Briand, de Ramsay Mac Donald — revenus au pouvoir — et de M. Stresemann. Auront-ils l'énergie et l'audace de briguer cette couronne ?

II. — **Le protocole et « l'acte général » d'arbitrage et de sécurité.**

J'avais marqué, à la fin de mon dernier article, que pour réaliser le désarmement, le moyen le plus efficace et le plus rapide serait une entente franche, sincère, totale entre la France, l'Angleterre et l'Allemagne, entente à laquelle, sans doute, l'Italie mussolinienne n'adhérerait pas, mais en face de laquelle la résistance italienne serait impuissante.

Je n'ai aucune illusion sur la possibilité de voir réalisée cette idée dans un laps de temps prévisible. La superstition des vieux rites diplomatiques est encore trop fortement enracinée chez nos hommes d'Etat pour qu'ils osent, malgré le réalisme affai-

riste auquel notre époque prétend incliner, procéder, comme, devant une difficulté analogue, procéderaient des hommes d'affaires.

Il faut donc, le désarmement étant la condition essentielle de toute organisation de la paix et la procédure pratiquée jusqu'ici à la Société des Nations pour réaliser ce désarmement se heurtant à des obstacles qui, pour l'heure, paraissent insurmontables, songer à des moyens plus efficaces et plus expéditifs.

Ce moyen a été trouvé et — tout le monde le devine — c'est le Protocole de Genève.

Souder indissolublement l'un à l'autre les principes d'arbitrage, de sécurité et de désarmement ; créer, pour tous les membres de la Société des Nations, l'obligation, non seulement de mettre au ban une nation qui, au lieu de porter un différend devant le Tribunal suprême de la Haye, tenterait une agression, mais de lui appliquer les plus sévères sanctions économiques et, au cas où celles-ci ne suffiraient pas, de dresser contre elle la force unie des armées de terre et de mer qui auront été laissées aux différentes nations. Voilà en quoi consiste le Protocole de Genève, et voilà qui constituait le barrage le plus irrésistible contre toute menace de guerre. Quelle nation, en effet, à moins d'être frappée de folie, oserait défier les forces du monde entier ? La menace de voir toutes les puissances s'unir, avec toutes leurs forces économiques, militaires et morales, contre un agresseur, c'est là le frein nécessaire et suffisant à toute velléité belliqueuse, la garantie efficace de la sécurité et l'indispensable prélude au désarmement universel.

Le Protocole, on le sait, n'a pas été réalisé, s'étant heurté à l'invincible résistance de l'Angleterre. Cette résistance — nous n'avons cessé de le démontrer — est proprement incompréhensible, la raison alléguée par le gouvernement conservateur, à savoir que les Dominions et l'Angleterre elle-même répugnent à prendre la responsabilité d'intervenir militairement et même économiquement dans toutes les querelles pouvant surgir dans un coin quelconque du monde, n'étant qu'un prétexte, puisqu'il est évident — je viens de le dire — qu'aucune nation du monde, à moins d'être frappée de folie, ne se hasarderait à braver la juste vindicte de l'ensemble des puissances. Rien que la volonté fermement exprimée de l'Angleterre de ne pas permettre à la guerre d'éclater eut, en 1914, empêché la catastrophe. Combien plus sûrement n'aurait-elle pas été empêchée si, dès l'abord, à l'Angleterre s'étaient joints avec toutes les autres relations non intéressées, les Etats-Unis.

Mais rien ne sert d'exalter les vertus du Protocole puisque, en dépit des efforts de la France et de certaines puissances neutres, il n'a pas été accepté par l'Assemblée de Genève.

Un effort cependant a été tenté à la dernière session de la Société des Nations, de créer un succédané au Protocole, effort

auquel il n'a pas été fait, dans notre presse, la publicité qui lui était due légitimement.

Les jurisconsultes de la première et de la troisième Commissions de l'Assemblée, ont, en effet, élaboré, à la place des trois modèles de conventions générales et des conventions bilatérales, destinées à réaliser l'arbitrage et la sécurité, un « *acte général* » qui, affirment ses auteurs, « tout en n'altérant en rien l'économie des trois conventions, ajoute à leurs avantages sous le rapport de la simplicité du système et de la souplesse des engagements ».

Cet acte général n'est pas un projet ayant besoin, pour devenir vivant, de faire l'objet de négociations, ni de recevoir des ratifications. Dès que deux ou plusieurs nations auront décidé de contracter une convention d'arbitrage, elles n'auront qu'à la signer. Elle sera immédatement incorporée aux archives de la Société des Nations, munie de la signature du président en exercice de l'Assemblée et du secrétaire général de la Société des Nations et elle restera indéfiniment ouverte à l'adhésion de tous les autres Etats.

L'Assemblée a invité tous les Etats, qu'ils soient membres de la Société des Nations ou non, « et dans la mesure où leurs accords actuels ne satisfont pas déjà cette fin, à accepter les obligations, répondant aux intentions ci-dessus, soit en devenant parties à l'acte général, soit en concluant des conventions particulières suivant les modèles de conventions bilatérales, ou dans des termes qu'ils jugeront opportuns ».

De plus, l'Assemblée a invité le Conseil à « informer tous les Etats, membres de la Société des Nations, qu'au cas où entre des Etats le besoin se fait sentir de renforcer la sécurité générale donnée par le Pacte de la Société et de contracter pour cette raison des engagements relatifs au règlement pacifique de leurs différends éventuels et où les négociations relatives se heurtent à des difficultés, le Conseil, si le désir lui en est exprimé par une des parties — et après examen de la situation politique et en tenant compte de l'intérêt général de la paix — est prêt à mettre à la disposition des Etats intéressés les bons offices susceptibles d'être acceptés volontairement par eux et d'amener une heureuse issue des négociations ».

Cet « acte général » constitue un événement de la première importance sur lequel l'attention publique mérite d'être attirée. Comme l'a affirmé l'indéfectible ami de la paix qui s'appelle Nansen, si les conventions bilatérales ne peuvent encore, à l'heure où nous sommes, être éliminées, il n'en est pas moins certain que la Société des Nations, destinée à nouer un lien de solidarité entre tous les Etats et à assurer leur sécurité, ne remplit vraiment son rôle qu'en créant une procédure d'arbitrage et des garanties de sécurité générales.

C'est là à quoi tend « l'acte général ». Cet acte est, en somme, comme nous l'avons dit, un succédané du Protocole dont il ne

se distingue que parce qu'il n'implique aucune sanction. Il ne contient que l'obligation générale, au cas d'un différend, à recourir, non à la force, mais à l'arbitrage.

Le jour où *tous* les membres de la Société auront adhéré à cet « acte général », l'idée de sanction s'y introduira d'elle-même et ce jour-là, ce sera le Protocole réalisé et, à partir de ce jour, il faudra bien que le désarmement universel entre dans la voie des réalisations.

Il ne convient pas, sans doute, de s'abandonner à l'espoir que la création de cet « acte général » soit uue garantie suffisante pour l'instauration de la paix universelle. Mais, en s'ajoutant aux dispositions du Pacte de la Société des Nations, à Locarno, à tant de conventions d'arbitrages bilatérales, il crée un nouveau et important rempart contre les menaces de guerre.

A la place d'un seul instrument clair, net, catégorique, comme l'aurait été le Protocole, c'est un tissu d'actes et de conventions que nous voyons se former autour de l'idée de paix.

Nous aurions, certes, préféré la première méthode. Mais puisque celle-ci s'est révélée impraticable, ne sous-estimons pas la valeur de la seconde. Félicitons-nous des efforts, pas assez appréciés, faits par la Société des Nations pour résoudre l'irrésoluble problème et affirmons avec Nansen que la Société des Nations a le devoir d'avancer courageusement dans la voie qui lui est ouverte, et qu'il est plus digne d'elle de se tromper que de craindre d'agir par peur de se tromper.

III. — **Fédéralisme et Etats-Unis d'Europe.**

C'est le retour au Protocole ou, à défaut de ce retour, la substitution au Protocole de l' « acte général » auquel adhéreraient tous les membres de la Société des Nations qui m'ont apparu comme le remède à l'état d'incertitude, de trouble, d'incohérence dans lequel, depuis la conclusion des traités de paix, se débat le monde.

C'est donc dans la Société des Nations que nous voyons le salut de l'humanité souffrante et angoissée, c'est la Société des Nations que nous considérons comme la créatrice et l'organisatrice de cette paix vers laquelle vont les vœux fervents de tous les peuples et de tous les hommes.

Mais quelle Société des Nations ? Celle qui délibère en ce moment sur des problèmes secondaires et subalternes, sans oser, en dehors des conversations particulières entre ministres des Affaires étrangères, aborder ouvertement et directement les questions vitales dont vont dépendre, pour de longues années, les destinées des principaux Etats Européens ? Ou bien une Société des Nations dont les membres ne seraient plus nommés par les gouvernements, mais désignés par les Parlements, une Société des Nations qui, au lieu de constituer un conglomérat non articulé, non sectionné, serait arrivé à une conscience assez

claire et assez distincte de la haute tâche qui lui est dévolue pour se soumettre à la grande loi qui régit tout ce qui est destiné à vivre et mérite de vivre et qui est la loi de l'organisation.

Le rythme du développement de tout vivant est le passage d'un état incohérent à un état plus cohérent, le passage d'un état homogène à un état plus hétérogène, le passage d'un état indéfini à un état plus défini.

La Société des Nations telle qu'elle a été constituée est encore à l'état de nébuleuse où il n'y a pas encore de diversité de structure, où les parties qui la composent ne se sont pas encore distinguées les unes des autres, ne se sont pas spécifiées, en un mot, ne sont pas devenues des organes, c'est-à-dire des membres d'un tout indissolublement attachés à ce tout et concourant à ses fins essentielles, mais constituant, au sein de l'ensemble, des individualités distinctes et définies.

N'est-il pas évident que la Société des Nations, telle qu'elle est établie et dans laquelle les nations les plus éloignées les unes des autres par la distance, par la culture, par les intérêts sont appelées à se prononcer sur des questions qui ne concernent qu'un petit nombre d'entre elles et dont toutes les autres n'ont aucune raison de se préoccuper, n'est-il pas évident qu'une telle Société est incapable de remplir le rôle difficile et magnifique qu'elle est appelée à jouer et que la déception qu'éprouvent les peuples à constater combien le travail de la Société des Nations est lent, difficultueux, incessamment entravé, est entièrement légitime.

Sans doute, il est naturel qu'au milieu de la grande angoisse de la guerre, des âmes généreuses, comme le fut celle du grand Wilson, soient allées au plus pressé et aient rédigé ce Pacte, qui a été une des plus nobles manifestations du génie fraternel des hommes, mais qui, à le regarder de près, n'est pas autre chose qu'un grand cri d'espoir, qu'une affirmation sublime, qu'une virtualité magnifique.

Il faut maintenant que ce cri devienne un chant harmonisé, que cette affirmation soit étayée logiquement, que cette virtualité devienne réalité.

Pour cela, il faut que l'organisation de Genève devienne un organisme véritable, c'est-à-dire qu'il soit articulé, sectionné, remodelé selon la grande loi de la division du travail.

Il y a, au sein de la Société des Nations, des nations européennes, des nations asiatiques, des nations américaines, sans parler, pour le moment, des peuples africains et des peuples australiens. Parmi ces peuples il est inconstestable que les Européens constituent une unité, de par, malgré toutes les divergences qui les séparent, une communauté patente de culture et d'intérêts.

Rien de plus simple et de plus urgent, que de reconnaître cette communauté, en créant, au sein de la Société, une section d'Europe, création qui entraînerait immédiatement celle d'une

section d'Asie et d'une section d'Amérique, à laquelle, une fois qu'elle serait constituée, les Etats-Unis adhéreraient plus aisément qu'à la Société des Nations elle-même.

Une fois cette section d'Europe créée, les membres qui la constitueront ne pourraient pas ne pas s'apercevoir que l'état d'isolement, de non-solidarité, d'hostilité dans lequel ils vivent actuellement est un véritable défi à la raison, que leur intérêt le plus pressant est de supprimer les barrières factices — barrières politiques, et surtout barrières économiques — qui les séparent, que leur intérêt le plus pressant est de s'unir, de se fédérer, de s'organiser harmonieusement, comme se sont organisés les Etats-Unis d'Amérique qui ont su amalgamer en un seul tout les Etats du Nord et les Etats du Sud dressés naguère les uns contre les autres, comme s'est organisée cette Confédération helvétique au sein de laquelle vivent, heureux et fraternels, Romands, Germains et Italiens.

Les Etats-Unis d'Europe ont été le grand rêve des hommes du XIX^e^ siècle, il faut que les hommes du XX^e^ siècle en fassent une réalité. De toutes parts, il est des esprits qui travaillent à cette réalisation. Ici, ce sont des hommes trop peu nombreux et n'appartenant qu'à l'élite intellectuelle et sociale, qui se sont groupés autour de ce que le comte Canergi-Kudenhoven a appelé le *Pan-Europa*. Là, c'est l'association qui s'est formée en France autour de M. Emile Borel. Il n'est pas de jour que je ne reçoive l'invitation de me joindre à quelque Ligue nouvelle se proposant de travailler à l'édification d'une Europe unie.

Il y a là l'indice heureux d'une conscience de plus en plus vive de ce qu'exige l'heure où nous sommes. Mais il y a aussi un émiettement d'efforts contre lequel il faut réagir : pour constituer une Société des Nations, fédération de fédérations continentales, pour édifier les Etats-Unis d'Europe, fédération de fédérations inter-continentales, il faudrait commencer par fédérer toutes les associations, toutes les Ligues, tous les groupements visant la même fin.

Mais ce n'est pas tout et ce n'est pas le plus essentiel ni le plus urgent. Jusqu'à présent ne se sont donnés à l'idée des Etats-Unis d'Europe que quelques intellectuels. Il s'agit maintenant non seulement d'élargir leur cercle, mais d'intéresser à cette idée, de conquérir à cette idée, de passionner à cette idée les peuples.

Nous savons tous que, si toute réforme profonde, qu'elle soit d'ordre politique, d'ordre social, d'ordre moral, d'ordre religieux, commence toujours par vivre dans l'esprit d'un individu supérieur groupant autour de lui quelques fidèles, elle n'arrive à se cristalliser dans la réalité que lorsqu'elle a pris corps et vie dans l'âme des masses.

C'est à cette œuvre-là qu'il faut que s'attachent tous les Européens convaincus que, seule, la création des Etats-Unis d'Europe est le remède efficace à la folie de surarmement, que, seule, elle peut conjurer les menaces de guerre suspendues sur

notre tête, que, seule, elle peut sauver cette civilisation qu'a créée le génie grec, qu'a affirmée le génie français, qu'a approfondie le génie germanique, qu'a dramatisée, pathétisée le génie slave, et qu'une guerre nouvelle ruinerait à tout jamais.

Il faut par une propagande, elle aussi organisée, s'adressant à la fois à la raison et au sentiment, faire de la création des Etats-Unis d'Europe l'idéal des prolétariats, la maîtresse-œuvre de l'effort des syndicats, des fédérations de fonctionnaires, des partis politiques avancés, de l'homme de la rue des villes et de l'homme des champs, l'Evangile nouveau de tous les hommes de bonne volonté.

CE QU'ON FAIT A GENEVE QUAND ON N'Y FAIT RIEN, PAR M. WILLIAM MARTIN.

(Journal de Genève du 2 novembre 1928)

Généralement, le mois d'octobre est ce qu'on appelle à Genève un « mois creux ». Après l'intense activité de l'Assemblée, les gens éprouvent le besoin de se détendre ; beaucoup partent en vacances, et l'on ajourne tout ce qui n'est pas urgent.

Nous voudrions montrer ici ce qu'est, à Genève, un mois creux. Nos lecteurs en déduiront seuls ce que peut être un mois plein.

C'est surtout dans le domaine économique que l'activité a été grande au cours de ce mois. Successivement, la commission d'experts pour la nomenclature douanière. la Conférence de la double imposition et le Comité économique se sont réunis. Bientôt ce sera le tour de la Conférence générale sur les statistiques économiques.

Il faudrait être aveugle pour ne pas voir que le monde est engagé dans un vaste processus d'unification économique. Ce sont des besoins économiques qui, à côté du désir de paix et de sécurité, ont donné naissance à la Société des Nations. Il n'est donc pas étonnant que les préoccupations économiques se soient imposées à elle en première ligne. Il en a été exactement de même, au cours des années qui ont suivi 1847, lorsque la Confédération suisse, à peine née, a été appelée à unifier coup sur coup les douanes, les monnaies, les poids et mesures, les postes, les transports, etc..... *Mutatis mutandis,* le même phénomène se reproduit sur le plan international.

Prenons, par exemple, la question de la double imposition et de l'évasion fiscale. Sous ce titre un peu rébarbatif, se cache une double réalité. Le but des conventions qu'on vient d'élaborer et qui seront proposées aux Etats pour régler leurs relations mutuelles n'est pas seulement de faire rentrer quelques sous

dans la caisse des administrations fiscales ou d'éviter à certains particuliers l'ennui de payer deux fois leurs impôts. Cela, c'est la réalité immédiate, le but apparent. Mais ce qu'on fait, en vérité, est beaucoup plus élevé et important.

On s'efforce tout d'abord de faciliter et de favoriser la circulation des capitaux, en la mettant à l'abri des tracasseries fiscales. Pour cela, il faut aller plus loin encore. Il faut chercher à adapter les unes aux autres les législations fiscales des divers pays. Certes, il ne s'agit pas ici d'unification dans le sens strict du mot ; il s'agit seulement de chercher des principes communs sur lesquels pourraient être fondés les systèmes fiscaux nationaux.

Le Comité de la nomenclature douanière ne fait pas autre chose, dans son domaine ; son but n'est pas uniquement de faciliter l'échange des marchandises ; il cherche avant tout à uniformiser, dans la mesure du possible, les législations douanières des différents pays.

Le Comité économique fait de même en ce qui concerne les tarifs, le traitement du commerce étranger, etc. Au cours de cette session, le Comité a mis sur pied une œuvre importante et délicate, qui concerne le charbon et le sucre. Il s'agit de trouver, par des arrangements internationaux, le moyen de remédier aux crises périodiques de ces industries qui nuisent à la fois aux producteurs, aux ouvriers et aux consommateurs.

On se bornera, pour le début, à établir les faits. Mais ce qui importe surtout, c'est que l'Italie s'est ralliée à une œuvre qu'elle avait tout d'abord combattue et critiquée. Les Italiens avaient redouté qu'une entente entre producteurs ne fût fatale aux consommateurs. Mais ils se sont rendu compte que les consommateurs ne sauraient profiter longtemps de l'anarchie de la production et que cette entente étant certaine et déjà en voie d'élaboration, il était préférable, à tous égards, qu'elle se produisît sous les auspices désintéressés de la Société des nations.

Signalons encore, parmi les efforts d'adaptation actuelle des conditions économiques des différents pays, la réunion des commissions du transit et des communications pour l'unification du jaugeage maritime, de la circulation routière, etc., etc. Il s'agit là d'une œuvre d'envergure formidable et de longue haleine. On ne saurait s'étonner qu'elle ne soit pas achevée en un jour. Mais la constance et la multiplicité de l'effort montrent qu'il correspond à des besoins profonds, universels et permanents.

*
* *

Deux autres grandes commissions sont réunies en ce moment à Genève, la Commission des mandats et la Commission d'hygiène.

La Commission des mandats se félicite particulièrement d'avoir eu devant elle l'administrateur du Sud-Ouest africain.

Tout ne va pas comme on le désirerait dans ce territoire et bien que le général Smuts ait été l'un des auteurs responsables du système des mandats, son pays semble souvent le confondre avec l'annexion pure et simple. C'est là précisément ce que la Commission des mandats a la charge d'empêcher.

La présence de l'administrateur du territoire, qui n'était encore jamais venu à Genève, a permis, croyons-nous, d'éclaircir beaucoup de malentendus. Il a pu donner à la commission des explications satisfaisantes sur plusieurs points importants. De son côté, la commission a été en mesure de faire comprendre à l'homme qui a la charge d'administrer ce territoire ce qu'elle entend par le mandat, son esprit, ses exigences.

C'est précisément dans ce contact mutuel et dans le sentiment de contrôle et de publicité qu'il donne aux administrations coloniales que résident l'essence et la valeur du régime des mandats.

***

L'œuvre de la Commission d'hygiène est si vaste et multiple qu'il faut se borner ici à une énumération. Elle suffira à montrer la quantité du travail accompli. Au cours du mois d'octobre on s'est occupé de la lutte contre la syphilis, de la vaccination contre la tuberculose, de la puériculture, du paludisme, du cancer, de la variole, de l'épidémie de dengue en Grèce et de questions relatives aux stupéfiants et à l'alcoolisme ; en novembre se réunira la deuxième conférece de la maladie du sommeil.

C'est là une œuvre dont la valeur est à la fois humanitaire et politique. Humanitaire en ce qu'elle aide à rendre des milliers de gens à la santé et à la vie, et à vivifier des populations entières dont la capacité productive est réduite ou anéantie par les épidémies. Politique, parce qu'elle offre des bienfaits positifs à certains pays lointains qui ne peuvent rien attendre de direct de la S. d. N. dans d'autres domaines.

Voilà ce qu'on fait à Genève quand on ne s'y occupe pas de politique.

UNE ANNÉE NORMALE, PAR M. WILLIAM MARTIN.

(Journal de Genève du 26 décembre 1928

Toutes les années, dans la vie des peuples comme dans celle des individus, ne peuvent pas apporter une quantité égale d'agitations et de sensations. Il en faut, de temps à autres, de plus calmes qui puissent servir, en quelque sorte de mètres pour apprécier les autres. Ce sont d'ailleurs les plus heureuses, et à

mesure que nous sortons des excitations de la grande guerre et de ses suites, ces années doivent aller en se multipliant.

On aurait tort, au surplus, de prendre cette expression : « année normale » dans un sens péjoratif ou trop au pied de la lettre. Car si l'année 1928 a été normale pour la Société des nations, elle n'a nullement été vide ou monotone. Il suffira, pour s'en assurer de jeter sur l'activité de la Société au cours de cette année un rapide coup d'œil.

Dans le domaine politique, il faut noter tout d'abord la rentrée dans la Société de deux membres démissionnaires, l'Espagne et le Costa-Rica. Le gouvernement de ce dernier Etat avait demandé au Conseil une interprétation de l'article 21 du Pacte, qui fait allusion à la doctrine de Monroe. La réponse du Conseil affirmant que tous les membres de la Société ont des droits et des devoirs égaux a été généralement accueillie avec une vive sitisfaction dans l'Amérique du Sud.

Une occasion s'est présentée, presque aussitôt d'appliquer cette théorie. Le conflit survenu entre la Bolivie et le Paraguay a amené le Conseil à une intervention positive, la première de ce genre sur le continent américain. Son action aurait pu être plus forte, si le gouvernement britannique était moins préoccupé de la répercussion que peut avoir chacun de ses actes aux Etats-Unis. Du moins a-t-elle permis de constater que la Bolivie se considérait comme membre de la Société des nations et d'arrêter les hostilités déjà engagées. Ce n'est pas un succès extraordinaire, mais ce n'est certainement pas un échec.

Les méthodes prudentes du Conseil qui se considère plutôt comme un médiateur que comme un arbitre, ont été appliquées avec un bonheur inégal, dans les trois grandes affaires politiques qui lui ont été soumises, l'affaire des mitrailleuses de Saint-Gotthard, celle des optants hongrois et celle des relations polono-lituaniennes. La première a été liquidée tant bien que mal ; les deux autres en sont encore au stade des négociations directes, avec des chances d'accord qu'il ne faut pas sous-estimer.

Dans le domaine du désarmement, l'année 1928, malgré de nombreuses dicussions, a été creuse. La Commission consultative n'a pu se mettre d'accord que sur un geste nécessaire, mais négatif, le rejet d'un projet démagogique de la délégation russe. Pour le reste, la nécessité d'attendre le résultat des négociations en cours entre les gouvernements, en dehors de la Société des nations, sur la sécurité et le désarmement naval s'est imposé à tout le monde.

Malheureusement, l'Assemblée n'a pas pu enregistrer officiellement la conclusion du pacte Kellogg qui n'est pas encore en vigueur, et le compromis naval franco-anglais, dont on s'était promis monts et merveilles, a dû être abandonné devant l'opposition catégorique des Etats-Unis.

La neuvième Assemblée, qu'on a pu appeler l'Assemblée, de la franchise, a, par contre, initié une discussion internatio-

nale d'une haute tenue et d'une grande utilité, sur la question des minorités. Cette question a été posée à nouveau, en des termes plus vigoureux que diplomatiques, au cours de la session du Conseil qui s'est tenue à Lugano.

Certains s'en inquiètent, le régime des minorités étant hérissé de difficultés. Mais il nous paraît sain qu'après huit ans d'existence, la Société des nations puisse aborder sans trembler les problèmes centraux de la vie internationale, ceux dont dépend vraiment la paix.

C'est probablement dans le domaine économique que la S. d. N. a enregistré les plus grands succès. Non pas certes qu'elle ait rien à son actif d'aussi éclatant que la Conférence économique internationale de 1927. Mais cette conférence serait restée vaine et stérile si elle n'avait pas été suivie d'un travail de réalisation pratique, plus obscur mais non moins utile. L'année 1928 a vu mettre en œuvre les organismes nouveaux issus de la Conférence, le Comité économique et le Comité consultatif. Deux conférences spéciales ont abouti à des conventions, l'une sur les restrictions d'importation et d'exportation, l'autre sur les statistiques. Un travail patient d'unification a été accompli, notamment dans le domaine de la nomenclature douanière, de la police vétérinaire, du traitement des étrangers, etc... Enfin, de grandes enquêtes ont été instituées dans deux industries spéciales, le sucre et le charbon.

Ce travail est à longue échéance. Ses résultats n'apparaîtront que peu à peu. Mais on peut dès maintenant affirmer que la Société des nations est en train de créer la base économique qui manque encore au rapprochement des peuples et à sa propre activité où, si l'on aime mieux, de traduire par une politique nouvelle, les réalités économiques profondes dont elle est née.

Il faudrait plus de place que nous n'en avons pour énumérer tout ce que la Société des nations a accompli en d'autres domaines, au cours de cette année « normale ». Mentionnons seulement, entre tant d'autres choses de grande portée, la conclusion de l'emprunt bulgare, l'entrée en vigueur de la convention de l'opium de 1925, et l'aide demandée à l'organisation d'hygiène par le gouvernement hellénique, en vue d'un assainissement scientifique de son pays.

Nous tenons à mentionner encore la très importante décision prise par la Société des nations au mois de septembre, au sujet de l'emplacement de son futur palais. La collaboration bienveillante de toutes les autorités suisses a permis de donner à cette épineuse question une solution de nature à satisfaire les intéressés.

La cour internationale de justice, de son côté, a vu sa compétence obligatoire reconnue par trois Etats nouveaux, l'Allemagne, l'Espagne et la Hongrie ; elle a rendu au cours de cette année trois avis consultatifs et cinq jugements. Un juge nouveau, M. Hughes, lui a été nommé en remplacement de

M. John Bassett Moore ; enfin elle a fait à l'Assemblée, l'objet de délibérations prolongées et d'une haute tenue, provoquées en partie par une proposition de la délégation suisse.

La reprise générale de l'activité économique dans le monde a procuré à l'Organisation internationale du travail de réels succès. Alors qu'en 1926, le nombre des ratifications de conventions avait été de 29 et en 1927 de 33, en 1928 ce nombre s'est élevé à 85. Ce phénomène prouve que le Bureau international du travail dépend étroitement de la situation économique générale.

Outre sa conférence annuelle le B. I. T. a convoqué cette année une conférence intergouvernementale pour le statut juridique des réfugiés ; en outre la commission des travailleurs intellectuels a tenu sa première session.

Au début de l'année, le directeur-adjoint du B. I. T., M. Butler, s'est rendu dans l'Afrique du Sud et M. Albert Thomas se trouve actuellement en Extrême-Orient, suivi de près par M. Avenol, secrétaire général adjoint de la S, d. N. qui se rend en Chine.

En dépit de ses détracteurs, on le voit, la Société des nations joue dans la vie internationale un rôle utile et croissant. S'étonner qu'elle ne fasse pas davantage c'est, si l'on est de bonne foi, méconnaître les conditions de l'evolution, qui pour être durable doit être lente.

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SOMMAIRE

	Pages
Discours de M. N. TITULESCO, Paris, le 15 mars 1929	407
Memorandum du Comité Exécutif des CONGRES DES NATIONALITES EUROPEENNES, avril 1929	420
Projet de Loi du GOUVERNEMENT FRANÇAIS quant à l'adhésion à l'acte général pour le Règlement Pacifique des différends internationaux, mars 1929	430
Letter from Mr. Frank B. KELLOGG, Washington, February 19, 1929.	437
Inaugural Address of PRESIDENT HOOVER, Washington, March 4, 1929	440
Discours de M Paul HYMANS, Bruxelles, le 17 mars 1929	442
Speech of M. Stanley BALDWIN, Leicester, March 21, 1929	443
Déclaration du Comte BETHLEN, Budapest, le 31 mars 1929	444
Letter of Thanks issued by KING GEORGE, April 22. 1929	446
Speech of Sir Austen CHAMBERLAIN, Wakefield, April 27, 1929.	447
Note sent by Mr. Stanley BALDWIN to the League of Nations Union, London, May 1929	450
Speech of Sir Austen CHAMBERLAIN Birmingham, May 1929.	454
Discours de M Auguste ZALESKI, Varsovie, le 24 mars 1929.	458
Statement of Mr. MACKENZIE KING, May 7, 1929	462
Discours de M. N. TITULESCO, Berlin, le 21 mai 1929	463
Speech of Lord CUSHENDUN, Rochester, May 21, 1929	465
Statement of Mr STIMSON, Washington, May 31, 1929.	466
Speech of Mr. J. Ramsay MACDONALD, Lossiemouth, June 18, 1929.	467
Message of Mr. J. Ramsay MACDONALD and Speeches of Mr. Arthur HENDERSON, General DAVES and Sir Austen CHAMBERLAIN, London, June 18, 1929	468
Rede von Dr. Eduard BENES, Prag, 20. Juni 1929.	48
Discours de M. Raymond POINCARE et du Président de la République Française M. DOUMERGUE, Verdun le 23 juin 1929.	48
Reden von Albert BERZEVICZY, Josef VESZI und Graf BETHLEN, Budapest, 27. Juni 1929.	
The KING'S SPEECH, London, July 2, 1929.	
Speech of M. J. Ramsay MACDONALD, London, July 2, 1929.	
Discours de M. J. AVENOL et du Roi d'Egypte FOUAD, Genève, le 5 juillet 1929.	
Discours de M. E. J. PHELAN et du Roi d'Egypte FOUAD, Genève 5 juillet 1929	
Discours du Président de la Confédération Suisse Dr. Robert P Bellinzona, le 18 juillet 1929.	

(*Voir la suite du Sommaire à la page 2 de la couve*

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Pages

Resolution of Senator CAPPER, Washington, March 1929. . . . 512
Speech of Mr. D. LLOYD GEORGE, Kondon, July 3, 1929 514
Speeches of Mr. G. LOCKER-LAMPSON, Colonel WEDGWOOD, Sir Austen CHAMBERLAIN, Mr. Walter RUNCIMAN and Mr. Arthur HENDERSON, Londom, July 5, 1929. 515
Résolutions adoptées par le Congrès de l'INTERNATIONALE OUVRIERE SOCIALISTE, Bruxelles, du 5 au 11 août 1928. 521
Résolutions adoptées par LA PAIX PAR LE DROIT, Nancy le 31 octobre et le 1er novembre 1928 542
Discours de M. J. PAUL-BONCOUR, Paris, le 15 décembre 1928. . . 546
Résolutions adoptées par L'ASSOCIATION FRANÇAISE POUR LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS, Paris, le 16 décembre 1928. 547
Résolution adoptée par la CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR LES METHODES MODERNES DE GUERRE, Francfurt-sur-Main, du 4-6 janvier 1929 548
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MINORITIES OF RACE, LANGUAGE AND RELIGION, London, March 21 and 22, 1929. 549
Resolution adopteld by the Executive Committee of the LABOUR AND SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL, London, February 12, 1929. . . . 555
Mémoire du Bureau Permanent de l'ENTENTE INTERNATIONALE CONTRE LA TROISIEME INTERNATIONALE, Genève, février 1929. 555
CONFERENCE ON FORCED LABOUR, London, March 6 and 7, 1929. . 566
Appel du BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DE LA PAIX, janvier 1929. . . 571
Lettre du BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DE LA PAIX, Genève, avril 1929. 573
Annual Report of the NATIONAL REFORM UNION, Manchester, April 1929 574
Résolution adoptée par la LIGUE FRANÇAISE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN, Rennes, avril 1929. 575
Eingabe der DEUTSCHEN FRIEDENSGESELLSCHAFT an den Reichskanzler, Berlin, 16. April 1929. 577
Eingabe der DEUTSCHEN FRIEDENSKARTELLS an die Unterrichtsverwaltungen, Berlin, 22. April 1929. 581
Resolution adopted by the WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, Geneva, April 19, 1929. 584
LABOUR'S Electoral Programme, London, April 30, 1929. 584
Metting of the WOMEN'S PEACE CRUISADE, London, May 9, 1929. . 585
Statement on the Foreign Policy of the LIBERAL PARTY, London, May 23, 1929 587
Mémoire de l'UNION CATHOLIQUE D'ETUDES INTERNATIONALES, Fribourg, mai 1929 588
Speech of Mr. D. LLOYD GEORGE, London, March 1, 1929. 592
Statement of Mr. Elihu ROOT. Geneva, March 20, 1929. 593
Discours de M. Louis DE BROUCKERE et Réponse du Jonkheer Dr. J. LOUDON, Genève, le 15 avril 1929. 595
Letter of Lord CECIL OF CHELWOOD, April 1929. 598
Speech of Mr. D. LLOYD GEORGE, London, May 9, 1929 599
Si nous parlions de Genève ?, par M. J. PAUL-BONCOUR. 601
Discours de M. le Prof. William RAPPARD, Zurich, le 16 mai 1929. 603
Speech of Lord CECIL OF CHELWOOD, Paris, May 29, 1929. . . . 606
Rede von Lord CECIL OF CHELWOOD, Berlin, 6. Juni 1929. . . . 607
The Geneva Protocol by Mrs H M. SWANWICK. 614
Der Konflikt zwischen Bolivia und Paraguay, von Prof. Dr. Hans WEHBERG. 616
Rome et Genève, par M. William MARTIN. 620
Who is the Enemy ? by Mr. H. WILSON HARRIS. 622
La Santé d'un Peuple, par William MARTIN. 625
Der Weltschiedsvertrag der Generalakte, von Prof. Dr. Hans WEHBERG. 627
L'Agriculture au Carrefour, par M. William MARTIN. 634
Armies ford Ever, by Mr. H. WILSON HARRIS. 636
Nach der Genfer Debatte, vom Ausschuss der Europäischen Nationalitätenkongresse. 638
r Austen's Record, by Mr. H. WILSON HARRIS. 642

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DISCOURS DE M. N. TITULESCO, SUR LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS ET LES MINORITES, PARIS, ACADEMIE DIPLOMATIQUE LE 15 MARS 1929.

Parmi les sujets que notre Académie a mis à l'étude, la Société des Nations, comme de droit, occupe une place d'honneur.

Peut-on, sans trop d'inconvénients, aborder une question d'actualité dont la discusssion n'est pas close à Genève ?

Je le crois, mais à la condition de ne pas prendre position sur les aspects particuliers du problème, de quelque nature qu'ils soient, avant de connaître les renseignement que le Comité d'Etudes, nommé par le Conseil, nous fournira et les opinions qu'il émettra.

Sous le bénéfice de ces observations, je crois même que l'examen de quelques aspects généraux du problème peut présenter une certaine utilité.

En effet le problème des minorités paraît s'être transformé en une sorte de refuge, où les fausses impressions sont venues s'accumuler en masse.

Pour l'opinion publique, anxieuse de paix et de justice, le mot *minorité*, depuis longtemps, est devenu le synonyme du mot *complication*.

Il est même devenu pour elle une source de suggestions assez ténébreuses. Ainsi il évoque, pour beaucoup, tantôt l'image d'Etats se dressant contre d'autres Etats ; tantôt l'image de pays, récalcitrants à tout devoir d'humanité et cherchant à se frayer, à travers des articles de traités, un passage vers la liberté la plus absolue poussée jusqu'au droit d'opprimer tantôt l'image de groupements d'hommes brandissant au-delà des frontières des privilèges impérissables envers et contre tous!

Il est vrai que ces images changent avecchaque degré de latitude.

Heureusement, il n'en est rien.

L'histoire politique des dernières dix années prouve au contraire que s'il y a un terrain sur lequel se sont affirmées la solidarité internationale et la générosité compréhensive de toutes les nations sans distinction, c'est bien le terrain du traitement des minorités.

Il est vrai que transposé dans le domaine des relations internationales, le problème des minorités semble intéresser particulièrement deux catégories d'Etats. D'une part, les Etats qui voient un nombre considérable d'hommes auxquels les attachent des liens de race, de langue ou de religion, appelés à vivre pour toujours audelà de leurs frontières et qui ont l'intérêt légitime de voir le maximum de protection accordée à leurs anciens

sujets. D'autre part, les Etats, sur le sol desquels ces minorités sont appelées à vivre et qui tout en étant sincèrement disposés à assurer les droits de l'homme et spécialement l'individualité culturelle et religieuse à tous leurs habitants sans distinction aucune, ont néanmoins un intérêt tout aussi légitime à ne pas voir se cristalliser en corps étrangers à l'organisme national des groupements quels qu'ils soient, à ne pas voir se créer un Etat dans le sein de l'Etat.

Mais ce serait une singulière erreur que cette constatation pour considérer le problème des minorités sous la forme d'un antagonisme entre Etats.

Le problème des minorités intéresse la Société des Nations tout entière sans distinction. La sollicitude à l'égard des minorités est générale et tout aussi sincère d'un côté que de l'autre. Si cette sollicitude est pour les uns sentimentale, elle est pour les Etats à minorités d'ordre politique.

Un Etat qui pousserait le sentiment jusqu'à créer des complications politiques sans égard pour les intérêts de la paix, violerait les obligations assumées par le Pacte. D'autre part, un Etat, qui ne s'efforcerait pas d'assurer le maximum de bien-être à ses minorités, un Etat qui ne réaliserait pas que c'est dans la loyauté de tous ses citoyens à son égard et non pas dans l'annihilation de l'individualité culturelle et religieuse de certains de ses sujets que réside son intérêt primordial ; un Etat qui ne se rendrait pas compte que c'est à lui d'être le meilleur champion des intérêts bien compris de ses minorités ne violerait pas seulement la loi d'humanité qui doit guider toute communauté civilisée : il violerait la loi de la conservation de sa propre existence !

Il est néanmoins vrai que dès que l'on sort du domaine des affirmations de principe pour entrer dans celui des réalisations pratiques, dès que l'on tâche de procéder à un ajustement concret entre des intérêts opposés; on assiste à un heurt de conceptions des plus contradictoires. Le bon droit et les intérêts de la paix sont invoqués avec une force égale, semble-t-il, des deux côtés. On paraît être en pleine confusion : Le problème semble inextricable.

A quoi tient cette discordance, souvent trop bruyante et toujours douloureuse ? A une raison bien simple. On a discuté, on discute, on persiste à discuter le problème des minorités, en confondant, avec une facilité surprenante, le *désirable* avec *l'obligatoire*.

Si nous abordions, cependant, ce problème d'une manière plus simple mais plus précise. Si nous disions : Ce qui constitue une obligation internationale actuelle doit faire l'objet d'une exécution efficace et scrupuleuse ; ce qui dépasse les obligations internationales actuelles, peut faire l'objet d'une discusssion ; mais que chacun sache que discussion ne vaut pas engagement et que discussion signifie liberté, nous aurons non seulement

simplifié le problème, mais nous l'aurons aussi éclairci et, par là, contribué à sa solution.

Nous aurons éclairci le problème, parce que, envisagé sous cet angle, on ne tardera pas à s'apercevoir que le droit positif actuel des Traités est non seulement scrupuleusement appliqué, mais encore qu'il s'est établi à côté de lui, par le concours bienveillant de tous les intéressés, un droit plus large, un droit plus souple, un véritable droit prétorien, qui est l'expression de l'esprit de solidarité généreuse sans lequel la Société des Nations ne saurait travailler.

Quelles sont, en effet, les limites du droit positif actuel des minorités, ces limites qu'à mon sens on a trop souvent perdues de vue ?

Loin de moi l'idée de faire un exposé détaillé sur ce sujet que d'ailleurs M. Mandelstamm a traité devant vous avec une compétence et une maîtrise absolues.

Contentons-nous de fixer brièvement les trois pièces du système : Les droits subjectifs des minorités, les instruments diplomatiques qui les ont créés et les garanties internationales qui leur sont octroyées.

Certains droits de l'homme ont été assurés aux minorités dans certains pays, sous une garantie internationale. Ce sont notamment : Le droit à la nationalité, le droit à la vie, le droit à la liberté individuelle et à la liberté du culte, le droit à l'égalité, le droit d'user de la langue minoritaire, le droit de participer aux bénéfices des fonds publics destinés à des buts d'éducation, de religion, de charité. Ajoutez à ces droits généraux certains droits spéciaux octroyés à des minorités expressément dénommées : Les minorités juives, les Valaques du Pinde, le mont Athos, les communautés sicules et saxonnes de Transylvanie, les Ruthènes au Sud des Carpathes et vous aurez, dans son ensemble, le bouquet des droits subjectifs appartenant aux minorités.

Quels sont les instruments diplomatiques qui ont donné le caractère de droit international positif à ces prérogatives ? Ils sont variés, mais leur ensemble peut se décomposer comme suit :

Il y a d'abord les traités spéciaux, dits Traités des Minorités, signés à Paris pendant la Conférence de la Paix. Par la Pologne, la Yougoslavie, la Tchécoslovaquie, la Roumanie et la Grèce.

Il y a ensuite certains chapitres spéciaux insérés dans les Traités de Paix et assurant la protection des minorités en Autriche, en Hongrie, en Bulgarie et en Turquie.

Il y a encore des déclarations faites dans le même but devant le Conseil de la Société des Nations par l'Albanie, l'Esthonie, la Finlande, la Lettonie et la Lithuanie.

Il y a, enfin, des conventions répondant aux mêmes nécessités, notamment la Convention germano-polonaise pour la Haute-Silésie en date du 15 mai 1922 qui fixe aussi une procédure

spéciale contractuelle distincte des règles de droit commun et la Convention pour le territoire de Memel en date du 5 mai 1924.

L'énumération des droits subjectifs des minorités a pu paraître longue ; celle des instruments qui les consacrent a pu paraître fastidieuse ; mais la garantie internationale, le véritable droit positif des minorités, les dispositions contractuelles qui font sortir cette matière du droit international pour le faire entrer dans le droit international, résident toutes mais absolument toutes, dans le texte suivant que vous retrouverez dans tous les traités ou déclarations se référant aux minorités :

« La Tchécoslovaquie, (ou l'Autriche, la Pologne, la Yougoslavie, la Roumanie, etc... agrée que dans la mesure où les stipulations des articles précédents affectent des personnes appartenant à des minorités de race, de religion ou de langue, ces stipulations constituent des obligations d'intérêt international et seront placées sous la garantie de la Société des Nations. Elles ne pourront être modifiées sans l'assentiment de la majorité du Conseil de la Société des Nations. Les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, l'Empire Britannique, la France, l'Italie et le Japon s'engagent à ne pas refuser leur assentiment à toute modification des dits articles qui serait consentie en due forme par la majorité du Conseil de la Société des Nations.

La Tchécoslovaquie (ou l'Autriche, la Pologne, la Yougoslavie, la Roumanie, etc...) agrée que tout membre du Conseil de la Société des Nations aura le droit de signaler toute infraction ou danger d'infraction à l'une quelconque de ces obligations et que le Conseil pourra procéder de telle façon et donner telles instructions qui paraîtront appropriées et efficaces dans la circonstance ».

Voilà ce que disent les Traités. C'est tout.

A examiner attentivement ce texte fondamental, mais unique, on est conduit à faire certaines observations d'une importance capitale pour l'éclaircissement du problème qui nous préoccupe.

D'abord, dans les nombreux instruments que nous avons énumérés, comme dans la disposition qui crée la garantie internationale, on parle des minorités sans les définir.

Qu'est-ce donc une minorité ? Les traités ne le disent pas. Doit-il s'agir d'un nombre considérable d'homme que la race, la langue, la religion distinguent des autres, ou doit-il s'agir de quelques-uns seulement ? Les traités ne le disent pas. Doit-il s'agir de groupements établis depuis longtemps ou seulement de réfugiés établis récemment ? Les traités ne le disent pas. Les textes parlent, il est vrai, de la différence de race, de langue, de religion. Mais qui est appelé à distinguer entre la langue et le dialecte, entre la religion et la secte ? Les traités ne le disent pas. Ce qu'il est important de relever, c'est que les traités qui protègent les minorités sont en fonction d'une réponse à une

question capitale ayant trait à la définition de l'objet même de leur protection. Ceci est tellement vrai, que six ans après l'entrée en vigueur des traités de minorité, M. de Jouvenel reconnaissait dans les débats de Genève la nécessité d'une bonne définition des minorités, dans le cadre des traités existants, bien entendu. Et M. l'Ambassadeur de Mello-Franco disait au Conseil le 9 décembre 1925 que les minorités, telles que les envisagent les traités, n'étaient pas seulement des groupements ethniques, mais encore des attributs psychologiques, sociaux et historiques et partant, il reconnaissait que la définition de la minorité devait faire l'objet d'une étude confiée à des techniciens : juristes, historiens et sociologues !

Allons-nous nous embarrasser de cette imprécision pour entraver la protection existante des intérêts minoritaires ? Loin de moi cette pensée. Ce que je veux, c'est la lumière et non pas une mauvaise action. Ce que je veux, c'est qu'on retienne ce qu'est le traité et ce que, malgré ses défauts, le travail fécond de la Société des Nations a pu en faire.

Contentons-nous donc pour le moment, de la constatation que les minorités se distinguent des majorités comme le blanc se distingue du noir, et poursuivons l'examen du texte fondamental, mais unique, qui établit la garantie internationale des droits de minorités.

Cette garantie est-elle permanente ou temporaire ? Que de discussions intéressantes à ce sujet. Nous avons entendu la théorie de la permanence à tel point absolue, que la garantie de la Société des Nations, en matière de minorités, apparaissait comme l'unique exception à la loi de Gœthe sur le sort changeant des choses. Nous avons entendu la théorie d'une permanence atténuée par la désuétude dans laquelle tomberait le droit positif des minorités réconciliées, faute de plaignants. Nous avons entendu la théorie de la permanence sous la forme de l'éternité de demain qui succèderait à l'éternité d'aujourd'hui.

Laissez-moi rappeler, à ce sujet, le texte même qui crée la garantie internationale en matière de minorités et son interprétation par M. Tittoni, dont le rapport du 20 octobre 1920 constitue, de l'avis de tous, la charte fondamentale dans la matière.

« Il ne sera pas inutile tout d'abord de définir clairement le sens exact des termes : Garantie de la Société des Nations. Il semble évident que cette stipulation signifie avant tout que les dispositions concernant les minorités sont intangibles, c'est-à-dire qu'elles ne peuvent pas être modifiées dans le sens de porter une atteinte quelconque aux droits actuellement reconnus et sans l'assentiment de la majorité du Conseil de la Société des Nations ».

L'intangibilité du droit positif actuel des minorités signifie donc ceci : Sa modification ne dépend pas seulement du con-

sentement des signataires, d'une part, les Grandes Puissances d'autre part les Etats à minorités, mais encore d'un assentiment supplémentaire, notamment celui de la majorité du Conseil. Mais cet assentiment obtenu, par les Etats à obligations minoritaires, les Grandes Puissances signataires des Traités de minorités se sont, avec anticipation, formellement engagées à ne pas refuser leur consentement à une telle modification.

Ai-je dit tout cela dans le but de demander la suppression de la garantie actuellement existante en matière de minorités? Rien n'est plus loin de ma pensée. L'existence de la garantie actuelle est un élément d'apaisement psychologique pour les minorités de partout. Le concours que la Société des Nations a donné aux minorités et aux Etats dans leurs démêlés compliqués est des plus précieux.

Ce que je veux, c'est que lorsqu'il s'agit des traités, on en parle avec précision, que l'on sache où ils commencent et où ils finissent, condition indispensable pour que l'on reconnaisse, à chaque moment, où l'on se trouve.

Continuons d'examiner le texte de la garantie internationale en matière de minorités. Qu'observons-nous encore ?

Les Traités des minorités ont été faits en dehors de la Société des Nations, entre les Grandes Puissances, d'une part, et les Etats à minorités, d'une autre. Ces traités prévoient que les droits conférés aux minorités seront placés sous la garantie de la Société des Nations. Nous nous trouvons en présence d'une stipulation en faveur d'un tiers. Mais ce tiers c'est la Société des Nations, dont les droits et obligations sont fixés par le Pacte. Peut-on étendre les droits et obligations de la Société des Nations autrement que par la voie d'un amendement au Pacte ? Voilà une question à laquelle je ne me proposerai pas de répondre ici.

Qu'il me suffise de rappeler qu'elle a préoccupé le représentant d'un pays qui n'est pas signataire d'un Traité de Minorités. J'ai nommé Lord Balfour.

En effet, le 22 octobre 1920, lors de la discussion du rapport de M. Tittoni, on lit dans le procès-verbal du Conseil le passage suivant :

« M. Balfour demande si le Conseil a le droit de ne pas accepter la charge de la protection des minorités et s'il ne pourrait pas, par conséquent, faire des réserves sur la procédure instituée par les Traités pour la protection des minorités par le Conseil.

« L'opinion générale du Conseil est que le Conseil pourrait en théorie refuser de garantir les droits des minorités, mais que pratiquement, un refus est impossible. Il aurait, en effet, des inconvénients graves : Les traités n'ayant été acceptés par les intéressés qu'avec la plus grande difficulté, il faut éviter de réduire encore leur autorité.

« M. Balfour demande que tout au moins ses observations soient portées au procès-verbal ».

Ai je rappelé ceci dans le but d'en déduire la cessation immédiate comme illégale de l'intervention de la Société des Nations en matière de minorités ? Qui pourrait le penser ? Je l'ai rappelé pour bien mettre en évidence qu'à un geste de générosité des Grandes Puissances en faveur des minorités a suivi un second geste de générosité des Etats intéressés, qui ont volontairement accepté les stipulations en question et un troisième geste de générosité de la Société des Nations, qui a accepté une charge supplémentaire pour le plus grand bien des peuples. Rappeler ce concours de générosité ne me semble pas inutile au moment où des voix s'élèvent pour dire que la Société des Nations ne remplit pas tout son devoir. Elle fait mieux : Elle le dépasse !

Enfin, à bien observer le texte qui établit la garantie internationale en matière de minorités, on arrive à une quatrième conclusion des plus importantes.

En quoi réside cette garantie ?

Elle réside dans le fait que tout Membre du Conseil a le droit d'attirer l'attention du Conseil sur l'infraction ou le danger d'infraction aux obligations contenues dans le Traité des Minorités. Ceci signifie que toute infraction aux Traités des Minorités ne devient une question internationale que si l'un des membres du Conseil prend la responsabilité personnelle de la signaler à l'attention du Conseil. En d'autres termes, conformément aux traités, le problème des minorités n'existe pas et ne peut exister sur le terrain international comme un différend entre la minorité et le Gouvernement intéressé, mais seulement comme un différend entre un ou plusieurs Etats agissant sous leur propre responsabilité, comme procureurs de l'humanité, en faisant leur la cause en question et le Gouvernement national intéressé.

Voilà tout ce que les Traités disent, en matière de garantie internationale des minorités.

Ce n'est pas avec mélancolie que l'on doit envisager ce bilan d'imprécisions et de limitation. Au contraire, il faut penser à la satisfaction intérieure que donne le fait de savoir qu'en dehors des strictes limites de la loi il y a les commandements impérieux de la conscience et de constater que la cause sacrée des minorités progressera plus vite par un appel à la bienveillance et à la générosité des peuples que par l'évocation du spectre des sanctions.

A côté du droit, il y a la pratique. Et parce qu'on la considère critiquable, on parle de la changer. A côté de la pratique, il y a donc la réforme.

La pratique, a-t-on dit, a dévié des intentions des fondateurs du système des minorités.

Mais a-t-elle dévié dans un sens restrictif ou dans un sens extensif, par rapport aux intérêts des minorités ? L'examen que

nous venons de faire, prouve, à lui seul, que la déviation n'a pu être que dans le sens extensif, car autrement il eût été bien difficile que le système créé par les Traités fonctionnât commodément.

Déjà à la séance du 22 octobre M. Balfour soulignait la tâche ingrate et difficile du Conseil en matière de minorités et disait : « s'il faut intervenir pour protéger une minorité, un des Membres du Conseil devra se résoudre à se faire l'accusateur de l'Etat qui n'aurait pas tenu ses engagements ».

Et M. Tittoni de répondre : « Il est vrai que la tâche attribuée au Conseil est loin d'être agréable mais il ne peut guère la refuser ».

Or, trois jours plus tard, voici M. Hymans qui déclare avoir été frappé par les observations présentées à la séance précédente, par M. Balfour sur la situation difficile où serait placé un Membre du Conseil qui accuserait un Etat d'avoir violé les traités de minorités. En conséquence, M. Hymans suggère, dans le but de rendre cette tâche moins ingrate, une proposition tendant à faire examiner par un Comité de Trois toute pétition émanant des minorités. Le Conseil décide l'approbation de la proposition de M. Hymans en ces termes :

« En vue de faciliter aux Membres du Conseil l'exercice de leurs droits et devoirs en ce qui concerne la protection des minorités, il est désirable que le Président et deux membres désignés par lui dans chaque cas, procédant à l'examen de toute pétition ou communication à la Société des Nations ayant trait à une infraction ou à un danger d'infraction aux clauses des Traités pour la protection des Minorités. Cet examen aura lieu aussitôt que la pétition ou la communication en question aura été portée à la connaissance du Conseil ».

Le Comité des Trois était né !

Qu'il mérite des éloges ou qu'il mérite des critiques, une chose est claire : Par son instauration, en fait sinon en droit, la procédure en matière de minorités est déclanchée non pas par un acte émanant d'un membre du Conseil sous sa propre responsabilité, ainsi que le traité l'exige, mais par la plainte des minorités elles-mêmes, alors que conformément au rapport Tittoni, la pétition est une simple source d'information pour le Conseil.

En effet, après un premier examen de la plainte, au point de vue de sa recevabilité on la transmet au Gouvernement intéressé pour observations. Ensuite, comme généralement les observations écrites ne sont pas considérées suffisantes, on appelle devant le Comité des Trois, des délégués pour donner des explication verbales ! Aux explications verbales succèdent les conseils amicaux, des Membres du Comité des Trois : Conseils amicaux, sous forme de rappel des devoirs internationaux. Tout celà à huis clos, bien entendu, mais c'est un procès en rè-

gle dont la procédure a dû être établi minutieusement par les résolutions du Conseil.

Les services que le Comité des Trois a rendus à la cause des minorités sont trop connus pour qu'il ait encore besoin d'une défense. Un sentiment de justice me commande cependant de constater que le plus grand bien que l'on puisse faire au Comité des Trois c'est de dire tout le mal qu'en pensent les Etats à obligations minoritaires : Il leur a fait passer nombre d'heures désagréables. Je ne dis pas qu'ils ne lui doivent pas aussi nombre de bonnes actions. Mais comme il m'a été donné de connaître les deux versants du coteau en ma qualité de Membre du Conseil et de représentant d'Etats à obligations minoritaires, je puis affirmer, en toute impartialité, qu'il est beaucoup plus facile de supporter les critiques que l'on adresse au Comité de Trois que de supporter celles qu'à son tour il adresse aux représentants des Etats intéressés, chargés de lui fournir des explications orales.

Tout le monde n'est pas du même avis, c'est fort possible. Mais que l'on approuve ou que l'on critique le système de la Société des Nations, ceci ne peut rien contre ce fait indiscutable : Le comité de Trois et la procédure qu'il suit sont en dehors du Traité des Minorités. Ce sont eux qui constituent précisément ce droit prétorien établi dans l'intérêt des minorités à titre gracieux, par la constante collaboration de la Société des Nations et des Etats à obligations minoritaires sans le consentement desquels il ne saurait d'ailleurs fonctionner.

Aussi, en face des critiques apportées à la pratique actuelle, dont les unes, comme celles de MM. Stresemann et Dandurand sont inspirées par le noble désir de mieux faire, dont les autres sont dues à la malveillance ou à la simple ignorance, se dresse le bilan suivant qui prouve que la Société des Nations a fait plus que ce que lui dictaient les obligations strictes des Traités et que les Etats à minorités se sont employés de leur mieux afin de l'aider dans l'accomplissement de sa mission humanitaire.

Premièrement la Société des Nations a accepté sans obligation prévue dans le Pacte et dans un esprit de générosité qui commande le respect, la garantie des stipulations concernant la protection des minorités.

Deuxièmement, la Société des Nations ne s'est pas embarrassée de l'imprécision des instruments diplomatiques et a accordé sa sollicitude et sa protection aux minorités sans énoncer les éléments constitutifs de ces dernières.

Troisièmement, la Société des Nations a instauré à côté du droit restrictif des Traités une pratique plus souple qui assure aux minorités l'examen de leurs demandes suivant une procédure minutieuse, avant qu'un membre du Conseil ait fait sienne leur cause et qui oblige les Gouvernements intéressés à des explications avant que l'action légale prévue par les Traités soit déclenchée.

Quatrièmement, la Société des Nations a imposé certaines limitations au droit prétorien, extra-légal qu'elle a créé elle-même, mais elle n'a jamais porté atteinte au droit légal des membres du Conseil qu'elle a voulu conserver intact, tel qu'il résulte des Traités.

Enfin, la Société des Nations, malgré tout ce qu'elle a fait dans le passé, mise en présence de propositions d'une haute élévation de pensée comme celles de l'honorable Dr Stresemann et celle du président Dandurand, a nommé un Comité d'Etudes, afin de rechercher dans quelle mesure on pourrait en tirer profit dans le cadre des obligations existantes et de l'intérêt général bien compris.

Quand tels sont les faits, peut-on vraiment parler d'une déviation de la pratique de la Société des Nations, en défaveur des minorités, par rapport aux intentions des fondateurs du système?

Les minorités peuvent-elles vraiment se plaindre que la théorie et la pratique ne vont pas de pair et qu'il y a contradiction éclatante entre les promesses du Traité et les faits réels?

Si cela était, que dire alors des Etats qui ont signé des traités restrictifs et qui n'ont accepté la pratique actuelle que parce qu'ils croyaient que l'on ferait justice à leur geste en y voyant l'expression d'une contribution bénévole à une cause humanitaire sacrée, mais sacrée par la réciprocité morale qu'elle implique?

Contradiction entre les promesses des fondateurs du système et la réalité d'aujourd'hui?

Qu'on me permette de rappeler un fait, assez peu connu, quoiqu'il remonte à dix ans seulement et qu'il se rapporte aux travaux de la Conférence de la Paix.

On cite la lettre de M. Clémenceau à M. Paderewski comme étant le document qui révèle l'esprit qui a guidé la Commission des Nouveaux Etats et la Conférence de la Paix dans l'élaboration du statut nouveau des Minorités. Rien de plus juste. Mais cette lettre en date du 28 juin 1919 qui ne contredit d'ailleurs en rien ce que je viens de dire, doit être lue à la lumière du procès-verbal en date du 29 mai 1919, de la Conférence de la Paix, présidée par M. Clémenceau lui-même.

On aurait ainsi l'image nette de la contre-partie que les fondateurs du système offraient aux Etats appelés à signer les Traités de Minorités et qui n'étaient point très désireux d'accepter les nouvelles stipulations qui les inquiétaient au point de vue de leur souveraineté nationale.

Dans le projet primitif du Pacte de la Société des Nations il il y avait un certain article 21 qui assurait la protection des minorités dans tous les pays. Cet article, que les Etats appelés à signer les Traités à Minorités avaient accepté, était ainsi conçu :

« Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour déclarer qu'aucune entrave n'interviendra dans le libre exercice de toute croyance, religion ou opinion, dont la pratique n'est pas incompatible avec l'ordre public et les mœurs et que, dans leur juridiction respective nul ne sera troublé dans sa vie, sa liberté ou sa poursuite de bonheur en raison de son adhésion à une telle croyance, religion ou opinion ».

Cet article 21 fût retiré du projet du Pacte, parce que l'on considérait qu'il portait atteinte à la souveraineté des Etats.

Les nouveaux Etats invoquèrent alors le principe de l'égalité des Souverainetés et déclarèrent accepter toute disposition que tout les Etats faisant partie de la Société des Nations admettraient sur leur propre territoire en cette matière, mais refusèrent de se soumettre à des clauses spéciales.

Comment la conférence de la Paix justifia-t-elle son attitude d'imposer à certains pays des obligations qu'elle-même considérait incompatible avec la souveraineté normale d'un Etat? Très simplement! Elle dit aux Etats à minorités: Nous vous concédons de larges accroissements territoriaux, nous vous *garantissons vos frontières nouvelles*, il est donc juste que nous stipulions les conditions dans lesquelles il est possible de vous donner cette garantie.

Mais écoutons plutôt les paroles prononcées par le président Wilson à la séance du 31 mai 1919, où fut discutée la question des minorités:

« Je ne crois pas qu'il soit humiliant pour la Roumanie de recevoir des *conseils amicaux* des Etats qui s'appellent les Etats-Unis d'Amérique, la Grande-Bretagne, l'Italie, la France. Aucun de ces Etats ne voudra exercer un pouvoir *indû* en Roumanie... Dans ces conditions, est-il déraisonnable et injuste que les Grandes Puissances disent à leurs associés non pas en dictateurs, mais en amis: Il ne nous est pas possible de *garantir* des règlements territoriaux que nous ne croyons pas justes et nous pouvons accepter de laisser subsister des éléments de désordre, qui, croyons-nous, troubleront la paix du monde »... Comment une Puissance, les Etats-Unis par exemple, car c'est la seule au nom de laquelle je puisse parler, peut-elle, après avoir signé ces Traités, au cas où ils contiendraient des éléments qui ne lui paraissent pas devoir être permanents, déclarer à son peuple à 3000 milles de distance, qu'elle a établi la paix du monde? Cela n'est pas possible! *Et pourtant ces transactions impliquent l'espoir de la Roumanie, de la Tchécoslovaquie, de la Serbie que si l'une quelconque des clauses de ce règlement n'est pas observée, les Etats-Unis enverraient leurs armées et leurs navires pour veiller à leur exécution.*

Je demande à mon ami Kramer, à mon ami Trumbic, à mon ami Bratiano, *n'être assurés* que si nous estimons préférable de conserver dans le traité les mots qu'ils désirent omettre, ce n'est pas pour insister sur des conditions déraisonnables, mais

parce que nous voulons que le Traité nous donne le droit de décider si *ce sont là des choses qu'il nous est possible de garantir* ».

Voilà ce que disait le président Wilson, le 31 mai 1919, à la réunion de la Conférence de la paix, présidée par M. Clémenceau qui signa la lettre du 28 juin 1919.

En comparant le régime de plus en plus meilleur que la Société des Nations a fait aux minorités, à côté et par-dessus les traités et le sort de la contre-partie offerte par la Conférence de la Paix aux Etats à obligations minoritaires, je me demande si ce ne sont pas ces derniers qui sont autorisés à se poser la question de savoir si, après une première décade d'activité de la Société des Nations, les idées des fondateurs du système des minorités apparaissent aujourd'hui encore sous le même aspect ?

Et maintenant que nous savons avec précision quel est le droit positif des minorités, quelle est l'action humanitaire de la Société des Nations en vertu de ce droit et à côté de lui, nous sommes à notre aise pour comprendre comment le problème des minorités se pose actuellement et quelle est la réponse qu'il comporte.

Depuis un certain temps et notamment aujourd'hui, nous assistons à un mouvement qui tend à réformer la protection des minorités telle qu'elle existe dans le but de la rendre plus efficace et plus complète. Rien de plus noble. Mais dans ce mouvement une tendance se fait jour, notamment celle de présenter certains pays — ceux qui n'ont pas de traités de Minorités — comme des apôtres d'une justice internationale nouvelle et comme des réfractaires à toute amélioration du sort des minorités, les pays liés par des Traités de Minorités. Rien de plus faux que cet antagonisme, nous l'avons démontré, rien de plus injuste que cette discrimination en face du même idéal de justice.

Il n'est pas moins vrai que cette croyance, même erronée, oblige les Etats à obligations minoritaires, à préciser leur point de vue à ce sujet surtout au sein de cette Haute Académie à laquelle revient l'honneur d'avoir inscrit à son ordre du jour, dès sa première séance publique, le problème des minorités ethniques et à laquelle revient donc le droit de connaître l'opinion de tous ses membres, pour qu'elle puisse en juger, au moment opportun, scientifiquement et en pleine connaissance de cause.

On a cherché à présenter le point de vue des Etats à obligations minoritaires comme tendant à créer les complications aux Grandes Puissances en inventant des minorités là où il n'y en avait pas. Je ne crois pas que cette présentation soit tout à fait exacte. Je ne crois pas que les Etats à obligations minoritaires qui ont appris les droits de l'homme à l'école française, les libertés constitutionnelles à l'école britannique, le

principe des nationalistes à l'école italienne, songent à retourner contre leurs maîtres l'enseignement sacré qu'ils en ont reçu.

Il me semble que la position des pays à obligations minoritaires pourrait se résumer plus fidèlement comme suit :

De quoi s'agit-il :

S'agit-il de la mise en vigueur de nos obligations actuelles ? Nous répondons : Mesurons-les !

S'agit-il de certaines améliorations dans le cadre de nos obligations actuelles ? Nous répondrons : Discutons-les !

S'agit-il de *l'extension* de nos obligations actuelles ? Nous sommes forcés de répondre : Partageons-les !

S'agit-il de poser le problème des minorités dans son vrai cadre qui est de nature morale et non pas coercitive, nous répondrons : Comptez sur nous pour tous ce que la morale, l'esprit humanitaire et l'intérêt général commandent de faire.

Qu'est-ce donc, scientifiquement parlant, que le droit des minorités ? C'est un droit positif humain *mais régional*, Cette constatation impose un choix : Ou bien le droit des minorités est un droit positif permanent mais à tendance universelle, ou bien le droit des minorités constitue un droit temporaire destiné à sauvegarder les droits de l'homme jusqu'au moment où la conciliation de tous les intérêts s'est faite harmonieusement.

Les obligations des Etats à l'égard des minorités doivent être universelles sous forme de droit ou sous forme de morale. Droit positif, perpétuellement régional est une conception inadmissible. Le droit des minorités ne peut rester éternellement le droit des vaincus et des nouveaux venus !

Que l'universalité se réalise sur le terrain du droit ou sur celui de la morale, nous n'avons pas de choix à faire, les deux conceptions nous conviennent également. Je ne dis même pas qu'un choix doive être fait immédiatement. Mais il faut qu'une conception nous oriente pour l'avenir. Je ne sais ce qu'elle sera.

Ce que je sais, c'est qu'elle ne doit pas être. L'extension des obligations actuelles, quelle qu'en soit la forme ou la méthode, à la charge de quelques Etats seulement, sans perspective de les voir acceptées par d'autres, sans perspective d'en voir la fin, quelle que soit la bienveillance qu'on montrera aux minorités, quels que soient les efforts que l'on fait pour réaliser à leur égard les désirs les plus exigeants, tout cela ne contribuerait qu'à affaiblir la consolidation des Etats.

On ne peut servir la paix que par un idéal. Or l'idéal doit avoir comme base la justice et non pas la certitude internationale.

C'est pourquoi je dis : Accomplissons scrupuleusement le devoir d'aujourd'hui. Partons de ce qui est.

Exécutons pleinement nos obligations existantes sous les auspices de la S. d. N. Que les minorités soient traitées avec bien-

veillance, mais que les Etats auxquels elles ressortissent le soient aussi. Cherchons avec l'aide de la Société des Nations ce qui dans le cadre moral peut amener le rapprochement de tous les hommes, que la langue, la religion, ou la race, seuls séparent.

Et lorsque la finalité poursuivie par les Traités sera accomplie, traçons largement le programme de nos devoirs moraux vis-à-vis des hommes, en tant qu'hommes. Nous aurons ainsi mieux mérité de nos patries respectives, nous aurons aussi plus facilement enrayé les difficultés qui semblent nous séparer aujourd'hui, car la morale est une pour tous et l'homme égal à l'homme partout où il se trouve.

MEMORANDUM DU COMITÉ EXECUTIF DES CONGRES DES NATIONALITES EUROPEENNES, PRESENTE A M. ADATCI, RAPPORTEUR DU CONSEIL DE LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS, RELATIF AUX PROPOSITIONS FAITES PAR LES REPRESENTANTS DE L'ALLEMAGNE ET DU CANADA CONCERNANT LA PROTECTION DES MINORITES NATIONALES, AVRIL 1929

Avant d'entrer dans le fond de cet exposé, dont le but est seulement de contribuer à mettre en lumière les divers aspects des questions touchées par les propositions susmentionnées, nous croyons devoir préciser le caractère des Congrès des Nationalités Européennes, où les expériences et les aspirations communes de presque toutes les minorités nationales d'Europe se sont manifestées en des discussions documentées et en des résolutions unanimement prises.

Ces Congrès sont la représentation directe et légitime des Minorités suivantes : Allemands de Danemark, Esthonie, Hongrie, Italie, Lettonie, Lithuanie, Pologne, Roumanie, Tchécoslovaquie et Yougoslavie ; Blanc-russes de Pologne ; Bulgares de Roumanie ; Catalans d'Espagne ; Hongrois de Roumanie, Tchécoslovaquie et Yougoslavie ; Juifs de Bulgarie, Esthonie, Lettonie, Lithuanie, Pologne et Tchécoslovaquie (Carpatho-Russie) ; Slovènes et Croates d'Italie et d'Autriche ; Suédois d'Esthonie ; Tchécoslovaques d'Autriche et Ukrainiens de Pologne et de Roumanie, c'est-à-dire 34 minorités appartenant à 12 peuples différents, et vivant dans 14 Etats européens.

Les Congrès furent tenus à Genève, annuellement, depuis 1925 ; le cinquième Congrès va avoir lieu, lui aussi, à Genève, fin août 1929.

Afin de rendre les travaux de ce Congrès plus efficaces, certaines limitations furent prévues et observées dès le début.

D'abord, les matières à discuter ne sont traitées que sous l'aspect que ces problèmes présentent dans les pays d'Europe.

Ensuite ne sont admises à prendre part aux Congrès que les Minorités nationales ayant une personnalité bien définie, clairement différenciée et nettement distincte de tout autre nationalité, et qui sont représentées par des délégués venant des pays mêmes.

En outre, les solutions envisagées sont uniquement celles qui sont réalisables dans le cadre des Etats.

Enfin sont exclues des travaux du Congrès toutes considérations de modification de frontières.

Ces limitations seraient, peut-être, déjà suffisantes pour déterminer le caractère, l'esprit et les tendances qui président à l'œuvre des Congrès des Nationalités Européennes.

Il y a lieu de faire observer, en outre, que les résultats de cette œuvre commune représentant l'unanimité des points de vue des Minorités des races et des nationalités les plus diverses et des parties les plus différentes de l'Europe.

Tout ce qui vient d'être exposé est confirmé d'une façon incontestable par les informations parues dans la presse, par les discours sténographiés et publiés dans les comptes rendus des Cougrès et, enfin, par les conclusions et résolutions des Congrès, jointes à ce Memorandum.

Le Problème des Minorités Nationales.

Il suffit d'un examen rapide du problème pour se rendre compte que les questions des minorités ne sont pas des questions locales ou régionales, mais, au contraire, des questions d'ordre tout-à-fait international. La meilleure preuve en est offerte par le fait que les pétitions présentées jusqu'ici sur la base des traités à la S. d. N. proviennent de Minorités appartenant aux 13 peuples suivants : albanais, allemand, arménien, blanc-russe, bulgare, grec, hongrois, juif, lithuanien, polonais, russe, tchécoslovaque et turque.

On constate aussi qu'il s'agit, dans l'ensemble, d'un problème non passager, mais, au contraire, durable, car il dérive de sentiments qui sont à la base de la vie morale et intellectuelle des peuples.

Toutefois, l'aspect le plus important du problème, en Europe Centrale et Orientale surtout, résulte du fait, que, dans certaines zones, les peuples sont enchevêtrés d'une manière inextricable. En Esthonie, Lettonie, Lithuanie, Pologne, Tchécoslovaquie, Autriche, Hongrie, Roumanie et Yougoslavie, c'est-à-dire en neuf Etats, habitent non seulement les unes à côté des autres mais sont, en grande partie, entremêlées, des populations appartenant aux nationalités suivantes: allemande, suédoise, juive, esthonienne, lithuanienne, lettonienne, blanc-russe, polonaise, ukrainienne, tchécoslovaque, russe, hongroise, roumaine, serbe-croate-slovène, bulgare, albanaise, turque. Dans chacun de ces Etats il y a des Allemands et des Juifs ; dans quatre d'entre eux, il y a des Polonais, des Hongrois et des Russes ; dans trois, des Ukrainiens, des Slovènes et des Lithuaniens ; et dans

deux d'entre eux chacun des peuples suivants : serbes-croates, blancs-russes, tchécoslovaques, bulgares, turcs, esthoniens, lettons. La situation dans lesdites parties de l'Europe est donc telle que des modifications de frontière, fussent-elles, peut-être même possibles, voire nécessaires dans certains cas, n'infirmeraient en rien la constatation fondamentale : Il n'est pas de modification de frontière possible qui puisse faire disparaître le problème des Minorités.

Le caractère du problème des Minorités nationales comme nous venons de le décrire, impose une seule solution générale et juste: c'est celle vers laquelle tendant tous les efforts et tous les vœux des Congrès des Nationalités Européennes, à savoir, la création dans chaque Etat d'un régime qui assurerait à chaque Minorité son libre développement culturel.

« Il s'agit — a déclaré M. Aristide Briand — tout en sauve-
« gardant les Minorités dans le maintien de leur langue, de leur
« culture, de leur religion et de leurs traditions, de sauvegarder
« cette sorte de petite famille dans le sein de la grande, non pas
« pour affaiblir celle-ci, mais pour assurer l'harmonie de tous
« ses éléments constitutifs. Il ne s'agit pas de la désapparition
« des Minorités, mais, d'une sorte d'assimilation qui fait grandir
« la nation sans diminuer la petite famille ».

La gravité du problème dans son état actuel

L'état actuel du problème est caractérisé précisément par le fait que la réalité, dans les divers Etats de l'Europe possédant des Minorités Nationales, est très loin de la situation si éloquemment préconisée dans les paroles précitées.

A titre d'illustration, nous allons considérer quelques aspects seulement d'entre les plus caractéristiques de la situation actuelle des Minorités.

Point n'est besoin de dire que la première condition pour sauvegarder l'âme et l'esprit individuels des Minorités, c'est le libre développement culturel, assuré surtout par l'école et, en général, par tout l'enseignement et par la faculté de se servir librement de leur langue. Or, c'est précisément dans ce domaine que la situation des Minorités est particulièrement difficile dans nombre d'Etats. Plus d'un million d'enfants européens ne peuvent recevoir l'enseignement que dans une langue qui n'est pas la leur. Dans la plupart des cas, il n'y a même pas de possibilité de créer des écoles privées. Et même, dans certains cas, l'usage de la langue minoritaire dans la vie publique et privée, dans la presse et même dans les églises, est interdit.

Dans maints Etats, la population minoritaire autochtone est affaiblie et diminuée, d'un côté, par l'oppression politique et les mesures d'assimilation violente qui provoquent des émigrations individuelles et en masse ; de l'autre côté, par les obstacles auxquels un grand nombre de ressortissants minoritaires se sont

heurtés pour obtenir le droit de citoyen de l'Etat englobant la Minorité, voire même le droit de rentrer dans leur pays. Si l'on compare les statistiques de 1918 à 1920 avec celles de date plus récente, l'on constatera que, dans certains cas, la population minoritaire a été diminuée dans une mesure impressionnante. Or, l'état d'irritation que l'on constate dans un grand nombre de problèmes minoritaires n'est-il pas dû à l'agitation inévitable des émigrés involontaires?

Dans divers Etats, des mesures et des réformes spéciales ont été mises sur pied dans le but de léser les Minorités dans leur situation économique. C'est ainsi que les lois agraires ont été souvent exécutées d'une façon inique à l'égard des ressortissants appartenant à certaines Minorités. La pratique arbitraire instituée par les autorités administratives chargées de l'application de ces lois est venue souvent aggraver leur caractère de lois d'exception. Par ce moyen, on est arrivé à ébranler toute la situation économique de certaines minorités.

Ces graves atteintes aux droits les plus élémentaires de l'individu produisent un grand malaise et une vive irritation au sein des Minorités.

Nous nous bornerons à ces quelques points caractéristiques; nous croyons qu'ils suffisent à illustrer la gravité de l'état actuel du problème des Minorités.

Or, cette situation est préjudiciable, non seulement pour les Minorités mais aussi pour les Etats eux-mêmes.

D'abord, l'arbitraire à l'égard des Minorités en même temps qu'il nuit directement à celles-ci, devient, en dernier lieu, également nuisible aux majorités. Les Etats s'en trouvent, en effet, affaiblis dans leur constitution morale et juridique. C'est à ce propos qu'il convient de citer les paroles d'un grand juriste : « Ce qu'on sème dans le domaine du droit civil, on va le cueillir dans les domaines du droit public et du droit international ».

En outre, la situation faite aux Minorités telle que nous venons de l'exposer, envenime les relations entre les Etats et c'est là que réside la cause profonde des litiges et des conflits internationaux. C'est un fait que le sentiment de la solidarité nationale, aujourd'hui plus fort et plus vif que jamais, unit les peuples par-dessus les frontières, quel que soit l'Etat auquel ils appartiennent, et tous les peuples sentent le besoin spirituel de se préoccuper du sort de chacun de leurs membres.

Tels sont, en brève synthèse, les faits qui déterminent la réalité indiscutable et la gravité, chaque jour croissante, du problème des Minorités.

Et c'est donc à tort qu'on prétend, comme on l'a fait quelquefois, que les pétitions et les protestations des Minorités sont la conséquence d'une agitation artificielle et d'une propagande d'exaltation. L'expérience montre que tout mécontentement dans les questions de ce genre s'appuie sur des faits concrets. La meilleure façon d'éliminer tout sujet de plainte, c'est de

créer un état de choses où des doléances et des récriminations seraient inutiles et où tous les citoyens de l'Etat pourraient vivre en parfaite harmonie.

Les voies propres à résoudre le problème des Minorités

C'est dans l'entente directe entre la Minorité et l'Etat que toutes les Minorités voient le moyen le plus approprié — et vers lequel tendent, d'ailleurs, tous leurs efforts — à résoudre leurs problèmes.

Il est réconfortant de constater que l'idée de l'entente direct a progressé dans la pratique et que, dans certains Etats, les Minorités peuvent marquer des succès quant à la réalisation de leurs aspirations, tendant à régler ces questions directement avec leurs Etats.

Cela vaut, pour la Lettonie, et, surtout, pour l'Esthonie. Dans ce dernier pays, après des pourparlers entre le Gouvernement et les Minorités et des travaux préliminaires auxquels ont pris part les deux parties, travaux qui n'ont pas duré moins de trois ans, l'on a pu aboutir à la création d'une loi pouvant servir de prototype pour d'autres Etats. Elle accorde aux Minorités une large autonomie culturelle, en leur donnant la possibilité de régler et de diriger elles-mêmes leurs affaires culturelles, spécialement dans le domaine scolaire. Cette loi, dont on avait, tout d'abord, prétendu qu'elle contribuerait à la création d'un Etat dans l'Etat et qu'elle séparerait définitivement les Minorités du peuple majoritaire, a donné à ce jour, après un fonctionnement de trois ans — et, sur ce point, tous les milieux s'accordant, aussi bien ceux du peuple majoritaire que des Minorités — des résultats diamétralement opposés à ce qu'on redoutait. Non seulement elle n'a pas conduit à la séparation, mais, au contraire, elle a aidé à l'encadrement approprié des Minorités et de leurs organisations publiques dans l'organisme de l'Etat.

A regret, il ne s'agit là que de cas isolés, une politique opposée étant pratiquée dans maints autres Etats. C'est au développement historique de certains peuples qu'on convient d'attribuer, dans une certaine mesure, la responsabilité de l'incompréhension existante quant à la nécessité de régler, entre eux-mêmes, des questions qui constituent, depuis des générations des sujets d'antagonisme suscités précisément par la vie en commun dans le cadre d'un même Etat.

Or, la Société des Nations est appelée à exercer dans ce domaine une haute et importante mission. En jetant dans la balance tout le poids de son autorité morale, elle peut tracer et indiquer des voies susceptibles de rapprocher et de réconcilier les peuples et les Etats. A ce propos, il convient de rappeler que « l'Union Interparlementaire » a, plus d'une fois, émis le vœu — en recommandant sa réalisation à l'attention des divers Etats — que, par l'institution de Commissions paritaires, l'on crée

une forme d'organisation dans laquelle un règlement loyal des différents entre Majorités et Minorités pourrait être recherché et trouvé. On peut regretter que cette idée n'ait été accueillie, voire réalisée, dans aucun des Etats. Par ailleurs, en mettant en valeur des expériences faites dans les Etats comme l'Esthonie, en vue du règlement du problème des Nationalités, la S. d. N. accomplira, incontestablement, une action généreuse et féconde dans l'intérêt de la paix de l'Europe.

Si la S. d. N. était prête à employer tous les moyens à sa disposition pour arriver, d'une façon générale, à la solution du problème des Minorités, c'est-à-dire par une étude approfondie des droits des Minorités et en préconisant des voies susceptibles d'amener une entente entre Etats et Minorités, l'accomplissement de son rôle en tant qu'instance pour le règlement des différends relevant de sa juridiction deviendrait, de lui-même, de moins en moins nécessaire. Il n'existe pas, en effet, de Minorité aux yeux de laquelle le recours à la S. d. N. par la voie d'une pétition ne soit une *ultima radio*.

Ce n'est que lorsque toutes les tentatives faites en vue de régler, par des négociations directes, tel ou tel autre différend, demeurent infructueuses, qu'une Minorité se décide actuellement à adresser une pétition à la S. d. N. Cela peut être démontré documents à l'appui. Il s'ensuit qu'il est absolument indispensable que ce droit de dernier recours à l'institution suprême assumant la sauvegarde des stipulations des traités, existe non seulement en droit, mais aussi en fait. Qu'il nous soit cependant permis de constater, en toute franchise, que la garantie de ce droit, voire son exercice, est aujourd'hui pour les minorités presque inexistant et cela doit être attribué, en première ligne, à la procédure en vigueur.

Les défauts de la procédure en vigueur concernant l'examen des pétitions des minorités

Les défauts de la procédure actuelle découlent de trois causes principales :

1° D'abord le manque absolue de publicité dans la procédure, en commençant par des pétitions des Minorités ; cette pratique établie par une décision du Conseil de septembre 1923, est tout-à-fait contraire aux principes généraux de l'activité de la S.d.N. Elle rend aussi plus difficile le rôle et l'intervention des membres du Conseil.

L'on connaît les difficultés d'ordre moral qui s'opposent à l'intervention des membres du Conseil. S'ils portent devant le Conseil de la S. d. N. une question des Minorités quelconque, ils s'exposent à être suspectés de sentiments d'inimitié envers l'Etat mis en cause. La publicité, en plaçant chaque question dans le domaine de l'opinion publique, pourrait contribuer à faire disparaître cette difficulté.

Quand on a interdit en 1923 la publicité des pétitions, on s'est appuyé surtout sur le motif que les plaintes des minorités présentent un caractère de propagande et d'excitation, déterminant l'aigrissement des rapports entre les peuples. A ce moment là, il n'existait pas encore de règles pour la recevabilité des pétitions. L'opposition à leur publication était donc, jusqu'à un certain point, compréhensible. Par la suite, le Conseil a établi en 1925, certaines règles pour la recevabilité des pétitions. Dès lors, on ne saurait plus justifier la pratique en vertu de laquelle les pétitions reçues par le Conseil ne peuvent pas être publiées. Il convient encore de faire remarquer, à ce propos, que presque toutes les pétitions proviennent des organisations officielles des Minorités qui fonctionnent dans les Etats mêmes et dont les dirigeants sont des citoyens de l'Etat en question. Ceux-ci, en adressant une pétition à la S. d. N. assument donc toute la responsabilité et tous les dangers et conséquences que pourrait entraîner leur attitude. Cela suffit déjà pour empêcher que les plaintes ne soient rédigées de telle façon qu'on puisse s'en servir comme instrument d'agitation.

Nous sommes persuadés que la publication des pétitions, surtout de celles qui proviennent des organisations officielles des Minorités, comme aussi la publication des comptes rendus complets avec tous les rapports des Comités des Trois, pourraient se faire sans aucun danger d'agitation et présenteraient une grande utilité pour tous, car il en résulterait, au moins, l'apaisement de toute l'opinion publique, surtout dans les pays où vivent les peuples intéressés.

2° Insuffisance de la procédure ayant pour but de recueillir les informations qui constituent la base des travaux du Comité des Trois.

Inutile de souligner que nous sommes entièrement convaincus de la bonne foi des Comités des Trois et de leurs membres, mais la procédure ne prévoit, après la présentation des plaintes des Minorités, que les observations des gouvernements mis en cause. Les pétitionnaires n'ont pas la possibilité de répondre par des remarques aux observations des gouvernements et ils ne reçoivent même pas communication des observations de ceux-ci. Dans ces conditions, les Comités des Trois reçoivent forcément une information incomplète et unilatérale.

Alors même que le Comité des Trois juge que la plainte est sérieuse et bien fondée, les pétitionnaires ne savent pas quelle en est la suite. Un membre du Conseil qui a siégé dans plusieurs Comités des Trois, résumait ainsi les conséquences de cette procédure : « la partie qui a introduit la plainte reste par la suite éliminée ».

Ces lacunes de la procédure en vigueur sont peut-être la cause la plus directe de la profonde déception des Minorités quant à l'efficacité de la garantie de la S. d. N. L'on ne saurait donc être surpris qu'un fort scepticisme commence à se mani-

fester au sein des Minorités, scepticisme qui pourrait, ainsi qu'un membre du Conseil l'a justement fait remarquer,se transformer en désespoir.

3° La pratique établie par les Comités des Trois dans l'examen des plaintes.

En fait, la fonction des Comités des Trois ne devrait consister qu'à préparer la tâche réservée au Conseil même. En réalité,en cette matière, la fonction du Conseil a été complètement supprimée en faveur du Comité des Trois qui l'a remplacé. Or, les Comités des Trois n'ont ni l'autorité ni la compétence du Conseil, et, spécialement,ne peuvent recourir à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale.

Les adversaires des Minorités prétendent que les fonctions du Comité des Trois seraient une amplification des traités « en faveur des Minorités ».

Cette affirmation n'est pas d'accord avec la réalité. On peut constater, au contraire, que la pratique actuelle n'a joué nullement en faveur des Minorités, et qu'elle n'a pas été instituée dans leur intérêt. De fait, on peut même remarquer qu'elle tourne plutôt au détriment des Minorités.

Il est, peut-être, vrai que le travail des Comités des Trois a donné, en quelques cas, des résultats utiles. Mais en beaucoup de cas, ce ne sont que des succès transitoires ou éphémères,car avec ses moyens d'informations,et aussi longtemps qu'il existe la règle de procédure ne permettant pas de saisir le Conseil de la S. d. N. dans des questions dont il avait été déjà saisi auparavant, le Comité des Trois n'a pas la possibilité de vérifier si les mesures par lui recommandées pour assurer un règlement durable des questions ont été réellement prises.

Mais c'est dans une autre direction que l'on doit rechercher le défaut capital de la procédure en usage. La possibilité que les membres du Conseil avaient auparavant de prendre une initiative, sur la base de documents en leur possession, a disparu. Sans toutefois qu'une règle expresse s'y oppose,tant que le Comité des Trois s'occupe d'une pétition et ne présente pas encore son rapport à ce sujet,aucun membre du Conseil,par égard pour ses collègues, ne se permet généralement d'user de son droit d'initiative dans la même question. Mais le fait le plus saillant est que les Comités des Trois ont presque complètement cessé de présenter des rapports au Conseil. Alors que les membres des Comités des Trois sont disposés à faire des démarches ou à intervenir officieusement auprès des Gouvernements, ils ne sont pas, pour des raisons très compréhensibles, régulièrement enclins à présenter au Conseil un rapport dans lequel il faudrait parler des démarches entreprises sans résultat et provoquer ainsi l'adoption d'une décision qui pourrait être désagréable pour le Gouvernement mis en cause. Cette situation déterminée exclusivement par les causes d'ordre psychologique, fait que l'on aboutit au résultat que presque toutes les

pétitions sans distinction, qu'elles soient fondées ou non, s'arrêtent aux Comités des Trois, et que le Conseil reste, en fait, en dehors de leur examen.

Il suffit, pour illustrer ces faits, de considérer que, tandis que la situation des Minorités provoque des pétitions de plus en plus fréquentes, les rapports du Secrétariat de la S. d. N. à l'Assemblée, sur l'action du Conseil concernant la protection des Minorités, sont d'une année à l'autre plus brefs.

Par là s'explique aussi pourquoi le recours à la Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale n'est pas utilisé, car les pétitions ne parviennent pas au Conseil qui, seul, pourrait exercer ledit recours. Cela est d'autant plus regrettable que c'est par la Cour de La Haye seulement qu'on pourrait retirer ces questions si délicates du domaine politique pour les placer dans le domaine juridique.

La conclusion qui s'impose à la suite de l'examen de ces défauts et de ces injustices, est que toute la procédure n'a abouti qu'à entraver ou à étouffer les pétitions des minorités.

Propositions

1. Rétablissement de la publicité de la procédure

a) Publication de toutes les pétitions provenant des Minorités et répondant aux règles établies par le Conseil de la S. d. N. en 1925.

b) Publications des observations présentées par les Gouvernements, concernant lesdites pétitions, des répliques qui pourraient être faites par les pétitionnaires ainsi que des rapports des Comités des Trois.

c) Publication, en outre, d'un ensemble de toutes les pétitions parvenues à la S. d. N. pendant l'année sous forme d'un recueil spécial, ou bien dans le rapport annuel du Secrétariat, ainsi que la procédure et des négociations auxquelles elles ont donné lieu.

2. *Complément de l'information fournie aux Comités des Trois, voire aux membres du Conseil, en ce qui concerne chaque pétition adressée à la Société des Nations*

Les pétitionnaires, surtout lorsqu'il s'agit d'organisations des Minorités qui fonctionnent dans l'Etat en cause, doivent obtenir le droit de fournir, le cas échant, une réplique aux observations présentées par l'Etat. En outre, sans prétendre que les Minorités aient dans la procédure les mêmes droits que l'Etat et sans rapport à la question de la personnalité juridique des Minorités, on devrait cependant chercher un mode quelconque permettant aux Minorités d'intervenir et de suivre la procédure.

3. *Amélioration de la pratique actuelle des Comités des Trois*

a) Présentation obligatoire dans un délai déterminé de rapport des Comités des Trois au Conseil de la S.d.N. en ce qui con-

cerne l'instruction de chaque pétition répondant aux règles établis par le Conseil, étant entendu que ces rapports devraient viser, en premier lieu, à donner non une appréciation, mais un exposé de l'Etat de fait réel.

b) La procédure en vigueur devrait être accélérée par la fixation d'un certain délai, sous lequel les rapports des Comités des Trois devraient être transmis au Conseil.

c) Elargissement des Comités des Trois dans le sens que, dans l'avenir, y siègent tous les membres du Conseil, voire leurs suppléants, ainsi que le prévoit la proposition de M. le Sénateur Dandurand.

d) En outre, on devrait aussi envisager une plus complète solution de la question de procédure par la création dans la S. d. N. d'un organe permanent spécial.

4. *La Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale de la Haye* devrait être régulièrement consultée, afin que, de cette façon, l'examen des questions étant retiré du domaine politique puisse se poursuivre sur le terrain juridique.

5. *Constitution d'une Commission spéciale d'experts* auprès de la S. d. N. pour l'étude en général de toutes les questions concernant les Minorités, l'examen des solutions possibles et la réalisation de toutes les tâches incombant aujourd'hui à la S.d.N. en dehors de la procédure en vigueur. (Nous signalons par exemple comme étude possible à réaliser par cette Commission celle de la question de l'existence de fait de certaines Minorités, l'examen des progrès accomplis dans les différents pays, des enquêtes sur les lois locales, l'élaboration des règles et des recommandations générales pouvant conduire à une entente directe entre les Etats et les Minorités, etc.)

6. *Réalisation des engagements d'ordre moral votés par l'Assemblée de la S. d. N. 1922.*

Quoique l'unanimité se soit faite autour de cette résolution exprimant le vœu que tous les Etats membres de la S. d. N., y compris ceux qui n'ont pris aucune obligation de cette nature dans un traité, accordent à leurs Minorités, au moins des droits égaux à ceux prévus par les stipulations des traités, on est forcé de constater que dans maints Etats qui ne sont liés par aucun traité, se poursuit une dénationalisation ouverte et systématique des Minorités. Or, la conséquence en est que, dans les Etats signataires des traités, se crée l'opinion que, lors de l'élaboration des stipulations desdits traités, il s'agissait moins de principes de droits généraux que d'une contrainte unilatérale imposée seulement aux signataires. Il est clair que là réside une difficulté psychologique et un grave obstacle entravant la reconnaissance et le respect des stipulations des traités par les Etats qui y sont soumis. Cette situation, si un changement n'intervenait pas sous peu, serait de nature à provoquer une crise générale, puisqu'elle ébranle les normes prescrites par la

S. d. N. en 1922 et, par conséquent, le prestige de la S. d. N. Pour ces motifs,il est de la plus grande urgence pour la S.d.N., au cas où une généralisation des stipulations de protection ne saurait être prévue, voire réalisée dans un bref délai, de faire valoir, en mettant dans la balance toute son autorité, les normes morales notées l'année 1922.

Il a été clairement souligné dans les discours prononcés à la dernière session du Conseil, non seulement que les droits des Minorités étaient sacrés,mais qu'on repoussait toute idée d'assimilation, tout procédé de dénationalisation, toute contrainte et tout procédé de violence.Ce sont ces procédés qui ont créé jadis l'atmosphère, l'état des esprit favorables à l'éclat de la guerre, et on ne doit pas s'étonner de voir les Minorités se décider contre cet esprit, si on songe qu'étant justement et régulièrement placées aux frontières des Etats, elles seraient les premières à souffrir de toute guerre possible,et elles en souffriraient doublement car, pour elles, toute guerre européenne et surtout dans le Centre et l'Orient de l'Europe, ne serait qu'une guerre civile, qu'une guerre fratricide, C'est pourquoi les représentants légitimes des Minorités se considèrent dans l'obligation morale de faire un appel à la S. d. N. en insistant sur le besoin qu'elles sentent profondément de règler sérieusement cette question des Minorités, si on veut assurer réellement la paix de l'Europe.

PROJET DE LOI PAR LEQUEL LE GOUVERNEMENT FRANÇAIS DEMANDE AU PARLEMENT L'AUTORISATION D'ADHÉRER A L'ACTE GÉNÉRAL POUR LE RÉGLEMENT PACIFIQUE DES DIFFÉRENDS INTERNATIONAUX, ADOPTÉ LE 26 SEPTEMBRE 1928 PAR L'ASSEMBLÉE DE LA SOCIÉTÉ DES NATIONS, MARS 1929

(Le Temps du 16 mars 1929).

En déposant sur le bureau de la Chambre des députés un projet de loi tendant à autoriser l'adhésion de la France à l' « Acte général d'arbitrage » approuvé par l'assemblée de la Société des Nations, le 26 septembre 1928, le gouvernement est assuré déjà de répondre à votre sentiment ; l'initiative qu'il vous propose de prendre n'en est pas moins telle qu'il ait le devoir d'en souligner l'importance et les conséquences.

Si vous lui accordez l'autorisation qu'il sollicite, ce sera, en effet, la première fois, non seulement que la France s'engagera à recourir obligatoirement à l'arbitrage pour régler pacifiquement les différends qui viendraient à s'élever entre elle et tel ou tel Etat déterminé, mais qu'elle prendra à cet égard un engagement — pourrait-on dire — « en blanc », valable vis-à-vis

de tous les Etats qui voudront contracter les mêmes obligations.

Engagement *à portée universelle*, car notre adhésion une fois autorisée par vous et notifiée au secrétaire général de la Société des Nations, il ne dépendra plus de nous de limiter l'étendue de ses conséquences : tout Etat qui signera cet acte à son tour aura vis-à-vis de nous, en matière d'arbitrage, à la fois des droits et des devoirs ; et, de même qu'il nous appartiendra de réclamer de lui le règlement arbitral des litiges qui surgiraient entre nous, il lui appartiendra de l'exiger de nous.

Engagement *général*, en second lieu, en ce sens qu'il ne concerne pas telle ou telle catégorie de litiges, mais — sous les réserves qui seront indiquées plus loin, et qui ne visent que les possibilités de recourir, dans certains cas, à des procédures pacifiques parallèles — tous les litiges qui viendraient à surgir.

C'est là, dans la voie de l'organisation technique de la paix, un acte qui marquera, si vous nous autorisez à le faire, un nouveau progrès dans la politique de réalisations méthodiques, dont les actes de Locarno, limités à certaines puissances de l'Europe, et, tout dernièrement, le pacte de Paris, ouvert à toutes les puissances, ont marqué les principales étapes.

Il est donc particulièrement nécessaire d'en définir la portée exacte.

Aux termes de l'article 12 du pacte de la Société des Nations, les membres de la Société se sont engagés, s'il s'élevait entre eux un différend susceptible d'entraîner une rupture, à le soumettre, « soit à la procédure d'arbitrage, soit à l'examen du conseil ». Le pacte lui-même a, d'autre part, établi implicitement, dans son article 13, une distinction — fondée d'ailleurs sur une doctrine devenue classique — entre les litiges « généralement susceptibles » de la première procédure, et que l'on est convenu de désigner comme litiges « d'ordre juridique », et les autres litiges, pour lesquels le mode de règlement normal est la procédure du conseil définie à l'article 15. Cette distinction se trouve consacrée par l'article 36 du statut de la Cour permanente de justice internationale, et, encore qu'on en puisse discuter les limites, elle a été constamment maintenue dans la suite.

Dans les années qui ont suivi la fondation de la Société des Nations, le gouvernement français s'est efforcé de donner un effet pratique aux obligations qu'il avait ainsi contractées. Se conformant aux vœux répétés de l'assemblée de la Société des Nations en faveur de l'arbitrage, il a négocié des conventions particulières de conciliation et d'arbitrage. La convention avec la Tchécoslovaquie, signée le 25 janvier 1924, a ouvert la voie à une série de conventions, dont il suffit de rappeler ici les dates, pour montrer la continuité de notre effort et l'importance et la rapidité des résultats obtenus : le 16 avril 1925, une convention était conclue avec la Suisse ; le 16 octobre 1925, étaient

signés les actes de Locarno, contenant une importante convention d'arbitrage avec l'Allemagne ; puis viennent ensuite : 19 mars 1926, convention avec la Serbie ; 10 juin, avec la Roumanie ; 5 juillet, avec le Danemark ; 20 octobre 1927, avec le Luxembourg ; 10 février 1928, avec les Etats-Unis ; 3 mars, avec la Suède ; 10 mars, avec les Pays-Bas ; 6 juillet, avec le Portugal. Ainsi, dans l'espace de quatre ans, 11 conventions de conciliation et d'arbitrage ont été signées, dont 10 avec des Etats européens et une avec les Etats-Unis. D'autres sont actuellement en cours de négociation.

De son côté, la Société des Nations se préoccupait d'organiser, en le précisant, le système de règlement pacifique obligatoire des différends et de sanctions contre l'agression, dont le pacte avait posé les bases.

C'est de ce travail — qui conduisit d'abord au projet de traité d'assistance mutuelle soumis aux gouvernements en 1923 — qu'est né, en octobre 1924, le protocole de Genève, système complet, comportant un jeu de sanctions en cas d'agression, et établissant l'arbitrage obligatoire, dans tous les cas, comme le moyen juridique de définir l'agresseur. Pour établir un règlement englobant tous les litiges, le protocole s'était fondé sur la distinction faite par le pacte entre les litiges d'ordre juridique et les autres litiges ; la solution des premiers était assurée par la clause facultative — rendue obligatoire — de l'article 36 du statut de la Cour permanente de justice internationale, par laquelle les Etats peuvent s'engager à soumettre les litiges de cette catégorie à la juridiction de la Cour sous réserve de réciprocité ; pour les autres litiges, il avait maintenu la procédure du conseil telle qu'elle est instituée à l'article 15 du pacte, en la complétant, dans le cas de la « fissure » de l'alinéa 7, c'est-à-dire d'impossibilité de solution par défaut d'unanimité au sein du conseil, par une procédure arbitrale, suivant un système assez compliqué qui se trouve exposé en détail dans le remarquable rapport sur le protocole, présenté par M. Paul-Boncour à la présente législature.

En même temps que le protocole la délégation française à la Société des Nations avait donc signalé la clause facultative de l'article 36 du statut de la Cour permanente de justice internationale. Lorsqu'il apparut que l'effort d'organisation internationale, dont le protocole était l'expression, n'aboutirait pas, la question se posa de savoir si le gouvernement français ratifierait l'adhésion donnée en son nom à la clause facultative. Si, d'une part, cette clause pouvait apparaître comme constituant un progrès sur l'état antérieur du droit international, par le seul fait qu'elle comportait un engagement général, valable à l'égard de tous les Etats signataires, d'autre part, il était certain qu'elle avait été dépassée par les traités particuliers, négociés par le gouvernement de la République, qui ne limitent pas leur champ d'action aux litiges d'ordre juridique, et dont

plusieurs, en raison des conditions géographiques ou politiques du pays cocontractant, organisent l'arbitrage obligatoire pour tous les litiges, sans aucune restriction. Le développement du mouvement en faveur de l'arbitrage ne risquerait-il pas d'être ralenti si nous adhérions, dans ces conditions, à la clause facultative ?

Ces différentes considérations furent exposées à la commission des affaires extérieures de la précédente législature. Par une résolution adoptée le 1er février 1928, la commission déclara qu'il y avait lieu d'affranchir notre adhésion à la clause facultative du lien de subordination où elle se trouvait par rapport au protocole ; toutefois, d'accord avec le gouvernement, elle convint de différer toute discussion ultérieure jusqu'aux conclusions du comité d'arbitrage et de sécurité, que venait de constituer la commission préparatoire du désarmement et dont il était permis d'attendre une solution plus vaste de la question de l'arbitrage.

Ce comité avait été réuni, en effet, avec la mission de rechercher, dans le développement des principes de la Société des Nations (arbitrage, sanctions et assistance mutuelle contre l'agresseur), des garanties nouvelles de sécurité susceptibles de faciliter la limitation et la réduction des armements. L'opposition de certaines puissances à un système général de sanctions ne permit d'aboutir qu'à l'établissement d'un système complet de règlement pacifique des différends ; les autres questions ont été disjointes et laissées aux négociations d'Etat à Etat, en vue desquelles le comité a toutefois établi des modèles de conventions. Il y a là, par rapport à la situation qu'avait envisagée le protocole de 1924, une différence fondamentale, qu'il importe de souligner dès maintenant.

A la différence de la clause facultative de l'article 36 du statut de la Cour permanente de justice, « l'Acte général d'arbitrage », tel qu'il est sorti des délibérations du comité d'arbitrage et de sécurité complétées par les travaux de la première commission de l'assemblée de la Société des nations, et tel qu'il a été approuvé par cette assemblée le 26 septembre 1928, organise un système complet de règlement pacifique de tous les difrents, même politiques. Si, suivant le précédent créé par les traités de Locarno, une distinction est faite entre les différends au sujet desquels les parties se contestent un droit, et les autres différends, c'est pour les renvoyer, suivant le cas, à des procédures différentes, et non en vue d'écarter pour les uns ou pour les autres l'engagement de se soumettre à une décision impérative. Cette constatation suffit à montrer les progrès que, malgré l'échec du protocole et les résultats encore incomplets obtenus dans le domaine de la sécurité, les idées d'arbitrage continuent à faire dans les débats internationaux.

Pour les diflérends au sujet desquels les parties se contestent un droit, l'acte général prévoit une alternative : ou bien ils sont

réglés, suivant la voie judiciaire, par la Cour permanente de justice internationale ; ou bien, si les parties tombent d'accord à cet effet, ils sont renvoyés à un tribunal arbitral, sur l'organisation duquel certaines règles sont fixées.

Pour les autres différends, il est prévu une procédure de conciliation, inspirée dans ses grandes lignes de celle des actes de Locarno ; mais si cette procédure n'aboutit pas, alors que les traités de Locarno n'envisagent d'autre solution qu'un recours au conseil, l'Acte général prévoit l'institution d'un tribunal arbitral spécial, au sujet duquel il édicte également des règles précises, et qui statuera souverainement en dernier ressort.

Tel est le système. Mais il importe de noter que les auteurs de l'Acte général, mesurant l'importance du progrès qu'ils proposaient aux Etats de réaliser dans la voie de l'arbitrage, ont reconnu la nécessité de ménager des transitions. L'Acte général ne se présente donc pas comme un tout dont les divers éléments sont inséparables. Différents types de procédure (règlement judiciaire, conciliation, règlement arbitral) sont, au contraire, définis dans des chapitres différents, et la faculté est laissée aux Etats, ou bien d'adhérer seulement à celles de ces dispositions qui sont relatives à la conciliation et au règlement judiciaire, sans se lier, en ce qui concerne le règlement arbitral des différends non juridiques, ou bien, enfin, d'adhérer seulement aux dispositions relatives à la conciliation.

L'adhésion que nous vous demandons l'autorisation d'apporter, au nom du gouvernement de la République, est *une adhésion totale* : elle porte sur les trois procédures proposées pour le règlement des litiges. Si, en effet, usant de la faculté prévue par l'Acte général lui-même (article 39), nous vous proposons d'accompagner notre adhésion de *certaines réserves auxquelles*, d'ailleurs, par application de l'article 40 de l'Acte, *il sera, à tout moment, possible au gouvernement de la République de renoncer*, en totalité ou en partie *ces réserves visent des catégories de litiges* et non pas l'une ou l'autre des procédures prévues.

On n'examinera point en détail ici les dispositions de l'Acte. Elles sont exposées avec une grande clarté dans le rapport par lequel le représentant de la Grèce, M. Politis, les a présentées à l'assemblée de la Société des nations. Mais il est deux points essentiels qu'il importe de mettre en valeur.

Tout d'abord, à la différence du protocole de Genève de 1924, l'Acte général n'a rien prévu pour sanctionner la violation des obligations que contracteront les Etats en y adhérant. Il institue l'arbitrage, mais l'arbitrage sans sanction.

D'autre part, alors que, dans le système conçu par les fondateurs de la Société des nations, l'action du conseil, telle qu'elle est prévue par l'article 15, constitue un mode normal de règlement des différends au même titre que la procédure d'arbitrage l'Acte général, au contraire, ignore complètement le conseil de la Société des nations. Sans doute, pour expliquer ce silence,

on fait valoir que les rédacteurs de l'Acte avaient le souci de le rendre acceptable par les Etats non membres de la Société qui ne reconnaissent pas la compétence du conseil. Il n'en reste pas moins qu'en ignorant, sinon en méconnaissant, le rôle efficace de conciliation que peut jouer et qu'a déjà effectivement joué le conseil, l'Acte général risque d'être interprété comme tendant à diminuer, dans l'organisation de la paix, les attributions du conseil. Nous n'avons pas voulu que l'on pût reprocher à la France de se prêter à une telle altération du système conçu en 1919.

Par sa composition même, le conseil, en effet, peut être mieux en mesure qu'un collège d'arbitres d'apprécier les facteurs d'ordre politique ou d'ordre moral susceptibles de peser dans le règlement de certains conflits n'ayant pas un caractère strictement juridique. Dans l'histoire de son fonctionnement depuis neuf ans, vous trouverez maints exemples à l'appui de cette affirmation.

Au surplus, le gouvernement de la République n'entend user que dans des limites très étroites de la faculté, que lui laisse l'article 39 de l'Acte général, de déroger aux procédures instituées par cet Acte : à l'égard de trois catégories bien spécifiées de litiges, dont la gravité politique peut éventuellement être telle que le recours au conseil soit indispensable, et seulement dans le cas où le gouvernement estimera opportun de se prévaloir du droit qu'il tient du pacte de la Société des nations de porter le litige devant le conseil. Trois exceptions sont ainsi prévues :

1° « Litiges ayant trait à des prétentions de nature à porter atteinte aux traités existants. »

Il s'agit ici de la revision des traités, dont les conditions sont prévues à l'article 19 du pacte de la Société des nations : il ne nous a pas paru admissible qu'un tribunal arbitral quelconque put imposer au gouvernement français la revision d'un traité quel qu'il soit.

2° « Litiges ayant trait à des prétentions de nature à porter atteinte au régime politique et économique de l'Etat. »

Au cours des discussions qui ont abouti à l'établissement de l'Acte général, il avait été admis que la réserve « de la constitution », courante dans les traités d'arbitrage américains, était parfaitement compatible avec les termes de l'article 39. Mais, le terme « constitution » ne nous a paru répondre ni aux nécessités spéciales de notre législation organique qui est loin d'être tout entière incluse dans nos lois constitutionnelles, ni surtout aux conditions impérieuses de la vie économique moderne ; on ne saurait douter, en effet, que, bien qu'il n'existe pas de « constitution » économique, les principes fondamentaux de leur organisation douanière, fiscale, bancaire, ferroviaire, etc., etc., en un mot leur régime économique peut revêtir pour les

Etats modernes un caractère au moins aussi essentiel que leur régime politique.

3° En l'absence de dispositions contractuelles, résultant de conventions existantes ou de celles qui seront conclues sous l'action de la Société des nations en matière de limitation des armements, « litiges ayant trait à des prétentions de nature à porter atteinte à l'organisation de la défense nationale ».

D'autre part, on ne peut négliger les conventions particulières de conciliation et d'arbitrage « déjà conclues et à conclure » par la France.

L'effort accompli dans cette voie, pendant les dernières années, a été rappelé plus haut ; les résultats acquis montrent assez combien il serait fâcheux qu'une atteinte fût portée au développement d'une politique qui a permis à la France d'organiser autour d'elle un réseau pacifique et de resserrer ses liens d'amitié avec 11 Etats. Il est hors de doute qu'à l'heure actuelle beaucoup d'Etats entendent rester fidèles au système des conventions bilatérales et que plusieurs hésiteraient à adhérer à l'Acte général, si cette adhésion devait avoir pour effet de faire tomber les conventions particulières qu'ils ont conclues avec tel ou tel Etat : les conventions intervenues avec nous ne deviendront caduques que du consentement des deux contractants. Reconnaissons d'ailleurs que si l'Acte général peut être considéré comme constituant le mode de règlement de droit commun des différends internationaux, les traités particuliers établis en tenant compte des rapports particuliers de la France avec tel ou tel Etat déterminé peuvent établir des modes de règlement dont le mécanisme est mieux précisé d'avance, et approprié aux cas concrets en vue desquels ils sont conclus.

Au reste, c'est l'assemblée de la Société des nations elle-même qui, dans la résolution par laquelle elle a approuvé l'Acte général, a souligné que cet Acte, et les traités particuliers de conciliation et d'arbitrage inspirés des mêmes principes, devaient être considérés comme deux méthodes également recommandées, conduisant à la réalisation de l'arbitrage obligatoire.

Des trois termes, « arbitrage, sécurité, désarmement », qui avaient été liés en 1924 dans une même formule, le plus essentiel, « la sécurité » n'a pas encore, malgré les efforts de nos délégués à Genève, paru susceptible d'une solution générale. Cependant, le gouvernement de la République n'a pas voulu attendre, pour s'employer, dans les deux autres directions, à une œuvre de progrès. En matière de désarmement, c'est lui qui, le premier, a préconisé à Genève une première réalisation proportionnée à l'état de la sécurité internationale telle qu'elle peut être établie par des accords de caractère régional, du type des actes de Locarno. En matière d'arbitrage, notre adhésion à l'Acte général constituera beaucoup plus qu'une première étape.

Arbitrage obligatoire pour tous les différends, en application

de l'Acte général ou des conventions particulières, le gouvernement gardant pour des cas strictement délimités la faculté de recourir à la procédure du conseil : telle sera la conséquence de notre adhésion. Pour en apprécier l'étendue, il suffit de relever que dans l'Acte général de conciliation et d'arbitrage, élaboré récemment par la conférence panaméricaine réunie à Washington l'arbitrage n'est obligatoire que dans les différends d'ordre juridique, et demeure facultatif dans tous les autres cas, tandis que la procédure de conciliation n'a aucune force obligatoire. Et cependant, il s'agit d'un continent où n'existent point les mêmes causes historiques d'opposition nationale qu'en Europe, et dont l'organisation juridique a précédé celle de la Société des nations, lui servant, à certains égards, de modèle.

Ce qui nous importe, à l'heure actuelle, c'est que l'Acte d'arbitrage reçoive l'application la plus étendue, puisque c'est de cette application que dépendra la portée de notre engagement, et, d'autre part, des garanties qui nous sont assurées. Il faut que les Etats auxquels cet Acte est actuellement soumis n'hésitent point à s'engager. En cette matière, où l'exemple joue un grand rôle, la rapidité avec laquelle interviendra notre adhésion doit prendre une importance majeure.

Or, il est nécessaire que votre approbation précède cette adhésion. L'Acte général n'a point été établi sous la forme d'une convention, signée par des plénipotentiaires dont l'engagement ne devient valable qu'après ratification par les chefs d'Etat. Comme les conventions du travail, il ne comporte qu'une procédure d'adhésion. Si vous votez le projet de loi qui vous est soumis, le ministre des affaires étrangères notifiera au secrétaire général de la Société des nations l'adhésion de la France à l'Acte général dans les termes mêmes que reproduit l'article premier dudit projet ; une copie conforme de la loi sera jointe à sa lettre pour attester qu'il est autorisé à faire au nom de la France cette déclaration.

Nous vous demandons de nous mettre sans retard en mesure d'adresser à Genève l'acte d'adhésion de la République française.

LETTER FROM THE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE MR. FRANK B. KELLOGG TO EACH OF THE SIGNATORIES OF THE PROTOCOL OF SIGNATURE OF THE STATUTE OF THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, FEBRUARY 19, 1929.

At a conference held in Geneva in September 1926 by a large number of the States signatories to the Protocol of Signature of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice,

a Final Act was adopted in which were set forth certain conclusions and recommendations regarding the proposal of the United States, together with a preliminary draft of a Protocol regarding the adherence of the United States, which the Conference recommended that all the signatories of the Protocol of Signature of December 16, 1929, should adopt in replying to the proposal of the United States. Twenty-four of the Governments adopted the recommandations of the Conference of 1926 and communicated to the Government of the United States in the manner suggested by the Conference. By these replies and the proposed Protocol attached thereto the first four reservations adopted by the Senate of the United States were accepted. The fifth reservation was not accepted in full but so much of the first part thereof as required the Court to render advisory opinions in public session was accepted, and the attention of my Government was called to the amended rules of the Court requiring notice and an opportunity to be heard.

The second part of the fifth reservation therefore raised the only question on which there is any substantial difference of opinion. That part of the reservation reads as follows :

« *** Nor shall it (the Court) without the consent of the United States entertain any request for any advisory opinion touching any dispute or question in which the United States has or claims an interest ».

It was observed in the Final Act of the Conference that, as regards disputes to which the United States is a party, the Court had already pronounced upon the matter of disputes between a member of the League of Nations and a State not a member, and reference was made to advisory opinion N° 5 in the Eastern Celelia case in which the Court held that it would not pass on such a dispute without the consent of the non-member of the League. The view was expressed that this would meet the desire of the United States.

As regards disputes to which the United States is not a party but in which it claims an interest, the view was expressed in the Final Act that this part of the fifth reservation rests upon the presumption that the adoption of a request for an advisory opinion by the Council or the Assembly requires a unanimous vote. It was stated that since this has not been decided to be the case it can not be said with certainty whether in some or all cases a decision by a majority may not be sufficient but that in any case where a State represented on the Council or in the Assembly would have a right to prevent by opposition in either of these bodies the adoption of a proposal to request an advisory opinion from the Court, tho United States should en joy an equal right. Article 4 of the « draft Protocol states that » should the United States offer objection to an advisory opinion being given by the Court, at the request of the Council or the Assembly, concerning a dispute to which the United States is

not a party or concerning a question other than a dispute between States, the Court will attribute to such objection the same force and effect as attaches to a vote against asking for the opinion given by a member of the League of Nations either in the Assembly or in the Council, and that the manner in which the consent provided for in the second part of the fifth reservation is to be given should be the subject of an understanding to be reached by the Government of the United States with tho Council of the Leogue of Nations.

The Government of the United States desires to avoid in so far as may be possible any proposal which would intenfere with or embarras the work of the Council of the League of Nations, doubtless often perplexing and difficult, and it would be glad if it could dispose of the subject by a simple acceptance of the suggestions embodied in the Final Act and draft Protocol adopted at Geneva on september 23, 1926. There are, however, some elements of uncertainly in the bases of these suggestions which seem to require further discussion. The powers of the Council and its modes of procedure depend upon the Covenant of the League of Nations which may be amended at any time. The ruiling of the Court in the Eastern Carelia case and the rules of the Court are also subject to change at any time. For these reasons, without further inquiry into the practicability of the suggestions, il appears that the Protocol submitted by the twentyfour Governments in relation to the fifth reservation of the United States Senate would not furnish adequate protection to the United States. It is gratifying to learn from the proceedings of the Conference at Geneva that the considérations inducing the adoption of that part of Reservation 5 giving rise to differences of opinion are appreciated by the powers participating in that Conference. Possibly the interest of the United States thus attempted to be safeguarded may be fully protected in some other way or by some other formula. The Government of the United States feels that such an informal exchange of views as is contemplated by the twenty-four Governments should, as herein suggested, lead to agreement upon some provision which in un objectionable form would protect the rights and interests of the United States as an adherent to the Court Statute, and this expectation is strongly supported by the fact that there seems to be but little difference regarding the substance of these rights and interests.

INAUGURAL ADDRESS DELIVERED BY PRESIDENT HOOVER, WASHINGTON, MARCH 4, 1929.

(The Times, March 5, 1929).

The United States fully accepts the profound truth that our own progress, prosperity, and peace are interlocked with the progress, prosperity, and peace of all humanity. The whole world is at peace. The dangers to a continuation of this peace are largely the fear and suspicion which still haunt the world. No suspicion or fear can rightly be directed toward our country. Those who have a true understanding of America know that we have no desire for territorial expansion, for economic or other domination of other peoples. Such purposes are repugnant to our ideals of human freedom. Our form of government is ill adapted to the responsibilities which inevitably follow the permanent limitation of the independence of other peoples.

Superficial observers seem to find no destiny for our aboun ding increase in population, in wealth, and power except that of imperialism. They fail to see that the American people are engrossed in the building for themselves of a new economic system, a new social system, a new political system—all of which are characterised by aspirations of freedom of opportunity—and that these are the negation of imperialism. They fail to realise that, because of our abouding prosperity, our youth are pressing more and more into our institutions of learning, that our people are seeking a larger vision through art, literature, science, and travel, that they are moving toward a stronger moral and spiritual life—that from these things our sympathies are broadening beyond the bounds of our nation and race towards their true expression in a real brotherhood of man. They fail to see that the idealism of America will lead it to no narrow or selfish channel, but inspire it to do its full share as a nation toward the advancement of civilisation. It will do that not by mere declaration, but by taking a practical part in supporting all useful international undertakings. We not only desire peace with the world, but to see peace maintained throughout the world. We wish to advance the reign of justice and reason towards the extinction of force.

The recent Treaty for the Renunciation of War as an instrument of national policy sets an advanced standard in our conception of the relations of nations. Its acceptance should pave the way to the greater limitation of armaments, the offer of which we sincerely extend to the world, but its full realisation also implies a greater and greater perfection in the instrumentalities for the pacific settlement of controversies between the nations. In the creation and use of these instrumentalities we should support every sound method of conciliation, arbitration, and judicial settlement.

American statesmen were among the first to propose, and they have constantly urged upon the world, the establishment of a tribunal for the settlement of controversies of a justiciable character. The Permanent Court of International Justice, in its major purpose, is thus peculiarly identified with American ideals and with American statesmanship. No more potent instrumentality for this purpose has ever been conceived, and no other is practicable of establishment. The reservations placed upon our adherence should not be misinterpreted. The United States seeks by these reservations no special privilege or advantage, but only to clarify our relation to advisory opinions and other matters which are subsidiary to the major purpose of the Court. The way should and, I believe, will be found by which we may take our proper place in a movement so fundamental to the progress of peace.

Our people have determined that we should make no political engagement, such as membership in the League of Nations, which may commit us in advance as a nation to become involved in the settlements of controversies between other countries. They adhere to the belief that the independence of America from such obligations increases its ability and availability for service in all human fields of human progress.

Mr. Hoover here referred to his recent "good will tour" in Latin America, saying that each of the Republics of the South was building "a racial character and a culture which is an impressive contribution to human progress". We wish, he said, only for the continuance of their independence, the growth of their stability, and their prosperity.

It is impossible for my countrymen to speak of peace without profound emotion. In thousands of homes in America, in millions of homes around the world, there are vacant chairs. It would be a shameful confession of our unworthiness if it should develop that we have abandoned the hope for which all these men died. Surely civilisation is old enough, surely mankind is mature enough, so that we ought in our own lifetime to find a way to permanent peace. Abroad, to west and east, are nations whose sons mingled their blood with the blood of our sons on the battlefields. Most of these nations have contributed to our race, to our culture, to our knowledge and our progress. From one of them we derive our very language, and from many of them much of the genius of our institutions. Their desire for peace is as deep and sincere as our own.

Peace can be contributed to by respect for our ability in defence. Peace can be promoted by the limitation of arms and by the creation of the instrumentalities for the peaceful settlement of controversies. But it will become a reality only through self-restraint and active effort in friendliness and helpfulness. I covet for this Administration a record of having further contributed to the advance of the cause of peace.

DISCOURS ÉLECTORAL DE M. PAUL HYMANS, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE LA BELGIQUE, BRUXELLES, LE 17 MARS 1929

(L'Indépendanee belge du 18 mars 1929).

Avant de parler de certains problèmes de politique intérieure, je voudrais caractériser la position internationale de la Belgique, car à mon sens on ne peut dissocier notre situation au dehors de notre situation au dedans.

Depuis 10 ans, un immense effort tel que l'histoire n'en connaît pas, et auquel la Belgique s'est étroitement associée, a été tenté et poursuivi pour organiser la coopération des peuples, instituer une vie internationale régulière, un régime de droit et de paix.

Les traités d'arbitrage et de conciliation se multiplient de toutes parts.

D'autre part, les intérêts économiques s'enchevêtrent ; les grandes affaires se nouent de pays à pays et deviennent internationales. La Société des Nations étend son action dans le domaine économique et crée un mouvement tendant à abaisser les barrières douanières, à éviter les guerres de tarifs et à faciliter les ententes et les courants commerciaux.

Ce sont-là de puissantes forces de paix qu'anime un mouvement spirituel.

Mais oserions-nous dire que tout danger de guerre a disparu ?

Nous sommes à un carrefour d'où partent des chemins divergents. De quel côté s'orientera l'humanité ?

Devant ces incertitudes, quelle est la position de la Belgique et quels sont ses devoirs ?

Petite puissance politique, elle est une grande puissance industrielle et commerciale. Elle a des intérêts dans le monde entier. Partout, on trouve des entreprises, des capitaux, des ingénieurs, des hommes d'affaires belges.

Nous avons une splendide colonie vers laquelle se tournent parfois des regards jaloux et où nous avons à accomplir une double tâche lourde et magnifique.

Quelles sont les conclusions de cet examen ?

C'est d'abord que la Belgique a le devoir d'organiser sa défense.

C'est ensuite qu'elle doit continuer à collaborer de toute son énergie au développement de l'œuvre de la paix et du mouvement de coopération internationale.

SPEECH OF THE BRITISH PRIME MINİSTER MR. STANLEY BALDWIN, LEICESTER, MARCH 21, 1929.

(The Times, March 22, 1929(.

We have striven for peace. Peace was what the country wanted for her convalescence. We have striven for it at home and abroad. Let me call your attention for a few minutes to what our contribution has been to the peace of the world, because many of those who have done nothing for that peace and will have no opportunity of doing anything for it, spend their time in belittling our efforts and in saying we have made no efforts at all.

Six years ago the problem of reparations was looked upon as insoluble. Conference after conference was held. The French went into the Ruhr and all Europe was in despair. Then the matter was taken out of the hands of the politicians and put into the hands of financial experts. The Dawes report came into existence. That report was not final, but it has worked admirably for nearly five years, and today we see a Committee sitting in Paris attempting to get, if not finality, a scheme of settlement that may, at any rate, last for many years. I wish them all success, as I believe they will have, and that their work may be as fruitful in 1929 as the work of the experts was en 1924 (Cheers).

The friction and suspicion which existed in Europe five or six years ago, particulary between France and Germany, a friction which was a legacy of the War and the Peace Treaty, is far, far less. Locarno brought France and Germany together and opened up a new era of cooperation in Europe.

The Kellogg anti-war pact has been signed by many nations who have pledged themselves—and it is up to their people to see that those pledges are kept—not to resort war as an instrument of national policy They are two great landmarks. It was our influence which brought Germany into the League of Nations—in the words of Lord Grey: "The greatest single step to secure European peace since the foundation of the League of Nations." (Cheers.)

So much for Europe. When we came into office there was the question open with Turkey at Mosul, which in old days might have led to war. We referred it to the League of Nations for arbitration, and we agreed to be bound in advance to accept their decision. Peace was secured by that means, and our relations with Turkey to-day are excellent.

Look at China. You wil remember when the troubles broke out in China how Mr. Llyod George and the Labour Party criticized us for sending troops to China to defend our own people and to keep order. They rose up and prophesied war. What has been result ? Our people; came through unscathed, and we

made a treaty with China which has placed our relations on the friendliest footing and nothing but the settlement of their internal troubles by the Chinese themselves now stands between us and a large increase of our trade in that great continent. (Cheers.)

The power and the influence of the League of Nations has grown during the lifetime of this Government. They have settled questions between Germany and Poland, Poland and Czechoslovakia, Serbia, Greece and Albania.

Now, as to the disarmament. I don't know why it is that so many English people take pleasure in fouling their own nests when the matter of disarmament is discussed. We are always blamed for everything. The fact is we have led the world in disarmament. We are the only nation which has reduced its Army year by year continuously since the Armistice. With regard to the Navy, four years ago we decided to lay down four cruisers in the following year, and three each in the subsequent years. As a matter of fact we reduced that programme. We laid down one-last year and two this and our fighting Services, as a whole, excluding the Air Force, which dit not exist before the War, number 50.000 less than they did in the year before the War. There is no country in the world which can show anything like that record in practical disarmament. (Cheers).

I would like to say before I come to a close that we owe a great deal in these matters of peace abroad to our Foreign Secretary who has been actuated by one single desire, to promote peace in Europe and to give the full support of Great Britain to the League of Nations. I would add this : His clear sincerity and integrity have regained for this country the prestige and the position in the world which but a few years ago we were in danger of losing. (Cheers.)

DECLARATION FAITE PAR LE COMTE ETIENNE BETHLEN, PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL DES MINISTRES DE HONGRIE AU COLLABORATEUR DU JOURNAL HONGROIS 8 ORAI UJSAG, BUDAPEST, LE 31 MARS 1929.

Quant à la question des minorités qui figurera sur l'ordre du jour du Conseil à sa session de juin et éventuellement aussi à sa session de septembre, la Hongrie fera parvenir son mémorandum à la Commission des Trois, afin de la renseigner à ce sujet. Nous ne manquerons pas de saisir cette occasion, présentée par la Société des Nations aux Etats-Membres pour exposer leur point de vue devant le Conseil. Nous indiquerons les lacunes dans la procédure de la protection des

minorités, lacunes qui formaient à plusieurs reprises l'objet de discussion du Conseil. Nous tâcherons de contribuer, par notre collaboration à augmenter l'efficacité de la procédure dans les affaires de la protection des minorités. Nous proposerons surtout une plus grande publicité de la discussion. Une telle publicité, semblable à celle des audiences judiciaires, donnera un caractère de compétence à toute la discussion.

A cette occasion, nous ne manquerons pas de démontrer les suites de la procédure actuelle dans les milieux minoritaires eux-mêmes. Une rechute sensible se manifeste dans la situation des minorités si on la compare à la situation d'avant-guerre. bien qu'à ce moment-là il n'existait ni traités de minorités ni un facteur international pour garantir les droits minoritaires.

M. Stresemann, Ministre des affaires Etrangères du Reich, souligna la grande responsabilité résultant des traités de minorités, assumée par la Société des Nations vis-à-vis les minorités, responsabilité dont elle ne peut plus se soustraire, en aucune circonstance.

Si la Société des Nations veut garder intact son prestige, il est de son propre intérêt de faire face aux obligations qui lui incombent de par les dispositions des traités de minorités.

La tendance de certains Etats à faire assumer la protection des minorités par des Etats n'ayant signé aucun traité des minorités, peut-être très honorable de la part de ces Etats-là, mais elle n'est actuelle qu'au moment où la protection des minorités, par des traités de minorités de la part des Etats ayant réellement pris de telles obligations sera pleinement assurée. Et si ces Etats soutiennent que la situation, d'après laquelle certains Etats-Membres de la Société des Nations doivent avoir plus d'obligations dans ce domaine que d'autres Etats, — est intolérable, nous répondons de la façon suivante :

Nous acceptons volontiers que les droits et obligations des Etats-Membres soient égalisés au cas où l'on procédera à éliminer d'autres inégalités existant d'une part entre les Etats vaincus (parmi lesquels la Hongrie) et de l'autre entre les Etats vainqueurs. Les Etats vaincus notamment ont dû prendre, par suite des traités, de telles obligations, surtout au point de vue militaire, qui ne lient pas les autres Etats. La Société des Nations dispose de droits particuliers vis-à-vis des Etats assumant ces obligations, pour assurer l'observation de celles-ci.

Si cette inégalité entre la Hongrie et les Etats vainqueurs venait à disparaître, ce n'est qu'alors que la Hongrie deviendra comme membre de la Société des Nations un Etat égal en droit aux autres Etats, à ceux qui demandent maintenant les droits égaux, mais seulement en ce qui *les* concerne et au point de vue de leurs obligations contractées envers la Société des Nations pour la protection des droits des minorités.

LETTER OF THANKS ISSUED BY THE BRITISH KING CEORGE, CRAIGWELL HOUSE, APRIL 22, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, april 23, 1929).

Craigweil House, 22ud April, 1929.

In looking back on my long illness and recovery my heart is full of thankfulness of far deeper origin than any mere sens of relief.

I have been brought back from the danger and weariness of the past months by the wonderful skill and devotion of my doctors, surgeons, and nurses.

And help has come from another source of strength. As month after month went by learned of the widespread and loving solicitude with which the Queen and I were surrounded.

I was able to picture to myself the crowds of friends waiting and watching at my gates and to think of the still greater number of those who in every part of the Empire were remembering me with prayers and good wishes.

The realisation of this has been among the most vivid experiences of my life.

It was an encouragement beyond description to feel that my constant and earnest desirs had been granted—the desire to gain the confidence and affection of my people.

My thoughts have carried me even further than this, I cannot dwell upon the generous sympathy shown to me by unknown friends in many other countries without a new and moving hope. I long to believe it possible that experiences such as mine may soon appear no longer exceptional, when the national anxieties of all the peoples of the world shall be felt as a common source of human sympathy and a common claim on human friendship.

I am not yet able to bear the strain of a public ceremony, but I look forward on some appointed day to joining with my people at home and overseas in thanking Almighty God, not merely for my own recovery but for the new evidences of a growing kindliness significant of the true nature of men and nations.

In the meantime I hop that this message may reach all those, even in the remotest corners ot the world, from whom I have received words of sympathy and goodwill.

(Signed) GEORGE R. I.

SPEECH OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN WAKEFIELD, APRIL 27, 1929.

(The Times, April 29, 1929),

Sir Austen Chamberlain, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking at Nostel Priory, near Wakefield, on Saturday afternoon, dealt with Mr. Gibson's speech on disarmament at Geneva.

It must speak first and foremost (Sir Austen Chamberlain said) of what has been happening at Geneva in the Preparatory Conference on Disarmament. All of you will have heard something of—I hope that many of you will have read for yourselves—the notable declaration made by Mr. Gibson, the principal representative of the Government of the United States. It is notable in many ways. It has, I think, paved the way for a real advance in that movement towards disarmament wich all the world desires and needs.

But it has a special interest for us because it shows once again how close in these matters are the policies of the United States and of Great Britain, and how similar is our outlook and our point of view. Mr. Gibson dwelt on the importance which the signature of the Kellogg Pact had for the problem of disarmament. I agree with him. It is something like four years ago that, speaking in the Assembly of the League at Geneva, I said that moral disarmament was a preliminary to physical disarmament of the nations. Mr. Gibson, expressing the opinion of his Government and of President Hoover, dwells upon the new outlook which we ought all to bring to these matters in the light of the solemn engagement which we have taken not to have recourse to war as an instrument of policy.

But our agreement does not stop there. Mr. Gibson defines the purpose and the sbject of the United States as being to secure in the naval field not merely limitation of armaments, but reduction of armaments, and a reduction which shall not be applied to this or that class only, but shall be applied to every class of war vessel. I have already, in the House of Commons, the Prime Minister has already in the country, expressed our full adherence to, and our acceptance of this policy so declared by the United States. (Cheers).

No difference of purpose

Between them and us there is no difference of purpose, no difference of principle. We, too, desire not merely limitation, but reduction of armaments. We, too, desire not merely a partial reduction applied to certain classes of warships, but a reduction applied throughout the whole field of naval construction. And as between them and us I do not hesitate to declare

my profound conviction that at no time would an arrangement have been difficult, as between them and us war is a contingency that no sane or responsible man will contemplate as a possibility of the policy which he pursues. (Cheers.)

If we had had to consider only their needs and ours, long ago we could have made a broad, and large gentlemen's agreement expressive of the confidence that we have in one another, of the confidence that we have that each of us signed these international undertakings in good faith, and with the resolve to keep them in the spirit as well as in the letter. We could have said to them :—"Trusting to you that you build what is required for your needs, we will build only what is required for the necessities of our defences, and, in considering our defences, we do not have to consider the naval forces of the United States".

Cause of the difficulty

It was not between us two, or if we had stood alone because of our particular circumstances, that a difficulty arose. It was because we had to find some rule which could be applied to our diverse circumstances and at the same time would be applicable to all the great navies of the world.

What was the problem ? I stated it last February in words which I venture to repeat to-day. It is not whether the United States Navy should be equal to our own ; we have accepted fully and with intention parity with the United States. It was not that they wanted reduction and we did not. We desire reduction as earnestly as they, "The problem". I said, "is to find some equation by which we can measure naval strength-so that the parity which both nations desire may be reached, and reached at a level which indicates not any increase in the armaments of the world, but a reduction".

The significance, the importance, and hopefulness of the statement which Mr. Gibson made the other day is that by suggesting new criteria of comparison he has made it easier to find a standard by which reduction may be fixed, while taking account of the different circumstances and the different needs of the Powers which are concerned.

But Mr. Gibson made a second, and, in its way, an equally remarkable contribution to this problem only yesterday. He turned from naval armaments to land armaments. Again observe how similar is the standpoint and the outlook of the United States to that of our own country.

The trained reserves

He said, speaking on the question of trained reserves, that the Government of the United States would have desired that those trained reserves should be included in any scheme for

limitation and reduction. But, recognizing that the United States, which, like this country, maintains but a very small Army, scarcely more than a police force equivalent to the duties which it has to discharge—realizing that countries so situated could not dictate to the great military nations of the Continent, with their different systems and different traditions—Mr. Gibson said that, while that was the desire of the United States, they would not insist upon it in deference to the feelings and traditions of other countries, in the hope that by yielding their view those other countries would be led to make a great step forward in the direction in which they all desire to move.

I call your attention to that because only last summer his Majesty's Government and your humble servant were the victims, or the objects, at any rate, of unmeasured denunciation and even vituperation by both the other parties in the State, because we had said and done exactly what Mr. Gibson said and did yesterday at Geneva. We were told that we had made disarmament impossible. We were told that, worse than that, we had definitely separated ourselves from the United States and created a real divergence between their policy and ours.

Now we see that, moved by the same desire to make progress, to find the lines upon which progress may be made, Mr. Gibson makes a declaration at Geneva for which we were denounced when we made it a year ago.

I do not wish to pretend that all difficulties are over. We have still a long way to go. We have many obstacles to overcome, but I hail the American action at Geneva in these last days as a hopeful sign of ultimate success, and as having made a most valuable contribution to the cause of disarmament and peace.

The Balfour note

Observing that there had been one other speech upon international affairs within the last week about which he must also say something. Sir Austen Chamberlain referred Mr. Snowden's raising of the question of inter-Allied debts and his denunciation of the Balfour Note as "an infamous Note". Recalling the conditions of the Balfour Note, Sir Austen Chamberlain said that it had been the charter of European reconstruction ever since. That declaration, made on behalf of the British people, had been unchallenged until now. It had been the stable foundation on which every international arrangement for the settlement of debts or of reparations had been founded.

Choosing that document for his denunciation as "infamous", Mr. Snowden had gone on "in language which in international affairs has a peculiar gravity and danger", to talk of repudiating the conditions of the Note.

Repudiation, continued Sir Austen Chamberlain, is an easy way out of difficulties—or it seems so at the beginning. Repu-

diation sounds easy in this sphere of foreign affairs, but repudiation once established as a policy will not remain abroad. It will be brought into domestic affairs, and the whole basis of public and private faith as between nation and nation and between man is destroyed, is at least jeopardized, when language of that kind is held.

Given an oportunity of correcting what might have been a hasty word, Mr. Snowden repeated the offence. Happily, however, wiser counsels had prevailed in Mr. Snowden's party. Mr. MacDonald had announced that so long as he had any responsibility there should be no repudiation—no repudiation except of Mr. Snowden. (Laughter).

"We may count, therefore", Sir Austen Chamberlain said, "that so long as Mr. MacDonald is responsible, and if he has and is allowed power to carry out his own views he, at any rate, will keep British faith when British faith has been pledged. In the course of his speech Mr. Snowden used language of our nearest neighbour, our closest and most powerful Ally in the great struggle in which we were engaged but at few years ago, of an insulting and offensive character. What is the good of preaching peace, what is the good of expressing your desire for disarmament, if you cannot even keep a civil tongue in your head when you are speaking of your friends ; and if in international affairs leading men, who have held responsible positions and aspire to responsible positions again, are to use language of a great and friendly nation such as would be resented as insulting and impertinent if used from man to man in your own ranks ? It is not in that way that you serve the peace of the world ; not on those lines that you are going to promote better feeling amongs nations".

NOTE SENT BY THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MR. STANLEY BALDWIN TO THE BRITISH LEAGUE OF NATIONS UNION, LONDON, MAY 1929

(The Times, May 1o, 1929).

The statement of policy issued by the League of Nations Union is welcome as affording a further opportunity for emphasizing that support of the League of Nations and the pursuit of peace are the cardinal principles of Conservative policy. Few references are needed to substantiate this. Sir Austen Chamberlain has himself inaugurated a policy of attending in person every session of the League Council and of the Assembly, and no representative of any other country has been more constant or more assiduous in his service to the League. The conclusion

of the Locarno Pact was in large measure his work, and it was only Locarno that made possible the entry of Germany into the League. By submitting the dispute with Turkey over the northern boundary of Iraq to the arbitration of the League, the Government both strengthened the authority of the League and brought peace to the Near and Middle East. The Chinese policy of the Government has had such results that—in the words of a leading Berlin news-paper—"The English merchant who was yesterday the object of a boycott is today a member of a nation in whose honour salutes are fired and flags waved."

All Conservatives will endorse the importance of the signature of the Kellogg Pact emphasized by the League of Nations Union. The attitude of the Conservative Party to that momentous document has been set out by the Prime Minister in the following words:—" It is so tremendous a thing that few of us realize it, and the result of that signature will be nothing unless the nations, realizing to what they are commited, make up their minds that that signature shall be honoured to the end of time. In spirit every nation that signs that pact has got to keep it before its mind whenever it prepares estimates of its own armaments it must realize what the implications of that pact are."

Reference must now be made to the specific points put forward by the League of Nations Union.

Settlement of disputes

I. — *" The improvement of the machinery for the peaceful settlement of international disputes."*

It has to be remembered that those countries like our own which are already members of the League have thereby agreed (Article 12) " that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to inquiry by the Council." Consequently, for the members of the League, the " alternative methods " already exist and the members are pledged to employ them. In so far as concerns the United States and Great Britain, it will be recalled that Article 2 of the Kellogg Pact, of which both are signatories, reads: " The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts, of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means. " It is not clear whether the League of Nations Union suggests the adoption of the optional clause with or without reservations. Hitherto it has been common ground to all parties that certain important reservations would be necessary. So long as this is the case it is not clear that anything would really be gained by such a conditional acceptance, and the last Imperial Conference decided

against it for the present while reserving the subject for further discussion as events develop. It should be added that, so far from the Kellogg Pact making the signature of the optional clause more important, it makes it less so; for the pact in itself tends to close the famous gap in the covenant.

The Government attach the greatest importance to the International Court at The Hague. They have shown this by the number of cases which they have referred to that Court, and it may be confidently expected that as time goes on a body of Case Law will grow up as a result of the decisions of that Court which will be of the greatest assistance to the cause of peace.

Armaments.

II. — *" The limitation and reduction of armaments by international agreement. "*

Every Conservative will agree as to the desirability of limiting and reducing armaments by international agreement. The Government has led the world in practical disarmament and has also done everything in its power to further the work of the Preparatory Commission. Technical considerations cannot, of course, be overlooked, but the failure of the Geneva Three-Power Conference of 1927 reinforced the lesson that no one nation can do anything without the concurrence of the others and that long and careful diplomatic preparation is essential for the success of any future Naval Limitation Conference.

III. — *" The withdrawal from Germany of foreign troops, the presence of which in that country constitutes a growing obstacle to international understanding and good will. "*

All Conservatives will endorse the statement of the present Government's policy made on December 3, 1928—" His Majesty's Government would welcome an early evacuation of the Rhineland by the French, British, and Belgian forces, irrespective of the legal right of the ex-Allied Governments to continue their occupation until the expiry of the period fixed by the treaty. "

IV. — *The general adoption and application of the recommendation of the International Economic Conference, with a view to the early removal of barriers to international trade. "*

It should not be forgotten that the present Government took a prominent part in calling the International Economic Conference, in preparing its agenda and in urging the general adoption of its recommendations. All parties are agreed that it would be to the advantage of this country if all international trade barriers could be abolished, but it is equally agreed that this is a matter for international agreement and cannot be achieved by the action of one Government or party alone. This

country has been the first to ratify the International Convention for the Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions, the only Convention yet drawn up arising out of the work of the International Economic Conference.

Hours of labour.

V. — *" The Washington Hours Convention. "*

The Government have worked consistently to secure a solid international settlement of the hours question on the basis of the 48-hour week which is already enjoyed by 92.6 per cent. of the workers engaged in British industry.

Such a setlement requires a Convention adapted to modern industrial conditions and framed in clear and simple language, so that there may be no doubt as to the obligations that it involves and so that those who ratify it and enforce it by legislation, as we should do, may be assured that its provisions will be applied by all other ratifying nations with a reasonable degree of uniformity.

It is generally agreed that the Washington Convention in its present form is not drawn in such a way as to satisfy fully these requirements. In some respects it fails to make any provision for the legitimate needs of individual industries some of which have a working week of 48 hours or less, and yet do not fall within the Convention as at present drawn. At the same time, owing to the ambiguity with which a good deal of it is worded, the Convention affords no guarantee of uniform application in practice in the various countries concerned.

In pursuance of their policy, the Government have urged at Geneva that the International Labour Conference should be given an opportunity of revising the Convention in order that a lasting and agreed international settlement on the basis of a 48-hour week may be secured and enforced. And at the 43rd Session of the Governing Body in Geneva in March last Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, the Minister of Labour, stated in detail the points on which, in the opinion of the Government, amendments were desired, amendments which, if satisfactory, would have enabled the British Government to ratify the Convention.

VI. — *" The Budget of the League. "*

No one would wish to see the activities of the League unduly restricted by financial considerations, but, as Lord Cecil pointed out with great emphasis in a speech delivered at the Assembly in Geneva in 1926, it is very important that the League should confine itself to really international action and that it should not be led by any argument, however powerful or however specious, to extend its activities beyond the international sphere. It is of supreme importance that the League's activities should be concentrated on the purposes for which it

was founded and not dissipated over other fields of endeavour.

It would have been easy to have commented at greater length upon the policy set out by the League of Nations Union, but what has been written is sufficient to demonstrate that the Conservative Party can be implicitly relied upon to persevere, as has indeed been its practice in the past, in wholehearted endeavour yet further to strengthen the authority of the League of Nation and thereby to ensure the more certain pacification of the world.

ELECTORAL ADDRESS FROM THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN TO THE ELECTORS OF WEST BIRMINGHAM, MAY 1929

(The Manchester Guardian, May 14, 1929).

Sir Austen Chamberlain, in his address to the electors of West Birmingham, writes : "For nearly five years I have held the office of Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. With the support and assistance of my colleagues in the Government I have throughtout that period worked steadily in the cause of international peace, giving constant service and support to the League of Nations, strengthening our old international friendships, and laying the foundation of those new and friendly relations which we hope to maintain henceforth with former foes.. And we shall continue to work patiently and stead-fastly for the promotion of peace and goodwill among our own people and between the nations of the world."

Speaking at his adoption meeting in West Birmingham last night, Sir Austen Chamberlain said that there was still much to be done, but no candid man would venture to assert that the state of Europe and of the world to-day was not more stable and more peaceful than on the day when the present Government became responsible for he conduct of the country's affairs. "We have restored and confirmed old friendships, and we have used them not to pursue old feuds, but based upon the confidence which we inspired to bring about the common reconciliation of the old friends with the old enemies. We no longer shout to one another across the frontiers. We meet in the League of Nations, and we talk as friends and as men who know that on the preservation of our friendship the salvation of our common civilisation depends."

DISCOURS DE M. AUGUSTE ZALESKI, MINISTRE DES AFFAIRES ETRANGERES DE POLOGNE, VARSOVIE, SOCIETE D'ETUDE DES PROBLEMES INTERNATIONAUX, LE 24 MARS 1929.

(Messager Polonais du 25 mars 1929).

C'est pour la troisième fois, a dit le ministre au début, que, selon la coutume adoptée chaque année, j'ai l'honneur, Messieurs, de prendre la parole devant vous. Le sujet de mon discours m'est en quelque sorte imposé par le moment même auquel je prends la parole. Ainsi, quinze jours à peine après les débats de Genève qui ont trouvé une répercussion si vive dans l'opinion polonaise, il me serait difficile de ne pas mettre à profit l'occasion qui se présente à moi aujourd'hui pour vous faire part, Messieurs, des impressions que j'ai rapportées de Genève et des considérations qu'elles m'ont suggérées.

La psychologie politique et la diplomatie

Avant toutefois d'examiner l'importance de la dernière session du Conseil de la S. d. N. je désirerais faire, pour un moment, une digression dans un domaine d'ordre plus général, celui notamment de la psychologie politique. Retour de Genève et vivement intéressé, comme toujours, par la réaction de notre opinion publique sur les manifestations de notre politique étrangère, j'ai revu tout un amoncellement de découpures de journaux se rapportant aux débats minoritaires de Genève. J'y ai trouvé nombreuses épithètes laudatives à mon adresse. J'y ai trouvé bon nombre d'affirmations du succès obtenu par le ministre polonais des Affaires étrangères, de la justesse de sa politique, du choix très approprié de sa tactique, de l'habileté dont il a fait preuve sur le terrain international, etc.

En un mot, en lisant certaines de ces appréciations, j'avais malgré moi l'impression que, dans l'opinion, prévalait la tendance de se représenter la politique étrangère comme une manière d'épreuves disputées sur l'échiquier international, épreuves n'ayant d'ailleurs qu'un rapport lointain entre elles, ou tout, ou presque tout, dépendait du bon ou du mauvais jeu de la diplomatie et que, comme il en est dans les échecs, le succès ou la défaite en politique étrangère dépendaient du degré d'habileté diplomatique du ministre des Affaires étrangères.

Evidemment, je n'ai guère besoin de vous prouver, Messieurs combien irréelle est cette manière de juger de la politique extérieure. Il me paraît de même inutile d'ajouter que cette manière de voir n'est guère partagée par tous les publicistes et politiciens polonais.

Tout de même, Messieurs, je ne voudrais pas que vous interprétiez mes paroles comme un désir d'amoindrir l'importance

du rôle de la diplomatie dans la politique étrangère. J'ai voulu uniquement faire observer, qu'en dehors de l'habileté diplomatique, de nombreux facteurs concomitants jouaient un rôle très important dans ce domaine.

Les facteurs concomitants de la politique étrangère

Il me semble qu'il serait superflu de faire ressortir l'existence de certains facteurs concomitants stables en politique étrangère tels que la situation géographique et la configuration d'un pays, son passé historique, la force numérique, dans une période donnée, de sa population, etc. J'ai eu l'occasion, Messieurs, de parler devant vous plus en détail à ce sujet en 1927. Pour le moment je désire avant tout mettre en relief deux facteurs dont dépendent en majeure partie les résultats de la politique étrangère, ses succès et ses échecs. Ses facteurs sont : la conjoncture internationale générale dans le moment donné ainsi que la politique intérieure d'un pays. La meilleure diplomatie, le plus habile ministre des Affaires étrangères ne peuvent faire grand chose au profit de leur pays au cas où la conjoncture générale et la politique intérieure ne les seconderaient pas.

Evidemment, en sens contraire, une conjoncture favorable, tant extérieure qu'intérieure, peut être gâchée par l'inhabilité ou la négligence de la diplomatie.

Des motions réunies par le hasard

Après cette courte digression, je reprends le sujet annoncé et je désire vous faire part, Messieurs, des impressions remportées à Genève des débats sur le problème minoritaire. Je tiens à remarquer en passant que si, dans la suite de mon discours, j'emploierai des termes tels que "jeu" et "épreuves" je le ferai, conformément aux réserves que je viens de faire en ce qui touche le rôle de la diplomatie dans la politique étrangère.

Il n'est pas dans mes intentions, Messieurs, de vous présenter un compte-rendu détaillé du cours des délibérations sur les projets qui, cela dit en passant, ne semblent avoir été réunis que par l'effet du hasard. Ce sont Messieurs, des choses que vous connaissez par ailleurs.

Je désirerai par contre consacrer le peu de temps dont je dispose à la genèse de chacun de ces projets, pris séparément, cela se conçoit, étant donné que, malgré certaines similitudes caractérisant ces deux projets, les sources politiques dont ils émanent ne sont guère similaires.

La Genèse du projet Dandurand

Pour ce qui est de la source d'inspiration du projet du Canada sans nier, pour le moins du monde, le noble idéalisme qui caractérise la personne de son délégué au Conseil de la S. d. N.,

très sensible au sort fait aux minorités, je suis enclin à rechercher cette source, d'une part, dans les préoccupations de politique intérieure du gouvernement du Canada, tendant au maintien de sa majorité parlementaire, dont une quinzaine de députés dépendent d'électeurs qui n'appartiennent ni à l'élément anglo-saxon ni français de la population du Canada ; d'autre part il convient, à mon avis, de rechercher cette source dans certaines tendances d'émancipation de ce gouvernement dans le domaine de la politique étrangère en général et dans celui de la politique de la S. d. N. en particulier.

Il est évident que, de même que nous, personne ne saurait en vouloir au Canada d'accorder sur le terrain de la S. d. N., toute sa sollicitude au problème minoritaire et que, depuis longtemps ce dernier désire jouer un certain rôle dans les questions minoritaires. Il va sans dire que les préférences et les prédilections d'intérêt de chacun des membres de la S. d. N. dépendent de son libre choix.

Nous pouvons regretter uniquement, de notre point de vue, que le projet canadien et le projet allemand se soient rencontrés dans le même moment et que, aux yeux des non initiés, ce concours de circonstances a pu donner l'impression d'une action politique concentrée germano-canadienne.

Il convient de même de regretter qu'avant le dépôt de son projet au Conseil de la S. d. N., le gouvernement Canadien ne se soit pas entendu avec les gouvernements des Etats intéressés directement au problème de la procédure minoritaire, notamment avec les Etats liés par des engagements minoritaires internationaux.

Une telle entente aurait permis au gouvernement canadien de se rendre compte des chances qu'avait son projet de passer intégralement ou en partie, de même qu'il lui aurait permis de choisir le moment opportun à la discussion de ce projet à la S. D. N. Car il n'est pas exclu que, si les projets canadiens avaient été présentés à un autre moment plus opportun et dans une autre conjoncture, l'attitude adoptée à l'égard de ces projets par les Etats intéressés aurait pu être autre qu'elle n'est aujourd'hui.

L'historique du projet allemand

Pour ce qui est de la genèse du projet allemand, celle-ci remonte fort loin. Le prélude à ce projet sur le terrain de la S. D. N., prélude précédé d'ailleurs par de nombreux préparatifs sur d'autres terrains, a été l'action entreprise à la dernière assemblée de la S. D. N. par la délégation allemande, cherchant à faire passer au premier plan des problèmes auxquels s'intéressait l'assemblée, celui des minorités.

La réfutation aux critiques adressées à la S. D. N. pour activité déployée dans le domaine minoritaire, a été donnée

alors par les délégations française, tchécoslovaque et polonaise.

Alors déjà, j'ai été obligé de déclarer aux protecteurs trop zélés du problème minoritaire au sein de la S. D. N., que nous ne pouvons consentir à aucune innovation dans la procédure minoritaire de la S. D. N., dépassant le cadre des traités minoritaires, innovation dans le genre de l'institution d'une commission minoritaire. Je me suis vu obligé de déclarer alors ne pouvoir consentir à aucune innovation de ce genre uniquement qu'à condition que les engagements internationaux seraient généralisés.

Le débat minoritaire n'était prévu qu'en septembre

Il est devenu évident, déjà en septembre dernier, que la délégation allemande ne se satisferait pas d'une discussion quelque peu superficielle et générale de l'assemblée 1928 et qu'elle cherchera, dans le proche avenir, une occasion de donner à cette discussion une portée plus grande. On supposait alors à Genève, qu'en raison de nombreuses considérations le gouvernement du Reich choisirait le mois de septembre, c'est-à-dire la session prochaine de la S. D. N. pour engager le débat minoritaire. Ces prévisions se sont montrées inexactes ; la partie, dans le domaine minoritaire, a été jouée en mars au lieu de l'être en septembre. Je ne chercherai pas à affirmer que le fait d'avoir avancé ce délai, a été au profit de la thèse et du projet de l'Allemagne. Je ne puis me défendre contre l'impression, qu'à Lugano, en tirant des conclusions assez inattendues pour de nombreux auditeurs et, à première vue, incompréhensibles, de mon discours, dans lequel je flétrissais, d'une manière objective, l'action subversive dirigée contre l'Etat par le Volksbund de Silésie, M. Stresemann, tout en annonçant d'une manière solennelle l'inscription à l'ordre du jour de la prochaine session du Conseil de l'ensemble du problème minoritaire intéressant la protection des droits minoritaires, M. Stresemann, dis-je, a rendu certains services à ceux contre lesquels, dans l'opinion générale du moins, cette annonce avait été dirigée.

Le projet allemand et sa réaction

Cette annonce a provoqué des conséquences que sans doute M. Stresemann n'avait pas prévues.

Ainsi, tout d'abord, cette annonce a suscité une assez vive inquiétude et a provoqué une indignation visible dans beaucoup de pays intéressés directement au problème de la protection internationale des minorités, c'est-à-dire dans les pays qui ont contracté des engagements relatifs aux minorités. Ainsi l'annonce qui a été faite a permis à ces Etats de se rendre compte, par les manifestations de leurs opinions politiques, de

la solidarité d'intérêts qui existait entre eux dans le domaine minoritaire, ce qui a abouti à l'établissement d'un front commun et d'une action commune sur le terrain de la S. D. N.

L'annonce faite par M. Stresemann à Lugano a eu encore pour effet de provoquer de profondes réflexions au sujet du problème minoritaire et des buts auxquels pouvait servir la braise, maintenue à l'état d'incandescense qui couvait au fond de ce problème. Ces réflexions étaient faites par l'opinion publique de ces pays qui considèrent la consolidation de l'état de choses actuel en Europe en tant que tâche essentielle de leur politique étrangère. Comme vous savez, Messieurs, ces réflexions ont eu, en définitive, pour résultats, l'opposition énergique des représentants de ces Etats, à la dernière session du Conseil, contre toute tentative de faire servir le problème international de la protection des minorités à des buts étrangers à ces problèmes, et égoïstes.

Les buts inavoués

Je viens de faire allusion aux buts inavoués poursuivis par les promoteurs de l'action minoritaire entreprise sur le terrain de Genève.

Je ne doute pas un seul instant qu'une partie de la presse étrangère m'en fera grief et s'efforcera de prouver qu'il convient de chercher les motifs de la proposition allemande uniquement dans le souci d'assurer le bien des minorités nationales au nom de grands idéals de droit, de justice, de paix, de fraternité internationale, dans le désir d'accroître l'autorité du Conseil de la S. D. N. ainsi que dans bien d'autres nobles préoccupations. Toutefois, en dépit de ces preuves, présentées d'une façon si éloquente, du mal-fondé de mon opinion, je ne puis y renoncer. En effet il n'est point facile de comprendre pourquoi un Etat, qui aspire visiblement à jouer le rôle de patron et de porte-parole des minorités nationales, au lieu de donner le bon exemple aux autres, conformément au proverbe « verba docent exempla trahunt », au lieu de commencer par lui-même en acceptant les obligations minoritaires internationales perfectionnées selon sa nouvelle recette, pourquoi cet Etat-là prétend imposer ces obligations aux pays déjà liés par le traité de minorités, d'ailleurs contrairement aux principes de légalité de tous les Etats ?

Je reconnais ne pas comprendre — et je ne les comprendrai sans doute jamais — les raisons pour lesquelles ce pays aurait le droit moral d'agir comme il l'a fait, sans nier bien entendu le droit formel de chaque membre du Conseil de la S. D. N. de soulever les questions minoritaires.

Ce n'est pas seulement dans mon esprit, et dans celui des Polonais, Roumains, Yougoslaves, Grecs que l'on voit naître des doutes en ce qui concerne les buts de l'action minoritaire alle-

mande ; ces doutes se sont fait jour également dans l'opinion publique de plus d'une nation qui n'est pas directement intéressée à ces questions.

Dans ces conditions les observations suivantes dont un homme politique objectif m'a fait part à Genève, immédiatement après le discours de M. Stresemann, apparaissent des plus naturelles et compréhensibles : « J'ai l'impression, dit-il, que ce discours a été prononcé dans le but d'y faire figurer une phrase rappelant d'une façon non équivoque à la S. d. N. l'existence de l'article 19 du Pacte ».

Aussi, cette allusion si peu voilée à l'article 19 du pacte s'est-elle vu opposer une si verte réplique de la part du délégué d'une puissance qui ne tient aucunement à ce que la question des minorités devienne un « levier pour briser les Etats ».

La Société des Nations. Instrument de paix

La dernière session du Conseil a eu le grand avantage, pour la Pologne et pour les autres nations, de répandre dans le monde la conviction que la Société des Nations ne peut être employée comme instrument devant servir à des buts autres que ceux formulés expressément dans le pacte de cette institution, que la tâche de la S. d. N. consiste à assurer la sécurité et la conservation des Etats et non à les miner et désagréger. Il convient de se réjouir que le Conseil a constaté à nouveau, au cours de sa dernière session, avec autant de netteté que d'autorité que le but des traités des minorités est l'assimilation des groupes allogènes de façon à les faire entrer politiquement dans le cadre de l'Etat et obtenir la fusion politique de la minorité avec la majorité. Bien entendu personne à la S. d. N. n'a jamais songé, ni ne songe à l'assimilation ethnique des minorités, personne ne prétend les amener, à l'aide de minorités, à fusionner au point de vue ethnique avec les majorités et à renoncer à leur langue, leur culture ou leur confession.

Jamais, j'en ai l'impression, ni M. Mello Franco, ni Sir Austen Chamberlain, ni M. Benès, ni M. Hymans n'ont émis de pareilles opinions et c'est pourquoi les critiques adressées par M. Stresemann à la théorie dite de l'assimilation paraissent avoir été sans objet. La thèse professée par M. Franco Mello est celle de l'unité politique des Etats. Cette thèse, qui n'a rien de commun avec la tendance à dénationaliser les minorités, est celle des « mains propres » vis-à-vis des minorités, et elle comporte l'impératif catégorique de la loyauté inconditionnelle vis-à-vis de l'Etat.

L'évolution favorable de l'opinion allemande

En réfléchissant sur le dernier débat des minorités à Genève, on ne peut résister à l'impression qu'il est appelé à avoir une

certaine influence, favorable à notre point de vue, sur l'état d'esprit des minorités en Pologne et plus particulièrement sur celui de la minorité allemande. Je pense qu'à la longue les chefs de cette minorité ne peuvent manquer de se dire qu'au lieu de chercher à l'étranger protecteurs et défenseurs, il serait plus raisonnable de se placer sans réserve sur le terrain d'une sincère loyauté dans les rapports avec l'Etat et de tendre à un accord et une collaboration avec la majorité polonaise.

Je dois relever avec satisfaction que des faits se sont produits ces derniers temps qui semblent indiquer que, dans les milieux dirigeants de la minorité allemande, on peut observer une tendance des plus louables et qui mérite d'être encouragée. Un de ces symptômes a été le très intéressant discours de M. Will représentant de la majorité allemande, prononcé à la commission des Affaires Etrangères, discours empreint d'un sentiment de loyauté vis-à-vis de l'Etat polonais. Un autre symptôme également favorable est la proclamation publiée récemment par l'union allemande culturelle et économique de Haute Silésie. J'ai l'espoir que ce sont là des premières hirondelles annonçant l'amélioration des rapports entre la minorité allemande et l'Etat polonais. Si la minorité allemande en Pologne adoptait sincèrement et sans restriction le point de vue formulé dans le discours de M. Will il ne serait pas difficile, me semble-t-il, de trouver une plateforme de collaboration entre cette minorité et l'énorme majorité de la nation polonaise pour le grand profit de deux parties et de la patrie commune.

Je crois également que, dans ce cas,la minorité allemande ne serait plus comme le désire M. Will un obstacle sur la voie d'entente entre la Pologne et le Reich allemand, mais qu'au contraire elle pourrait jouer utilement le rôle de trait d'union entre les deux nations et les deux cultures. Elle pourrait faciliter dans une très forte mesure cet accord qui nous en convenons avec le député Will constitue une nécessité vitale pour les deux Etats et les deux nations.

Il me semble que la dernière session de Genève — et c'est là encore un de ses effets favorables — a déblayé le terrain à cet effet et qu'elle a enlevé dans une large mesure au problème minoritaire le caractère d'un conflit polono-allemand. La session de mars a effacé l'impression d'une certaine tension dans les rapports polono-allemands, impression qu'on a pu observer, contre le gré des parties intéressées, après la session du Conseil à Lugano.

Règlement des affaires de Haute-Silésie

Je voudrais à cette occasion insister sur certains points de la dernière session qui, sauf erreur, sont de bonne augure pour l'entente polono-allemande. Je tiens donc d'abord à souligner le fait que, cette fois, lors du règlement des plaintes minori-

taires de Haute Silésie tant allemandes que polonaises, il n'y a pas eu de discours politiques des représentants des deux parties il n'y a pas eu non plus de discussion polono-allemande. Le règlement des affaires de Haute Silésie n'a pas dépassé cette fois le cadre d'un examen objectif des faits. Je tiens d'autre part à faire ressortir le fait assez significatif que le Conseil de la S. d. N. a cru pouvoir acheminer avec le consentement des deux parties, la question longue et difficile du règlement des inscriptions scolaires, sur la voie des négociations directes entre les deux parties. J'espère que ces négociations, qui commencent demain à Paris, aboutiront enfin à une solution satisfaisante et que de cette façon, on verra s'établir la méthode la plus opportune, à mon sens, du règlement des malentendus silésiens : celle de l'accord direct. Je crois que la bonne volonté de part et d'autre aidant, bonne volonté dont je ne doute pas, l'application de cette méthode permettra de dessaisir dans une large mesure le Conseil de la S. d. N. des questions minoritaires dont il est en ce moment inutilement surchargé.

Le désir d'accord de la Pologne

Je ne vous dirai rien de neuf, Messieurs, en vous faisant part de ce que j'ai déclaré déjà à maintes reprises : le gouvernement polonais, dans ce domaine comme dans d'autres, tend et tendra à l'accord avec le Reich sans se laisser rebuter par les difficultés qu'il rencontrera sur son chemin, car il considère que l'entente et la collaboration polono-allemande surtout, lorsqu'elles se développent sous les auspices de la S. d. N. sont non seulement dans l'intérêt commun des deux pays, mais aussi constituent une des garanties essentielles de la paix en Europe.

STATEMENT OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA, MR. MACKENZIE KING, HOUSE OF COMMNOS, MAY 7, 1929.

(The Arbitrator, June 1929).

Questioned in the House of Commons on May 7th, the Prime Minister, Mr. Mackenzie King, said that Canada was prepared to sign the optional clause of the World Court, but he declared that he does not intend to sign without a previous conference with all parts of the Empire as promised at the last Imperial Conference. He continued : " I did not say we would not sign unless all parts of the Empire agreed. Our view is that there should be a conference in the first place. After such a conference it will be for us to say whether we will sign alone or whether all other parts of the Empire should sign a the same time.

We are quite prepared to sign the optional clause, but we gave an undertaking at the last Imperial Conference that we would not take this step until an opportunity had been given to all parts of the Empire to meet together. That opportunity will be afforded at the next Imperial Conference, but it is quite possible that the matter may be arranged by correspondence ".

DISCOURS DE M. N. TITULESCO, BERLIN, LE 21 MAI 1929.

(Journal de Genève du 22 mai 1929.)

Nous nous complaisons un peu trop, depuis la fin de la grande guerre, dans la psychologie des bâtisseurs de mondes nouveaux ! Nous avons une tendance trop marquée à considérer les créations pacifiques des dix dernières années comme des choses constituant en elles-mêmes un commencement et une fin. Nous sommes, à cause de cette conception fragmentaire, trop souvent désarmés en face de la vague montante du scepticisme destructeur, en croyant que nous ne pouvons lui opposer que la fragilité de créations hâtives et quelque peu artificielles.

Quoi qu'on en dise, ni le Pacte de la S. d. N., ni le Pacte Kellogg, ni tout autre pacte similaire, ne constitue le commencement d'un monde nouveau, ou la fin définitive d'un monde ancien. Ils sont l'aboutissement d'une longue évolution et, par là, le point de départ d'une évolution nouvelle. Ils représentent l'organisation juridique, sur le plan politique, d'une communauté internationale déjà existante sur le plan culturel, économique et social.

On est surpris de constater à quel point le monde d'où est sorti la grande guerre était organisé, par l'initiative des plus intéressés, sur le plan international. Des conventions portant sur les matières les plus variées, des organes permanents d'exécution, travaillant soit conjointement avec les organes de l'Etat, soit indépendamment d'eux, sous forme de congrès ou conférence, sont là, pour révéler la matérialisation évidente et déjà avancée d'une communauté internationale complexe et agissante. Cette communauté internationale était même à tel point consciente que le dicton : Le capital, qui est international, ne permettra pas la guerre, nous endormait dans une quiétude pleine d'agrément.

Les événements sont venus couper court à cette grande illusion.

Qu'est-ce à dire ? Que l'on s'était trompé sur le sens du mouvement ? Pas le moins du monde ! On s'était trompé simplement sur le fait qu'une telle communauté internationale pou-

vait se suffire à elle-même tant que le facteur psychologique par excellence, *le facteur politique*, se dérobait à elle.

Qu'était, en effet, le monde, internationalisé à tant d'égards, au moment de la guerre, au point de vue politique ?

Ce monde, qui ne connaissait pas de frontières pour tant d'échanges entre les hommes, était divisé en Etats, conçus comme une force absolue et illimitée, consciente d'elle-même, se constituant elle-même, se gouvernant elle-même. Cette conception était cependant un triomphe de la liberté par rapport au régime féodal et par rapport à la séparation du pouvoir laïque et religieux. Sa tendance centraliste répondait elle-même à une grande nécessité, notamment celle d'assurer l'indépendance de l'Etat par rapport aux corporations autonomes, par lesquelles pouvaient ressusciter les forces refoulées du passé. Il n'en est pas moins vrai qu'au point de vue international une telle conception de l'Etat engendrait le droit à la guerre comme un attribut illimité de la souveraineté.

Il y avait là, de nos jours, sous nos yeux, une antinomie éclatante entre la réalité sociale et économique et la conception politique. C'est de cette antinomie que veut mettre fin l'organisation internationale de la paix qu'est sortie la grande guerre. C'est à cette antimonie que le monde s'est donnée depuis dix ans...

Dans quelle mesure, se demande M. Titulesco, le but a-t-il été atteint ?

... Il y a dix ans, la communauté internationale touchant pour la première fois, sous la forme d'une action politique concertée de presque tous les Etats sans distinction, la matière brûlante du droit à la guerre, l'abordait avec timidité. Elle se contentait de la rendre plus difficile ; elle n'osait pas encore décréter sa mise hors de loi. Cinq ans plus tard, les efforts dont est sorti le Protocole de 1924 réussissaient à faire proclamer par la communauté internationale la guerre d'agression comme un crime. Dix ans plus tard, la guerre en elle-même comme fait pur et simple est mise hors la loi. Non, ce ne sont pas des mots vides et solennels que les signataires du Pacte de Paris ont présentés au monde : ce sont des réalités vivantes qui ferment un cycle pour ouvrir un cycle nouveau et plus large...

Mais, objecte-t-on : que peut faire, dans l'état actuel des choses, la loi, fût-elle la plus formelle, contre le retour de la guerre ?

Au fond, la question se réduit à la valeur de la loi internationale

Il est certain que personne ne s'imagine que la paix perpétuelle a été établie sur terre par ce qui a été fait. Ce serait croire que la tâche que l'humanité est appelée à remplir a été exaucée en quelques ans par quelques signatures.

Mais, d'autre part, peut-on constester que la loi internationale soit le facteur le plus important pour la réalisation du but

poursuivi ? Une réponse nette, catégorique, s'impose à cette question avant de pouvoir aborder toute autre. Si ce n'est pas à la loi internationale qu'incombe la mission d'établir la paix, à quelle autre méthode pourrait-on avoir recours si ce n'est la force en vue de la domination ?

Et, si l'on exclut cette dernière comme inacceptable, quelle est la première loi internationale à établir, si ce n'est celle qui abolit le droit à la guerre comme fait pur et simple ? Certes, des lois d'organisation sont nécessaires sur les terrains les plus variés, économiques, culturelles, financières, militaires, politiques. Chacune de ces lois a ses conditions propres qui déterminent sa réalisation. Mais en règle générale, ces lois ne peuvent être élaborées que par une collectivité qui croit à la paix.

Comment ces dernières pourront-elles être réalisées si l'on sape systématiquement la confiance dans la loi fondamentale qui conditionne toutes celles que nous appelons de nos vœux ? Comment ces dernières seront-elles jamais possibles si nous dénions toute efficacité aux lois internationales en elles-mêmes ?

Nous sommes pris dans un cercle vicieux diabolique d'où on ne peut sortir que par un acte de raison ou par la catastrophe.

Le monde a devant lui des possibilités infinies. Mais rien ne pourra être fait tant que nous ne réalisons pas la signification entière de tout ce qui a été accompli, tant que nous ne nous pénétrerons pas de cette loi fondamentale de la dynamique de la paix : *Prudence quant à toute réalisation nouvelle, loi statutaire dans toute réalisation déjà achevée !*

SPEECH OF LORD CUSHENDUN, ROCHESTER, MAY 21, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, May 22, 1929).

" On the subject of disarmament, Mr. Ramsay MacDonald has been telling us his idea of how negotiations at Geneva ought to be conducted and how he would do it if were head of the Government. His notion is simple but puerile. He would formulate his proposal, put it on the table at Geneva, and then ' get the other nations to accept it '. He would very soon find that the other nations are not quite so ready as he thinks to be either coerced or cajoled. I expect that if Mr. MacDonald had a little more experience he would have enough sense to do exactly as we did.

" Mr. MacDonald appears not to understand that there must be unanimity at Geneva, and that consequently any one nation by persisting in opposition can prevent any particular proposal being carried. We therefore the other day recognising that there must be give and take and that it is more important to arrive

at agreement on disarmament than to stick out for our own view on every point, and so to wreck the conference, announced that we would not do this but would withdraw our opposition on any point about which there was general assent of others against our view. The representative of the United States made a precisely similar declaration, which after all was only common sense when you are trying to reach agreement between a large number of independent States ".

STATEMENT OF THE AMERICAN SECRETARY OF STATE MR. STIMSON,, WASHINGTON, MAY 31, 1929.

(The Times, June 1, 1929).

In connexion with the President's speech at Arlington yesterday, in which he advocated naval disarmament, and stressed the imperative character of this problem I wish to call attention to another aspect of the same question. The President yesterday spoke about it with reference to its direct relation to the promotion of peace and to relieving the world from the threat of war. In addition to these considerations we do not always realize the immense material burden which is imposed upon the nations of the world to-day by the cost of modern ships of war. That cost is mounting with every fresh discovery in warfare. A modern capital ship costs between 35 and 40 millions of dollars [between £7,000,000 and £8,000,000]—several times the cost of a battleship of a few years ago. Even a modern 10,000-ton cruiser costs more than double the original cost of the Library of Congress. I have in my possession a memorandum from the Director of the Budget showing the cost of the programme recommended by the Navy Department in case the policy of naval reduction which the President advocates is not adopted. That memorandum shows that the authorized and contemplated naval programme for construction of new ships alone amounts to £1,170,800,000 [234,160,£000]. In addition to this enormous sum for new construction there will also be required very large increases in the already large naval budget to cover the operating cost of these new ships.

When it is borne in mind that the foregoing figures involve the construction programme of only one nation, and that if it proceeds, other nations will be impelled to follow suit, the burden of unproductive expenditure which will be imposed upon the economic world during the next 15 years can be to a certain extent realized.

Mr. Stimson explained that his statement must be accepted as supplementary to Mr. Hoover's address yesterday, an expo-

sition of the economic side of the general problem, which could with less propriety have formed part of an oration in the presence of the illustrious dead. He was asked whether the fact that he made it to-day could be assumed to have relation to any news reaching him of the possible result of the British General Election, but answered that he had no authentic news of the polling, and could as well have made his statement yesterday as to-day. Upon the domestic effect of Mr. Hoovers's policy of naval reduction—the possibility, that is to say, of the retarding or modifying the 15-cruiser programme voted by last Congress—the Secretary of State declined to say more than that the Act of Congress itself empowered the President to adjust the development of that programme to the agreements which he might possibly reach with other nations.

SPEECH OF THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MR. J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, LOSSIEMOUTH, JUNE 19, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, June 19 1929).

"Be the merits or demerits of the Government what they may, I can claim one thing which will not be disputed, We have lost no time in getting into harness. We, at any rate take no easy complacent view of the needs of the nation. I have made it clear both before and during the election that I put our relations with the United States in the forefront in national concerns. As regards them we have not let the grass grow under our feet. General Dawes, the new American Ambassador, has been good enough to take a long journey up here to see me and have a talk with me about them. He saw some of the beauties of Morayshire, he heard of some of its historical stories, and I hope these were, in part at any rate, a recompense for his weariness of body.

"We found each other taking the same general views on world peace. The hands we clasped were not cold with official correctness, but warm with a friendship inspired by common enthusiasm for service in the cause of international goodwill and common sense. We did not meet to threaten other nations, to dominate other peoples, nor indeed did we meet to form alliances and pacts. We have no intention of presenting to the other nations an accomplished fact they can take or leave. A more genial, humane, and democratic spirit than that was in Logie House last Sunday afternoon.

"We met inspired by the hope that we might be instrumental in preparing a bord round which the other nations might ulti-

mately sit in co-operative fellowship, studying the arts and the ways of peace, gaining a sense of security not by arms but by the absence of arms.

"Symbolising the openness of our hearts and our purpose, the sunshine poured through the great windows of the room in which we sat. With it came the song of the birds and the murmur of the Findhorn, and I believe human eyes watched us as we sat talking and penning notes.

"As to the wide-world purpose of what is known as the Anglo-American conversations, I hope that neither the large States nor the small ones will have any doubt that they are exclusive—they are inclusive. The mighty Republic across the Atlantic will enter into no European entanglements and alliances, but no one ought to suspect that it will decline to serve common interests of peace and democracy.

"There are obstacles to be surmounted, differing interest to be reconciled, some historical inheritances to be soothed, rivalries which are legitimate to be confined to their proper channels—such considerations, for instance, as those mentioned by Mr. Churchill the other day to be studied and adjusted.

"That is the glorious task which the happy conversations which the American Ambassador and I had together at Logie opened up, and I would pray the whole nation, irrespective of party, to share helpfully in our labours, to give us its confidence, and to enable us to carry the work to a successful conclusion."

MESSAGE OF THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MR. J. RAMSAY MACDONALD AND SPEECHES OF THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER MR. ARTHUR HENDERSON, THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR GENERAL DAWES AND SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, LONDON, JUNE 18, 1929.

(The Times, June 19, 1929).

General Dawes, the new American Ambassador, had an enthusiastic welcome from the Pilgrims at a dinner given in his honour at the Hotel Victoria last night. The discussion between General Dawes and the Prime Minister at Forres last Sunday on naval disarmament, and Mr. MacDonald's announcement that both of them would deal with the subject in the public speeches they were to make last night, added interest to the occasion. Lord Desborough presided over a large and distinguished company, numbering nearly 500 and including ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of various nations, members of the Government and of the Services, and many, American visitors to this country.

Mr. Wilson Taylor, the hon. secretary, read the following telegram from the Pilgrims of the United States ;—"On behalf of Pilgrims of United States I wish to join with all heartiness in applauding welcome given by Pilgrims of Great Britain to our new American Ambassador. He will constantly be the bearer of good tidings. He enjoyed public confidence in extraordinary degree, and public opinion at home will eagerly support his constructive efforts to join Great Britain and United States in still closer fellowship, to safeguard that international peace, international association, and international progress which are assured by the action of the civilized world in formally and finally renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Cordial greetings from Pilgrims to Pilgrims.—Nicolas Murray Butler, President."

The Chairman read the following telegram from the Duke of Connaught, President of the Pilgrims :—"Please express to our guest my great regret at being unavoidably prevented from presiding to-night at the Pilgrims' dinner. I desire to welcome General Dawes most warmly on taking up the high position of American Ambassador to England, and I can assure him that he will meet with a very cordial reception from all Englishmen, who attach so much importance to the good relations between our two countries."

A letter from the Prime Minister was also read by the chairman, as follows :— "I am very distressed that you have fixed the day of the Pilgrims' dinner at a time when I have to be in the North of Scotland, as nothing would have given me greater pleasure than to have been able to comply with your request that I should take part in welcoming the American Ambassador. I still remember what a delightful evening we had together when Mr. Kellogg was similarly welcomed by you. Fortunately, there are no great issues standing between our two countries. We are rather like men between whom there are a few neglected roads with a slightly rough surface and with some overgrowth, but who are determined to smooth them out so that they can get more directly in contact with each other. Moreover, we are placed in the extraordinarily fortunate position that our coming together in no way means that we are leaving somebody else. It is a great world impulse to get side by side, which both America and ourselves are feeling. We long for no alliance, either of common offence or of mutual defence, but rather for a good will which when demonstrated in the eyes of men will make the whole world applaud as being both an example and an encouragement for the other nations to come into the same companionship. Pray, therefore—although I cannot be at the dinner and grasp the hand of General Dawes—allow me to join my heart and voice with yours in giving him a bearty and hospitable British welcome, and in wishing for him a prosperous and distinguished term of office."

The chairman explained that the Pilgrims Society was founded 25 years ago to inculcate the spirit of good will among all nations, but especially between the people of this country and the United States of America, and it had been a custom hallowed by observance that the first appearance of a new American Ambassador should be at a gathering of the Pilgrims. They welcomed General Dawes that night not merely, as the new American Ambassador but as a statesman who was a companion in arms (Cheers.)

Mr. Arthur Henderson, the Foreign Secretary, proposed the health of General Dawes, He said :—

In the absence of the Prime Minister it is my pleasure to submit to this large and representative gathering the toast. "The American Ambassador." In proposing this toast, it is my privilege to extend to you. General Dawes a very sincere and cordial welcome on your arrival in our midst to take up your new and responsible duties.

It is not many days since you set foot on these shores, but in those few day you have stirred our imagination by your purposeful energy, your characteristic hustle, by the refreshing naturalness and directness of your actions. When I reflect upon those crowded hours I wonder whether you do not regard yourself to-night as plunged into what are sometimes called the public pleasures associated with your high office before you have had time to familiarize yourself with your new abode in London. I am tempted, at any rate, to suggest that we might very properly sympathize with one another, for I, too, find myself undertaking my first public duty on a very limited acquaintance with my new responsibilities at the Foreign office.

But, Mr. Ambassador, while this is my first public act, it is certainly a very happy and pleasurable one. In extending our united greetings to you. Sir, I would have you believe that they are doubly sincere, because you are both the Ambassador of your country and an old comrade in service. For we remember that both in the stressful days of war and in the anxious times that followed you played a distinguished personal part. It is no exaggeration to suggest that your name, linked so closely as it is with one of the major pieces of posts-War constructive effort in Europe, is a familiar and highly respected one both in this country and on the Continent.

To-day, Sir, you come into our midst as the Ambassador of a great and friendly neighbour. Your nation has played an important part in the struggle for freedom, and it is destined, I believe, to play a vital part in the cause of peace, by leading the nations to have reliance, not on force, but upon moral right and international law. The democracies which you, Sir, and we represent have marched side by side in comradeshid and understanding through a long period. There subsist between them, I confidently assert, the mutual trust, the well-founded respect,

and the community of aim that are the essential ingredients of real friendship and helpful cooperation. They are animated by common ideals of peace and of human well-being. They are at one in their desire to eliminate war from international relationships and to translate the powerful popular sentiment on peace into practical measures for peace.

Whatever mischief-makers and busybodies, wherever they may be found may say to the contrary, I assert without any hesitation or qualification that the British people look upon the United States of American and upon all other nations with only peace in their hearts. We desire to see the ideals of peace realized. We desire that peace shall endure, not merely as a condition representing the absence of war, but as a system of human relationships represented by active cooperation between the nations.

It was, I think, Abraham Lincoln who remaked that "God must have loved the common people since He made so many of them," and it may safely be said that the peoples of the world desire peace, that they yearn for that freedom which is possible only when war shall be no more. If we accept that it is the duty and the primary function of statesmanship the world over so to conduct affairs as to ensure to the peoples increased opportunities for happiness and human well-being, then I can imagine no greater service that statesmanship may render than that of uprooting war from human society and lifting the burden of armaments that lies so heavily upon mankind.

I hope and believe, Sir, that our respective countries are inspired by the true comradeship of peace and that both are anxious to join with the other nations in a new and concerted effort—and a successful effort—to reach the goal of definite disarmament. The world needs disarmament world They believe that the would welcome it. There is now new hope and new strength in the hearts of the peoples of the world. The peoples yearn for it. Governments time for action is here. They wait anxiously for results. They look to their Governments resolutely to grapple with the difficulties, to carry them onward and upward to the tableland of peace, friendship, and cooperation, towards which they have been struggling through long generations.

And so it is, Mr. Ambassador, that in offering you this welcome we greet you in the spirit of friendship and hope that fills the hearts, not only of all of us assembled in this room, but of all those multitudes outside in whose name we speack, and we trust that your stay among us may be both congenial to you personally and profitable to the supreme cause of Anglo-American understanding and international peace and cooperation.

GENERAL DAWES

The American Ambassador, in reply, said : —

We are in a period when mankind, emerged from its greates cataclysm—the World War—is lifting its eyes from the darkness of the past toward the sunlight of international peace and tranquillity. It is the era of effort for world construction—moral and material.

The ratification of the Kellog Peace Treaty, which is the agreed upon expression of a world intention, has one of its first effects in a pronounced change in the form of the international discussion of the world's peace. The closing of the discussion upon the form of the expression of the principle, and the inception of the discussion of the practical methods by which to make it effective, prove the existence of the general détermination to make the treaty not a mere gesture, but the foundation of an era of « Peace on earth and good will toward men ».

The matter of first importance at the present time is that the friends of the world's peace move unitedly toward that objective with a clear understanding among themselves that any effort which is not a united effort is liable to be ineffective and tending toward disintegration. To avoid confusion and delay endangering their common objective, they now should not only unitedly consider what steps should be taken toward it, but the order in which those steps are to be taken.

The question of an early agreement on naval reduction by the nations is of outstanding importance at the present time, and it would seem to be the next step to be taken toward world peace. As to any other contraverted questions between any nations or between Great Britain and the United State, their future peaceful settlement, either way, will not be endangered by the cessation of an enormously expensive naval competition in progress during their discussion.

Congres has already by law commited the United States to an immediate naval programme involving over $ 250,000,000 giving, however, to the President the power to suspent it in the event of an international agreement for the limitation of naval armament.

On May 31 last the Secretary of State of the United States said : « I have in my possession a memorandum from the Director of the Budget showing the cost of the programme recommended by the Navy Department in case the policy of naval reduction which the President advocates is not adopted. That memorandum shows that the authorized and contemplated naval programme for the construction of new ships alone amounts to $ 1,170,800,000. When it is borne in mind that the foregoing figures involve the construction programme of only one nation, and that if it procceds other nations will be impelled to follow suit, the burden of unproductive expenditure

which will be imposed upon the economic world during the next 15 years can be to a certain extent realized ».

My address to-night concerns itself with suggestions as to a change in the method of future negociations for naval disarmament. Agreement upon a method of negotiation must concern, from the very beginning, all interested naval Powers and should have not a partial, but a world, sanction. While in the course of the discussion I may refer to the principe of equality of naval power as between Great Britain and the United States, it is only because the outcome of previous conferences shows that this is the agreed policy of both Governments. My theme is what method of procedure had best be adopted to translate a policy of naval reduction into a fixed agreement between the nations—a step so important to the peace of the world and to the happiness hereafter of mankind.

Edmund Burke, in his « Observations on a Late State of the Nation », once made a profound remark about politics which he could have made with equal truth of law, of governmental systems, and of dealings with international relations of all kinds, including, methods of negotiation for reparation settlements or reduction in naval armament. « Politics », said he, " ought to be adjusted not to human reasonings but to human nature, of which the reason is but a part, and by no means the greatest part ".

The long time which elapsed after the ending of ihe Great War before a proper method of negotiation for reparation settlements, was evolved was because the first method was adjusted to human reasoning and not to human nature. That method was to have the recommended settlement prepared by the continuing and concurrent work of economic experts and statesmen combined.

Since the reparation settlement involved, in each one of the nations interested, both an economic and a political problem, it was reasonable to suppose that it would be best determined by the joint effort of statesmen and of economists working together. This futile effort continued so long before its abandonment that all Europe was brought to the brink of economic and political chaos. And then only, in the latter part of 1925, did the Reparations Commission as an experiment decide upon the separate formation of the First Committee of Experts. This expedient, viewed at that time as almost hopeless by most economists and entirely so by most politicians—then designated by one great member of the Reparations Commission as the "prescription of a pill for an earthquake"—proved successful.

The formation of that Committee was not a triumph of intellect—it was the triumph of despair. It was adopted because nothing else had worked. Its success was du to its inconscious but proper adjustment to the law of human nature. What happened thereafter demonstrated that by accident the world had

discovered that the proper method of settling an international problem, involving a separate economic and political problem in each country, was to use independent experts whose suggestions were their interpretation of the correct and fundamental economic principles involved in the situation, their formula then to be handed over to the statesmen, who, reinforced by general public confidence in the impartiality of expert opinion, could better bring the respective public sentiments into acceptance of the necessary working compromise between political expediency and economic principles.

In committees formerly composed of colabouring statesmen and economists, the economists had always stood rigidly for conclusions endangering the statesmen and the acceptance of the Plan, and the statesman for conclusions which would stupify the economists and endanger the success of the Plan. Under such circumstances the arrival at a constructive compromise was well-nigh impossible. The method was not adjusted to the law of human nature.

Economic and technical problems are one thing—governmental and political problems another. The rigid attitude and determined expressions of international economic and technical specialists as to the inviolability and sacredness of technical principe is perhaps praiseworthy, but we must remember that these expressions are often incident to a doubtful embodiment of them in a personal interpretation of their applicability to international political situations, of which the experts are not always competent diagnosticians.

One who is inclined to believe that economists and technicians, claiming to be guided in their intellectual voyages by the stars and compasses and high lighthouses of fixed principles, never compromise, as do the alleged unworthy politicians, is lacking in experience in international economic negociations. For six years after the War the unhappy Reparations Commission, besides its other misfortunes, was surounded by an army of economic experts representing the different nations interested in the problem. These experts delivered innumerable written ultimatums as to the correct economic principles which underlay their divergent recommendations which filled vast untouched libraries and now moulder in their unruffled dust. The disagreements of these experts with each other, each swearing devotion to infallible principle, was a complete and overwhelming as those which characterized the deliberations of the supposedly less worthy, entierely confused, but fully as determined politicians and statesmen.

I remember during the last two weeks of deliberation on the part of the First Committee of Experts appointed by the Reparation Commission that, as the inside expert Committee was labouring with the formulation of its conclusions, almost all of them more or less the result of a compromise, they faced a

snowstorm of protesting papers filled with the voluminous but disagreeing economic advice of outside experts removed from the field of negotiation.

What I have said has a most direct bearing upon the question of the method of conducting the great negotiation for naval disarmament soon justly to occupy the attention of the world. The question is how best to adjust the methode of negotiation to accord with the laws of human nature so that a successful outcome, so vital to the welfare of the world, may not be unnecessarily endangered.

International naval reduction is a task the successful accomplishment of which requires the cooperative employment of two distinctly unrelated talents—that of naval technical experts and of statesmen.

Important as is a preliminary expert examination of economists to report to the statesmen on an international problem involving both an economic and political phase, it is even more important where naval technicians and statesmen confront a problem involving both a technical and political phase. But here we must keep in mind the law of human nature. In the case of a preliminary use of economic experts, their prime objective is a formula which will recognise the dominance of economic law, and the success of the statesmen in reaching the second objective of accommodating the expert formula to the political conditions in the respective countries is something as much desired by the economic experts as by the statesmen themselves. That later achievement only will crown with success the preliminary expert effort. This attitude has recently been twice demonstrated. So anxious was the first Economic Committee of Experts, Reparations Commission in 1924, that their report should be the basis of a successful settlement that they were engaged continually during their work in adjusting the form of their statement to expected political repercussion.

It was their constant endeavour to frame their conclusions in such language as would make them easily understood and be as inoffensive from a political standpoint as was possible. This effort to adjust economic necessity to political expediency led them to many collateral individual conference for advice from European statesmen during their work. As a result, when the report of the First Committee of Experts was delivered to the statesmen of the London Conference, the latter found it unnecessary to change the Plan, but only to supplement it by collateral international agreements relating to it, making it politically acceptable to all the nations concerned. And thus it was with the world important report of the Second Committee of Experts just completed. It was their intense desire to have a constructive outcome of their work, as much as because the work itself was a diplomatic as well as an expert employment, that led them to consult constantly with the leading European

statesmen during their epochmaking labours. This desire on the part of these Economic Committees accorded with the law of human nature. But in the case of naval technical experts, working for a formula for naval equality, the law of human nature runs contrary to such an attitude. It would be vastly more difficult, other things being equal, for a mixed commission of navy technicians and statesmen to agree on a plan for naval disarmament than for a mixed commission of economists and statesmen to agree upon a reparations settlement, practically impossible as history has shown the latter to be.

A naval expert is qualified to define accurately the principles which should determine abstract naval equality, but the law of human nature decrees that his opinion is relatively not as safe in a programme which he formulates as a practical interpretation of those principles applied to a partial destruction of his own navy. The proper pride of a naval officer's life is his navy. His whole professional career impels him to think of a navy only in terms of victory. He not only instinctively feels, but he is rightly taught to feel, that he must strike not for equal navies, but for a superior navy. It is difficult for him to forget that with a superior navy, victory is probable, with an inferior navy almost hopeless. Other things being equal, I fear no naval officier ever inherently favours equality.

The naval officer has his duty to perform to his State, and it is primarily to secure it against attack. He therefore trusts to his ships and his armament. It is the duty of the statesman to remove from his State the danger of attack. Upon the latter primarily lies the duty of peace-making, and in these negotiations he must hold the initiative. He is the one to build up the new order and to start the new policy, guided as he goes by the advice of those competent and patriotic naval experts who serve him. What differences there are in their respective duties can be coordinated into a policy of statesmanship, and that and that alone is what I have in mind in what I now say.

I have no knowledge of the qualifications and records of any naval officers heretofore engaged in these negotiations, or acquaintance with them. I am concerned only that the methods under which this work is to be done, whoever may do it, shall be adjusted to the laws of human nature.

At the beginning of the work the contribution of the naval experts to the problem should be a definition of abstract equality. It is certainly possible for naval experts to arrive at a definition for evaluation of fighting strength of ships. Thus, for instance, one might find a yardstick with which to determine the military value of individual ships. These ships might differ in displacement, size of guns, age, speed, and other characteristics, and yet such an agreed properly weighted value might be given to each of these differing characteristics as to make it possible to compare, for example, the cruiser fleets or combi-

ned fleets of two navies, and establish a parity between them. If naval experts rise to the proper sense of their responsibility, the use by statesmen of their yardstick will not be one which will invite peril from those extreme pacifists and extreme militarists who form the "lunatic fringe."

But, again, in connexion with the method of preparing the naval yardstick, let us consider the law of human nature. Should a Commission composed of the representatives of each Navy concerned meet to reach agreement upon this yardstick, they would be asked to agree upon something the use of which will reduce in number the idols of their hearts—the ships of their navies. I am casting no reflection here upon naval officers when speaking of the law of human nature which subconsciously influences the actions of all mankind, learned or ignorant, good or bad, rich or poor, skilled or unskilled, great or humble, old or young, of every race and nationality of the world.

I have already spoken of the fallibility and lack of agreement of expert and economic opinion as exemplified by the experience of the Reparations negotiations. I will say, frankly, that from a commission of naval experts of the respective nations meeting together and called to evolve a final definition of the naval yardstick, I personally should expert a failure to agree.

It would seem that, to adjust to human nature the method of arriving at naval reduction, each Government might separately obtain from their respective naval experts their definition of the yardstick and then the inevitable compromise between those differing definitions, which will be expressed in the final fixation of the technical yardstick, should be made by a committee of statesmen of the nations, reinforced from the beginning by those separate expressions of abstract technical naval opinion and able again to seek further naval advice, if necessary, before the final fixation.

These statesmen should further be the ones to draw up for the world the terms of the final agreement upon naval reduction, which should be couched in those simple terms understandable to the ordinary man in the street, which, while the pet aversion of the casuist, are the highest expression of true statesmanship. That final agreement, covering the quantitative dispositions, will go to the nations for approval or rejection.

If this should be the outcome, let those entrusted with the last draft of the conclusions of the last Conference be men born with the faculty of clear and concise statement, for that document must appeal to the composite will of the peoples of the nations, and in order to make the proper appeal it must be read generally and understood.

There, again, we remember the operations of the law of human nature, and will hope that in these men the temptation to show erudition be subordinated to writing that which, while

properly covering the cause, may be understood by the audience. A clear statement of the case, understantable by all, should mean success.

And here let me anticipate the possible comments of those whom we have always with us on both sides of the ocean—the social purveyors of the trivial in international discussion who talk so continually about good relations and do so little to forward them.

In all I have said to-night I intend nothing in derogation of the absolute necessity for the consideration and presentation of the naval side of this question by its ablest experts the world over, and, on the other hand, nothing in derogation of the absolute necessity of bringing to the political side of it the highest qualities of statesmanship which the world can provide. But to properly solve the problem we must adopt a method which brings the full weight of both of these classes of men to bear upon it, without their unnecessary collisions during the first formulating period when they are primarily concerned with two separate objectives.

Again, and also anticipating certain comment, let me say that while it is the fashion of these sensational days to attribute to any statement of irritating fact by a public man some malevolent purpose towards individuals, there is nothing of this in my mind.

The Committee from the Governments which met at Geneva to agree upon naval disarmement was a mixed commission of statesmen and naval technicians, and, in my judgment, that was the reason for its failure. The method was adjusted to human reasoning, but not to human nature.

We should not look upon the failure at Geneva in 1927 as the failure of individuals, but of the method under which they were asked to function. This may be said, however that under the laws of human nature, probably 90 per cent. of Englishmen think the American Delegation was responsible for the mistake, and 90 per cent. of Americans think that the British members of the Commission were responsible for the mistake. The great, ovewrhelming, and soul-satisfying fact about it is that the British and American people are a unit in agreeing that, whoever was responsible for it, a mistake was made. And of what is this significant? It means that in the inarticulate consciences and hearts of the two great English-speaking peoples there is upheld, sacred and inviolate, the principle of the equality between them of naval strength. Their attitude upon this question—unmistakable—assumed as out of the realm of debate even by the nationalistic demagogues of both countries—while decorated by reason, is based under the providence of God upon fundamental human instincts and a commingling of the blood.

In these circumstances, let us be hopeful for the cause of world peace and the progress of civilization ; for in the joint

hands of these same English-speaking peoples rests not only their secure guarantee, but as well the ark of the covenant of human freedom.

Sir Austen Chamberlain, proposing the toast of " The Chairman " said :—

Sweet are the uses of adversity. (Laughter). Had your Excellency fixed your arrival a few weeks earlier and had it then been my fate to follow you when you made your important declaration it would have been my duty to respond to it and to comment upon it. But, happily, I belong to a minority— (laughter)— and, as we all know, minorities are under the special protection of Providence and the Prime Minister. (Laughter). Accordingly my task to-night is lightened and becomes one not of duty but of pleasure.

If I take any part in this oratorical tournament, it is only to assure his Excellency that the welcome which the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs tendered to him was a welcome not of a party but of the British nation—(cheers)—and that the sentiments of friendship, of deep, undying friendship, for the country and the people of whom he is the representative which were expressed by my right hon. friend are the feelings of all our people, of all our parties, and that whatever differences we have among ourselves—and the speech of the Secretary of State did not this evening disclose such a new departure in policy as would bring me into the ranks of his critics—whatever differences we have among ourselves, we are united not merely in the wish but in the determination to settle, in the friendly spirit which neighbours and kinsmen should, such differences as must arise in daily intercourse even between the best and most cordial of friends.

Mr. Ambassador, you have made your first most important speech in my country, which is an appeal and a message not only to our people here, but to all the peoples of the world. I myself have a growing hope, I may say a growing confidence, that the difficulties of detail and of adjustment which have hitherto separated our two nations on this naval question will be solved by the use of that new yardstick of which the President of the United States spoke, and of which you have spoken again to-night. These declarations, made on behalf of the American Government, have shown an appreciation of the difficulties and of the peculiar circumstances of other Powers, which I believe not only our Government and our people, but every Government and every people interested in the naval question, have been quick to recognize, and meeting in that spirit, we are confident that, with the good will and with the understanding that it discloses, there will be a solution of our difficulties and a reduction of naval armaments before very much more time has passed over our heads. (Cheers.).

REDE DES AUSSENMINISTERS DR. EDUARD BENES, PRAG, AUSSENAUSSCHUSS DES ABGEORDNETENHAUSES, 20 JUNI 1929

(Prager Presse vom 21 Juni 1929).

Der Aussenminister reagierte zunächst auf die Ausführungen Dr. Czechs über das Minderheitenproblem und konstatierte, dass es zunächst notwendig wäre, grundsätzliche Missverständnisse zwischen ihm und dem Abg. Dr. Czech zu beheben, damit es moglich ist, zu einem Abschluss zu kommen, worin beide übereinstimmen und worin sie grundsätzlich auseinandergehen. Ich möchte konstatieren, fährt der Minister fort, dass es ein Irrtum wäre, anzunehmen. dass ich in dieser oder jener Form in meinem letzten Expose meinen früheren Standpunkt und meine Ansichten über das Nationalitätenproblem geandert habe. Das, was ich in meiner Rede verteidigt habe, verteidige ich bereits elf Jahre, habe ich immer verteidigt und werde es auch in Zukunft verteidigen. Ferner ist es absolut unrichtig, meine Erklärung und die Erklärung des Präsidenten der Republik über die Minderheitenfrage in Gegensatz zu stellen, wie dies auch Herr Abg Kallina getan hat, und zwar gerade deshalb — und darin liegt vielleicht eine gewisse Aufklärung — weil im Standpunkt des Abg. Dr. Czech und auch des Abg. Kallina einige Dinge verbunden sind, welche ich grundsätzlich unterscheide.

" Sehr wichtig ist es, in den Minderheiten fragen einzelne ihrer rechtlichen und politischen Seiten gut zu unterscheiden. Im vollen Bewusstsein dessen, was ich sage, behaupte ich, dass es sehr gefährlich ist, wie man jetzt überhaupt über Minderheitenfragen international diskutiert.

Nicht dass ich vielleicht irgenwelche Konzessionen an die Minderheiten und ähnliches fürchten würde — das ist eine Frage der Innenpolitik und zum grossen Teil eine Frage des Verhältnises der politischen Parteien innerhalb des Staates zueiuander. Von Bedeutung ist es aber in der internationalen und Innenpolitik die Minderheitenprobleme bis in alle Details gut zu analysieren und einerseits ihre rein rechtliche Seite zu sehen, andererseits ihre internationale und ihre innenpolitische Seite. Das bedeutet nicht, dass diese Fragen nur Juristen lösen sollen.

Vom Augenblich jedoch, wo es sich um einen internationalen Vertrag handelt, der seinen genauen Text hat, welcher seinen prägnanten Sinn haben muss, muss man vor allem genau die Rechtsbasis festsetzen, nach welcher man sieht, worum es sich eigentlich handelt. Würde diese Rechtsbasis in allen internationalen Fragen voll und konsequent respektiert werden, würde bald in der ganzen internationalen Politik ein ungeheueres Chaos entstehen und es würden internationale Konflikte solchen Charakters entstehen, dass statt der Arbeit für den Frieden nur

Zwistigkeiten gesät und Krieg und Konflikte vorbereitet würden. Das gerade ist das Wesentliche, dass diese juristische Seite Ausdruck des gegenseitigen Verhältnisses der Staaten untereinander und gleichzeitig auch Ausdruck der moralischen Kräfte ist, welche die Geschicke der Völker leiten, und nicht bloss eine Frage der Kraft und Macht, welche diese Völker haben.

" Die juristische Seite der einzelnen Verträge ist Ausdruck der sittlichen Kräfte, welche in einem bestimmten Stadium der internationalen Politik vorherrschten. Sie bestimmt ihren Sinn und Inhalt, sie zeigt wozu der Staat eigentlich verpflichtet ist. Deshalb müsse er als Aussenminister vor allem den Rechtszustand des Minderheitenproblems sehen.

Die zweite Seite der Sache ist die, dass der Minister in keinem Falle zulassen kann, dass von wem immer einseitig Verpflichtungen geändert werden, welche wir übernommen haben. Auf diesem Grundsatz beruht das Wesen des interantionalen Lebens überhaupt ".

Deshalb bestehe er auf unseren bisherigen Verpflichtungen und auch den Rechten und bestehe darauf, dass es unter diesen Umständen nicht möglich ist, dass es einseitig jemanden einfällt, auf Kosten des anderen vereinbarte Verpflichtungen abzuändern. Deshalb habe der Minister so entschieden, unerbittlich, wie Herr Abg. Dr. Czech sagte, betont, dass der Minister hier in nichts nachgeben kann, dass Verträge eingehalten werden müssen. Auf die Bemerkung des Abg. Kallina, dass man beim Waffenstillstand auch von der Selbstbestimmung gesprochen habe und dass dies nicht eingehalten worden sei, bemerkt der Minister, dass wir über das Wesen der Selbstbestimmung bis zum Jüngsten Tag streiten könnten, da jeder von ihr eine andere Vorstellung hat.

Die dritte Frage ist die, dass Abg. Dr. Czech nach Ansicht des Ministers nicht hinreichend das unterschieden hat, was der Minister in seinem Expose betont hat, dass er nämlich die internationale und innerpolitische Seite des Problems der Minderheitenverträge vermengt hat. Das, was eine politische Partei oder Minderheit als ihren Plan, ihr Programm aufgestellt hat, als Ziel in der Innenpolitik, das ist ihre Sache und der Minister respektiere das. Er konstatiere bloss, welches unsere Rechte und unsere Verpflichtungen zum Ausland sind, zur internationalen Kontrolle, zum Völkerbund. Diese zwei Sachen dürfen nicht vermengt werden.

" Die Minderheitenverträge, wie wir sie heute haben, repräsentieren ein bestimmtes Minimum an Rechten und Pflichten, welches durch die Texte gegeben ist, dieses Minimum muss international respektiert werden und in Sachen des Ausmasses dieses Minimums gilt die internationale Inhärenz und Kontrolle. Ueber dieses Minimum hinaus kann keine internationale Inharenz gelten ".

Damit ist allerdings nicht gesagt, dass diese oder jene Partei

im Wege der Innenpolitik nicht das anstreben soll, was sie als ihr Recht erachtet, Konzessionen vom Staate und den anderen Parteien anstreben aber das ist Sache der Innenpolitik, von der sich die Aussenpolitik angemessen unterscheiden muss. Der Abschluss ist der, dass Abg. Dr Czech das Exposé des Ministers ungenau in dem Sinne interpretiert hat, dass der Minister nicht das gestreift hat, was Standpunkt der Partei des Abg. Dr. Czech oder dieser oder jener anderen Partei ist. Er habe bloss das verteidigt, dass Verpflichtungen, welche wir international übernommen haben, einseitig weder geändert noch unrichtig interpretiert werden können noch dürfen.

Wenn Abg. Dr. Czech sagt, dass heute der psychologische Augenblick vorliegt, wo man über alle diese Dinge sprechen könnte, könne der Minister sagen, dass er bereit ist, sich über das ganze Minderheintenproblem und über unsere Innenpolitik offen auszusprechen, sobald dazu die geeignete Zeit vorhanden ist, betont aber von neuem und unterstreicht es, dass es nicht möglich ist, diese zwei verschiedenen politischen Linien zu vermengen. Für den Aussenminister ist es von Beteutung, genau die Demarkationslinie zu ziehen, was man innenpolitisch diskutieren kann und was der internationalen Kontrolle untersteht. Er behauptet, dass man nicht verlangen kann, dass wir selbst und einseitig auf uns irgendwelche neuen Verpflichtungen nehmen. Wenn der Völkerbund beschliessen wird, dass das auch alle übrigen annehmen sollen, dann sei dies etwas anderes.

Aber es sei nicht möglich, zwei Kategorien von Staaten zu schaffen, die einen, welche Verpflichtungen bereits haben und welchen noch neue auferlegt werden, und die anderen, welche keine Verpflichtungen haben und welchen keine neuen auferlegt werden. Das wäre eine Verletzung des ersten und wesentlichen internationalen Grundsatzes von der Gleichheit der Staaten. Immer ist es möglich, sich eines bestimmten Teils der Staatssouveränität zu begeben. Das geschieht in jedem internationalen Vertrag und geschah auch durch den Minderheitenvertrag. Der Minister gibt dies zu und war selbst auf der Friedenskonferenz dafür, dass das angenommen wird, und deshalb habe er auch sofort in der revolutionären Nationalversammlung dem Vertrauen Ausdruck gegeben, dass wir das erfüllen werden. Er wiederhole aber, dass es nicht möglich ist, dem Staat einseitig neue Verpflichtungen aufzuerlegen oder ihnen einen anderen Sinn zu geben, den sie nicht gehabt haben und nicht haben.

Der Minister möchte nicht, dass wir von neuem in die Situation kämen, einen Streit über die Interpretation dieser Minoritätsverträge führen zu müssen. Juristisch kann man freilich über jeden Text bis zum jüngsten Tage streiten. Es ist doch bekannt, wie Juristen Texte auszulegen verstehen. Es existieren aber internationale juristiche Korporationen, die zur Kontrolle der Minoritätsverträge berufen sind und diese wissen

sehr wohl, welchen Sinn die Minoritätsverträge hatten und haben. Diese Verträge wurden doch in einer besonderen Kommission der Friedenskonferenz geschaffen wo es ihretwegen langwierige Diskussionen gab. Hierüber bestehen Protokolle. Die einzelnen Staaten haben ihre Bemerkungen zu den Verträgen gemacht, man weiss sehr wohl, zu welchem Ziel und unter welchen Bedingungen die einzelnen Bestimmungen getroffen wurden, und der Minister zweifelt nicht, dass eines Tages eine Interpretation dieser Verträge durch den Internationalen Gerichtshof im Haag auf Grund dieses ganzen Materials erfolgen wird. Dann wird man sehen, dass die Tschechoslovakische Republik bei dieser Interpretation sehr gut abschneiden wird im Verhältnis zu dem, was sie ihren Minoritäten bereits gewährt hat. Die Interpretation wird so limitativ sein, dass sie keineswegs die Theorien einiger Angehöriger unserer Minoritäten unterstützen wird, die das Exposé des Ministers kritisierten.

Der Minister resumiert, dass durch seine Worte das Missverständnis zwischem ihm und Dr. Czech über die Auslegung der Minderheitenverträge beseitigt werden kann.

Wenn Abg. Dr. Czech erklärte, dass wir die Beschlüsse seiner Partei und so weiter nicht lesen und daher seine Politik nicht richtig verstehen können, so könnte man diesen Vorwurf gerade auf ihn anwenden. Dr. Czech kann sich nicht in die Situation hineindenken, in welcher sich der Aussenminister befindet, der, über die Minoritätenverträge sprechend, bloss die Wahrheit verteidigt, von der er überzeugt ist, nur das verteidigt, wovon er weiss, dass es seinerzeit so bestimmt wurde, denn der Minister selbst war an diesen Dingen beteiligt. Wenn durchgesetzt wird, dass im Völkerbunde ein neuer Minderheitenschutz für alle geschaffen wird, dann ist die Situation eine andere. Abg. Dr. Czech hat jedoch die Ausführungen des Ministers nicht ganz richtig verstanden, wenn er behauptet, dass der Minister den unerbittlichen Rechtsstandpunkt verteidigt. Dies habe der Minister niemals getan, denn er verteidige nur das, wovon er überzeugt sei und was er durch elf Jahre in gleicher Weise verteidigt hatte. Als Aussenminister müsse er sich von den Prinzipien des internationalen Rechtes leiten lassen. Er bittet daher, dass die Abgeordneten ihre programmatischen Ziele und innerpolitischen Bestrebungen deutlich von dem trennen, was international kontrolliert werden soll und wozu der Staat international verpflichtet ist. (Abg. Dr. Czech : Aber das gilt an die Adresse aller, nicht nur an die deutschen Sozialdemokraten, sondern auch an die tschechischen Parteien). Jawohl, aller, dass ist selbstverständlich.

Abg. Ing. Kallina erklärte ganz entschieden, er sei gegen alle Friedensverträge, aber gleich darauf berief er sich auf die Minoritätsfriedensverträge und forderte deren Einhaltung. Dies geht denn doch nicht, man muss logisch bleiben. Wenn man

die Friedensverträge nicht anerkennt, darf man sich auch auf andere Verträge nicht berufen.

Abg. Kallina sprach auch davon, dass nichts für die Abrüstung getan werde und dass wir abrüsten sollen. Gleichzeitig verteidigte er sehr eingehend seine politische Philosophie der Macht und unterstrich dies noch durch einen Aufschlag auf den Tisch. Herr Kollege, sagt der Minister, dies ist eine schlechte Aufmunterung zur Abrüstung. Damit liefern Sie nur Argumente gegen die Abrüstung. Das sollten Sie nicht tun.

Wie sollen die anderen Lust haben, abzurüsten, wenn Sie so sprechen und ihnen drohen, dass eines schönen Tages alle Friedensverträge durch materielle Macht umgestürzt werden. Dies ist eine schlechte Politik. Ich wollte damit nur auf die Widersprüche in Ihren Ausführungen hinweisen und den Charakter dieser Ausführungen beleuchten.

Die Ergebnisse der Belgrader Konferenz erachtet der Minister als die wichtigsten, die in den letzten Jahren für die Erneuerung der Zusammenarbeit der Kleinen Ententestaaten erzielt wurden. Alle waren wir uns in den letzten Jahren bewusst, dass die Bundesgenossenschaft in positivem, konstruktivem Sinne ausgebaut werden muss. Wir sind uns der Kraft wohl bewusst, die die Klein-Ententestaaten besitzen. Im Bewusstsein dieser Kraft können wir bei verschiedenen Zwischenfällen unsere vole Sicherheit und Ruhe, aber auch unsere. Entschlossenheit zum Ausdruck bringen,in dieser Sicherheit liegt unsere Stärke, mit der wir rechnen können. Ich verteidige weiterhin die Politik meines realen. Optimismus und behaupte, dass ich diesen realen Optimismus, von dem ich seit Jahren durchdrungen bin, konsequent in allem zur Geltung bringe. Die Kombinationen über ein italienisch-magyarisc hes Einvernehmen sind in Wirklichkeit eben bloss Kombinationen, die der momentanen politischen Konjunktur entsprechen, wie sie da oder dort aufgefasst wird, aber sie sind eben nur Kombinationen. Sie gehen nicht in die Tiefe. Ich stimme nicht ganz mit der Formulierung überein, die in dieser Beziehung Kollege Svetlik angedeutet hat, der dieser Sache eine grössere Bedeutung beilegt, als sie tatsächlich besitzt.

Was unser Verhältnis zu Ungarn anbelangt, habe ich meinen letzten Ausführungen nichts hinzufügen. Damals erklärte ich, dass es zu einer Intervention kommen wird. Aber schon vor der Intervention haben wir unseren Standpunkt formuliert und auf dem beharren wir auch jetzt. Ich betone jedoch, dass das Vorgehen der Klein-Ententestaaten in jedem Falle konsequent solidarisch sein wird. Dies gilt jetzt mehr denn je nach der letzten Konferenz in Belgrad.

Zu der Erwähnung Dr. Hajns, dass die Worte des Ministers über die moralische und symbolische Bedeutung der Arbitrage verträge bereits eine Kritik enthalten, konstatiert der Minister, dass die Arbitrageverträge eine grosse moralische und eine gro

sse symbolische Bedeutung besitzen, aber zugleich auch heute schon eine bedeutende praktische Wichtigkeit haben, was bei der nächsten Gelegenheit festzustellen sein wird. Der Minister betont, welch grosse realpolitische Bedeutung die Locarno-Arbitrageverträge für unsere Staaten besassen, freilich auch deshalb, weil sie von den grossen Staaten unter gewissen Umständen und im Zusammenhang mit gewissen politischen Ereignissen abgeschlossen wurden.

Es wäre daher politisch nicht richtig, den Arbitrageverträgen keine tatsächliche politische Bedeutung beizumessen. Wenn ich jedoch die moralische Seite der Sache betonte, so wollte ich damit sagen, dass ich die Bedeutung dieser Verträge nicht übertreiben will sondern diese Faktoren in der praktischen Politik real und realistisch beurteile und ihnen nur den tatsächlichen Wert beimesse, den sie haben. Ich würde für unseren Staat namentlich in unserer gegenwärtigen internationalen Situation es als einen Fehler betrachten, wenn man dies nicht voll einschätzen würde.

Der Minister schliesst mit folgender Erklärung :

« Eine gewisse Ungeklärheit der Gesamtsituation, die sich aus den letzten internationalen Diskussionen, aus den Verhandlungen des Völkerbundrates über die Minderheiten aus der neuen Situation in England, aus der Lösung der Reparationsfrage, aus der künftigen grossen politischen Reparationskonferenz und aus den angekündigten Verhandlungen zwischen Amerika und England ergibt, könnte bei dem flüchtigen Beobachter die Frage wachrufen, was dies alles eigentlich bedeute. Nach meiner Ansicht bedeutet dies einfach die Fortsetzung jener aufsteigenden politischen Linie, die ich schon so lange verteidige und eine Satisfaktion für all das, was unsere Politik durch ganze zehn Jahre getan hat. Was ich über die Minderheiten sagte, möchte ich auch über alle anderen Fragen sagen. Es gibt nichts, was an unserer Aussenpolitik zu ändern wäre. Die aufsteigende Linie der inneren und äusseren Konsolidierung ist bei uns systematisch verfolgt worden, wir haben uns an die internationale Situation angepasst. Es war dies aber keine Konjunkturalpolitik, sondern eine Politik der aufsteigenden Linie, welche stets die augenblickliche Situation zu würdigen, sich ihr anzupassen, sie auszunützen verstand, eventuell wenn sie ungünstig war, sie mit Erfolg abzuwarten wusste. Weil die ganze Linie unserer Politik diesen Charakter hat, dass sie nicht lokalen Umständen und Tageseinflüssen und Veränderungen unterliegt, werden wir zum Beispiel mit England unter der gegenwärtigen Regierung ein gleich freundschaftliches Verhältnis erhalten wie unter der konservativen Regierung. Das ist und war immer die Stärke unserer Politik. Daher konnte ich über die Konferenz der Kleinen Entente und über unsere internationale Situation optimistisch referieren und ich betone neuerdings, dass unsere Politik nach dieser Richtung hin in Ruhe diese Linie fortsetzen wird, denn

dies allein ist im Stande, unsere gute internationale Situation, die wir duch unsere bisherige Arbeit gewonnen haben, uns auch weiterhin zu erhalten.

DISCOURS DE M. RAYMOND POINCARE, PRESIDENT DU CONSEIL DES MINISTRES, ET DU PRESIDENT DE LA REPUBLIQUE FRANCAISE M. DOUMERGUE, VERDUN, LE 23 JUIN 1929.

(Le Temps du 24 juin 1929).

Discours de M. Raymond Poincaré

Vous voici, à votre tour, monsieur le président, dans cette ville ressuscitée. La population qui vous y accueille a cruellement souffert. Mais ses épreuves n'ont ni altéré son caractère ni bouleversé ses traditions. Elle est restée ce qu'elle était avant la guerre. Ce n'est pas ici, ce n'est pas en Lorraine, qu'on a jamais pu souhaiter un conflit sanglant entre deux nations voisines. On n'oubliait rien ; mais, même pour assurer le retour de la justice, on se serait gardé de rien faire ou de rien dire qui pût amener une conflagration. On savait que, dans le cas où la paix serait troublée, les habitants de cette contrée seraient les premières victimes désignées par la fatalité. On savait que la belle vallée où est assise la ville de Verdun serait exposée à devenir le théâtre des plus terribles batailles. Mais plus on désirait éviter la guerre, plus on voulait que si malgré nous elle éclatait, elle se terminât par la victoire et par la réparation de nos droits violés ; et c'est pourquoi, lorsque l'ennemi s'est rué sur la place de Verdun, elle a, tout de suite, crié à la France : « Fais-moi confiance ! Ils ne passeront pas. »

Aujourd'hui, plus que jamais, les habitants des marches lorraines, qui viennent de subir une fois de plus les horreurs de l'invasion, sont passionnément attachés à la paix. Mais la paix, ils veulent que ce ne soit pas seulement un beau mot, ni même une de ces idées-forces que chacun interprète à sa manière ; ils veulent que ce soit une solide et durable réalité. Aussi, ne la comprennent-ils que dans le droit et la sécurité. Pourvu donc que les traités soient respectés et que nos réparations soient payées dans les conditions que le gouvernement avait indiquées et que vient de préciser l'expertise internationale, les populations qui ont aujourd'hui, Monsieur le Président, l'honneur de vous recevoir se déclareront satisfaites et resteront au premier rang parmi les ouvriers de la paix et de la concorde universelle.

Discours du président de la République

Nous nous associons certes de grand cœur, mon cher maire, à l'allégresse et à la joie de vos concitoyens à la vue de leur ville bien-aimée pleine de vie, rayonnante de jeunesse et offrant à leurs légitimes ambitions, grâce à son parfait aménagement, de belles perspectives d'activité et de prospérité.

Mais nous voulons aussi que cette activité et que cette prospérité soient durables. Elles ne le seront que si, dans l'avenir, sont épargnées à la France, qui en a tant souffert et qui en souffre durement encore, les terribles épreuves qui ont semé sur son sol tant d'effroyables destructions et ruiné même par endroits jusqu'à sa fertilité.

Pour que Verdun n'ait pas à redouter une onzième destruction — car depuis son origine elle a été dix fois détruite, — il faut que notre pays, que la vieille Europe, que le monde, puissent vivre et progresser dans tous les domaines au milieu d'une pure atmosphère de paix.

La France républicaine avait donné, avant la dernière guerre maintes preuves de son vif attachement à la paix.

A la veille d'être attaquée et envahie, au début d'août 1914, elle en a donné d'autres, tellement éclatantes et indiscutables, que personne au monde ne pouvait mettre en doute sa volonté résolue d'éviter tout conflit.

« Aujourd'hui plus que jamais, M. le Président du Conseil vient de le déclarer avec la haute autorité de sa parole, les Français sont passionnément attachés à la paix ».

Nul pays n'a plus souffert de la guerre que le nôtre et n'a offert, à la fin des hostilités, le spectacle d'aussi effroyables dévastations.

Ceux qui ont pu les éviter ne peuvent être plus que nous animés d'un amour passionné de la paix. Le monde entier doit comprendre qu'ayant été les plus éprouvés et les plus meurtris nous ayons plus que tous autres le désir d'être assurés que la paix, selon le vœeu tout à l'heure exprimé par M. le Président du Conseil, ne sera pas « seulement un beau mot, mais une solide et durable réalité ».

Elle ne peut l'être que par le respect absolu des traités et par un ensemble de mesures de sécurité et de précautions appropriées qui rendent la guerre impossible ou tout au moins funeste pour quiconque voudrait y recourir.

C'est au maintien de ces traités, c'est à la recherche de ces mesures et de ces précautions que tous les gouvernements qui se sont succédé au pouvoir en France depuis la fin de la guerre ont employé leurs efforts. Il est juste de reconnaître que ces efforts n ont pas été vains, Sans aucune interruption ils se sont poursuivis avec la clairvoyance, l'esprit de méthode, de sagesse et de prudence qui sont indispensables pour les rendre efficaces et les faire aboutir à des résultats durables.

La paix, messieurs, est une conquête qui exige un travail continu, une action réfléchie, une volonté égale chez tous les peuples en même temps qu'une transformation progressive des mentalités héritées de siècles où la guerre était la dernière raison.

Le véritable esprit pacifique, sans lequel la paix sera toujours instable, se formera d'autant plus vite que dans chaque pays les rapports entre les citoyens s'inspireront davantage d'un esprit d'entente et de concorde.

La discorde intérieure est une mauvaise préparation à la création et au maintien de la paix internationale. Aussi, messieurs, passionné comme je le suis pour l'entente entre les peuples, vous ne serez point surpris que je désire ardemment voir la France qui, de tout temps, a donné de si grands, de si nobles et de si généreux exemples au monde, lui donner aussi l'exemple de cette paix intérieure dont la pratique généralisée peut seule créer l'esprit qui tuera la guerre.

REDEN DER OBERHAUSMITGLIEDER ALBERT BERZEVICZY UND JOSEF VESZI UND DES UNGARISCHEN MINISTER-PRAESIDENTEN GRAF BETHLEN, BUDAPEST, OBERHAUS, 27. JUNI 1929.

(Pester Lloyd vom 28. Juni 1929.)

Oberhausmitglied Albert Berzeviczy :

— Es liegt uns eine ganze Serie von Gesetzentwürfen vor, durch die eine Anzahl vont mit verschiedenen Ländern abgeschlossenen, Schiedsgerichtsverträgen inartikuliert werden soll. Zählen wir zu diesen Vorlagen auch noch den schon früher inartikulierten Freundschafts-und Schiedsgerichtsvertrag mit Italien, sowie den jüngst mit Spanien abgeschlossenen Schlichtungs- und Schiedsgerichtsvertrag hinzu, so können wir feststellen, dass diese Kette internationaler Vereinbarungen den glänzendsten und imposantesten Beweis für die Friedensliebe und den Wunsch Ungarns darstellt, jeden möglichen Streitfall im Schiedsgerichtsverfahren zu regeln. Sie bildet aber auch einen *entschiedenen Erfolg unserer Aussenpolitik*, für den wir unserer Regierung aufrichtige Anerkennung schulden, da durch diese Verträge Ungarn herausgehoben wurde aus seiner früheren Isolierung und in ein System von Staatsverträgen eingefügt wurde, das unserem Lande einen gewissen Rückhalt und gewisse freundschaftliche Verbindung sichert. (Lebhafte Zustimmung.) Diese Gesetzentürfe werden gekrönt durch zwei weitere Gesetzesvorlagen, durch die der Kellogg-Pakt inartikuliert, be-

ziehungsweise — und dies scheint mir wichtiger zu sein — die Zustimmung Ungarns zum internationalen Dokument über die obligatorische Inanspruchnahme des Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshofes im Haag proklamiert werden soll. Auch diese Vorlagen sind ein eklatanter Beweis nicht nur für die Friedensliebe Ungarns, sondern auch für das ungarische Rechtsgefühl, das jeden Rechtsstreit unter den Schild des Rechtes zu stellen wünscht. Und da muss ich es als eine charakteristische Erscheinung kennzeichnen, dass von den einseitigen feindlichen Staaten lediglich *Belgien* seine Zustimmung zu diesem Dokument erteilt hat, während alle übrigen Länder sich bisher hartnäckig weigerten, sich der Jurisdiktion des Haager Ständigen Gerichtshofes zu unterwerfen. Während also Ungarn jede Streitfrage ruhig und in aller Aufrichtigkeit unter den Schutzschild des Rechtes stellt, wenden sich andere Staaten in grosser Anzahl mit lebhafter Scheu vom Arbitragegedanken ab, weil sie sich sicherer fühlen, wenn über ihre Sache nicht ein unabhängiger Richter das Urteil spricht, sondern wenn sie ihre Angelegenheit in das Gebiet der Machtsphäre hinüberspielen und der Entscheidung politischer Körperschaften anheimstellen können, in denen sich ihre Freunde in der Mehrheit befinden. (Lebhafte Zustimmung.) Das hat sich in eklatanter Weise anlässlich des *ungarisch-rumänischen Optantenstreites* gezeigt und noch bezeichnender ist es, dass einer der führenden Politiker Rumäniens eben dieser Tage mit einem gewissen Stolz erklärt hat, dass sich Rumänien niemals der Entscheidung eines Schiedsgerichtes unterwerfen werde. Solange bei den europäischen Staaten eine solche Mentalität herrscht, können wir nicht hoffen, dass die Verwirklichung der Arbitrageidee den Frieden Europas dauernd sichern und die Abrüstung ermöglichen werde, wie uns schon so lange versprochen wird, ohne dass die Siegerstaaten bisher die Initiative zur Entwaffnung ergriffen hätten.

— Was nun den *Kellogg-Pakt* betrifft, so hat Ungarn diesem mit gewissen Vorbehalten zugestimmt. Diese Reservate gehen nicht so weit, wie die anderer Staaten. Wir haben uns bloss vorbehalten, dass wir durch die Zustimmung zum Pakte auf unsere Ansprüche, Hoffnungen und Bestrebungen, die Abänderung der ungerecht festgesetzten Grenzen auf friedlichem Wege zu erwirken, nicht zu verzichten brauchen. Die im Senat der Vereinigten Staaten hierüber abgeführte Debatte beweist, dass Ungarns Auffassung die richtige ist und dass dieser Vorbehalt zum Inhalt des Kellogg Paktes durchaus nicht in Widerspruch steht. An unserer Aufrichtigkeit kann also wirklich niemand zweifeln. *Nichts spricht mehr für sie als der Umstand, dass wir ja vollständig entwaffnet sind.* Wir haben die einschlägigen Bestimmungen des Friedensvertrages restlos erfüllt, wir sind also auch gar nicht fähig. Krieg zu führen, und ebendarum kann an der Aufrichtigkeit und dem Ernst unseres Friedenswillens niemand

zweifeln. Nicht das gleiche gilt aber von den übrigen Staaten, die dem Kellogg-Pakt ebenfalls zugestimmt haben, aber ihre Rüstungen dennoch fieberhaft fortsetzen, also offenkundig zum Krieg rüsten, obwohl sie gleichfalls gelobt haben, den Krieg nicht als politisches Mittel in Anspruch zu nehmen. Unsere Friedensliebe ist also solcherart durch die Tatsachen gehärtet. Und dennoch war es immer Ungarn, das auch noch in der jüngsten Vergangenheit stets verdächtigt worden ist, der Ruhestörer in Europa zu sein. Das gleiche ist geschehen, als Minister präsident Graf *Bethlen* am Heldengedenktage eine Rede gehalten hat, die den Gefühlen der gesamten ungarischen Nation zweifellos restlos entsprach. *Die ungarische Nation steht in dieser Beziehung auf demselben Standpunkt wie der Herr Minister präsident und sie wird von diesem Standpunkt niemals abweichen.* Wegen dieser Rede haben die Staaten der Kleinen Entente eine Note an unsere Regierung gerichtet, in der sie um Beruhigung, beziehungsweise Wiedergutmachung angesucht haben. Auf die schrankenlosen und scharfen Ausbrüche, die in der rumänischen Presse und in den Reden einiger rumänischen Politiker erfolgt sind, möchte ich jetzt nicht mehr reflektieren, einesteils, weil in der gestrigen Sitzung der rumänischen Kammer ein nüchternerer Ton angeschlagen worden ist, anderenteils, weil der rumänische Aussenminister in einer Erklärung den Vorfall als abgeschlossen bezeichnet had. Ich glaube, dass sich derartige Dinge nur dann nicht wieder ereignen werden, wenn die Staaten der Kleinen Entente endlich dahinter kommen, dass das Verhältnis Ungarns zu ihnen nicht so geartet ist, wie sie es sich vorgestellt haben, nämlich, dass *wir nicht unter ihrer Vormundschaft oder ihrer Disziplinargewalt stehen, sondern trotz der Entwaffnung, trotz der Verstümmelung unseres Landes ein freier Staat sind, dessen öffentliche Meinung sich frei äussern kann wie in jedem anderen Lande.* Wie wollen eine Anderung des Friedensvertrages *ausschliesslich durch friedliche Mittel* erreichen, und hat die rumänische Regierung jüngst erklärt, dass wir mit friedlichen Mitteln nichts erreichen könnten, weil Rumänien und die übrigen Mitgliedstaaten der Kleinen Entente nicht geneigt wären, mit uns über eine Anderung der Grenzen zu verhandeln, so nehmen wir dies von einer Regierung, die in dieser Frage auch von der Opposition unterstützt zu werden scheint, zur Kenntnis. *Aber schliesslich hat keine Regierung der Welt das Recht, die Macht und den Willen ihrer Nationen für alle Ewigkeit zu binden,* und darum vertrauen wir auch fürderhin darauf, dass einst eine Zeit kommen wird, da auch Rumänien gezwungen sein wird, einzusehen, dass es in seinem eigenen Interesse und im Interesse des europäischen Friedens sich mit uns in Verhandlungen einlassen *muss.* Dass wir gerade von rumänischer Seite in so heftiger Weise angefeindet werden, ist um so überraschender, als sämtliche Interessen Rumäniens auf ein freundschaftliches Verhältnis zu uns hinwei-

sen. *Rumänien wird ja von den gleichen Gefahren bedroht wie wir.* Osterreich, Ungarn und Rumänien : diese drei Länder bilden die Schranke in Europa, die, um mich so auszudrücken, das nördliche vom südlichen Slawentum trennt. Im Augenblick, da diese Schranke, einerlei, an welchem Punkte, durchbrochen sein wird, werden wir die slawische Flut nicht mehr aufhalten können und *in dem Moment, da Ungarn in diesem Meer versinkt, ist auch die Lage Rumäniens unhaltbar geworden. Darum müsste Rumänien in Ungarn auch un den Preis von Opfern eine Stütze suchen und Freundschaft mit uns schliessen.* Es ist fürwahr ein misslicher Anblick, wenn sich Rumänien gegen Ungarn mit der slawischen Flut verbündet.

— Anlässlich der Demarche der Kleinen Entente ist sehr viel über unser Verhältnis zu Frankreich gesprochen worden und wir alle konstatieren mit einer gewissen Freude, dass gegenüber der Demarche die französische offiziöse Presse nicht den Ton angeschlagen hat, an den wir von früher her gewöhnt waren. Ich bin der Ansicht, dass zwischen einem mächtigen, bis an die Zähne bewaffneten und eine in Europa fast unermessliche Macht repräsentierenden Staat und einem kleinen, unbewaffneten Staate die Bedingungen des guten Verhälnisses und der Freundschaft stets nur jener grosse, mächtige Staat bestimmen kann. Auf solche Weise ist in der Jüngstvergangenheit unser Freundschafsverhältnis zu *Italien* zustande gekommen, wenn auch dieses Verhältnis seine traditionelle Vorgeschichte hatte. Ich würde mich sehr freuen, wenn diese neueren Erscheinungen darauf hinweisen sollten, dass *Frankreich uns in Zukunft mehr Verständnis entgegenbringen wird.* Ich hoffe auch, dass dies geschehen wird in dem Augenblick, da eine vertrauensvolle Fühlungnahme zwischen Paris und Budapest möglich geworden ist, da man von uns nicht mehr erwarten wird, dass wir die Alehnung an Frankreich über Prag, Bukarest und Belgrad suchen sollen. Ich hoffe, dass diese Zeit nicht mehr weit enfernt ist und dass wir uns wieder der aufrichtigen Bewunderung überlassen können. die Ungarn für die französische Nation und die Schöpfungen des französischen Genius stets empfunden hat, und ich hege auch die Erwartung, dass die freundschaiftlichen Beziehungen, die früher zwischen der französischen und der ungarischen Nation bestanden, sich zu unseren Gunsten erneuern werden. Mit Rücksicht auf die vorgerückte Zeit will ich meine Gedanken nicht weiterspinnen, ich betone bloss noch, dass die vorliegenden Entwürfe so wichtige, so heilsame und so wertvolle Früchte einer providentiellen Aussenpolitik sind, dass wir sie nicht nur mit Beruhigung, sondern auch mit vollster Befriedigung und grösstem Vertrauen annehmen können. (Lebhafte Eljenrufe. Zustimmung und Applaus auf allen Seiten des Hauses).

Oberhausmitglied Josef Vészi :

Hohes Haus! Vor nicht allzu langer Zeit wurde im Parlament und in den Spalten der Presse bisweilen die Frage aufgeworfen : gibt es überhaupt eine ungarische Aussenpolitik und wenn ja, was ist ihr Ziel und was sind ihre Methoden? Jetzt liegen uns sechs Gesetzentwürfe vor : vier Schlichtungs- und Schiedsverträge, die Vorlage über die Ratifizierung des Kellogg-Paktes und der Gesetzentwurf über die Genehmigung des Beitritts zur Fakultativklausel der Satzungen des Haager Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshofes. Zu diesen sechs Vorlagen treten noch weitere Momente aus jüngster Zeit hinzu, so der Budapester Besuch des italienischen Staatssekretärs *Grandi* und des polnischen Aussenministers *Zaleski*, die Rede des Grafen *Bethlen* am Heldendenkmal, dann die Pariser Reise des Herrn Ministerpräsidenten und das Ergebnis, das er von dieser Fahrt heimgebracht hat. Aus diesen Stücken lässt sich unschwer das Mosaik der ungarischen Aussenpolitik, ihrer Zielsetzungen und ihrer ganzen Wesensart zusammenstellen.

Da sind zunächst die vier Schiedsgerichtsverträge. Ihnen ging schon früher der Freundschaftsvertrag mit Italien und der Schiedsvertrag mit Osterreich voran, denen allen sich der der Gesetzgebung noch nicht unterbreitete Schiedsvertrag mit Spanien hinzugesellt. Die Bedeutung dieser Verträge für die ungarische Aussenpolitik hat heute Exzellenz Berzeviczy mit überzeugenden Argumenten dargetan. Sie sind unwiderlegliche Beweise für den friedfertigen Charakter der ungarischen Aussenpolitik, denn es geht aus ihnen hervor, dass wir stets bereit sind, mit allen Staaten, mit denen wir in geordneten Verhältnissen leben, Verträge einzugehen, die eine schiedlich-friedliche Austragung aller Rechtsstreitigkeiten gewährleisten.

Es wirft sich hier jedoch eine Frage auf, an der man nicht stillschweigend vorbeigehen soll : Wie kommt es, so lautet die Frage, dass wir mit keinem einzigen Staate der Kleinen Entente bisher einen solchen Vertrag abgeschlossen haben, obzwar wir mit Osteirrech ungeachtet der Burgenlanddifferenz schon seit Jahren einen Schiedsgerichtsvertrag haben. Zur Auffrischung der Erinnerung, der inländischen öffentlichen Meinung und zur Aufklärung des Auslands sei diesfalls auf folgendes hingewiesen :

Nach der Mohácser Rede des ungarischen Reichsverwesers, der mit einer hochherzigen Geste die serbische Nation einlud, all Differenzen, die sie von uns trennen, gegenseitig zu vergessen, und eingedenk der gemeinsamen Leiden einer historischen Vergangenheit die zwischen uns schwebenden Fragen zu regeln und solcherart einander näherzukommen, sind zwischen *Jugoslawien* und Ungarn gewisse Verhandlungen zur Regelung aller pendenten Fragen in Angriff genommen worden. In mehr als zwölf Fragen wurde auch eine Vereinbarung erzielt, und

einen grossen Tel dieser Abkommen hat die ungarische Gesetzgebung seinerzeit auch ratifiziert. Daran aber waren wir unschuldig. dass seit eine Reihe von Jahren in Jugoslawien eine Regierungskrise die andere abgelöst hat, so dass die Erledigung dieser Angelegenheiten andauernd Unterbrechungen erfuhr. Anlässlich der Verhandlung einer Gruppe dieser Abkommen hat unser Aussenminister Exzellenz Dr. *Walko*, wenn ich mich gut erinnere, ganz deutlich erklärt, dass wenn einmal all diese Fragen geregelt sein werden, Ungarn sich bereit finden werde, auch den Abschluss eines Schiedsgerichtsvertrages mit Jugoslawien in Erwägung zu zieben. Wenn es nicht so weit kam, so trifft, wie gesagt, Ungarn keine Schuld daran. Mit *Rumänien*, dem zweiten Nachfolgestaat, kam es nicht so weit, weil die Optantenfrage sich wie ein Keil zwischen Ungarn und Rumänien schob. Solange das Optantenproblem in Schwebe ist, so lange durch das Verschulden der Rumänen Ungarn nicht zu seinem Recht gelangen konnte, diese Rechtsfrage durch das Gemischte Schiedsgericht austragen zu lassen, konnten normale Verhältnisse zwischen den beiden Ländern sich nicht entwickeln und unter solchen Verhältnissen war der Abschluss eines Schiedsvertrages mit Rumänien ein Ding der politischen Unmöglichkeit. Was nun die *Tschecho-Slowakei* betrifft, so ist der Aussenminister dieses Nachbarstaates ein viel zu ehrgeiziger Staatsmann, als dass er sich mit geringfügigen Dingen, wie einem Schiedsvertrag, abgeben würde. Er liebt es immer mit grossen Konzeptionen vor die Welt zu treten, und so geschah es, dass er im Verlaufe der Jahre bald mit dem Gedanken einer Donaukonföderation, bald mit dem eines einheitlichen Wirtschaftsgebietes vom Erzgebirge zum Balkan, bald mit dem Plan eines Ostlocarno debütierte. Unsere Regierung konnte bei jedem dieser Anlässe bloss den Standpunkt einnehmen, dass von einer wirtschaftlichen oder politischen Annäherung erst die Rede sein könne, wenn gewisse politische Vorbedingungen geschaffen seien. Eine solche politische Vorbedingung war zunächst die *Regelung der Minderheitenfragen*. Wir können ja unmöglich in ein engeres Wirtschäfts verhältnis zu einem Staate treten, in dem unsere Stammesgenoss en verfolgt werden, in dem man sie ihres nationalen Charakters zu entkleiden trachtet, obzwar ihnen in internationalen Verträgen das Recht zugesichert, ist, in ihren Schulen und in ihren Kirchen, aber auch in ihrer örtlichen Verwaltung ihre nationale Kultur weiter zu entwickeln. Um dieses verbriefte Recht wurden unsere Volksgenossen gebracht. Sie wurden aber auch staatenlos gemacht, weil man nachträglich ihre Staatszugehörigkeit einer willkürlichen Revision unterzog und ihnen die tschecho-slowakische Staatsbürgerschaft, für die sie optiert hatten, aberkannte, in einer Zeit, in der die Frist für die Beibehaltung der ungarischen Staatsbürgerschaft bereits abgelaufen war. Eine ungeregelte Frage ist ferner auch die der *Pensionisten*. Erst in der jüngsten

Debatte über das Finanzgesetz wurde in diesem Hause darauf hingewiesen, wie schwer die Ruhegehälter das ungarische Budget belasten. Diese übermässige Belastung aber hat darin ihren Ursprung, dass die ungarischen Beamten aus den Nachfolgestaaten vertrieben wurden und ihnen keine anderer Zuflucht blieb als in dieses arme, verstümmelte Ungarn zu flüchten, wo dem schwer verstümmelten und verarmtem Staate die menschliche, die patriotische und Ehrenpflicht erwuchs, sich dieser unglücklichen Geschöpfe zu erbarmen und ihen die Ruhegehälter, die vertragsgemäss von den Nachfolgestaaten zu zahlen gewesen wären, aus unseren eigenen Mitteln anzuweisen. Auch das ist ein Problem, das gelöst werden muss, ehe wir mit einem der Nachfolgestaaten in nähere Wirtschaftsbeziehungen treten. Es lässt sich daher feststellen, dass wir mit allen Staaten, mit denen wir in geordneten Verhältnissen leben, freudig und bereit willig Schiedsgerichtsverträge abgeschlossen haben, die eine Garantie dafür bilden, dass Rechtsstreitigkeiten, die zwischen ihnen und uns entstehen mögen, nie zu verhängnisvollen Verwicklungen, zu ernsten Konflikten führen können.

Das wäre das eine Mosaikbruchstück, das zu dem Bilde unserer Aussenpolitik hinzugehört. Das zweite Mosaikstück ist der *Kellogg-Pakt*, dessen Tragweite mein verehrter Freund Exzellenz Berzeviczy in so überzeugender Weise dargetan hat. Ich muss gestehen, dass ich mich gewisser Vorbehalte bezüglich des praktischen Wertes des Kellogg-Paktes nicht entschlagen kann. Aussenminister *Walko* hat ja in dieser Hinsicht bei einer Gelegenheit darauf hingewiesen, dass gewisse Mächte ausdrücklich ausbedungen haben, dass der Kellogg-Pakt sich auf einen Verteidigungskrieg nicht beziehe ; wenn wir jedoch in Betracht ziehen, dass England und America auch bezüglich ihrer Monroedoktrinen Vorbehalte gemacht haben, so geht daraus hervor, dass der Wert der Erklärung überaus prekär ist, die sich im ersten Artikel des Kellogg-Paktes findet. Dieser Pakt, der seinerzeit als "Nie wieder Krieg" gedacht war, später jedoch stark denaturiert wurde, enthält nämlich in seinem ersten Artikel die Erklärung, dass die Vertragsmächte auf den Krieg als ein Werkzeug der nationalen Politik verzichten und im zweiten Artikel ist die weitere Erklärung enthalten, dass unter ihnen allenfalls auftauchende Streitigkeiten ausschliesslich auf friedlichem Wege ausgetragen werden sollen. Eine Sanktion hatten diese Erklärungen schon in der ursprünglichen Form nicht und sie haben sie auch in der gegenwärtigen Form nicht, unter der sie nunmehr endgültig ratifiziert sind. Wenn nun wenigstens die Grossmächte, in deren Hand die Entscheidung über Krieg oder Frieden in der Welt ruht, keine Vorbehalte an ihre Zustimmung geknüpft hätten, so könnte man immerhin trotz des Mangels an Sanktionen den Kellogg-Pakt mit einer gewissen moralischen Beruhigung begrüssen. Nun hat jedoch Sir Austen *Chamberlain* in seiner diesbezügli-

chen Korrespondenz mit der Regierung in Washington schon beim ersten Schritt erklärt, dass die Geltung des Paktes sich auf den Verteidigungskrieg nicht beziehen könne, und dass jeder Staat die Frage, ob der Krieg, den er führt, ein Verteidigungskrieg sei, innerhalb seines eigenen souveränen Wirkungskreises zu entscheiden haben werde. Seltsamerweise ist auch im amerikanischen Senat der gleiche Vorbehalt beinahe mit denselben Worten ausgesprochen worden mit dem Zusatze, dass der Pakt sich selbstverständlich auch auf die Monroedoktrin nicht erstrecken könne. In Europa hat es bis nun keine Monroedoktrin gegeben. Jetzt aber, anlässlich des Kellogg-Paktes, hat auch England erklärt, dass der Vertrag sich nicht auf die Gebiete beziehen könne, die für die britischen Interessen lebenswichtig sind. Nun hat die amerikanische Monroedoktrin wenigstens den Vorteil, geographisch genau umschrieben zu sein ; wir wissen, dass sie sich auf den amerikanischen Kontinent beschränkt. Die britische Monroedoktrin hingegen ist geographisch überhaupt nicht umschrieben. In ihrer Allgemeinheit kann sie sich auf beliebige Gebiete aller fünf Weltteile erstrecken und es ist rein Sache der Intuition zu erraten, welche Gebiete es sein können, die England gegebenenfalls als für sich lebenswichtig erklärt hat. Trotz alledem schliesse ich mich im Endergebnis den Worten an, mit denen Exzellenz Berzeviczy den Kellogg-Pakt begrüsst hat, denn wie wir vom Herrn Aussenminister Walko wissen, sind von den 64 Staaten, die zum Beitritt eingeladen wurden, nicht weniger als 62, wenn auch manche mit gewissen Vorbehalten, diesem Pakt beigetreten, also alle eingeladenen Staaten, bis auf zwei südamerikanische, die dafür spezifische Gründe zu haben glauben. Wir müssen also unsere Regierung dafür begrüssen, dass sie ohne Zaudern auch ihrerseits sich dem Kellogg-Pakt angeschlossen hat. Es wäre für uns in der Tat eine unerwünschte Lage entstanden, wenn 62 von den 64 Staaten ihren Beitritt erklärt hätten und Ungarn der einzige europäische Staat gewesen wären, der es nicht getan hat. Man kann sich denken, zu welchen Verdächtigungen dies Anlass gegeben hätte.

Ein weiteres Kennzeichen unserer friedlichen Politik ist unser Anschluss an das Obligatorium des Haager Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshofes. Wie mein verehrter Freund Berzeviczy, erblicke auch ich darin die relativ stärkste Bürgschaft des Friedens. In Prag liess man von Zeit zu Zeit als ballon d'essai die Idee eines Ostlocarno aufsteigen, ich aber sage, dass ein Ostlocarno absolut überflüssig ist. Nach der Fakultativklausel der Satzungen des Haager Gerichts müssen alle Streitfragen zwischen den Staaten, die diese Klausel unterzeichnet haben, durch diese Gerichtsstelle ausgetragen werden auch wenn bloss eine der beiden Streitparteien dies verlangt. Wozu also ein Ostlocarno ? Die Staaten der Kleiner Entente haben einfach die Fakultativklausel zu unterzeichnen, wie auch wir das getan

haben. Damit wäre für sie die Garantie gewonnen, dass jeder Rechtsstreit, der zwischen ihnen und uns entstehen könnte, auch ohne unser Hinzutun zur richterlichen Entscheidung gelangen müsste. Ein Ostlocarno ist also überflüssig. Die Kleine Entente hat einfach der Fakultativklausel beizutreten und damit ist für alle Zeiten die friedliche Austragung aller Rechtstsreitigkeiten zwischen ihnen und uns gesichert. Aus dem bisherigen aber geht klar hervor, dass die Schiedsverträge, die wir eingegangen sind, der Kellogg-Pakt, den wir unterzeichnet haben, die Fakultative Klausel, die die Unterschrift der ungarischen Regierung trägt, alles zusammen und jedes einzelne für sich untrügliche Beweise dafür sind, dass Ungarn eine friedfertige Politik befolgt und *seine nationalen Revendikationen, die es nie und nimmer verleugnen wird, (So ist es ! So ist es !) ausschliesslich mit friedlichen Mitteln zu verwirklichen trachtet.*

Hohes Haus ! Ich habe schon früher auf zwei andere wichtige Momente der ungarischen Aussenpolitik, auf den Budapester Besuch des Staatssekretärs *Grandi* und des polnischen Aussenministers *Zaleski* hingewiesen. Die Quelle unserer engen Freundschaft mit der italienischen Nation sind geschichtliche Uberlieferungen. Diese Freundschaft beruht auf der restlosen Identität der Interessen und auf einer Gefühlsgemeinschaft, die in der tiefsten Seele der beiden Nationen wurzelt. Nicht ganz so geartet ist die Lage hinsichtlich der freundschaftlichen Beziehungen zwischen Polen und Ungarn, insofern hier von einer restlosen Übereinstimmung aller Interessen leider nicht die Rede sein kann. Wohl aber handelt es sich auch hier um eine durch die Geschichte vieler Jahrhunderte besiegelte Freundschaft, deren Pflege und Entwicklung ein Seelenbedürfnis der beiden Nationen darstellt. Hohes Haus ! Bald nach dem Besuch des Herrn Staatssekretärs Grandi fand in unserer Hauptstadt die pietätvolle Feier statt, die dem Andenken des italienischen Obersten *Monti*, des heldenmütigen Kämpen unseres Freiheits kampfes, des Befehlshabers der italienischen Legion im 1849er Ringen Kossuths um die ungarische Freiheit, gewidmet war. Eben heute mengt sich von polnischer Seite ein ebensolches Gefühlsmotiv in unsere Erwägungen, denn in dieser Stunde, in der wir hier beisammen sitzen, sieht die Ehrenhalle unseres National-museums die Gebeine des Generals Josef Bem zu Gaste, die auf ihrem Wege aus dem entlegenen Syrien nach Warschau in der ungarischen Hauptstadt eine Nacht verbracht haben, um der ungarischen Nation Gelegenheit zu bieten, an diese Bahre zu pilgern und dort den Tribut ihrer unvergänglichen Dankbarkeit, Liebe und Pietät zu entrichten. Allzu nüchterne Realpolitiker werden vielleicht diese lyrischen Ergüsse belächeln, doch glaube ich, dass dies eine ganz verfehlte Realpolitik wäre. Wir besitzen Erfahrungen, geschichtliche Erfahrungen darüber, dass dergleichen Gefühlsmomente auch in den Gestaltungen der Politik nicht ganz unwirksam sind ; wenn Missver-

ständnisse auftauchen, bahnen sie auf beiden Seiten der freundschaftlichen Erledigung den Weg ; im Falle ernster Interessengegensätze aber erschliessen sie nicht nur die Möglichkeit, sondern auch den seelischen Zwang, ehe es zum Bruch kommt, noch einmal, zweimal, zehnmal es mit einer friedlichen Austragung der zwischen zwei guten Freunden entstandenen Differenzen zu versuchen. Wir erblicken also, hohes Haus, in unserer innigen Freundschaft mit Italien und mit Polen das, was der Herr Ministerpräsident im Abgeordnetenhause mit einem so plastichen Bild zum Ausdruck gebracht hat, dass nämlich die Freundschaft zu diesen beiden Nationen je eine Achse der ungarischen Aussenpolitik bildet. Als dritte Achse dieser Politik hat der Herr Ministerpräsident *unser freundschaftliches Verhältnis zum Deutschen Reiche* bezeichnet. Darüber sind nicht viel Worte zu verlieren. Wir leben in unverbrüchliche. Schicksalsgemeinschaft mit Deutschland. Zur gleichen, Zeit, durch den gleichen Schicksalsschlag sind wir beide zu Boden geschmettert worden. Aber auch inmiten aller Heimsuchungen haben wir unser Selbstgefühl, unseren Lebenswillen nicht hingeworfen. Die deutsche Nation in ihrer Grösse, die ungarische Nation in ihrer Schwäche und Verstümmelung waren auch inmitten der schwersten Prüfungen durchdrungen von Selbstvertrauen, vom Glauben an ihre Sendung und an eine bessere Zukunft und von dem unbeugsamen Willen, mit dem Aufgebot ihres Restes an Lebenskraft an der Herbeischaffung der Bedingungen eines erfolgreichen Wiederaufstieges zu arbeiten.

Ein weiteres wichtiges Mosaikstück im Bilde unserer Aussenpolitik stellt die *Pariser Fahrt des Herrn Ministerpräsidenten dar.* Wir müssen uns hüten, das Ergebnis dieser Fahrt zu überschätzen, noch mehr aber müssen wir es vermeiden, dem Ergebnis seinen wirklichen Wert abzusprechen. Ich glaube, die Sache richtig zu werten, indem ich feststelle, dass wir darin einen ersten Schritt zu einem wohlwollenden und vorurteilsfreien Verstehen zu erblicken und zu begrüssen haben, denn dank der klugen und zähen Aufklärungsarbeit der ungarischen Regierung ist nunmehr in der öffentlichen Meinung Frankreichs und vielleicht auch in den verantwortlichen Führern der französischen Politik die Erkenntnis erwacht, dass es keinerlei Interessengegensätze zwischen Frankreich und Ungarn gibt, und dass die Konzeption, die sich Frankreich von der Neugestaltung Europas machte, ohne Ungarn nur schwer zu verwirklichen sein würde, denn die französische Politik benötigt in ganz Europa Ruhe, wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt und einen gewissen Grad von Zusammenschluss. Dies aber wäre unerreichbar, wenn Ungarn, dieser wichtige Bestandteil Mitteleuropas, in dieses Werk nicht mit hineinkombiniert würde. Dass Frankreich in ganz Europa den ruhigen Fortschritt, das wirtschaftliche Gedeihen und ein Aneinanderrücken der Völker

wünscht, hat sich auch daraus ergeben, dass nach dem Aufgeben der Ruhrpolitik wichtige Zusammenschlüsse zwischen französischer und deutscher Schwerindustrie sich erzielen liessen auf Grund einer Interessengemeinschaft, die eine Vorbedingung dessen war, dass später die Politik von Locarno zustande gebracht werden konnte. Locarno aber war die Vorbedingung des Dawes-Planes, wie der Dawes-Plan nachmals die Vorbedingung für den gegenwärtigen Young-Plan war. Unter der Wirkung des Young-Planes und nach Regelung der interalliierten Schulden werden die Zinsenlasten Frankreichs erleichtert sein und die solcherart freiwerdenden französischen Kapitalien werden sich in Europa unterzubringen trachten. Sucht aben französisches Kapital in Auslande Unterkunft und hält die französische Industrie im Auslande Umschau nach neuen Betätigungsmöglichkeiten, so kann es seiner Aufmerksamkeit nicht entgehen, dass in diesem Teile Europas Ungarn nicht bloss der konsolidierteste Staat, sondern sozusagen der einzige konsolidierte Staat ist. Die Staatengebilde, die unter französischem Patronat seinerzeit zustande kamen, haben nicht einmal untereinander eine wirtschaftliche Gemeinschaft zustande zu bringen ver mocht, obzwar sie dreimal den An lauf dazu nahmen und die Versuche niemals über die ersten Vorverhandlungen hinaus gediehen sind, wie ja alle diese Nachfolgestaaten auch in ihrer inneren Politik unter fortwährenden Krisen leiden. Wir wissen ja, wie schwer die Erschütterungen in Rumänien waren, die dem Sturz des Bratianu-Regimes vorangingen. Auch sehen wir, dass in Jugoslawien die Demokratie und das parlamentarische Regierungssystem überhaupt Bankrott gemacht haben und wie dort Diktatur und Autokratie die Zügel ergreifen mussten ; auch sehen wir in der tschecho-slowakischen Republik, dass auch dort die Dinge gar nicht so rosig liegen, wie dies schon aus der nicht sehr erbaulichen Meinungsverschiedenheit hervorgeht, die zwischen den deutschen Mitgliedern der tschecho-slowakischen Koalitionsregierung und dem tschechischen Ministerpräsidenten in der Minderheitenfrage entstanden sind.

Wie anders ist das Bild geartet, das Ungarn der Welt darbietet. Mit der Sanierung haben wir eine Bravourleistung der wirtschaftlichen Rekonstruktion vollbracht. Die Völkerbundanleihe haben wir nur bis zu einem geringen Bruchteil in Anspruch genommen und schon nach Jahresfrist nicht bloss das finanzielle Gleichgewicht im Staatshaushalt erreicht, sondern auch ein Uberschuss konnte erzielt werden, und auch seither, obzwar die Privatwirtschaft bei uns ebenso wie fast überall in Europa eine schwere Krise durchmacht, haben sich in unserer Staatswirtschaft und in unserer inneren Politik auf dem Gebiete der Rechtssicherheit keinerlei bedenkliche Symptome gezeigt. Im Gegenteil schreitet das Werk der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Konsolidierung, die Graf Bethlen in so glücklicher

Weise inauguriert hat, in erfreulichem Masse vorwärts, und sie hat der Welt darüber die Augen geöffnet, dass Ungarn eine der sichersten Stützen der konstruktiven Politik in Europa darstellt.

Hohes Haus ! Ich möchte nunmehr ganz kurz auf die Debatte zurückgreifen, die gestern in der rumänischen Kammer abgeführt wurde. Zwar hat der Ministerpräsident darüber in der Vormittagssitzung die Ansicht der Regierung geäussert, vielleicht darf ich aber auch als ein bescheidener Vertreter der öffentlichen Meinung einige Bemerkungen daran knüpfen. Der rumänische Ministerpräsident hat nicht nur im Namen der eigenen Regierung, sonder auch in dem der verbündeten Regierungen erklärt, dass sie keinerlei Angst empfinden, dass sie sich in völliger Sicherheit fühlen. Das ist jedenfalls sehr beruhigend. Wenn sie aber keine Angst haben und sich in völli-Sicherheit fühlen, dann ist ja der Frieden von keiner Seite bedroht und dann bedrohen ja auch wir nicht den Frieden. Bedrohen wir aber ihren Frieden nicht, was für Sinn hat dann ihre Demarche gehabt ? Wenn wir ihren Frieden nicht bedrohen, wenn sie sich in Sicherheit fühlen, warum werden dann unschuldige Leventisten, die ihre Verwandtschaft in der Tschecho-Slowakei besuchen wollen, an der Grenze eingefangen und in den Kerker geworfen ? Wenn sie sich in Sicherheit fühlen, warum überfällt sie eine Panik, wenn das ungarische Credo gesungen wird ? In der rumänischen Note war behauptet, dass von rumänischer Seite an die ungarische Regierung seinerzeit die Frage gerichtet worden ist, ob bei dem Gedenkfest des namenlosen Helden ein irredentistisches Lied gesungen werden wird, und darauf sei die Antwort erfolgt, dass dies nicht der Fall sein werde. Dieser Darstellung gegenüber wurde im heutigen Abendblatt des Pester Lloyd von zuständiger ungarischer Seite erklärt, dass von rumänischer Seite eine derartige Anfrage an die ungarische Regierung nie ergangen ist, bloss der tschecho-slovakische Gesandte hat beim Staatssekretär im Ministerpräsidium Dr. Stefan *Bàrczy* angefragt, ob bei dieser Feierlichkeit das nationale Credo gesungen werden wird, und der Herr Staatssekretär hat darauf ausdrücklich erklärt, dass im Programm das zweimalige Absingen des Credo vorgesehen ist.

Da nun das ungarische Credo als ein angeblich irredentistisches Lied Veranlassung zu einer diplomatischen Demarche gab, so darf ich vielleicht einen Fall erzählen, den ich im vorigen Herbst als einer der ungarischen Delegierten beim Völkerbund erlebt habe. Nach einer Ausschusssitzung, in der ich gegen die Erschwerung der Einfuhr ungarischer Bücher in die Nachfolgestaaten Einsprache erhob, entspann sich zwischen einem tschecho-slowakischen Delegierten und mir ein Gespräch, in dessen Verlauf mein Prager Kollege das Vorgehen seiner Regierung damit zu begründen versucht, dass die ungarischen

Verleger allerlei irredentistische Dinge in die Bücher hineinschmuggeln. Ich fragte meinen Gesprächspartner, was denn das für irredentistische Dinge gewesen wären. Die Antwort lautete, dass es das ungarische Credo war. Auf meine Frage, ob mein Gesprächspartner das ungarische Credo kenne. erhielt ich eine verneinende Antwort. Daraufhin übersetzte ich ihm das ungarische Credo : ,,Ich glaube an einen Gott. " Nach diesem ersten Satz fragte ich, ob das Irredenta wäre. Die Antwort lautete verneinend. Da fuhr ich fort : ,,Ich glaube an ein Vaterland ". Wiederum fragte ich, ob das Irredenta wäre. Wieder kam eine verneinende Antwort. Ich übersetzte weiter : ,,Ich glaube an eine göttliche, ewige Gerechtigkeit. " Wieder fragte ich, ob das Irredenta sei. Abermals kam eine verneinende Antwort. Und nun übersetzte ich den letzten Satz : ,,Ich glaube an Ungarns Auferstehung ". Da sagte mein tschecho-slowakischer Kollege : ,,Sehen Sie,das ist Irredenta !" Ich aber klärte den Kollegen nunmehr auf über die Zeit, in der dieses Credo entstand ; es sei nicht heute und nicht gestern entstanden, sonder in einer Zeit, in die ungarische Nation scheintot im Staube lag und eben durch dieses Credo in die ungarischen Ohren und in die ungarischen Seelen posaunt werden musste, dass wir nicht tot sind, dass wir auferstehen müssen. Und wieder fragte ich, ob also unter solchen Umständen dieser Satz Irredenta wäre. "Nein". lautete die Antwort. Ich aber sagte nunmehr : Jezt weiss ich schon, wo die Irredenta steckt : sie steckt in dem Schlusswort : " Amen ! " (Heiterkeit). Damit hatte unsere Unterredung ein Ende. Heute sehen wir, dass wieder das nationale Credo als Vorwand dazu dient, uns der Irredenta anzuklagen und eine Demarche gegen uns zu richten.

Der rumänische Ministerpräsident hat übrigens in seiner gestrigen Rede erklärt, dass er seitens Rumäniens die Demarche als abgeschlossen betrachte. Damit können wir Ungarn uns ja vollauf zufrieden geben und so haben wir denn wirklich keinen Grund, die Sache weiterzuspinnen. Immerhin haben wir noch ein Wort darüber zu sprechen, dass der rumänische Herr Ministerpräsident in seiner Rede gesagt hat, die Kleine Entente habe durch ihre Demarche Ungarn vor einem schlimmen Übel bewahren wollen, denn die Gefahr sei nicht ausgeschlossen, dass wenn man hier fortwährend von Revision rede, schliesslich die ungarische öffentliche Meinung darüber toll werde und sich zu einem tollen Streich versteige, die ungarische Regierung aber nicht mehr über die Macht verfügen werde, das Ungartum von einem solchen Abenteuer zurückzuhalten. Darauf möchte ich nur respektvoll folgendes erwidern : Hinter dem rumänischen Staat steht eine im ganzen 50jährige Vergangenheit. Erst der Berliner Vertrag hat aus dem Vasallenstaat einen souveränen Staat geschaffen. Hier also will ein *fünfzigjähriger* Staatsäugling einen tausendjährigen Staat gegenüber den *ludi magister* spielen. Das ist eine Zumu-

tung, die wir ganz entschieden zurückweisen müssen. Wir müssen die Herren in Bukarest doch bitten, uns nicht bevormunden zu wollen, nicht unsere Vorsehung zu spielen und uns von keinerlei tollen Streichen zurückzuhalten. Diese Nation verfügt über die Erfahrungen eines Jahrtausends, sie ist politisch gereift und sie hat seit Kriegsende der ganzen Welt zahllose Beweise ihrer politischen Reife geliefert, ja die Beweise unserer politischen Reife haben uns das Vertrauen des ganzen Auslandes, jüngstens auch Frankreichs, errungen. Darum möchten wir unsere geehrten Nachbarn einladen, uns nicht belehren zu wollen, sondern eher darauf zu achten, dass die von ungarischer Seite ihnen gegenüber stets bekundete Loyalität endlich einmal auch von ihrer Seite mit gleicher Loyalität erwidert werde. Ich glaube in der ganzen Welt, namentlich auch in Paris, wird von uns erwartet, dass wir die Möglichkeit des Verstehens und des Zusammenwirkens mit den uns umringenden Nachbarstaaten suchen. Auch in der Vergangenheit haben wir keine einzige Gelegenheit hiezu ungenützt gelassen, doch ward uns stets entweder ein Nichtverstehen oder eine feindselige Zurückweisung zuteil. Ich bin sicher, dass unsere Regierung auch fortab nicht erlahmen wird in ihrem Eifer, die Verständigung mit den Nachbarstaaten zu suchen, und auch in der Zukunft wird es nicht an uns liegen, die Möglichkeit zu schaffen, dass die Beziehungen zwischen den Nachbarländern und Ungarn sich derart entwickeln, dass die Bahn für eine Annäherung, für eine friedliche Zusammenarbeit geöffnet sei. Die Welt möge ihre Blicke hieher wenden, denn die Scheuklappen sind ja jetzt auch von Augen geschwunden, die bisher uns gegenüber nicht unbefangen sein wollten. Die Welt möge uns also kontrollieren, möge Zeuge unserer Anstrengungen sein, die wir nach der friedlichen Verständigung hin unternehmen werden, si möge aber auch beachten, mit welcher Attitude von der anderen Seite darauf reagiert werden wird.

Tausend Jahre hindurch war das ungarische Volk in diesem Teil der Welt stets der Soldat des europäischen Gedankens. Das will und wird Ungarn auch in der Zukunft sein. Unerforschlich sind die Wege der das Völkerschicksal lenkenden Vorsehung, aber wir vertrauen auf diese Vorsehung. Von den Menschen aber erwarten wir, dass sie uns arbeiten lassen, dass sie uns die Weltkultur durch ungarische Werte bereichern lassen, und dass sie uns unsere nationalen Hoffnungen hegen lassen. Die ungarische Regierung aber, die unter den schwierigsten Verhältnissen unsere auswärtige Politik so erfolgreich gelenkt hat, bitten wir, uns auch weiterhin vorwärts zu führen nach einer besseren, einer schöneren Zukunft, nach dem Ziele der grossen nationalen Auferstehung. Die Vorlagen nehme ich an. (Eljenrufe und Applaus.)

Präsident Baron Wlassics: Wünscht noch jemand das Wort?

Es ist nicht der Fall. *Ich schliesse daher die Debatte.* Se. Exzellenz der Herr Ministerpräsident wünscht das Wort.

Ministerprasident Graf Stefan Bethlen :

Von den sechs zur Verhandlung stehenden Gesetzvorlagen dokumentieren die vier ersten unsere friedlichen Absichten gegenüber verschiedenen Staaten — Polen, Finnland, der Türkei und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, — an die uns zum Teil freundschaftliche Gefühle knüpfen. Die beiden letzteren Vorlagen legen von unserem Friedenswillen im allgemeinen Zeugnis ab, denn der Anschluss an den Kelloggpakt und an die Klausel über die obligatorische Inanspruchnahme des Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshofes im Haag können wohl nicht anders aufgefasst werden. Die beiden Herren Redner, Se. Exzellenz Berzeviczy und Se. Hochgeboren Josef Vészi, stellten diese Vorlagen als ein Dokument des Friedenswillens der ungarischen Aussenpolitik dar und entwarfen ein klassisches Bild dieser Aussenpolitik. Ich meinerseits will dem, was sie über unsere Besiehungen zu einzelnen Grossmächten und über jene zu den Staaten der Kleinen Entente sagten, nichts hinzufügen, da ihre Ausführungen so sehr damit über einstimmen, was die öffentliche Meinung Ungarns von diesen Beziehungen denkt und mit der politischen Richtung, die ich und meine Regierung, in erster Reihe aber der Herr Aussenminister, vertreten, dass es überflüssig wäre, ihre Gedanken weiterzuspinnen. Wenn ich dennoch das Wort ergreife, so tue ich es, um einige spezielle Bemerkungen zum *Kelloggpakt* zu machen, und diesen vom Gesichtspunkt der ungarischen Politik zu beleuchten (Hört ! Hört !)

Als man nach dem Kriege an die Neuregelung der Verhältnisse in Europa schritt, ergab sich sogleich die grosse Frage, wie man eine neuere ähnliche Katastrophe verhüten könne ? Für die, die sich mit dieser Frage befassen, ward es sogleich klar, dass ein neuerlicher Krieg eigentlich nur durch die allgemeine Abrüstung verhindert werden könne. Die allgemeine Abrüstung ist ein Problem, mit dem sich die besten Geister seit Jahrhunderten, vielleicht schon seit Jahrtausenden beschäftigen, aber angesichts dieses Problems warf sich jetzt die Frage auf, wer wohl die Sicherheit der einzelnen Staaten garantieren würde, die nötig ist, damit Staatsmänner in verantwortlicher Stellung ihren Nationen die Abrüstung empfehlen könnten. Das ist sicherlich ein schweres Problem, und dieses Problem ist es, das seit einem Jahrzehnt die besten Geister sämtlicher Regierungen und überhaupt die gesamte Politik Europas beherrscht. Was aber erfand man, um die Sicherheit verbürgen zu können ? Zunächst den Völkerbund. Dem Völkerbund lag nämlich der Gedanke zugrunde, dass eine internationale Stelle kreiert werden soll, der die Streitigkeiten zwischen den

Nationen unterbreitet werden müsste und die die Entscheidung unter vollständiger Ausschaltung der Möglichkeit des Krieges zu treffen hätte. Das Vertrauen zum Völkerbund ist aber heute vielleicht auch bei den Siegerstaaten noch nicht so gross, dass sie in diesem Vertrauen die Sicherheit hätten erblicken können, in der sie die Vorbedingung der Abrüstung erblicken. Der zweite Versuch, und diesen hat bereits der Völkerbund unternommen, bestand darin, ein allgemeines Protokoll zu unterzeichnen, das allen Staaten gewisse Bürgschaften für den Fall gewährt hätte, dass sie von irgendeinem Nachbarstaat, oder irgendeinem ferner liegenden Lande angegriffen werden sollten. Für diesen Fall waren auch gewisse Sanktionen vorgesehen. Dieser Vorschlag schien aber so weit zu gehen, dass er namentlich in der öffentlichen Meinung Ungarns auf sehr grosse Schwierigkeiten stiess, und so suchte man im Locarnopakt eine Teillösung des Problems wenigstens für die Gebiete längs des Rheins, für das Gebiet also, wo das Schicksal Europas im Weltkriege entschieden worden ist, für das Gebiet, das seit Jahrhunderten der Schauplatz der schwersten Konflikte der grössten europäischen Nationen war. Das war der zweite ernste Schritt, weil ja der Völkerbund das erwähnte Protokoll abgelehnt hat. An dem Locarnopakt aber waren die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika nicht beteiligt. Es blieb somit die grösste Macht ausserhalb des Abkommens, die mit ihren wirtschaftlichen Mitteln so sehr auf unsern Erdteil drückt und die auch im Bereiche der Politik stillschweigend die führende Rolle einzunehmen vermag.

Das ist der Werdegang des Kellogg-Paktes. Dieser Pakt stellt die Lösung des Sicherheitsproblems nach einer neuen Methode dar, er bezog zugleich auch die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika, die den Pakt eigentlich angeregt hatten, in das Problem ein. Wenn wir nun die Frage stellen, ob wohl das Problem durch diesen Pakt auch wirklich gelöst ist, so muss zunächst geantwortet werden, dass der Pakt wohl eine Demonstration für den Frieden ist, jedoch weder die Lösung des Sicherheitsproblems, noch auch die der Abrüstungsfrage umfasst. Der Pakt enthält nämlich zwei prinzipielle Erklärungen ; erstens, dass die Signatarmächte den Krieg nicht mehr als ein Mittel der nationalen Politik betrachten wollen, zweitens, dass sie in Hinkunft bestrebt sein werden, eventuelle Streitigkeiten auf friedlichem Wege auszutragen, allein der Wert dieser beiden Erklärungen, die an und für sich doch eine gewisse Bedeutung besitzen, erfährt eine sehr weitgehende Beeinträchtigung durch die Erklärungen, die einzelne Staaten abgaben, als sie ihren Anschluss an den Pakt angemeldet haben. Es genügt an diesem Punkte darauf hinzuweisen, was das Oberhausmitglied Josef *Vészi* schon erwähnt hat, dass es nämlich sämtliche Signatarmächte als eine Selbstverständlichkeit erklärt hatten, dass ein Verteidigungskrieg nicht im Widerspruch zum Pakte steht, und

dass jeder souveräne Staat selbst darüber zu entscheiden befugt ist, ob es sich um einen Selbstverteidigungskrieg handelt oder nicht. Amerika und England haben erklärt, dass sich ihrerseits an gewisse Territorien spezielle Interessen knüpfen, hinsichtlich deren sie sich ihre Aktionsfreiheit vorbehalten müssen. Der Kellogg-Pakt ist mithin an diesem Punkte auf die Monroedoktrin gestossen. Andere Mächte erklärten, dass eventuelle Kriege, die im Ausfluss des Locarnopaktes geführt werden sollten, nicht im Widerspruch zum Kellog-Pakt stehen. Ferner ist zur Anmeldung gebracht worden, dass das gleiche auch für Kriege oder Konflikte gilt, die auf Grund des Kellogg-Paktes möglich werden könnten. Und schliesslich sind auch noch die Neutralitätsverträge da, die einzelne Staaten untereinander abgeschlossen haben nnd in deren Reibe an erster Stelle die Verträge der kleinen Ententestaaten stehen.

Wenn ich nun auch vom theoretischen Standpunkte zugeben muss,dass ein Selbstverteidigungskampf nicht im Widerspruch zu den prinzipiellen Erklärungen des Kellogg-Paktes steht, erweckt es in mir dennoch die grösste Besorgnis, dass die durch diese. Neutralitätsverträge möglich gewordenen Kriege, da nun einmal diese Verträge als solche angemeldet und angenommen worden sind, nicht als solche gelten, die im Widerspruch zum Kellogg-Pakt stehen. Denn wären diese sogenannten Neutralitätsverträge rein defensiven Charakters, so könnten sie noch unter den allgemeinen Begriff der Selbstverteidigung fallen. Sieht man sich aber diese Verträge an und sucht man wenigstens die Grenzen jenes politischen Kreises zu finden, auf die sie sich beziehen, so muss man sich in klarem sein darüber, dass in diesen Neutralitätsverträgen auch solche Fragen geregelt sind, die in keinerlei Zusammenhang mit der Selbstwehr stehen und mehr oder minder eine Einmengung in die inneren Angelegenheiten anderer Staaten bilden. (Lebhafte Zustimmung). Wird ja in diesen Verträgen beispielsweise auch des österreichischen Anschlussproblems, der Hohenzollernfrage und der Habsburgfrage Erwähnung getan. Und überdies figuriert die Gefährdung der durch die Friedensverträge geschaffenen Ordnung als Casus belli, diese Begriffsdetermination ist aber so ausgedehnt, dass unter ihn auch offenkundige offensive Absichten subsummiert werden können. Das Übel besteht aber nicht nur darin, dass es Neutralitätsverträge gibt, die den Vertragspartnern auch weit über die Defensive hinausgehende Verpflichtungen auferlegen. Das sind nämlich nicht nur politische oder diplomatische, sondern auch militärische Verträge, weil in jedem der dem Völkerbunde angemeldeten Verträge je ein Punkt enthalten ist, wonach die detaillierte Fixierung und Durchführung gewisser Vereinbarungen "technischen Organen" vorbehalten bleibt. Darunter sind selbstverständlich die militärischen Vereinbarungen zu verstehen, die dem Völkerbunde selbsverständlich nicht angemeldet worden sind, die

aber natürlicherweise viel mehr enthalten, als die Verträge selbst, die dem Völkerbunde vorliegen. Einiges aus diesen Vereinbarungen hat auch unsere öffentliche Meinung in Erfahrung gebracht. Die Spatzen pfeifen es von den Dächern, dass es Vereinbarungen geben soll. die den militärischen Aufmarsch gegen Ungarn an gewissen Punkten vorschreiben, und zwar selbst in dem Falle,dass Ungarn im Falle eines Konflikts zweier anderer Staaten neutral bleiben sollte. Ich behaupte ja nicht, dass diese Nachrichten authentisch sind, ich kann es ja gar nicht tun, weil es sich um Geheimverträge handelt, aber je geheimer sie gehalten werden, um so besorgniserregender ist es, dass sie Bestimmungen offensiven Chararakters enthalten. Wird also die Frage gestellt, ob die Sicherheit Ungarns nach dem Anschluss an den Kellogg-Pakt grösser ist, so muss ich darauf antworten, dass dies sehr zweifelhaft ist seit dem Augenblick, in dem die auf Grund dieser Neutralitätsverträge möglich gewordenen Kriege von den Sanktionen des Vertrages ausgenommen worden sind. Der Pakt hat aber auch noch einen anderen Fehler. Er schreibt vor, dass Streitfälle durch friedliche Mittel zu schlichten sind, errichtet aber nicht zugleich auch die Organisation, vor der die Schlichtung stattfinden soll. Ob sich die Staaten an ein Schiedsgericht wenden sollen oder an den Ständigen Internationalen Gerichtshof, das überlässt der Pakt den Signatarmächten selbst. Und wir haben die Schiedsgerichtsklausel eben darum unterzeichnet, weil wir beweisen wollten, dass wir den Pakt ernst nehmen. (Lebhafte Zustimmung).

Das Oberhausmitglied Josef *Vézsi* hat an mich die Frage gerichtet, warum wir nicht auch mit unseren Nachbarstaaten Schiedsgerichtsverträge abschliessen. Er hat recht, wenn er diese Frage stellt, und wir müssen sie tatsächlich erörtern, da ja, wie dies Chamberlain festgestellt hat, nicht jene Schiedsgerichtsverträge wertvoll sind, die zwischen befreudeten Nationen abgeschlossen werden, sondern eigentlich nur jene, die Nationen abschliessen, die gegenteilige Interessen haben, oder in einem Konflikt miteinander stehen, oder unter Verhältnissen leben, die Konfliktsmöglichkeiten in sich tragen.

Weshalb gibt es keine derartigen Verträge ? Haben wir doch eine ganze Reihe solcher Verträge mit Nationen unterzeichnet, mit denen wir bisher auf Kriegsfuss gestanden sind, mit denen wir aber Freundschaft geschlossen und denen wir die Friedensrechte gereicht haben. Ich frage aber, hohes Haus : wenn es zwischen den Staaten Vereinbarungen gibt—wie solche zwischen unseren Nachbarn existieren—, welche Vereinbarungen nach meiner Ansicht nicht nur einen defensiven Charakter besitzen, sondern in gewissen gegebenen Fällen Ungarn gegenüber auch dann ein feindliches Auftreten statuieren, wenn Ungarn keinen ernsten Grund dazu gegeben hat, wenn es also solche Vereinbarungen gibt, dann frage ich, ob ein Vorschlag

ernst genommen werden kann, der zur gleichen Zeit, da diese Vereinbarungen aufrechterhalten werden, uns den Abschluss eines Schiedsgerichtsvertrages anbietet, ohne dass Schritte im Interesse der Abänderung oder Aufhebung der vorher erwähnten Vereinbarungen getroffen werden würden.

Meiner Ansicht nach können wir ein derartiges Angebot nicht ernst nehmen, denn wir konnten der artige Verträge wohl unterfertigen, doeh bedeutet dies nicht dass diese Verträge gegebenenfalls auch effektuiert werden könnten. (Zustimmung links.) Dies bedeutet nur so viel, dass in einem gegebenen ernsten Fall diese Verträge eventuell in den Papierkorp geworfen werden und dass jene Verträge ihre Gültigkeit behalten, die zwischen einzelnen zweiten und dritten Staaten gegen uns abgeschlossen wurden.

Wenn demnach die Staaten der Kleinen Entente von dem Wunsche erfüllt sind, dass ihr Verhältnis zu uns eine Besserung erfahre und dass die Zeit komme, da wir einen Schiedsgerichtsvertrag abschliessen können, so ist die Vorbedingung dazu nicht nur die Unterfertigung des Kellogg-Paktes, sondern der Umstand, dass soche Verträge, von denen wir keine Kenntnis besitzen, bezüglich welcher es aber mehr oder weniger bekannt ist, dass sie sich gegen uns richten, dass sie Verpflichtungen enthalten, gegen uns aufzutreten, aufgehoben werden, und dass der Haager Schiedsgerichtsvertrag unterfertigt werde; denn dies bildet jene Garantie, die uns die Sicherheit bieten würde, dass der zwischen uns und ihnen zustande gekommene Vertrag auch ernst zu nehmen wäre. (Lebhafte Zustimmung.)

Hohes Haus ! Vom praktischen Gesichtspunkt aus betrachtet, hat der Kellogg-Pakt noch einen Féhler, nämlich den, dass er keinerlei Sanktionen enthält, und dass infolgedessen jene Parteien, die ihn nicht einhalten, eigentlich nicht mit solchen Nachteilen und schädlichen Folchen rechnen können, die sie davor zurückhalten könnten mit dem unterzeichneten Pakt im Gegensatz stehende Schritte zu unternehmen. Wenn man nun an mich die Frage richtet, welche Gründe uns trotz der vielen Mängel veranlasst haben, diesen Pakt zu unterfertigen, so geht meine Antwort dahin, dass ich den Kellogg-Pakt für eine grosse Friedensdemonstration halte, an deren Spitze die grösste Macht der Welt, die Vereinigten Staaten von Nordamerika, steht. Ungarn will sich unter keinen Umständen von dieser Demonstration ausschliessen, denn *die Absichten Ungarns sind friedlich, Ungarn will nichts durch die Gewalt der Waffen erledigen, sondern vertraut auf die Kraft der Gerechtigkeit, vertraut darauf, dass die Welt zur Einsicht gelangen wird, welche Ungerechtigkeit Ungarn gegenüber verübt worden ist, und dann wird die Stunde schlagen, in der Ungarn auf friedlichem Wege Gerechtigkeit widerfahren wird.* Diesen Weg haben wir durch die Unterzeichnung des Kellogg-Paktes nicht verschlossen, und die Erklärung, die der Herr Minister des Aussern in der Note abgegeben hat, durch

die wir unseren Anschluss an den Kellogg-Pakt angemeldet haben, spricht expressis verbis aus, dass Ungarn mit dieser Unterzeichnung ein Obligo für jene Staaten zu erblicken glaubt, die den Kellogg Pakt ebenfalls unterzeichnet haben, un dass die Gerechtigkeit auch in den internationalen Relationen wieder hergestellt werde.

Graf Albert *Apponyi*, der in einer Rede festgestellt hat, dass der endgültige Friede nicht von der Verbesserung des internationalen Prozessrechtes, sondern von der Wiederherstellung der internationalen materiellen Gerechtigkeit erwartet werden kann, hat wahrhaftig recht. (Lebhafte Zustimmung.) Die Verbesserung des internationalen Prozessrechtes genügt nicht, und es genügt auch nicht der Verzicht auf gewisse Gewaltmittel in diesem Prozessrecht, denn der Verzicht auf sie, dient nur dann wirklich den Interessen des Friedens, wenn gleichzeitig in diesem Prozessrecht geregelt wird, auf welche Weise, die materielle Gerechtigkeit im internationalem Recht zur Geltung gelangt.

Durch den Beitritt zum Kellogg-Pakt haben wir auf den Krieg verzichtet, und zwar deshalb, weil wie ich davon überzeugt bin, dass gleichwie die beleidigte Partei durch ein Duell nicht die Gerechtigkeit wiederherstellt, sondern nur zeigt, dass sie bereit ist, für ihr Recht zu kämpfen ; auch wir wissen, dass auch der Krieg nicht immer der Gerechtigkeit dient, was wir bedauerlicherweise gerade aus den Ergebnissen des Weltkrieges gesehen haben, dem der Vertrag von Trianon folgte, Der Krieg dient vielmehr der Gewalt und er beschwört unter den Nationen Konflikte herauf, die dann später in vielen Fällen überhaupt nicht mehr gutgemachf werden können.

Wir sind gern bereit, auf dieses prozessrechtliche Mittel zu verzichten, aber nur um den Preis dass *wirnie und nimmer darauf verzichten werden, dass eine materielle Gerechtigkeit zugunsten Ungarns wieder hergestellt werde.* Dies aber haben wir und deshalb bitte ich das hohe Haus, ihn anzunehmen. (Langanhaltender stürmischer Beifall, Eljenrufe und Applaus im ganzen Hause.)

THE KING'S SPEECH, LONDON, HOUSE OF COMMONS, JULY 2, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, July 3, 1929).

My relations with foreign Powers continue to be friendly. The independent financial experts appointed to draw up proposals for a complete and definitive settlement of the German reparation problem have presented a unanimous report which is at present being considered by my Government in preparation for

a conference of representatives of the Governments concerned. A settlement of this problem will enable the occupying Powers to proceed with the evacuation of the Rhineland.

Conversations have commenced with the Ambassador of the United States of America on the subject of naval disarmament in consequence of which it is the earnest hope of my Government to ensure, in co operation with my Governments in the Dominions, the Government of India, and the Governments of foreign Powers, an early reduction of armaments throughout the world.

My Government considers that the time has come to submit to judicial settlement international disputes in which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights. For this purpose they are now consulting with my Governments in the Dominions and the Government of India regarding the signing of the Optional Clause embodied in the statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice.

SPEECH OF THE BRITISH PRIME MINISTER MR. J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, LONDON, HOUSE OF COMMONS, JULY 2, 1929.

(The Times, July 3, 1929).

The Government exists to deal with two dominating concerns The first is un employment and social benefit—(cheers)—and the next is peace secured by the cordial cooperation of the nations of the world. (Cheers). Essential to the first is a sound policy that will stimulate trade, that will raise the standard of living of the great mass of our people, and that will produce confidence that fair play is being done all round, upon which alone industrial peace can rest.

Essential to the second is a better understanding with America. (Cheers). The right hon. gentleman has put a question to me which I shall be much obliged if he will allow me to take away with me and postpone my answer. I say this, and I say it with all my heart, that I associate myself absolutely with what he has said about the great desirability of personal conference between those who bear the burden of State and those with whom they come into contact. But, perhaps, if the right hon, gentleman will allow me, I will communicate with him when I am in a position to make a definite statement as to what arrangements have been made. So far as America is concerned, conversations have already been started. They are purely of a preliminary and exploratory character. All our past experience shows how necessary that is if we are to succeed in an object which I am certain is common to America and to ourselves.The

relations which have been growing up recently between the two countries, which ought to be cooperators in all the good causes of the word, have not been too happy. Both of us are aware of that, and both are determined to do everything we can to change it. I can assure the House and the country that no time is being lost in dealing with modes of action, and such matters as the order in which we are to discuss the various problems are also being dealt with. The Pact of Peace known as the Kellogg Pact has been signed by practically all the nations of the world, and the Government is anxious to build upon it a disarmament policy which will recognise that pact as a living and controlling influence upon international policy (Cheers).

Further, I ought to say here, so that there will be no misunderstanding or mistake about it, that both Governments will seek at once the cooperation of the other great naval Powers, especially so soon as the negotiation stage proper has been reached. It is well known, however, that a preliminary understanding between America and ourselves is necessary if success is to crown our efforts. Those are the ideas with which we are beginning our work. I will make another point clear on account of certain remarks that I have seen on the subject—that the Chairman of the Preparatory Commission on Disarmament set up by the League of Nations asked that such conyersation should be held between the naval Powers, and we are undertaking our work in the hope that it will be a contribution to the solution of the problems engaging the attention of that Commission.

DISCOURS DE M. J. AVENOL, SOUS-SECRETAIRE-GENERAL DE LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS, ET REPONSE DE SA MAJESTE LE ROI D'EGYPTE FOUAD, GENEVE, LE 5 JUILLET 1929.

Discours de M. J. Avenol :

Sire,

Je prie Votre Majesté d'agréer nos profonds remerciements pour le grand honneur qu'Elle daigne faire au Secrétariat de la Société des Nations en le visitant à l'occasion de son séjour à Genève. Elle donne ainsi une marque hautement appréciée de l'intérêt qu'Elle porte au travail de la Société des Nations et à ses efforts pour provoquer et faciliter la collaboration internationale.

La bienveillance de Votre Majesté, qui règne sur un pays d'antique civilisation, une des plus vieilles du monde, une de celles qui ont fait faire à l'humanité ses premiers pas dans la voie du progrès, est particulièrement précieuse pour tous ceux qui ont foi dans la Société des Nations, qui voient en elle la

garantie d'un avenir meilleur, tout entier consacré aux travaux bienfaisants de la paix.

Votre Majesté, sous le règne de laquelle l'Egypte connaît une période de prospérité et d'éclat, me permettra de lui souhaiter, en mon nom et au nom de tous mes collaborateurs, une respectueuse bienvenue en la priant d'accepter l'hommage de notre grande reconnaissance pour Sa présence dans cette maison.

Réponse de sa Majesté le roi d'Egypte Found :

M. le Secrétaire général, ce n'est pas sans émotion que je pénètre dans ce temple de la paix si longtemps prêchée entre les hommes et qui vient seulement depuis quelques années d'avoir sa consécration. Je ne pouvais pas passer par Genève sans venir rendre hommage à l'œuvre d'union et de concorde entre les peuples que, par ses efforts inlassables cette Société des Nations tend à accomplir et sans payer un tribut d'admiration à son activité qui a pour objectif d'associer en une étroite collaboration internationale tous les Etats grands et petits. Chaque fois qu'elle y a été invitée, l'Egypte a été heureuse de participer aux réunions internationales tenues sous les auspices de la Société des Nations et elle a témoigné le plus grand empressement à adhérer aux résolutions prises. Au nom de l'Egypte et au mien, je vous remercie des paroles si élogieuses que vous venez d'adresser à mon pays et je forme les vœux les plus fervents pour cette société.

DISCOURS DE M. E. J. PHELAN, CHEF DE LA DIVISION DIPLOMATIQUE AU BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DU TRAVAIL, ET REPONSE DE SA MAJESTE LE ROI D'EGYPTE FOUAD, GENEVE, LE 5 JUILLET 1929

Discours de M. Phelan

Sire,

En l'absence de notre directeur, M. Albert Thomas, je prie Votre Majesté d'agréer l'expression de la très profonde gratitude du Bureau international du Travail pour le grand honneur qu'Elle daigne lui faire en lui consacrant quelques instants de son séjour à Genève.

Nous nous permettons d'y voir une preuve de l'intérêt que Votre Majesté porte à cette Organisation internationale du Travail qui a été instituée en même temps que la Société des Nations et dont l'objet est de fonder la paix universelle entre les peuples sur la base de la justice sociale.

La visite dont Votre Majesté veut bien honorer le Bureau

international du Travail acquiert, à cet égard, une signification particulière. Elle est pour nous un précieux témoignage de la sollicitude que Votre Majesté apporte aux questions sociales, comme à tous les autres grands problèmes de la vie moderne. Nous avons pu suivre en effet les travaux entrepris dans le Royaume d'Egypte pour la préparation d'un code du travail et nous connaissons les efforts du Gouvernement de Votre Majesté pour assurer aux travailleurs égyptiens une législation protectrice conforme aux principes qui ont été à l'origine de notre Organisation.

C'est en formant de tout cœur les vœux les plus sincères pour le règne de Votre Majesté et le bonheur de Son peuple que je me permets de Lui présenter, au nom de tous les collaborateurs du Bureau international du Travail, mes souhaits de bienvenue les plus respectueux.

Réponse du Roi

Monsieur le Directeur,

C'est avec un grand plaisir que Je profite de Mon passage à Genève pour rendre visite au Bureau international du Travail dont J'apprécie hautement l'activité et l'œuvre éminemment humanitaire.

Je Me suis toujours préoccupé du sort de la classe ouvrière qui a constamment trouvé auprès de Moi le plus ferme appui. A la veille de Mon départ d'Egypte, J'eus la satisfaction de poser la première pierre d'une cité ouvrière conçue d'après un plan réunissant toutes les conditions d'une bonne hygiène.

Soyez persuadé que Je travaille dans mon pays à l'amélioration du sort du paysan et de l'ouvrier.

Très touché des vœux que vous voulez bien former pour Mon peuple et pour Moi-même, Je vous en remercie et Je forme, à Mon tour, les vœux les plus chaleureux pour le succès du Bureau international du travail.

DISCOURS DU PRESIDENT DE LA CONFEDERATION SUISSE, M. LE DR. ROBERT HAAB, BELLINZONA, FETE DU TIR FEDERAL, LE 18 JUILLET 1929

(Gazette de Lausanne du 19 juillet 1929).

De plus, cette fête a pour but de nous exercer dans le maniement de notre arme nationale, que la nouvelle Confédération n'a jamais employée, ni n'emploiera jamais que pour la protection de notre sol sacré et de nos biens les plus précieux. Ni les idéologues, ni les ennemis déclarés de notre forte démocratie

bourgeoise ne réussiront jamais à enlever au Suisse sa passion innée pour le tir et sa fierté en son armée. Car notre armée est l'école des vertus viriles, qui à une époque de gain et de plaisirs, disparaissent si facilement. Pour notre Confédération, elle est, en même temps, l'expression de l'unité de la nation ; les diversités de politique, de race et de confession n'y trouvent point place et les différentes races apprennent, en son sein, à se connaître, à s'estimer et à s'aimer. Là, il n'y a que des Confédérés. Nous sommes sans arrière-pensées ; nous n'avons pas d'autre ambition que d'être et demeurer ce que nous sommes.

Nous vivons en paix et sur un pied d'amitié avec tous les Etats et nous nous réjouissons de voir aujourd'hui leurs représentants parmi nous. Nous sommes reconnaissants que notre pays se soit vu confier une institution qui embrasse le monde entier et qui peut constituer le plus grand bienfait pour l'humanité si elle veut vraiment établir des liens toujours plus étroits entre les peuples. Encore les actes ne correspondent-ils pas toujours aux paroles. Tandis que les représentants de tous les pays proclament la nécessité de plus grandes facilités dans le commerce international, des barrières de plus en plus élevées sont dressées qui rendent plus difficile la vie et la prospérité d'un petit pays comme le nôtre qui n'a pas de littoral maritime et qui dépend de ses exportations. Seuls la qualité de nos produits et l'habileté des ouvriers suisses de toute condition assurent notre avenir ; aussi est-ce la coopération et non la compétition, qui constitue la seule base nécessaire pour assurer à notre peuple des conditions d'existence satisfaisantes et un avenir de prospérité.

RESOLUTION INTRODUCED BY SENATOR CAPPER TO ENFORCE THE ANTI-WAR PACT, WASHINGTON, MARCH 1929.

(The Arbitrator, April 1929).

Whereas, the Congress of the United States, on August 29th, 1916, solemnly declared it " to be the policy of the United States to adjust and settle its international disputes through mediation or arbitration to the end that war may be honourably avoided ; and

Whereas, the United States, in pursuance of this policy, has concluded with a number of countries and is negotiating with many others, a treaty of arbitration and conciliation in a new form under which the parties agree to submit to arbitration all differences relating to international matters in which they are concerned by virtue of a claim of right made by one against the and to submit to a Permanent International Commission other for conciliation any dispute not submitted to arbitration, and

has thus shown its intention to carry out on its part the policy of the United States, and

Whereas, the United States has taken a further step in advancing its policy by ratifying the Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War, in which it is declared that the contrating Powers are :

> Persuaded that the time has come when a frank renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy should be made to the end that the peaceful and friendly relations now existing between their people may be perpetuated ;
>
> Convinced that all changes in their relations with one another should be sought only by pacific means and be the result of a peaceful and orderly process, and that any signatory Power which shall hereafter seek to promote its national interests by ressort to war should be denied the benefits furnished by this treaty ; and

Whereas, it is a breach of its obligations with the United States for any country which is a party to the Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War to have recourse to war as an instrument of national policy in its relations with any other party to the treaty ; and,

Whereas, the Governments which have associated themselves by the treaty " to the end that peaceful and friendly relations between their nationals to encourage a breach of the obligations of the treaty by exporting to a government which has committed such breach, arms, munitions, or implements of war or other articles for the support of such government ; and

Whereas, the declaration of its policy by the United States to prevent such encouragement by its nationals of a breach of the treaty would have a great effect in accomplishing the object of the treaty, that war may be honourably avoided ;

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,

That whenever the President determines and by proclamation declares that any country has violated the Multilateral Treaty for the Renunciation of War, it shall be unlawful, unless otherwise provided by act of Congress or by proclamation of the President, to export to such country arms, munitions, implements of war, or other articles for use in war until the President shall by proclamation declare that such violation no longer continues.

Section 2. It is declared to be the policy of the United States that the nationals of the United States should not be protected by their Government in giving aid and comfort to a nation which has committed a breach of the said treaty.

Section 3. The President is hereby requested to enter into negotiations with other Governments which ratify or adhere to

the said treaty to securc agreement that the nationals of the contracting Governments should not be protected by their Governments in giving aid and comfort to a nation which has committed a breach of the said treaty.

Section 4. The policy of the United States as expressed in Section 2 hereof shall apply only in case of a breach of the said treaty by war against a Government which has declared its adherence to a similar policy

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SPEECH OF MR. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, LONDON, HOUSE OF COMMONS, JULY 3, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, July 4, 1929).

Turning to the negotiations with the United States of America, Mr. Lloyd George said there was no one who would not wish well to the Government in the matter. The Washington Konference of 1921, which agreed to out down battleships, was the only disarmament conference ever held that ended in a practical reduction, and the world owed a dobt of gratitude to Mr. Hughes, who was then Secretary of State, and to Lord Balfour, who represented us at the conference, for that extraordinarily fine achievement.

I am trusting that in this conference the Government, in conjunction with the United States of America and other naval Powers, will not merely succeed in limiting cruisers, but that they will press forward Lord Balfour's appeal of 1921 for the abolition of the submarine. (Cheers.) At that time the United States was not prepared to give support to this proposal. Now they are. It would make an enormous difference it that were accomplished. There is one other thing, and I would like to say I hope the Prime Minister will consider twice before he enters on a one-sided conference between this country and the United States without the other Powers being present. There were susceptibilities and there was the example of the Anglo-French pact, which, though entered into with all sincerity gave rise to a crop of rumours.

Mr. MACDONALD was understood to say that Mr. Lloyd George would help him by admitting that that was the course he (Mr, MacDonald) pronounced himself in favour of.

Mr. LLOYD GEORGE: I am very glad of that. I only wish to emphasise the words of caution which he himself seems to have uttered. I trust (he went on) that the Government, if they succeed in getting an agreement to reduce the navies of the world, will not imagine that they have accomplished the whole task of disarmament. You will only have touched the fringe of

this question. At the present moment in Europe there are eight Powers, great and small, who have more powerful military equipment than before the war. The Disarmament Commission up to the present has been a perfec farce. There has been no reduction effected. There is no indication of the desire or intention, and unless the Government succeed in carrying out the policy which was the basis of the League of Nations, to secure a drastic reduction of the armaments on the Continent of Europe, the peril to peace will remain.

There was only one way to secure disarmament (the proceeded), and that was the way adopted in regard to Germany, which was compelled not only to reduce her army but to scrap her armaments. They should insist upon the Disarmament Commission facing the problem of seeing carried out the solemn undertaking which the Allied Powers and others gave in 1919 to reduce their armaments to a minimum of practical security. Unless that obligation is carried out it is useless to talk about arbitration.

I am glad that that the right hon, gentleman has made it clear that we are going to clear out ourselves from the Rhineland as soon as possible and bring pressure on the other Powers to carry out the obligationo of the treaty.

SPEECHES OF MR. G. LOCKER-LAMPSON COLONEL WEDWOOD, SIR AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN, MR. WALTER RUNCIMAN AND THE BRITISH FOREIGN MINISTER MR. ARTHUR HENDERSON, LONDON, HOUSE OF COMMONS, JULY 5, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, July 6, 1929).

Mr. G. Locker-Lampson (C.—Wood Green), who was Under Foreign Secretary in the late Government, opened a discussion on foreign affairs. He said that in recent years foreign affairs had been more outside party politics, and he congratulated the House on the practical continuity of foreign policy which had been pursued. Dealing with the question of the evacuation of the Rhineland, he said that everyone would agree that the British troops should be evacuated as early as possible. Considerable reductions had already taken place, but always in collaboration and agreement with France and Belgium, and he hoped that future reductions would proceed simultaneously between ourselves and those two Powers on the same lines.

Referring to the question of compulsory arbitration and the Optional Clause, he suggested that the Government should not sign the clause in a hurry without having first carefully consi-

dered what reservations were necessary. Everyone agreed that reservations were necessary and it must be remembered that the United States, the author of the Kellogg Pact, had not yet admitted the principle of compulsory arbitration. As a matter of fact there was very little ground that was not already covered by the arbitration treaties we had with various countries, and the Government should not close their eyes to alternative methods.

Colonel Wedgwood (Lab.—Newcastle-under-Lyme) said it was because Mr. Locker-Lampson's speech was a plea for continuity that he wanted to put in a plea for discontinuity. Only the other day, he went on, fortunately before the election, there appeared in the "Manchester Guardian" a leading article which I believe embodied the views and the exasperations of hundreds of thousands of people in this country. The leading article was called "The Nightmare's End." The nightmare which has been weighing not merely upon Liberals who read the "Manchester Guardian" but upon the mind of everey man of progressive ideas in this country for the last five years has been the right honourable gentleman, the late Foreign Secretary.

But what has been this nightmare whose end we hope has come ? It has been that the old traditions which have guided British Administrations in the past throughout the centuries have been dropped. The late Foreign Secretary puts safety first. His predecessors did not put safety first ; they put justice first ; they put the support of the oppressed first. They tried to preserve British traditions, and they had a vision, a better vision than his, of what British interests really were.

"Whe have seen the right honourable gentleman, afraid, perhaps, of a new war—I do not know what his fear was,—taking his orders from the French Government. It has humiliated us. We have seen him hob nobbing with every dictator throughout Europe. What is known of England in Greece to-day is the fact that the right honourable gentleman allowed himself to be entertained by the Dictator Pangalos.

Sir Austen Chamberlain : Where ?

Colonel Wedgwood : In Greece.

Sir A. Chamberlain : I was never in Greece during the dictatorship of M. Pangalos during the whole time I was in office.

Colonel Wedgwood : What is just as bad is what is known in Spain when the right honourable gentleman consented to have the Council of the League of Nations held in Madrid in order to give character to another Dictator. What is known in Spain is that papers are seized in Gibraltar under the direction of our Foreign Office lest they should get into Spain. The people who are being persecuted under these dictatorships in Europe, the people who are suffering far more than the old Liberals suffered in Italy under Bomba, or in Hugary under Metternich, are

our comrades, Socialists every one. They are the people who are filling the gaols in Budapest, in Kovno.

Mr. E. Brown (L.—Leith) : In Moscow they are Baptists.

Colonel Wedgwood : In Moscow, too.

Mr. Brown : There they are Baptists, not Socialists.

Colonel Wedgwood : I do not confine my ideas of tyrants to those of Fascist colour. There are just as bad ones in Moscow today. The prisons are full of our comrades, and our Ministers and our Secretaries of State are shaking hands and concerting with the people who are grinding our brothers down.

He hoped, he went on, there would be no continuity of our foreign policy in regard to the minorities of Europe, who were getting no sort of justice. The real charge against the late Government was that they had injured British prestige and destroyed old traditions because they wanted to preserve the old Entente with France.

Sir A. Chamberlain (C.—Birmingham), late Foreign Secretary, said the particular charge Colonel Wedgwood made against him was that he had received hospitality from M. Pangalos. He was mistaken, but that was not of much consequence. He also said that he had received from or offered hospitaly to the Prime Minister of Spain. Colonel Wedgwood might have added that he had received hospitality or offered hospitality to the Prime Ministers or Foreign Secretaries of other States.

The complaint seemed to be that as Foreign Secretary he cultivated the best relations he could with the rulers of foreign States, but if any Foreign Minister adopted a different policy he would not advance the peace of the world or the sense of security and goodwill on which peace ultimately rested. He was shocked the other day to see it announced that the Foreign Secretary had contributed to a French journal an article in which a violent attack was made on the head of a friendly State. He believed the right hon. gentleman made no such cnntribution, and that some previous utterance of a year ago had been republished. In these matters there was only one wise attitude. If it were true that we had no right to dictate a policy to the self-governing Dominions it was at least as true in relation to foreign nations. (A Labour member : What about Russia)? He would come to Russia later. It was not the business of the Government to indicate to a foreign nation what Government it should have—(Ministerial cheers)—or to frame its policy according to party likes or dislikes.

After asking whether any announcement could be made by the Foreign Secretary on the recent conversations at Nanking, Sir A. Chamberlain said he would add little about the negociations with the United States. The late Government welcomed most cordially the statement by Mr. Gibson at the last meeting of the Preparatory Commission at Geneva, which he understood had been further developed. The mention of the yardstick which

the President of the U. S. A. had introduced into the discussion seemed to him full of good augury, and the Opposition earnestly desired that the negociations should come to a successful termination. (Hear, hear).

In regard to the signing of the Optional Clause (continued Sir A. Chamberlain) I would reinforce the appeal to the Government not to act with undue haste. We are committed doubly and trebly to the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and the question that any Government has to put to itself is whether it should sign an engagement in advance to arbitrate a particular set of questions before a particular court excluding all other means of friendly and peaceful settlement in those cases. At present there is no definition of justiciable disputes, and therefore an engagement to refer them to this tribunal is ad indistinct and undefined engagement. (Hear, hear). May it not be well that we should know a little more exactly what will be held to be a justiciable dispute before we agree that every dispute which may be so considered shall go to this particular tribunal, excluding recourse, for instance, to the Council of the League, and it the Americans are parties to that conciliation tribunal established between the United States and ourselves by the Bryan-Spring Rice treaty?

" In my view there are a large number of international disputes—often some of the gravest—that a political tribunal like the Council of the League or that provided for in the Bryan-Spring Rice treaty has a better chance of settling equitably and to the satisfaction of the two parties than a strictly legal tribunal which takes account of nothing but the rules of law. I speak with all respect of the Permanent Court, but international law itself is very indeterminate. Upon what conception of law will the court proceed? In these matters there are two great schools of thought—the Anglo-American and the Continental, proceeding from entirely different conceptions of law. I say without hesitation that if we had a dispute with the United States I would sooner have an Anglo-American tribunal with the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States as President with a casting vote than send the dispute to a tribunal of which every member except the American and thé British judge would belong to the Continental school. (Hear, hear).

" I do not ask the Foreign Secretary to declare the Government's policy on this occasion. Indeed, I would beg him to give himself and his colleagues time to think out all the implications and to discuss them fully, as they have expressed the intention of doing, with the Dominions before declaring a definite policy.

Sir A. Chamberlain went on to thank the Government for the recognition in the King's Speech of a connection between the settlement of reparations and the evacuation of the Rhineland. " I want to see that evacuation ", he said, " but it is the freeing of German soil from occupation by foreign troops that I want to

see. Unless it is evacuation in that sense you have gained nothing by the mere withdrawal of British troops to have their places taken by French and Belgian troops. That will not advance and may impede the pacific progress of the world. (Opposition cheers).

Mr. Henderson (Foreign Secretary), referring at the outset to the article ascribed to him in a French journal, said he never saw the article and gave no authority for its publication or for his name to be associated with it. What had happened, he thought, was that a speech he delivered at an international conference a year ago in Brussels had been taken hold of and a paragraph or two abstracted and made to appear as if issued by him since his appointment as Foreign Secretary. He agreed with what Sir A. Chamberlain had said as to the importance of having all possible contact and co-operation between ourselves and other nations.

Continuing, Mr. Henderson assured the House that the Government were not taking the step of signing the Optional Clause without weighing all the implications involved. Perhaps Sir A. Chamberlain had laboured a little unnecessarily the suggestion of keeping contact with the Dominions, as the King's speech clearly showed that the first step taken both in regard to signing the Optional Clause and entering into diplomatic relations with Russia had been that of placing the matter before all the Dominions. Even if there had been no decision by the Imperial Conference that that course should be followed, he would have seriously considered whether he could have taken action in such important matters without first trying to secure wholehearted co-operation by the Dominions.

Sir. F. Hall (C. — Dulwich) : If the Dominions disagree as regards the signing of the Optional Clause, will the Government abandon their intention of signing it ?

Mr. Henderson replied that he thought he might fairly ask the hon. member to wait and see. (Cheers and laughter.) Continuing, he said the Government were conscious that Locarno and the Kellogg Pact ought always to be taken into consideration in any move with regard to the method of stabilising the peace of the world. The Optional Clause was a first step, and not the only step. If he did not answer to-day the question whether the signature would be with reservations or not he thought the House would quite appreciate the fact that the Government could not decide its position finally until they had had the replies from the Dominions.

As regarded the evacuation of the Rhine, he believed we all wanted evacuation to be carried out. It was essential evacuation should be carried out. It was only fair to Germany, who had carried out the whole conditions imposed on her by the Versailles Treaty, and that being so evacuation should be carried out as speedily as possible. (Hear, hear.) He had examined very

closely what has taken place between the several ex-Allied countries, including the conversations at Geneva last September, and whilst it was of the greatest importance we should make it unmistakably clear we were anxious evacuation should take place at the earliest moment, he was convinced that it would not be in the interests of the peace of Europe if the process had to be taken, as it were, by degrees or by stages He thought we ought to try to get both France and Belgium to take that step with us. " I am not sure, " Mr. Henderson said, " that the German Government itself would desire to see a piecemeal evacuation (Opposition cheers). It would be disappointed if evacuation were delayed, but equally disturbed if evacuation has to be on a piecemeal character.

" I have no reason to believe that any insuperable difficulty is going to be placed in the way by either the French or the Belgian Governments to a complete evacuation — (cheers), — and the House may be assured that all the moral influence we can bring to bear, especially at the coming conference which will deal with the experts' report, will be brought to bear to bring about a speedy and a unanimous decision in favour of evacuation ". (Cheers)

Mr. Runciman (L. — St. Ives) expressed complete agreement with what had been said by the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary on the subject of our relations with America. In so far as the intimacy between England and America was fostered the Liberal party hoped that nothing would be done which would produce the feeling in other great Powers that they were excluded from understandings arrived at. As to the Optional Clause the caution with which a good many had approached it had more to do with the tribunal than the clause itself. (Hear, hear.) If we are to come into the atmosphere of arbitration, said Mr. Runciman, we are bound to take certain risks and one of the risks must be the constitution of the tribunal. He did not think that the direction of the ex-Foreign Secretary was wrong, but the right hon. gentleman gave the impression that his pace was too slow and that he was too apprehensive as to the class of subject which might go to the tribunal. The Liberal party thought that the less delay there was in signing the Optional Clause the better. (Ministerial cheers.) It was necessary to carry the Empire with us but Canada had alrealdy taken steps in advance of the Mother Country. He doubted whether we should do anything to injure by a jot the harmony of the Empire if we made it clear that it was our intention to take full advantage of this new judicial machinery at the earliest moment.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTEES PAR LE CONGRES DE L'INTERNATIONALE OUVRIERE SOCIALISTE, BRUXELLES, DU 5 AU 11 AOUT 1928.

(Bulletin de l'Internationale Ouvrière Socialiste, septembre 1928).

Le point I de l'ordre du jour :

La situation politique mondiale et le mouvement ouvrier international

AUX TRAVAILLEURS DU MONDE !

Dix ans se sont écoulés depuis la fin de la guerre.

Malgré les promesses solennelles faites aux peuples par les gouvernements, la Paix n'est pas encore assurée, la course aux armements recommence ; les nations n'ont pas encore ce sentiment de sécurité que seul, d'ailleurs, le socialisme leur apportera complètement en abolissant les dominations de classe qui créent les antagonismes nationaux.

Des minorités nationales restent opprimées et les grandes puissances entravent ou exploitent leur effort de libération.

Dans certains pays,la démocratie a été étranglée par des dictateurs qui, sous des formes diverses, présentent les mêmes dangers pour la libération prolétarienne et pour la tranquillité du monde.

Partout, dans chaque nation, le capitalisme, plus agressif et plus avide que jamais, s'est efforcé de peser sur les travailleurs les charges de la guerre, soit par des impôts iniques et écrasants, soit par des mesures financières et économiques qui ont amené le chômage et condamné à la misère des millions d'hommes.

A travers les frontières, des trusts industriels et des cartels financiers de plus en plus puissants et coalisés dominent la production et les Etats et, aidé par l'industrialisation des pays agraires, surtout de la Chine, des Indes et des pays coloniaux, le capitalisme s'appesantit sur le prolétariat de couleur sans syndicats et sans protection, organisant par une exploitation éhontée, une concurrence déloyale contre les travailleurs européens et américains.

A tous ceux qui souffrent de la dictature capitaliste et des dictatures politiques, à tous ceux qu'inquiète l'avenir incertain et qui veulent la justice sociale et la paix mondiale, nous lançons notre appel. Qu'ils viennent à l'Internationale Ouvrière Socialiste ! Qu'avec elle et par elle ils assurent la victoire du socialisme et par le socialisme la souveraineté du travail dans les nations réconciliées.

C'est à l'Internationale Ouvrière Socialiste que déjà, malgré les âpres difficultés d'après-guerre, malgré les scissions prolétariennes, et malgré la concentration accrue du capitalisme,

l'on doit les premiers succès dans la voie du rapprochement des peuples.

C'est elle qui par les travaux de Francfort, de Hambourg, de Marseille, et grâce à l'action soutenue de ses grandes sections nationales, a préparé et obtenu l'accord des grandes puissances de l'Europe occidentale et centrale, base essentielle de la paix.

C'est elle qui, en face de solutions ruineuses de contrainte et de violence, indiqua les solutions pacifiques du problème des réparations et qui, en ce moment même, s'efforce d'arracher aux gouvernements la réalisation de leurs promesses sur l'arbitrage obligatoire, le désarmement général des nations et la liquidation complète de la guerre.

C'est sous sa pression, c'est sous la pression des masses ouvrières et paysannes, que les gouvernements ont été contraints à mettre la guerre « hors la loi » par des déclarations solennelles, dans lesquelles l'Internationale reconnaît les paroles que, la première, elle fit entendre au monde.

Le texte du Pacte de Kellogg, que les gouvernements vont signer et qui est une renonciation absolue de la guerre, est faussé par des réserves inacceptables de certains gouvernements et serait encore amoindri par l'exclusion de l'Union des Soviets. Il restera, en effet, lettre morte, si les travailleurs ne s'unissent pas et ne conquièrent pas le pouvoir politique pour étendre ce pacte, sans exceptions, au monde entier, pour organiser la paix après l'avoir proclamée, pour faire de la lettre une réalité vivante.

Pour cela nous faisons appel aux travailleurs d'Europe. Mais en même temps nous nous adressons aux travailleurs des Etats-Unis, de ce pays où la ploutocratie la plus puissante du monde fausse la démocratie et opprime le travail.

Travailleurs des Etat-Unis ! Les capitalistes de votre pays vantent votre prospérité, mais ne voyez-vous point qu'elle se désagrège ? Ne voyez-vous pas à quel degré le rythme haletant de votre travail vous use et vous épuise ? Ne voyez-vous pas que votre pays est le seul parmi les Etats avancés, où n'est prise aucune mesure de prévoyance vous mettant à l'abri des misères du chômage, de la maladie et de la vieillesse, que c'est seulement dans votre pays que l'action des organisations ouvrières est paralysée par sentences judiciaires ?

Les capitalistes de votre pays proclament avec fierté que votre niveau de vie est plus élevé que celui de vos frères d'autres pays. Mais voyez donc émigrer sans cesse du capital américain vers l'Europe et l'Asie, à la recherche d'une main-d'œuvre meilleur marché, dont l'exploitation menace votre « standard of life » en intensifiant le chômage dans votre pays.

Les capitalistes de votre pays se font les champions de la paix, mais ils organisent l'intervention militaire dans le Nicaragua et dans d'autres pays du continent américain.

Entrez donc dans nos rangs et soyez à l'avant-garde de la classe ouvrière comme votre capitalisme est à la tête des classes capitalistes du monde.

Notre appel,nous l'adressons également aux peuples opprimés de l'Orient.

Nous saluons leurs efforts de libération.

Nous saluons le succès de la révolution nationale en Chine sur le capitalisme mondial.

Et nous saurons exiger de nos gouvernements capitalistes qu'ils retirent leurs troupes et leurs vaisseaux, qu'ils ratifient les droits de la Chine à sa souveraineté, qu'ils lui laissent la liberté de sa législation et de son administration douanière, et qu'ils lui rendent ses concessions, qu'ils renoncent aux droits d'exterritorialité et reconnaissent le gouvernement national.

Nous protestons contre le coup d'Etat de l'absolutisme en Egypte, coup d'Etat qui, pendant trois ans, prive le peuple égyptien de son Parlement. Pour ce peuple, nous demandons l'indépendance réelle et son admission à la S. D. N. Nous demandons que le canal de Suez, cette grande voie de communication entre l'Orient et l'Occident, soit placé sous la protection de la S. D. N. et qu'en conséquence, les troupes britanniques évacuent aussitôt ce territoire.

Nous reconnaissons le droit des peuples indous à disposer entièrement d'eux-mêmes et soutenons leurs efforts dans cette direction.

Mais tout en secondant l'effort d'émancipation des peuples opprimés de l'Orient, nous devons déclarer que cette émancipation nationale, tout en préparant le terrain de la lutte sociale, n'apporte pas avec elle l'émancipation des travailleurs.

Les massacres de Changaï et de Canton ont montré que le prolétariat d'Orient recommence les expériences sanglantes dont le prolétariat européen, au XIX^e^ siècle, fut la victime. La bourgeoisie se sert et profite des rébellions du prolétariat,mais elle se tourne contre lui dès qu'il revendique sa part de la victoire commune.

Le jeune mouvement ouvrier d'Orient doit utiliser les expériences de la classe ouvrière des Etats industriels avancés de l'Europe et apprendre à employer ses méthodes de lutte. C'est pourquoi nous demandons aux travailleurs d'Orient de se joindre à nous.

Notreaction,l'action du prolétariat international pour sa libération et pour la paix,ne sera pleine et efficace que grâce à la liberté politique. Certes, la démocratie, liée à la situation des classes, n'est pas pour la classe ouvrière un but en soi. Mais elle constitue un moyen important pour réaliser en sus de l'égalité politique l'égalité sociale. La classe ouvrière atteindra ce but dans la mesure où elle mènera avec constance sa lutte dans le cadre de la démocratie bourgeoise, qu'elle élargira ses positions de force par l'usage des droits et libertés politiques, créant ainsi

les conditions pour l'érection de la démocratie prolétarienne.

De toutes ses forces l'Internationale se dresse contre la dictature d'une secte ou d'un homme, quelle que soit la forme de cette dictature.

Elle se dresse contre le facisme qui, étouffant la liberté à l'intérieur et menaçant la paix à l'extérieur, est un danger non seulement pour le peuple qu'il domine, mais aussi pour les nations démocratiques dont le développement l'humilie.

Elle dénonce et flétrit l'action du facisme italien, qui s'efforce de réunir autour de lui en vassaux tous les Etats réactionnaires des Balkans et de la Méditerranée et de grouper en une sorte de Sainte Alliance les pays de liberté, manœuvres facilitées par des régimes de semi-dictatures, notamment en Roumanie, en Yougoslavie et en Hongrie.

L'internationale dénonce les dangers de conflits entre les dictatures de Lithuanie et de Pologne. Elle exhorte les ouvriers et paysans de Lithuanie à la lutte contre le régime dictatorial et soutient de tout son cœur la lutte de la classe ouvrière en Pologne contre un régime qui, sous prétexte de changer les formes de la démocratie, tente de la détruire.

Elle dénonce aux peuples de tous les pays l'attitude des bourgeoisies nationalistes qui, hier, se réclamaient de la liberté individuelle contre l'ingérence de l'Etat et qui, aujourd'hui, rivalisent de flatteries à l'égard d'une odieuse dictature qui, sous prétexte de néo-syndicalisme, enchaîne le travail. Mais elle tient à dire aux travailleurs que cette réaction politique violente et dangereuse, est favorisée par la tactique même du bolchevisme qui, dans tous les pays, divise la classe ouvrière, comme on l'a vu récemment en France, en Allemagne et en Pologne, et par là même renforce les partis et les gouvernements de la bourgeoisie, prolongeant leur durée, accroissant leur domination.

Le dernier Congrès de l'Internationale Communiste, en déclarant inévitable le retour de guerres impérialistes, a placé à nouveau tout son espoir dans une guerre mondiale d'où naîtrait une nouvelle révolution. Quelle démence de diriger la pensée et les espérances des travailleurs vers de nouvelles guerres, alors que tous les travailleurs du monde devraient s'unir contre l'affreux retour de la sanglante barbarie de la guerre.

L'internationale ne méconnaît point les efforts héroïques des masses ouvrières de l'Union des Soviets dans la lutte contre le capitalisme et la terreur blanche. Mais onze ans après la révolution, la persistance des crises économiques montre que le régime de dictature d'une minorité terroriste empêche le développement des forces productives du pays, en même temps qu'il empêche les travailleurs russes de défendre leurs intérêts et qu'il maintient sous sa domination les nationalités qu'il opprime, ainsi que le Gouvernement des Soviets en a fait l'aveu dans des documents récemment publiés sur la Géorgie.

Certes, les réunis dans l'I. O. S. sont toujours résolus à défendre la république Soviétique contre toute hostilité des gouvernements capitalistes et contre toute agression contre-révolutionnaire, et à exiger de tous les Etats qu'ils entretiennent avec elle des relations pacifiques et normales.

Mais en même temps qu'aux travailleurs du monde entier, l'Internationale demande aux travailleurs de l'Union des Soviets d'unir leurs forces aux nôtres pour une politique mondiale du prolétariat, fondée non pas sur l'espoir d'une nouvelle guerre d'où sortirait une dictature de minorités, mais sur la nécessité de défendre la démocratie là où elle est menacée, de la rétablir partout où elle a été anéantie, et d'en faire un des moyens d'émancipation de la classe ouvrière.

La division du prolétariat réduit sa puissance, l'unité prolétarienne serait un nouveau stimulant, qui rendrait irrésistible sa lutte pour la paix et l'affranchissement social.

Par l'unité, vers la victoire sur le capitalisme et l'impérialisme !

Par l'unité, vers la conquête du pouvoir et vers le socialisme !

Prolétaires de tous les pays, unissez-vous !

LE POINT II DE L'ORDRE DU JOUR :

Le militarisme et le désarmement

I

L'Internationale Ouvrière Socialiste vise au désarmement total de tous les pays, sans distinction entre les nations victorieuses et les nations vaincues, tant en ce qui touche les forces de terre que les forces navales et aériennes. Ce but ne peut-être atteint que par les efforts persévérants et conjugués des travailleurs organisés, dont la tâche sera d'informer constamment les masses populaires sur les mobiles qui poussent à armer et les dangers qui en résultent, et, aussi de mener avec une vigueur croissante la lutte économique et politique de la classe ouvrière contre les classe dirigeantes.

Les tendances générales du capitalisme mènent à la guerre, mais il n'en est pas moins vrai que l'interdépendance croissante des entreprises économiques, les dépenses de plus en plus lourdes que les armements entraînent, l'expérience montrant que la course aux armements provoque automatiquement la guerre, le besoin d'être rassuré sur le sort des investissements financiers à l'étranger, la crainte de nouvelles révolutions que toute guerre peut provoquer, tout cela peut incliner certains éléments des classes dirigeantes à se montrer favorables en principe à la réduction des préparatifs guerriers. Une des tâches immédiates les plus importantes du Socialisme international est d'exercer sur tous les gouvernements la plus forte pression possible, d'utiliser les tendances existant même chez les classes dirigeantes, pour

triompher des puissantes tendances contraires impérialistes et militaristes et de réaliser une convention internationale de désarmement.

Les difficultés qui entravent le désarmement ne peuvent être surmontées que par la pression politique la plus énergique. Le devoir des partis socialistes est d'exercer cette pression par une action constante et vigoureuse au sein des parlements et des masses. Les partis socialistes devront veiller à ce que ces difficultés ne soient pas exploitées pour faire échouer toutes les tentatives de désarmement.

L'I. O. S. considère comme le devoir de tous les partis ouvriers :

1) D'imposer l'adoption dans tous les pays d'une loi excluant toute mobilisation militaire ou industrielle, avant qu'un conflit international n'ait été soumis à la Société des Nations ou à autre procédure de règlement amiable ;
2) D'exercer la pression la plus forte, même la plus révolutionnaire des masses, contre tout gouvernement qui se refuserait à l'acceptation ou respect de l'arbitrage, en recourant à la guerre dans le cas d'un conflit international.

II

L'I. O. S. exige que tous les conflits internationaux soient soumis à l'arbitrage obligatoire ou à toute autre procédure de règlement pacifique.

Elle demande que le traité général d'arbitrage et de conciliation, dit Convention A, et établi conformément à la proposition faite par la Norvège et la Suède, à la huitième session de la S. D. N., soit adopté sans réserve et soumis à la signature de la neuvième session. L'I. O. S. invite les partis affiliés à s'efforcer, chacun dans son propre pays, à faire que les Etats-Unis et l'Union des Soviets soient invités à signer ce traité dans le plus bref délai.

L'I. O. S. se rend compte que la lutte en faveur d'une réduction des armements sera d'autant plus efficace que le règlement des conflits internationaux s'opérera de plus en plus par des moyens pacifiques.

III

Le désarmement ne servira la cause de la paix que lorsqu'il cessera d'être une obligation unilatérale imposée aux vaincus par les vainqueurs. Une paix durable ne peut être réalisée qu'entre nations se trouvant sur un pied d'égalité. Par conséquent l'I. O. S. demande pour toutes les nations la même liberté pour le choix de leurs systèmes d'armée. Le rétablissement de cette égalité des droits entre nations implique d'urgence une convention internationale de désarmement, destinée à empêcher de nouvelles courses aux armements entre les vainqueurs et les vain-

cus de 1918. Cette convention devra déterminer des méthodes de réduction d'armement appropriées à chaque système militaire déterminé. Afin de rédiger semblable convention, la Commission du Désarmement sera convoquée dans le plus bref délai et les travaux de la Commission Préparatoire seront accélérés.

VI

Une convention de désarmement doit surtout viser à empêcher qu'aucun Etat puisse, en cas de conflit international, disposer immédiatement pour une agression de grandes masses de troupes instruites et armées. Une convention internationale doit stipuler :

1) Le maintien de noyaux aussi peu nombreux que possible dans les casernes ;

2. Une limitation des stocks d'armes autorisés pour les différents Etats.

Si, d'une part, toutes les nations doivent pouvoir déterminer librement leur système militaire, l'I. O. S. attire l'attention sur les graves inconvénients que présente ce type nouveau d'armée qui s'annonce et qui, combinant un fort noyau de militaires professionnels avec de fortes possibilités d'utilisation rapide de masses considérables pour une opération d'agression, combine les dangers des armées de milice et des armées de métier.

Il faut donc empêcher qu'il ne se forme nulle part — et surtout qu'il se forme dans les pays de milice — de forts noyaux d'armées de caserne et empêcher aussi — et plus particulièrement dans les pays à armée de métier — des dispositions qui permettent d'utiliser des masses considérables pour une agression soudaine.

V.

Dans les Etats dont l'armée a pour base le service militaire obligatoire, le temps de service doit être réduit à la durée d'instruction minime.

Il faudra ensuite restreindre le nombre des hommes qui peuvent recevoir une instruction militaire.

Dans les pays qui ont des armées de métier, il faudra d'une manière analogue limiter le nombre d'hommes sous les drapeaux en temps de paix.

La Convention internationale devra en outre contenir pour tous les pays les stipulations suivantes :

1) Interdiction de l'emploi des gaz et des microbes pour des buts de guerre, dans le sens des principes adoptés par la sous-commssion de la S. D. N. ;
2) Limitation du nombre des pièces d'artillerie lourde, des tanks, des avions ; réduction de la flotte dans son ensemble et dans les diverses catégories ;
3) Limitation des dépenses pour l'armée et la marine ;

4) Contrôle national et international de la production du commerce et du transport des moyens de guerre ;

La convention internationale concernant le contrôle du trafic des armes et des munitions doit être ratifiée dans le délai le plus bref par tous les gouvernements. Il est impérieusement nécessaire que les organisations ouvrières soient appelées à en contrôler l'application ;

5) Interdiction de punir les publications relatives aux armements clandestins;

6) Contrôle international de l'application de toutes ces réglementations, soit par la Société des Nations, soit par une autre organisation plus vaste, comprenant également les états non-adhérents à la S. D. N.

La valeur de conventions internationales sur l'interdiction de la guerre de gaz, de la guerre chimique et de la guerre de microbes, dépend dans une large mesure de la force que les organisations nationales et internationales déploieront pour faire observer ces conventions. Si les classes impérialistes conservent le pouvoir, elles briseront toutes les conventions dans toute guerre qui viendra. Il n'est pas de traité qui puisse empêcher qu'une nouvelle guerre impérialiste se serve de tous les moyens de la chimie et de la technique des guerres modernes.

Dans toutes les industries servant à la guerre, l'adaptation des usines à la production militaire est l'affaire de quelques heures, de quelques jours tout au plus ; l'organisation des industries chimiques surtout devient un péril immense qui ne peut être conjuré qu'en soumettant ces industries de guerre au contrôle de l'Etat ou en les socialisant. Ainsi la socialisation de ces industries de guerre pourra devenir une garantie efficace de paix dans les pays où la classe ouvrière exercera une influence décisive.

L'I. O. S. insiste sur la nécessité de hâter l'action en vue du désarmement. Il faut entrer résolument dans la voie de la réduction sans attendre, comme le voudraient les grandes puissances, qu'un nouveau degré de sécurité ait été atteint. Car c'est de l'arbitrage et du désarmement combinés et contrôlés que naîtra la véritable sécurité.

VI

Sans diminuer la lutte en faveur d'une convention internationale de désarmement, les partis ouvriers socialistes s'efforceront d'obtenir que chaque Etat supprime ou diminue spontanément ses armements.

Les conventions internationales peuvent seulement fixer pour chaque Etat le maximum de ses armements. Aucun Etat ne doit être obligé par une convention internationale à maintenir de plus grandes armées qu'il ne le juge lui-même nécessaire. Aucun Etat, lorsqu'il réduit ses forces armées au-dessous du

maximum admis par des conventions internationales, ne peut être puni par le retrait de garanties internationales.

VII.

Le développement des moyens techniques de guerre accroît le danger que toute organisation militaire, même la plus démocratiquement organisée, peut faire courir à la démocratie et à la classe ouvrière. Les partis ouvriers socialistes doivent donc unir à la lutte en faveur du désarmement, la lutte en faveur d'une démocratisation du pouvoir de disposer de l'armée et de la marine, et aussi d'une démocratisation de l'organisation intérieure de l'armée et de la flotte.

Dans ce but, les partis ouvriers socialistes exigent :

1. Pouvoir confié aux seuls parlements de disposer des armées et de la marine, aucune mobilisation, même partielle, sans décision parlementaire ;

   Contrôle de l'organisation intérieure de l'armée par une commission spéciale parlementaire ;

   Défense d'employer les forces militaires dans les conflits entre le capital et le travail.
2. Abolition de toutes les barrières qui séparent l'armée et le peuple et de toutes les institutions et dispositions qui transforment l'armée en un instrument que la classe capitaliste utilise contre le prolétariat. Dans ce but, combinaison d'une période de service aussi courte que possible avec la garantie de tous les droits civils et politiques des soldats et des marins ; protection des droits des soldats et des marins par des hommes de confiance choisis par eux-mêmes ; méthodes démocratiques appliquées au recrutement du corps des officiers, à la discipline et au code pénal militaire ; suppression des tribunaux militaires spéciaux en temps de paix.

VIII.

Pour empêcher la violation des conventions internationales de désarmement et pour prévenir les dangers du fascisme, il faudra interdire le recrutement et le maintien de milices fascistes et d'autres organisations similaires, et placer l'exécution de cette défense sous un contrôle international.

IX.

L'I. O. S. ne saurait se borner à dresser ici le programme immédiat de cette action constructive par laquelle le prolétariat travaille à consolider la paix. Quelque prix qu'elle attache à toute conquête, même partielle, dans l'ordre pacifique, elle doit rappeler aux travailleurs de tous les pays que la guerre ne sera définitivement vaincue que lorsque le socialisme aura triomphé. Aucune transformation du capitalisme ne peut tuer

en lui les forces de guerre qui sont de son essence même. L'impérialisme conduit à la guerre : guerre aux colonies, guerre dans les contrées nouvellement ouvertes au marché mondial, et, par une conséquence fatale, guerre entre les puissances industrielles elles mêmes. Dans l'ère capitaliste, toute guerre porte toujours la marque de l'impérialisme dominant. Et la lutte même que les puissances d'argent mènent avec une ardeur grandissante contre la démocratie contribue, en multipliant les régimes de dictature à l'intérieur des Etats, à aggraver les dangers de conflits extérieurs.

Aussi longtemps que les gouvernements poursuivront une politique impérialiste, il ne pourra donc y avoir de paix assurée. Il pourrait même arriver qu'un accord conclu entre gouvernements de l'espèce pour réduire ou limiter les armements, ne serve qu'à induire les travailleurs en un faux sentiment de sécurité et à détourner leur attention d'une politique inquiétante. Il est donc du devoir du socialisme de faire comprendre aux peuples combien seraient vaines les conférences pour la limitation des armements, si les gouvernements qui y participent persistaient à pratiquer une politique de guerre.

L'I. O. S. tient à proclamer que c'est surtout et avant tout l'action indépendante et directe de la classe ouvrière internationale, s'exerçant contre les gouvernements capitalistes, qui fera avancer les peuples dans la voie du désarmement.

Le mot d'ordre doit dont être : Vers l'organisation de la paix, vers le désarmement total, lutte sans merci contre toutes les formes de l'impérialisme

LE POINT III DE L'ORDRE DU JOUR :

Le problème colonial

I. — *Introduction.*

La politique coloniale a été un des moyens par lesquels le capitalisme s'est étendu sur la terre entière.

Elle a ouvert l'accès aux trésors naturels des pays arriérés, développé chez eux la production et les moyens de transport modernes et ainsi énormément élargi la base des matières premières pour l'économie mondiale et aidé au développement de la division internationale du travail.

Mais ce puissant développement des forces productives, ce grand progrès de la civilisation matérielle a été acheté au prix de bien des maux ; les peuples indigènes, livrés la plupart du temps à une domination étrangère brutale, à l'exploitation et au pillage éhontés du capital étranger, dépouillés dans bien des cas de la possession de leur sol, et tenus, sous le fouet de maîtres étrangers, au travail forcé. Les profits résultant de l'exploitation des trésors naturels des colonies et du travail indigène s'écoulent souvent dans la métropole, empêchant par

là le développement des forces naturelles et l'organisation de la production moderne dans le pays même.

D'un autre côté pourtant, le développement de la production et des moyens de transport modernes dans les colonies, a été le point de départ d'une évolution moderne de l'état social et cultural chez les peuples colonisés, les rendant ainsi accessibles à des idées démocratiques, nationales et sociales modernes.

Au cours de cette évolution, les peuples colonisés divers ont atteint des stades de développement divers.

Des peuples de vieille civilisation ont, dès à présent, sous la domination étrangère, dépassé dans une large mesure leur situation rétrograde au point de vue technique et social. Il s'est développé, au sein de ces populations, d'importants mouvements nationaux, qui tendent à se libérer entièrement du joug étranger et à développer une vie nationale indépendante. Dans ces pays, la domination étrangère pourrait déjà être supprimée, sans qu'ils dussent pour cela retomber de la phase capitaliste à une phase plus ancienne et plus primitive, sans que fussent détruites chez eux les méthodes modernes de production et de transport et sans qu'ils sortissent ainsi du cercle de l'échange international des marchandises.

Au pôle opposé sont des peuples colonisés qui se trouvaient, avant la domination étrangère, à un stade d'évolution très primitif, et ne l'ont même pas encore sensiblement dépassé sous la domination étrangère. Dans ces pays, les méthodes modernes de production et de transport reposent encore exclusivement sur la domination des étrangers. Sa disparition immédiate représenterait non pas encore le progrès vers une culture nationale, mais bien la régression à une barbarie primitive, non pas encore le développement d'une démocratie nationale, mais l'assujettissement des masses du peuple à la domination, soit d'une minorité de colons blancs, soit du despotisme indigène, ou à une nouvelle ère capitaliste et de guerres coloniales.

Entre ces deux pôles, les divers peuples colonisés se trouvent à des degrés divers d'évolution.

Le socialisme repousse le principe même de la domination étrangère établie sur les peuples colonisés. Il considère la suppression du système colonial comme une condition préalable d'une communauté internationale des peuples.

Il appuie en conséquence les aspirations à l'indépendance des peuples coloniaux qui ont dès à présent atteint la condition d'une civilisation moderne indépendante et revendique pour eux la complète libération du joug étranger, ou, s'il le désirent, l'assimilation avec des droits égaux à ceux des citoyens de la métropole.

Il réclame, pour les autres peuples colonisés qui ne sont pas encore à ce stade, une protection efficace contre l'oppression

et l'exploitation, une éducation systématique dirigée vers la préparation de l'indépendance de ces peuples et, en même temps, l'extension de leur autonomie administrative poussée progressivement jusqu'à la complète autonomie définitive.

A côté de la libération nationale, qui doit être avant tout le résultat des propres forces des peuples colonisés, il est nécessaire de favoriser dans ces pays la création et le développement d'un mouvement ouvrier socialiste. Pour déterminer les formes de ce mouvement, il est nécessaire de tenir compte des institutions et de la mentalité des indigènes et de lier leur lutte pour la libération nationale avec leur lutte de classe contre l'exploitation tant par l'étranger que par leurs compatriotes, mais aussi de préparer, par l'éducation, les masses ouvrières des peuples coloniaux à reconnaître, sans nuire à leur lutte pour leur libération nationale, la solidarité des travailleurs de tous les pays et à subordonner leurs intérêts nationaux particuliers aux intérêts communs de la classe ouvrière mondiale.

II. — *Appui donné aux luttes pour l'émancipation et à la revendication de liberté et de droits des peuples opprimés.*

L'I. O. S. appuie les luttes d'indépendance des peuples opprimés, que leur sujétion se soit produite sous forme de domination coloniale ou qu'ils aient été, sous les apparences conservées de l'indépendance voulue par le droit des gens, mis, par un système d'intervention militaire, de pénétration économique et de traités inégaux, dans une dépendance effective des puissances impérialistes.

Elle réclame la pleine indépendance et l'égalité internationale pour la Chine avec l'abolition des traités inégaux qui oppriment le peuple chinois.

Elle reconnaît le droit des peuples indous à disposer entièrement d'eux-mêmes et soutient leurs efforts dans cette direction. Elle salue le développement du mouvement syndical indou. Elle invite les ouvriers et les paysans de l'Inde à former leur propre parti, de telle sorte que la liberté politique, lorsqu'elle sera comprise, pourra être complétée par la liberté économique.

Elle appuie les revendications de complète indépendance de l'Egypte.

Elle veut que la Syrie et l'Irak (la Mésopotamie) obtiennent immédiatement une pleine indépendance et soient admis comme membres de la Societé des Nations. L'I. O. S. combat la politique d'oppression économique et d'intervention militaire des Etats-Unis dans les républiques de l'Amérique Centrale et de l'Amérique du Sud, et dans les républiques de Haïti, Saint-Domingue et Cuba.

Elle exige le droit de disposer d'eux-mêmes pour les peuples des Philippines, de l'Annam et de la Corée.

III. — *Colonies à civilisation développée.*

L'I. O. S. réclame que soit immédiatement assuré aux colonies ayant une population d'une culture avancée, — c'est-à-dire aux colonies à civilisation européanisée ou orientale, telles en particulier que les colonies de la couronne britannique, à l'exception des colonies africaines et de celles du Pacifique, aux colonies françaises, italiennes et espagnoles de l'Afrique du Nord, ensuite aux Indes Néerlandaises et à Madagascar, etc., — le degré d'administration autonome ou la forme d'administration qui est revendiquée par la population indigène de ces régions elle-même.

Les partis socialistes des Etats qui possèdent ces colonies ou qui les administrent sous mandat, s'engagent à intervenir de toutes leurs forces en faveur de toutes les mesures tendant à amener à garantir et à étendre le droit des peuples indigènes des pays coloniaux à disposer d'eux-mêmes.

Parmi elles figure en premier lieu la liberté, pour les indigènes, de s'organiser en vue de conquérir et bien exercer cette autonomie, les formes de cette organisation devant être adaptées aux institutions des indigènes et tenir compte de leur mentalité.

Parmi les mesures à prendre en vue du développement de l'autonomie, figurent les suivantes ;

a) Une représentation du peuple, élue par toute la population, et sans le consentement de laquelle aucune charge ne puisse être imposée à la population ni aucune ressource naturelle être livrée à aucun entrepreneur capitaliste particulier, et des représentants élus qui devront être associés à l'Exécutif administratif ;
b) Les administrations locales et régionales constituées de manière à être confiées aux indigènes, les minorités non-indigènes ayant toute garantie légale ;
c) Les non-indigènes ne devront pas avoir de privilèges légaux supérieurs à ceux des indigènes ;
d) Tous les postes administratifs et judiciaires, même les plus élevés, accessibles aux indigènes.

IV. — *Colonies à civilisation non-développée.*

Dans les parties moins civilisées du monde, en particulier dans l'Afrique tropicale et subtropicale et dans le Pacifique, les gouvernements européens ont souvent, comme moyens pour leur politique d'exploitation des forces économiques des colonies, dans l'intérêt de divers groupes capitalistes, employé les mesures suivantes :

a) Ils ont proclamé l'Etat propriétaire d'une grande partie du sol de ces régions, très souvent en dépossédant ou en évinçant les indigènes de leurs foyers ou en exigeant

d'eux un loyer exagéré en échange de l'autorisation d'y rester ;

b) Ils ont mis en vigueur de prétendus contrats en vertu desquels de vastes propriétés terriennes ou minières étaient cédées, contre des prix dérisoires, à des aventuriers européens.

c) Ils ont imposé le travail forcé pour l'exécution des travaux publics ou pour le service de l'administration locale, et ils ont légalisé ou permis, en dehors de la loi, le travail forcé pour des capitalistes privés. Par divers moyens, ils ont corrompu des chefs indigènes, pour se servir de leur autorité en vue d'obtenir de leurs sujets des travaux forcés ;

d) Ils ont imposé de lourdes charges fiscales aux indigènes pour les forcer à travailler pour des Européens. Dans le même but, c'est-à-dire pour s'assurer constamment une main-d'œuvre docile, ils ont prescrit par la loi l'enregistrement des indigènes, leur interdisant de circuler librement dans leur propre pays. Dans le même but, on a souvent privé les indigènes de leurs terres ou on leur en a restreint l'usage ;

e) Ils ont établi, par la loi, des infériorités légales pour les indigènes, interdit l'emploi d'indigènes dans les travaux qualifiés à la machine ; érigé en délit punissable d'amende ou de prison, pour les indigènes, l'abandon non-autorisé du travail, les privant ainsi du droit de grève ; ils ont enfin interdit aux indigènes de tenir des assemblées et de discuter des opinions pouvant, aux yeux des Européens, être propres à « exciter » les indigènes contre leurs employeurs.

En conséquence, le Congrès de l'I. O. S. émet les revendications suivantes :

1) Dans toutes les colonies de l'Afrique tropicale et subtropicale et du Pacifique, tout le sol non encore concédé à des Européens doit être reconnu propriété inaliénable de la communauté des indigènes ;

2) A toute famille indigène doit être garantie la possession des terres nécessaires à son entretien ;

3) Il ne doit être imposé aux indigènes ni impôts, ni charges de quelque sorte que ce soit en dehors des fins d'administration de services publics, profitant immédiatement aux indigènes ;

4) Ne peuvent, en particulier, être tolérés, des impôts si élevés que l'indigène ne puisse les payer sans être obligé de quitter son foyer pour aller prendre du travail chez un capitaliste ;

5) Toute forme de travail forcé ou de travail à l'entreprise, du type des engagements de coolies, toute forme d'imposition ou de pression destinée à mettre les indigènes dans l'obligation d'accepter du travail salarié, sera abolie ;

6) Tous les contrats de travail devront être conclus conformément à des contrats modèles établis et publiés par le gouvernement. Ces modèles devront contenir entre autres des clauses fixant :

la durée du contrat et les conditions sous lesquelles il pourra être renouvelé ;
la hauteur des salaires et la méthode de payement ;
les heures de travail ;
le lieu où le travail doit être fourni ;
les mesures à prendre, par les employeurs, pour sauvegarder la santé des travailleurs (prévoyance pour les soins à l'hôpital et le service médical) ;
les indemnités à payer aux ouvriers que des accidents ou maladies résultant des conditions de leur emploi, rendent totalement ou partiellement incapables de travailler, ainsi que les indemnités à payer aux familles des ouvriers ;
cas échéant, la nature et la quantité de la nourriture, et les dimensions de l'habitation fournie par l'employeur à l'ouvrier ;

7) Tous les contrats de travail devront être conclus devant un juge ou un fonctionnaire, dont le devoir sera de s'assurer que les termes du contrat sont conformes au contrat modèle établi par le gouvernement, qu'ils ont été parfaitement compris par l'ouvrier en question et que celui-ci agrée le contrat de sa propre volonté ;

8) Les contrats de travail devront être des contrats civils, et les infractions à ces contrats devront être jugées seulement en procédure civile ; les sanctions pénales pour rupture de contrat de travail devront être immédiatement abolies ;

9) Aucun contrat de travail ne pourra être valable pour plus d'une année ; en cas de renouvellement, il devra être soumis aux garanties prévues lorsqu'il a été établi ;

10) Le recrutement de la main-d'œuvre et les conditions de travail devront être réglés et contrôlés de manière à empêcher l'esclavage industriel et la destruction de la vie économique des communautés de villages ou de tribus indigènes ;

11) Le Congrès condamne sans restriction le principe d'accroître ou de diminuer les droits des travailleurs dans l'industrie d'après leur race ;

Il demande :

12) Une législation très complète de protection du travail, particulièrement de protection des femmes et des enfants ;
13) Les capitalistes et planteurs étrangers qui exploitent les ressources naturelles du pays, doivent réserver une partie suffisante de leur gain à un travail étendu de civilisation au sein de la population indigène ;
14) Dans la mesure du possible, les ressources naturelles seront exploitées en services publics, dont le revenu sera consacré au développement du pays même et à une large politique d'assistance ;
15) L'agriculture et la production agricole indigènes seront soutenues et encouragées par les gouvernements. En cas de besoin de machines, d'assistance scientifique, etc., le gouvernement procurera les capitaux nécessaires au moyen de banques de crédit agricole ou d'autres méthodes ; il encouragera l'emploi de meilleures méthodes de travail et soutiendra les coopératives de vente. Les gouvernements devront en outre favoriser la création de coopératives indigènes de consommation ;
16) L'organisation scolaire doit avoir pour but de préparer les indigènes aux tâches de la vie politique, économique et sociale moderne. La forme de ce système d'éducation devra toujours s'adapter au niveau général de civilisation du pays en question. L'instruction doit être donnée aux frais publics.

Tant que la population indigène de ces régions n'est pas en état de régir par des institutions parlementaires démocratiques, la structure complexe d'un Etat civilisé, il importe de veiller à ce que les Européens, les blancs, n'aient pas, comme classe exploitante, un pouvoir absolu sur leur administration. La magistrature et l'administration doivent être indépendantes des Européens établis dans la contrée ; les institutions judiciaires et la juridiction doivent garantir aux indigènes une protection légale aussi étendue qu'aux membres de la nation dominante.

Dans la mesure où existent déjà des institutions locales d'administration par des familles, des villages ou des tribus, ces institutions organiques doivent être conservées et rendues aussi efficaces que possible ; en cas de besoin, les indigènes devront aussi trouver appui et protection contre leurs propres chefs.

Où il existe des Conseils (Conseils consultatifs), ces organismes représenteront toutes les classes de la population dans une juste proportion entre les intérêts indigènes et européens, en étant entendu qu'il y a lieu d'augmenter le degré d'influence des indigènes. Où il existe des corps élus, le suffrage sera universel et égal, établi sur la base d'une liste électorale unique, à l'exclusion de tous privilèges. Les émigrants jouiront entre eux d'une parfaite égalité sans acception de nationalité.

Le service de santé et d'hygiène publiques sera administré avec énergie et avec toute l'extension possible pour le bien du peuple.

Pour restreindre l'influence pernicieuse de consommations stupéfiantes, telles que l'opium, l'alcool, etc., la production et la vente en seront interdites.

V. — *Dispositions générales*

Dans toutes les colonies, *l'utilisation militaire d'indigènes* pour d'autres fins que la protection de leur patrie, doit être interdite, tant que la population de ces régions ne jouira pas d'une autonomie complète.

En ce qui concerne le système des *mandats*, le Congrès constate :

Le principe de responsabilité du mandataire vis-à-vis de la S. D. N. ne peut être arbitrairement limité à quelques régions seulement ; il faut qu'il soit étendu à toute l'Afrique tropicale et subtropicale et aux colonies similaires à civilisation arriérée, que le droit soit reconnu à la collectivité des nations de veiller à l'exécution régulière des obligations résultant du rapport de mandataire à mandant. En attendant, le pouvoir de la Commission des Mandats de la S. D N. devra être étendu ; en particulier, elle devra entendre des témoignages oraux à l'appui des pétitions présentées par les groupes plaignants de ces régions.

Le Bureau International du Travail devra élaborer un Code pour la protection des ouvriers indigènes, lequel devra être adopté par tous les Etats administrant des colonies comme Code minimum de protection et à l'observation duquel la Commission des Mandats de la S. D. N. aura à veiller dans tous les territoires sous mandat. Pour toutes les régions qui ne sont pas sous mandat, les gouverneurs devront prendre ce Code comme base minimum et confier à la Commission des Mandats de la S. D. N. le droit de veiller à son observation.

Le Congrès réclame pour toutes les régions coloniales la politique de la « porte ouverte », l'égalité commerciale complète pour tous les Etats, et le même droit de s'établir pour les ressortissants de toutes les nations, là où leur établissement est possible sans porter préjudice aux intérêts des indigènes.

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L'Internationale Ouvrière Socialiste invite ses partis affiliés à se mettre en relation avec les mouvements d'indépendance des peuples opprimés, afin de les appuyer dans leur lutte pour les principes et revendications établies dans la présente résolution et, en particulier, à aider au développement du mouvement ouvrier politique et syndical dans ces pays, les influençant dans le sens de la démocratie et du socialisme.

LE POINT IV DE L'ORDRE DU JOUR :

La situation économique de l'après-guerre et la politique économique de la classe ouvrière

La période de l'après-guerre est caractérisée par le développement considérable de monopoles de plus en plus puissants. Dans un nombre toujours grandissant de branches de la production, le capitalisme individualiste, basé sur la libre concurrence, fait place au capitalisme organisé à base de monopole privé. Ces monopoles dépassent les frontières nationales et se transforment de plus en plus en cartels et en trusts internationaux.

Cette évolution a pour conséquence de placer toute l'économie internationale sous l'autorité de cartels capitalistes toujours plus puissants. Elle place la classe ouvrière en face de forces capitalistes toujours plus redoutables. Elle soumet les consommateurs à la dictature des prix imposée par les monopoles capitalistes. Elle met les gouvernements dans une écrasante dépendance de la ploutocratie capitaliste et crée des difficultés croissantes aux gouvernements qui essaient de s'émanciper de cette domination.

A mesure que s'accentue la concentration capitaliste se poursuit le procès de la rationalisation de la production.

Dans l'économie capitaliste, la rationalisation revêt nécessairement deux aspects : d'une part elle est un moyen d'accroître la productivité du travail et constitue un progrès technique dans la production ; de l'autre, elle est pour le capitalisme un moyen de compenser l'augmentation des salaires, la réduction de la journée de travail et le développement de la législation sociale par une économie progressive de main-d'œuvre et par l'aggravation de la contrainte exercée sur les travailleurs en vue de l'effort plus intense. Les ouvriers peuvent ainsi dans ces cas se trouver exposé à un plus grave abus de leur force les condamnant à une invalidité prématurée.

Ce développement technique augmente d'une part la quantité de marchandises que l'industrie lance sur le marché. Il rejette, au moins temporairement, des masses plus considérables de travailleurs dans la détresse du chômage. La réduction des salaires, par quoi le capitalisme essaye dans quelques pays de surmonter ses crises, accentue encore la contradiction entre le développement des forces productives du travail humain et la puissance de consommation des hommes qui travaillent. Cette contradiction se manifeste en crises économiques aiguës et en chômage massif.

A la nouvelle organisation du capital et aux nouvelles formes de sa technique productive se lie finalement la transformation des relations internationales. Le centre de gravité de l'économie capitaliste est déplacé de l'Europe vers les Etats-Unis d'Amérique. Dans les Etats agricoles, l'industrialisation se fait suivant

un système accéléré. Dans les régions coloniales, aux Indes, en Chine, etc., une industrie nouvelle se développe, basée sur une exploitation éhontée des femmes et des enfants. Le continent russe est à peu près retranché de l'économie mondiale.

L'organisation de l'économie mondiale par les trusts internationaux de la finance et de l'industrie ne supprime pas les antagonismes nationaux. Au sein des cartels internationaux, la lutte nationale se continue pour la part des débouchés attribuée à chaque pays. La politique des hauts tarifs douaniers pratiquée par certains Etats et aggravée par le nationalisme économique des Etats nouveau-nés de la guerre renferme la tendance de développer, à l'abri de la protection douanière, des industries importantes pour la conduite de la guerre. Cette politique trouve un stimulant nouveau dans l'utilisation des tarifs douaniers en concordance avec la pratique des contingentements au sein des cartels internationaux. Les entraves apportées à l'échange international des marchandises ont pour pendant les entraves apportées à la libre circulation de la main-d'œuvre, lesquelles accentuent les antagonismes nationaux jusqu'à créer un danger de guerre.

Dix années après la guerre, le chômage dans le monde est incomparablement plus considérable que jamais au cours des cinquante ans qui ont précédé la guerre. Dans beaucoup de pays et spécialement en Grande-Bretagne dans de nombreuses industries et particulièrement dans celle des mines, des centaines de milliers d'hommes ont perdu tout espoir d'être sauvés du terrible destin du chômage.

Mais loin d'ébranler la confiance de la classe ouvrière, les faits nouveaux constatés dans l'économie mondiale prouvent, au contraire, que l'évolution capitaliste crée elle-même de plus en plus rapidement les conditions favorables à l'abolition du capitalisme. Si les monopoles capitalistes exercent d'abord la pression la plus lourde sur les peuples, ils montrent, d'autre part, que leur évolution même tend à remplacer la concurrence par l'organisation systématique de la production générale. Si la rationalisation commence par aggraver les misères des travailleurs et augmenter le nombre de sans-travail, elle prouve, d'autre part, la possibilité de créer, en élevant au plus haut la productivité du travail, les conditions économiques, d'une vie civilisée de tous les hommes. Si les cartels et les trusts internationaux soumettent tout d'abord les peuples et les états au joug du capital international, ils prouvent, d'autre part, que les conditions préalables à la suppression de l'anarchie du marché mondial et à la direction internationale systématique de l'économie mondiale, se développent.

L'extension du mouvement coopératif peut aider à l'éducation de la classe ouvrière dans l'organisation économique. Il peut aussi, spécialement dans l'agriculture, améliorer l'adapta-

tion de la production à la consommation et dans certains cas affaiblir l'oppression économiques des cartels.

C'est l'évolution capitaliste elle-même qui place la classe ouvrière devant la tâche qu'elle accomplira également pour le profit de la classe paysanne et de la classe moyenne de plus en plus prolétarisée, de faire passer la production concentrée de la domination capitaliste aux mains des nations et de la communauté des nations.

Au sein de chaque nation le prolétariat doit apprendre à utiliser sa puissance politique et économique : *a*) pour placer les monopoles capitalistes sous le contrôle de la classe ouvrière organisée ; *b*) pour développer et étendre la gestion publique et les coopératives ouvrières aux dépens de la gestion privée par les monopoles capitalistes ; *c*) pour intensifier la législation sociale et le droit des organisations ouvrières de participer au contrôle de la rationalisation ; *d*) pour obtenir l'extension de l'assurance chômage et la réglementation des conditions de travail par les contrats collectifs et l'augmentation des salaires réels.

Sur le terrain international, la classe ouvrière a une triple tâche à remplir :

a) Elle doit s'efforcer, tout d'abord, de supprimer progressivement les entraves apportées au développement des échanges internationaux des marchandises. Elle doit, à cet effet, par son effort propre et en relation avec l'activité de la Commission Economique de la Société des Nations, encourager les conventions internationales qui tendent à supprimer les prohibitions à l'exportation et à l'importation, et à détruire le système des hauts tarifs douaniers protecteurs ; travailler à l'application générale de la clause de la nation la plus favorisée dans le trafic entre tous les pays, réclamer la politique de la porte ouverte dans tous les territoires coloniaux de la réintégration de la Russie soviétique dans l'économie mondiale, et l'institution de rapports économiques cordiaux avec la Chine ;

b) Elle doit ensuite poursuivre l'égalisation internationale des conditions de travail par le développement des conventions internationales protégeant les travailleurs et spécialement par l'extension de ces conventions aux territoires industriellement arriérés, dont les conditions de travail particulièrement mauvaises constituent pour les pays plus avancés au point de vue social une dangereuse concurrence, par l'encouragement et l'organisation syndicale dans ces territoires, et par la protection plus efficace de la main-d'œuvre coloniale et des migrations. Elle doit poursuivre ses efforts pour amener une entente entre syndicats et partis ouvriers sur la réglementation des migrations internationales.

c) Elle doit réclamer qu'un Bureau Economique international, placé sous le contrôle effectif des travailleurs organisés, soit annexé à la Société des Nations. Ce Bureau devra exercer un contrôle sur les cartels et les trusts internationaux et intervenir dans les cas où la surproduction et la concurrence menacent le standard de vie des travailleurs. Il devra en outre, préparer des accords internationaux particulièrement en ce qui concerne la répartition des matières premières et des denrées d'alimentation. Ce Bureau devra s'efforcer aussi d'obtenir une législation nationale et internationale astreignant à la publicité le fonctionnement des cartels et des trusts et le mettant ainsi en état d'exercer efficacement un droit d'enquête et de contrôle. Ce Bureau étendra graduellement ses attributions et contribuera ainsi à préparer l'organisation future de l'économie mondiale.

En proposant aux partis socialistes affiliés ces buts immédiats, le Congrès de l'I. O. S. invite les prolétaires de tous les pays à s'unir en vue de la lutte avec ce mot d'ordre : Substitution de la communauté nationale aux monopoles capitalistes, de la communauté des nations aux trusts internationaux !

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LES HUIT HEURES

Le Congrès constate avec indignation que neuf ans après la Conférence de Washington, la Convention sur la journée de huit heures n'est encore ratifiée que par une petite minorité de gouvernements.

Il salue la ratification par la Belgique et — bien que rationnelle — par la France, de même que les intentions de ratification du gouvernement allemand.

Il est d'avis qu'après la Conférence des Ministres, à Londres, la ratification aurait été faite par la grande majorité des gouvernements européens, n'était la résistance du gouvernement conservateur de la Grande-Bretagne.

Le Gouvernement britannique n'a pas réalisé les espérances mises dans la Conférence des Ministres ; au contraire, en proposant un amendement de la Convention, il a donné le signal à une attaque internationale contre la journée de huit heures.

Ce Congrès se dresse avec la plus grande énergie contre toute tentative d'affaiblir la Convention sur la journée de huit heures. De pareilles tentatives sont une attaque contre l'élévation culturelle et politique de la classe ouvrière.

Le Congrès souligne que la classe ouvrière doit mener pour la ratification et l'application de la Convention une propagande énergique et soutenue.

Il adresse aux partis adhérents l'appel de collaborer dans ce sens avec les syndicats.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTEES PAR L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DE L'ASSOCIATION FRANÇAISE « LA PAIX PAR LE DROIT », NANCY, 31 OCTOBRE ET 1er NOVEMBRE 1928.

(« La Paix par le Droit », janvier 1929).

Résolution sur le Pacte Briand-Kellogg et la Constitution

I. — L'Assemblée générale de la Paix par le Droit,

Considérant que le Pacte de la S. D. N. a retiré aux gouvernements des Etats Membres toute compétence pour la conclusion de traités secrets ;

Considérant de même que le Pacte Kellogg enlève aux pouvoirs publics toute compétence pour entreprendre une guerre offensive « dans un but de politique nationale » ;

Estime qu'il est nécessaire de réviser les textes des articles 8 et 9 de la loi constitutionnelle du 16 juillet 1875 dans le sens qui suit :

Article 8. — Aucune ratification de traité ne sera donnée qu'après l'assentiment des Chambres, et tout traité devra être enregistré intégralement au Secrétariat de la Société des Nations.

Article 9. — Aucune déclaration de l'état de guerre ne sera faite et aucune mobilisation ne sera ordonnée qu'avec l'assentiment des Chambres, assentiment qui ne pourra être obtenu qu'après que celles-ci auront constaté que le pays est en situation de légitime défense ou qu'il doit une assistance internationale en vertu du Pacte de la S. D. N., du Pacte de renonciation à la guerre ou de tout traité d'assistance et de garantie conclu dans le cadre de ces deux pactes.

II. — Considérant, en outre, que le citoyen a le droit d'exiger le respect de sa vie et de sa liberté dans les limites garanties par la Constitution et les lois.

L'Assemblée estime qu'il est urgent de mettre à l'étude l'organisation d'un contrôle juridictionnel, interne et international, sur les actes des pouvoirs publics, en vue d'assurer le respect des principes constitutionnels ci dessus énoncés. Ce contrôle juridictionnel devrait pouvoir être mis en mouvement, individuellement ou collectivement, par les citoyens eux-mêmes.

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LE PROGRAMME D'ACTION DE LA PAIX PAR LE DROIT

I. — *Les aspirations traditionnelles du pacifisme et la S. D. N.*

La S. D. N. a incontestablement réalisé une partie des aspirations du pacifisme d'avant-guerre ; elle les a même, dans une certaine mesure, dépassées, puisqu'elle constitue, depuis bientôt dix années, non seulement un système général de conciliа-

tion et d'arbitrage, mais une organisation permanente, à la fois politique, juridique et administrative, embrassant plus de 50 Etats et chargée, dès à présent, de la gestion d'un certain nombre d'intérêts communs de l'humanité tout entière.

Il s'en faut, cependant, que cette conquête, si précieuse soit-elle, dispense les anciennes sociétés de la paix de poursuivre, ou même d'intensifier leur propagande. On peut même assurer que la création de la S. D. N. ouvre aux organisations pacifistes, dont beaucoup ont pris d'ailleurs le nom d'Associations pour la S. D. N., des perspectives d'action plus variées, plus intéressantes et plus efficaces que jamais.

II. — *La S. D. N. a besoin de la pression d'une opinion publique avertie et vigilante.*

D'une part en effet, il ne faut pas se lasser de redire que la S. D. N. n'a pas par elle-même d'activité propre et qu'elle dépend à tout instant du concours des Etats qui la constituent. Ce sont les Etats qui assurent sa vie par leurs contributions annuelles ; ce sont eux qui lui assignent les tâches qu'elle doit remplir, soit à l'Assemblée, soit au Conseil, soit dans les diverses Commissions permanentes ou temporaires ; ce sont eux, enfin, qui sont exclusivement en mesure de mettre en pratique les recommandations des divers organes de la S. D. N., celle-ci n'ayant ni armée internationale à sa disposition, ni agents d'exécution proprement dits.

Or, il n'est pas douteux que les Etats membres de la Société sont encore mal adaptés à ces modalités nouvelles de la vie internationale. Les mieux intentionnés eux-mêmes ne tiennent qu'un compte insuffisant et tardif de l'œuvre accomplie par l'organisation de Genève et ajournent indéfiniment la ratification des conventions adoptées à Genève, tandis que d'autres poursuivent au sein même de la Société une œuvre silencieuse, mais obstinée, d'obstruction, pour ne pas dire de sabotage.

Ce sont ces hésitations, ce sont ces résistances, ce sont ces menaces que l'opinion publique doit s'efforcer de surmonter avec une vigilance sans défaut, par l'organe des Associations pour la paix et par la voix de leurs périodiques. La S. D. N., qui est née d'une exigence de la conscience humaine, a besoin que celle-ci manifeste continûment et énergiquement sa volonté de voir l'organisation de Genève produire son rendement maximum.

III. — *Sécurité. — Désarmement.*

Ce qu'on attend avant tout de la Société des Nations, c'est la consolidation de la sécurité internationale qui permettrait de réduire les armements. Déjà le Pacte de la Société apporte à cet égard de précieuses garanties, puisqu'il prévoit que « toute question qui affecte la paix du monde » relève de la compétence de l'Assemblée ou du Conseil de la Société. Mais cette

affirmation de principe risque de demeurer vaine tant que la Société des Nations n'a pas de pouvoir propre pour intervenir par elle-même contre un Etat qui se déroberait aux recommandations de prudence, aux conseils de modération que peut lui adresser la Société. L'arbitrage tel que le préconise le Pacte n'est encore qu'une procédure incertaine tant que les Etats demeurent libres de ne pas y recourir ou de se refuser à l'exécution des sentences arbitrales. La sécurité ne pourra naître que d'un système d'obligations mutuelles analogue à celui qu'avait si heureusement réalisé le Protocole de 1924, malheureusement demeuré lettre morte. Retour au Protocole, tel doit donc être le mot d'ordre des Sociétés pour la paix et pour la S. D. N. Mais l'arbitrage et le Protocole eux-mêmes peuvent être dépassés, et les Société de la Paix doivent étudier s'il ne serait pas possible d'appliquer aux Etats un système de garanties juridictionnelles analogues à celles qui assurent entre hommes d'une nation civilisée un état de paix et de sécurité à peu près parfait. Ample matière à études scientifiques et riche thème de propagande !

D'autre part, l'opinion publique ne peut se lasser de répéter que la lenteur pour ne pas dire la stérilité des travaux poursuivis par les divers organes de la S. D. N. en matière de réduction des armements constitue un scandale intolérable qui n'a que trop duré. Elle ne demande pas que cette réduction soit opérée à l'aveugle, hâtivement, ni d'un seul coup ; elle ne perd pas de vue le besoin de sécurité par les accords de Locarno et, récemment, par le pacte Kellog a réalisé par l'institution de la S. D. N., qui préoccupe justement les gouvernements ; mais elle estime que, dès à présent, la sécurité Briand, de tels progrès qu'une première étape peut et doit être enfin franchie, afin d'attester que les prescriptions de l'art. 8 du Pacte ne sont pas lettre morte.

IV. — *La force au service de la S. D. N.*

Si la sécurité et le désarmement progressent ainsi de pair, le jour s'approchera enfin où les Etats comprendront que leur sécurité dépend bien moins de leur propre force, toujours susceptible d'être dépassée par une autre, que de la Société des Nations elle-même, munie d'une armée de police internationale à laquelle ils pourront remettre le soin de garantir contre toute agression leur intégrité et leur indépendance.

V. — *La Collaboration des Peuples. — L'organisation de la production, la répartition des matières premières. La circulation des produits.*

Ce n'est pas tout ; la réduction générale des armements apparaît elle-même comme le couronnement d'une œuvre générale de rapprochement des peuples sur un double terrain, économique et moral.

Sur le terrain économique, la guerre douanière a succédé à la guerre des armes, prolongeant la misère, aggravant les antagonismes, semant des germes de conflits nouveaux. La S. D. N. a heureusement réagi. La Conférence Economique internationale de mai 1927 et le Comité économique consultatif ont dessiné de précieuses directives. Une œuvre immense d'organisation internationale de la production et de la répartition des richesses se prépare à Genève. Mais d'énergiques résistances se dessinent dans les milieux intéressés à la persistance de l'anarchie économique, et le succès ne sera assuré que si cette œuvre est connue et appuyée par une opinion informée et agissante.

VI. — *Le programme d'action des pacifistes.*

Mais c'est surtout dans le domaine du rapprochement moral que les organisations privées ont encore une tâche ample et difficile à remplir. La dernière guerre a accru démesurément les malentendus entre les peuples, qui se haïraient moins s'ils se connaissaient mieux. Pour créer l'atmosphère morale dans laquelle pourra prospérer la paix politique et économique, les méthodes les plus variées s'offrent aux bonnes volontés : multiplication des conférences et des articles sur les problèmes internationaux les plus actuels, échanges de conférenciers, d'étudiants, d'enfants, de correspondances, etc., de pays à pays ; participation aux congrès internationaux de tout ordre ; organisation d'écoles d'été ou de camps de vacances internationaux, voyages collectifs à Genève au moment de l'Assemblée de la S. D. N. ou de la Conférence du Travail ; organisation de fêtes de la paix avec accompagnement de chants, de déclamations, de représentations dramatiques, de jeux rythmiques, de projections lumineuses ou de films cinématographiques ; distribution de tracts, de brochures, de livres de propagande ; organisation de bibliothèques circulantes ; actions dans les écoles des divers degrés ; lutte contre les manuels scolaires haineux ou chauvins : autant de procédures qui ont déjà fait leurs preuves et que l'initiative privée peut s'ingénier à compléter et à perfectionner.

En résumé, la S. D. N. est un cadre fragile encore, qu'il s'agit à la fois de consolider et de remplir. Jamais activité plus nécessaire, ni plus passionnante ne s'est offerte aux volontés éprises de progrès social et de justice humaine.

Résolution sur l'Anschluss

« L'Assemblée, respectueuse du droit des peuples à disposer d'eux-mêmes,

» A) Constatant que l'art. 80 du Traité de Versailles statue que l'indépendance de l'Autriche est inaliénable « si ce n'est du consentement du Conseil de la S. D. N. »,

» Estime qu'il est loisible à l'Autriche de réclamer son rattachement à l'Allemagne.

» Que d'ailleurs, seul, un plébiscite régulier, et non quelques manifestations, si impressionnantes qu'elles soient, peut être l'expression de ce désir ;

» B) Constatant que l'Autriche n'est en aucune manière une « nationalité opprimée » et qu'elle jouit pleinement de son autonomie politique,

» Mais constatant d'autre part que les systèmes douaniers qui l'enserrent la maintiennent depuis dix ans dans un état de crise économique et sociale dangereux pour son existence et pour la paix internationale,

» Estime que l'on ne saurait s'opposer au rattachement si l'on ne fait rien pour donner à l'Autriche une situation viable,

» Fait appel à la Société des Nations pour qu'elle continue l'œuvre de reconstruction de l'Autriche qu'elle a si heureusement commencée ;

» C) Considérant qu'en exécution des décisions de la Conférence Economique Internationale de 1927, le Comité Economique de la S. D. N. prépare, dès maintenant, des conférences entre industriels en vue de l'abaissement des tarifs douaniers,

» Considérant que cet abaissement est particulièrement urgent en ce qui concerne l'Autriche,

» Prie instamment la S. D. N. de se saisir sans délai de cet aspect du problème autrichien.

» L'Assemblée estime que, seule, cette intervention ramènera sur son véritable terrain le problème essentiellement moral du rattachement—actuellement compliqué et dévié par la pression des difficultés économiques — et qu'elle aura en outre le mérite d'amorcer la suppression des barrières douanières et la pacification économique de l'Europe ».

DISCOURS DE M. JEAN PAUL-BONCOUR, PARIS, ASSOCIATION FRANÇAISE POUR LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS, LE 15 DECEMBRE 1928.

(La Paix par le Droit, janvier 1929).

Avec la liberté que me donne le fait de ne plus parler qu'en mon nom, de ne plus exprimer que ma conviction personnelle, mais ardente, mais passionnée, je dis bien haut, je crie qu'il faut en revenir au principle du Protocole, si on veut aboutir à une formule de désarmement qui ne soit pas, pour les peuples, une désillusion mortelle.

« Les nations, à leur tour, ne laisseront tomber leurs armes que le jour où elles sauront être défendues par une organisation capable d'assurer entre elles l'ordre international.

« Mais celle-ci existe ? Oui. C'est la Société des Nations. Mais

les sanctions sont prévues ? Oui, et de la manière la plus nette, écrite noir sur blanc dans l'article 16 du Pacte.

« Et pour commencer, dit en terminant M. Paul-Boncour, il faut signer le Traité général d'arbitrage, qui reste l'œuvre féconde de notre travail d'un an au Comité de sécurité et à la dernière Assemblée, qui rouvre toute grande la voie au Protocole, car de l'arbitrage généralisé sortirait nécessairement l'arbitrage sanctionné.

« Je souhaite pour mon pays qu'il soit le premier à apposer sa signature, comme il fut le premier à l'apposer au bas du Protocole.

. . . . . .

« Convention d'arrêt, tout de suite, pour qu'au moins, tandis que nous poursuivons notre action méthodique et reconstructive pour la paix, ne se prépare pas la guerre par la rivalité des armements, car si je ne crois pas du tout, oh ! mais pas du tout, que le désarmement suffit à assurer la sécurité, je ne crois pas moins fermement que la course aux armements, qui n'est pas seulement la course aux armements terrestres, nous ramènera des guerres dans un délai prochain ».

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTEES PAR L'ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DE L'ASSOCIATION FRANÇAISE POUR LA SOCIETE DES NATIONS, LE 16 DECEMBRE 1928

(La Paix par le Droit, janvier 1928).

I. — *Résolution sur l'Arbitrage et le Désarmement* :

L'Association Française pour la Société des Nations émet les vœux suivants :

« 1° Que la France prenne l'initiative de signer et de faire ratifier, la première, l'acte général d'arbitrage approuvé par la dernière assemblée de la Société des Nations et demande aux Etats, membres de la Société des Nations, de signer cet acte sans retard ;

» 2° Que la France agisse au plus tôt pour que, en attendant la signature d'une convention internationale de réduction des armements, soit immédiatement conclue une convention de limitation, assurant l'arrêt de la course aux armements ;

» 3° Que la France s'efforce de provoquer une évolution de la Société des Nations qui puisse assurer, à côté de la représentation des gouvernements et des Etats, la représentation des grandes forces supranationales (morales, sociales et économiques) ».

II. — *Résolution sur le conflit entre le Paraguay et la Bolivie*

« L'Association Française pour la Société des Nations, réunie en Assemblée générale,

» Soucieuse de voir se traduire par des effets pratiques les obligations du Pacte de la Société des Nations et l'universalité de celle-ci.

» Félicite M. Aristide Briand, président, et le Conseil de la Société des Nations d'avoir pris l'initiative de rappeler amicalement aux Républiques sœurs d'Amérique : le Paraguay et la Bolivie, leur devoir de résoudre par une procédure pacifique le grave différend de frontière survenu entre elles.

» Elle fonde sur la réponse pleinement satisfaisante du Paraguay et les sentiments élevés du peuple bolivien le ferme espoir que la paix ne sera pas troublée ».

RESOLUTION ADOPTEE PAR LA CONFERENCE INTERNATIONALE SUR LES METHODES MODERNES DE GUERRE, ORGANISEE PAR LA LIGUE INTERNATIONALE DES FEMMES POUR LA PAIX ET LA LIBERTE, FRANCFURT MAIN, DES 4-6 JANVIER 1929

(La Paix par le Droit, janvier 1929).

« Après avoir, au cours des sessions des 4, 5 et 6 janvier, de la Conférence internationale sur les méthodes modernes de guerre et la protection des populations civiles — organisée pa la Ligue internationale des Femmes pour la Paix et la Liberté — recueilli les témoignages irrécusables d'experts : savants et techniciens d'une valeur et d'une probité scientifiques incontestées ; ayant acquis la certitude :

» 1° Qu'il n'existe aucune mesure *efficace de protection* contre les moyens de destruction que la science met au service de la guerre ;

» 2° Que les conventions entre les gouvernements, visant l'interdiction de ces moyens, n'offrent aucune garantie, étant donné que les Etats violent déjà leurs engagements moraux en préparant le matériel nécessaire pour cette forme de guerre ;

» 3° Qu'une nouvelle guerre, en étendant ses ravages aux populations civiles, serait une guerre *d'extermination simultanée* des peuples qui risquerait d'anéantir la civilisation ;

» Convaincus qu'avec les nouvelles méthodes de guerre, il n'existe plus aucun moyen d'assurer la sécurité des Etats ; persuadés que la course aux armements conduit en même temps tous les pays à la ruine, nous reconnaissons comme un devoir urgent :

» 1° De faire connaître aux masses la gravité et l'étendue des dangers qui les menacent ;

» 2° De les mettre en garde contre l'illusion qu'une protection efficace est possible ;

» 3° De les amener, par là-même, à s'intéresser aux problèmes de la paix et à rechercher, aussi bien que les causes politiques, les causes économiques de guerre dont l'importance ne cesse de s'accroître ;

» 4° De rappeler aux gouvernements qui ont solennellement « renoncé à la guerre » que le désarmement total devait être la première conséquence de cette renonciation et que, sans cette mesure complémentaire, le Pacte de Paris pourrait apparaître comme une manœuvre diplomatique propre à leurrer les peuples ;

» 5° De susciter un puissant mouvement d'opinion en vue d'obtenir que toutes les propositions de désarmement, et en particulier celles déjà faites par l'U. R. S. S., soient examinées dans le plus bref délai par la commission spéciale, constituée à cet effet.

» En conséquence de ce qui précède, nous demandons que, dans tous les pays, il soit constitué des « comités de lutte contre les préparatifs de guerre » groupant les organisations et les individus décidés à entreprendre une telle action, et cela, en faisant tout particulièrement appel aux travailleurs qui, plus que tous autres, pourraient exercer une pression puissante sur les gouvernements ».

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MINORITIES OF RACE, LANGUAGE AND RELIGION, LONDON, MARCH 21 and 22 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, March 21 and 23, 1929(.

A two days international conference on minorities of race, language, and religion opened to-day at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, under the auspices of the British section of the Women's International League. The object of the conference is stated as follows : —

"During the last few years a great many different proposals have been put forward by various important national and international bodies, as well as by private individuals, for improvements in the methods of protecting minorities. It is clearly desirable that those who wish to help should agree together as to the best course to pursue, and it is in the endeavour to promote such an agreement that this conference has been arranged."

To-day's chairman, Sir Willoughby Dickinson, gave the opening address on "General minorities problem—a survey."

The greater number of the people who formed the minorities, he said, were men and women in very humble walks of life. They were peasants owing small farms of a few acres, small tradesmen, school teachers, and such-like. They were not politicians, and were certainly. with a few possible exceptions from Budapest and Berlin, not "agitators."

Referring to some of the apparently trivial, but to them very real, grievances of these minority classes abroad. Sir Willoughby said it was a great occurrence in the life of any peasant when his child presented himself for a scholarship in a secondary chool, or perhaps in a university. If, later on, he learned that the boy had failed owing to the requirement that examination papers must be written in a language in which he was only partly proficient, whilst another boy with far less mental equipment, had gained the scholarship, he became bitterly and justifiably exasperated.

It was in the multitude of small in justices done to small people that lay the gist of the "minority problem." The were some 20 to 30 millions of these small people who constituted the minorities of Europe, and one could not go on hurting the feelings of these people without endangering the peace of the world. This was the lesson which ought to have been learnt by tho experiences of pre-war years, but in these matters mankind seemed incapable of learning anything. Racial antipathy and religious intolerance appeared to be governed neither by decency nor by common sense.

There were many in the lower grades of administrators in Eastern Europe who regarded the minority treaties as a mistake, continued Sir Willougby, and he was not sure that there were not some members of the League's Council itself who shared this opinion. "Therefore."be added "those of us who hold the contrary opinion, and believe that the treaties are founded on sound principles, and that if they are in any way departed from there will be grave danger of another upheaval equal to that which brought on the late war, must direct our efforts to prove not only to the League of Nations, but to the Governments and peoples of the countries chiefly concerned, that the policy of allowing racial minorities to work out their own salvation in matters of purely domestic importance is really the wisest policy both for the peace of Europe and for the permanent well-being of the States \them selves."

Congratulating the League on having decided on an inquiry, Sir Willoughby remarked that the minorities were mostly of German race or language, but they were not the subjects of Germany, and was undesirable that they be led to think that they must look to Germany to get justice. It was to the League alone that they must turn, otherwise the inquiry might tend to

develop international friction instead of international co-ope ration.

Mme Bakker van Bosse (Holland) said that the general objection to minority movements was that one was in danger of creating unrest and dissatisfaction amongst people who had hitherto been quite content. She thought this objection was not without foundation, and they ought to be very careful how they formulated their demands. There was a tendency among certain Governments to deny the existence of national minorities. In Jugo-Salvia the Macedonian population, for instance, felt themselves to be non-Serbian, whereas the Jugo-Slavian Government adhered to the theory that they were Serbs and not entitled to minority protection at all.

Professor Edwin Löwenfeld (Berlin). in an address on "League system of minorities protection," said that the problem of minorities was one of the most delicate and perhaps the most difficult of those problems which the League of Nations had inherited from the war. In the Europe of to-day, which was to be based on the right of self-determination of the nation, there were living more than forty-eight million people in countries to which they were belonging neither with their tongue nor with the heart.

Short of carrying out enormous exchanges of population, which would have been impossible in Central Europe, considerable foreign minorities had to be left resident in the new States. The problem, therefore, must be solved. What was the good of setting peace on solid judicial basis if a volcano was underneath ? Most of the wars of the modern epoch had arisen throught dissatisfied minorities, and on a more thorough investigation they found that the same applied to the world war of 1914. In future it would not be different, whatever precautions one might take xgainst aggression. To assure permanent peace it was. after all, not sufficient to stablish arbitration and disarmament ; it was also necessary to suppress as much as possible the known causes of war, and amongst them the most dangerous of all were irredentist aspirations.

Undoubtedly, certain countries which had accepted the intervention of the Council in the consideration of minority treaties and felt this exceptional legislation to be an impairment of the sovereignty towards other States would wish to apply it in the most restricted possible way. They should, however, not forget that by this acceptance they had contributed to the consolidation of a world with new ways and habits, which was based upon these treaties of Paris which they desired in their own interests to see maintained in full.

The chief object, said Dr Lowenfeld, was and remained the securing of a normal existence of the minorities based or the principles of freedom and equality without, however, it being permitted for the minority to be a State within a State. If these

endeavours were to succeed then it was necessary that the League of Nations should gain more in political power and strike deeper root in the heart of the nations.

The part which the League of Nations was called upon to play as guarantor in the minority questions was not that of the international policeman, whose only duty it would be to take action against refractory States. Its task lay before all else in furnishing guidance advice, and aid in the sense of the resolution adopted unanimously by the Third Assembly.

At the afternoon session, when Dr G. P. Gooch was chairman, an address was given by Sir Walter Napier on "Working and development of minority machinery." It was very clear, he said that at the present time it would be impossible to get the minority obligations to be universally accepted by all the Powers of Europe. Therefore they must put this project on one side for the present as not being practical politics. This brought them to the other suggestion—one which, after all, had been made from the very beginning.—that there should be a permanent Minorities Commission set up.

The International Conference on Minorities of race, language, and religion, which opened at the Caxton Hall in London yesterday under the auspices of the Women's International League was concluded to-day. At the morning session, when Professor Noel Eakea was in the chair Professor René Brunet (Paris) gave an address on "Further aspects of development" of the minorities problem Remarking that the was speaking not as politician, but merely as a lover of righ and justice, Professor Brunet proceede to give an account of his experiences at Geneva, whither he went to speak on the rights of minorities. When a petition was sent to Geneva, he said, it was briefly acknowledged by the secretary of the Committee of Three, and that was all that was usually heard about it. Sometimes a representative of the petitioners would then go to try and find out whether a reply had been given. If this representative were lucky and had powerful backers he might get some information. He might even, for instance, learn the nature of the reply, but he could not, of course be certain that he had received the right information.

Supposing the Committee of Three did sent the petition to the Council, the latter was so occupied with other things that it was very difficult for the very modest representative of the minorities to get much attention. First of all he had to try to get the ear of the Council. What usually happened was that the Commitee of Three might probably discuss the questions at issue with the delegate of the accused Government behind closed doors. If the matter did go before the Council the latter would consist of political friends of the States in question, and it was very difficult to get anything done. As a matter of fact it was very difficult to get any Government to undertake the responsibility of bringing a question before the Council at all. Then came the ques-

tion of the Hague Court of International Justice. A petition nearly always contained questions of legal fact for reference to the Hague Court. At first the Council did use its right to refer questions to the Court but the latter always gave its opinion in favour of the minority, and this was so inconvenient that the Council had now ceased this practice. It was safer to consult a committee of jurists privately, which obviated the tiresome publicity of the Hague.

It was sometimes argued that it was easier to get people to discuss matters and act when this confidential method was adopted than if the matter had to be dragged before public opinion. On the other hand, one could not be certain that an agreement reached privately in Geneva would ever be put into actual practice. It was very apt to get lost in the journey from Geneva to the usually remote village concerned. Supposing the Government did promise to redress a grievance the minority did not know of this promise, and therefore had no means of taking further steps in the matter. The real difficulty was that whereas the Governments of countries with minorities took up a negative point of view, the minorities themselves were full of suggestions for reforms, but had no agreed programme.

"What we have got to do." added Professor Brunet, is first to get an agreed programme of reforms that are generally desired and then those reforms must be devided into two sections —1, those which demand the revision of treaties ; 2, those not so demanding, and therefore immediately realisable. It is most important to keep these two classes distinct" It was absolutely essential, Professor Brunet concluded, that the Leage should examine all petitions in a unimpartial spirit.

Mr. C. A. Macartney said his attitude toward "non-aggression pacts" was that it was far more expressive of human understanding and goodwill that the members of this conference, for instance, shoul assemble with the natural assumption that they were immune from attack upon each other than if they proceeded, however unanimously and sincerely, to sign a mutual pact of non-aggression. The whole system of treaties represented on attempt to take the whole question of minorities out of the field of politics. No one who looked at the problem from a non-political point of view would hesitate to grant the minorities their rights. The trouble was that the committee of three were mostly composed of foreign diplomats and politicians who were trained in the art of smoothing over awkward difficulties. This sort of composition had certain advantages, it was true, but it had the one great disadvantage that the members tended to look on things from the political view-point.

At the afternoon session, when the chairman Miss K. D. Courtney, Mr. Wilson Harris gave an account of the March League Council discussions on the minority problem. Referring to Sir Austen Chamberlain's speech, Mr. Harris remarked that while

the Foreign Minister was clear on the rights of minorities he was, if anything, clearer on the rights of sovereignty. He had insisted on the need for minorities to come Council with clean hands.

"Well we know that cleanliness is next to godliness," observed Mr. Harris, "but if it comes to that I think that some of the Governments could do with a little so ap and water." (Laughter and applause.)

Quoting a statement made by M. Briand showing that the number of petitions considered by committee of three last year was comparatively small, Mr. Harris said that there were two explanations : either there were far fewer complaints by minorities than was popularly supposed, or the secretariats who combed the petitions before they went before the committees were improperly suppressing many of them.

"I should refuse to accept the latter suggestion," he added, "unless I received convincing proof of its truth. I know some members of the Secretariat, and they have told me that, whenever there is uncertainty as to the merits of a petition, the minority is given the benefit of the doubt. I think that a more likely explanation is that minorities have become so discouraged by the non-results of previous petitions that they are giving up sending them to Geneva."

The Council had appointed a special committee of three to go into the whole problem of minorities' petitions procedure and to report to the June Council discussions.

"Therefore, the real fight—if fight there is to be—is before us," Mr. Harris conclued. "The pity is that throughout the Council discussions there was a rather lamentable lack of constructive proposals, and the Committee is getting to work with very little in which they can get their teeth."

Mr. Lucien Wolf said he was convinced that the treaties, supplemented by certain additions in the matter of procedure, constituted as effective a system for the protection of minorities as, humanly speaking, one cold possibly have, and that it would be extremely dangerous to dream of suggesting anything which woul be in the nature of a leap in the dark—such as a suggestion of a substitution for this system, which had been responsible for very considerable achievements, of an untried system which did not present any guarantee that it would work as well.

Mr. Wolf added that he could not see that a Minorities Commission would work better than the committees of three unless of course, it worked on precisely the same lines. The atmos phere would not be disinterested enough.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF LABOUR AND SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL, LONDON, FEBRUARY 12, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, February 1929)

" Considering that the oppression and forcible denationalisation of national minorities is one of the chief sources of national hatred, and therefore is a standing menace to peace, the Executive draws attention to the resolution of the Hamburg and Marseille Congresses, and in connection with the forthcoming deliberations of the League of Nations puts forward the following demands :

" 1. The international protection of national minorities should be extended to all national minorities, particularly to the German and Slavian minorities in Italy who have been excluded from international protection.

" 2. The international protection of national minorities should be extended in the sense that national minorities constituting homogeneous groups settled in given areas should be guaranteed democratic local self-governement, and that scattered minorities should be guaranteed equality of rights and freedom to use their language as well as to develop their schools and culture.

" 3. The method used by the League of Nations to deal with the difficulties of national minorities should be made more effective through the creation of a special permanent organ of the League of Nations for this purpose ".

MEMOIRE ADRESSE AUX GOUVERNEMENTS PAR LE BUREAU PERMANENT DE L'ENTENTE INTERNATIONALE CONTRE LA TROISIEME INTERNATIONALE, GENEVE, FEVRIER 1929.

Le 5 décembre 1928, le Commissaire adjoint aux Affaires étrangères de l'U. R. S. S., M. Litvinoff, a adressé à S. E. M. Loudon, Président de la Commission préparatoire de la Conférence du Désarmement de la Société des Nations, une lettre dans laquelle il insiste sur la nécessité de convoquer au plus tôt la dite Commission afin qu'elle puisse aborder sans retard l'examen du projet soviétique de réduction des armements.

On verra plus loin quel est le véritable motif de cette insistance ; pour l'instant, il suffit de constater que le Gouvernement soviétique s'apprête à poursuivre le sabotage de l'œuvre de désarmement entreprise par la Société des Nations, sabotage qui a été dénoncé, lors de la dernière session de la Commission, en mars 1928, par Lord Cushendun et d'autres délégués.

De son côté, à l'Assemblée de la Société des Nations, le 10 septembre 1928, M. Briand, signalant l'énorme effort militaire des Soviets, a fait une allusion directe à la guerre prolétarienne et attiré ainsi l'attention sur le point capital du problème de la Paix.

Depuis lors, des faits nouveaux se sont produits, de nouveaux documents ont vu le jour, qui établissent que le Gouvernement soviétique et son alter ego, la IIIe Internationale (1), conspirent méthodiquement contre la paix du monde, et qu'il est vain d'essayer d'établir une paix véritable tant qu'on ne les aura pas définitivement empêchés de nuire.

L'Entente Internationale contre la IIIe Internationale voudrait, en faisant connaître par le présent mémoire ces faits et ces documents, contribuer dans la mesure de ses moyens à l'affermissement de la paix, qu'elle appelle de ses vœux plus que quiconque, à cause même de l'œuvre qu'elle a entreprise. Elle n'oublie pas en effet que le bolchévisme est né de la guerre mondiale et que l action révolutionnaire dirigée de Moscou n'a dû ses succès qu'au trouble profond que la guerre a causé dans tous les domaines. Elle sait que le Gouvernement soviétique et la IIIe Internationale seraient trop heureux de voir se déclancher une nouvelle guerre, car une guerre favoriserait nécessairement leur action subversive. La paix internationale et sociale est la grande alliée de l'Entente dans la lutte qu'elle a entreprise contre le bolchévisme.

Or, la paix est menacée aujourd'hui par le Gouvernement soviétique et la IIIe Internationale, qui consacrent toutes les ressources d'un immense empire à préparer la « guerre prolétarienne », c'est-à-dire la guerre civile, la révolte coloniale et l'intervention de l'armée rouge soviétique. Nul ne contestera que la guerre civile est pire encore que la guerre internationale. La guerre des classes en Russie a causé des ruines plus grandes, des souffrances plus profondes et plus durables que la guerre mondiale ; le régime bolchéviste de Bela Kum, en cent trente jours, a coûté à la Hongrie autant que la grande guerre. La guerre civile est particulièrement odieuse parce qu'elle oppose les uns aux autres des hommes d'une même race, d'une même cité, parfois d'une même famille, et lorsqu'elle est organisé par les bolchéviks, elle revêt un caractère de haine et de lâcheté qui n'avait jamais été atteint.

Voici les faits et les documents auxquels nous avons fait allusion :

Le VIe Congrès mondial de la IIIe Internationale a tenu ses assises à Moscou, du 17 juillet au 1er septembre 1928. Ce Congrès a été préparé par la publication d'un rapport sur l' « Activité de l'Internationale Communiste entre le Ve et le VIe Congrès ». Ce rapport, qui remplit un volume de 682 pages (édition française), re-

(1) Appelée aussi « Internationale communiste » ou « Komintern ».

-late tout ce qui a été fait dans le monde de 1924 à 1928 pour préparer la guerre civile et fomenter les révoltes coloniales. C'est ce document auquel M. Kellogg a fait allusion en septembre 1928 lorsqu'il a confirmé l'impossibilité de reconnaître le Gouvernement soviétique parce qu'il est solidaire de l'action subversive exposée dans cette publication officielle.

Ce Congrès a fixé les nouveaux statuts de la IIIe Internationale ; il a établi le nouveau programme de celle-ci ; enfin, il a adopté une série de résolutions et de thèses sur « la lutte contre la guerre impérialiste et la tâche des communistes ».

I. **Nouveaux Statuts de la IIIe Internationale** (1)

L'Internationale communiste est

« le guide et l'organisateur du mouvement révolution-
« naire mondial du Prolétariat..... » (§ 1).

« **Est membre d'un parti communiste et de l'Internationale**
« **communiste celui qui accepte le programme et les statuts du**
« **parti communiste du pays où il réside et de l'Internationale**
« **communiste... qui se soumet à toutes les décisions du parti**
« **et de l'Internationale communiste** (2)..... ». (§ 3).

« Une fois qu'une décision a été prise par les Congrès de
« l'Internationale communiste, les Congrès de ses sections
« ou par leurs organes dirigeants respectifs, **cette décision**
« **doit être obligatoirement appliquée**..... ». (§ *5 c.*).

« Le Comité exécutif est l'organe dirigeant de l'Interna-
« tionale communiste dans l'intervalle des congrès ; c'est
« cet organe qui donne les directives à toutes les sections
« de l'Internationale communiste et qui contrôle leur acti-
« vité ». (§ 12).

« Les partis communistes doivent être prêts à passer dans
« l'illégalité ; **le Comité exécutif de l'Internationale commu-**
« **niste doit les aider à s'y préparer** ». (§ 36).

Il résulte de ces textes que les sections de la IIIe Internationale, c'est-à-dire les partis communistes de tous les pays, sont impérativement liés par les décisions des Congrès de la IIIe Internationale, donc notamment par les décisions du VIe Congrès que nous exposerons plus loin. Or, tous les membres du Gouvernement soviétique sont membres du Parti communiste russe, qui est le seul parti politique légal en U. R. S. S. et qui est la section dirigeante de la IIIe Internationale. Ils sont donc tous liés par les statuts, le programme et les résolutions de celle-ci. D'ailleurs, le camarade Rykoff, président du Conseil des Commissaires du Peuple, est membre du Comité exécutif de la

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(1) Publiés dans son organe officiel. *La Correspondance Internationale*, numéro spécial du 23 novembre 1928, p. 1615 et 1616.

(2) Les citations en caractères gras sont soulignées par le Bureau de l'Entente ; les citations en italique sont soulignées dans le texte.

IIIe Internationale, ce qui l'oblige notamment à aider les partis communistes hors de Russie à se préparer à passer dans l'illégalité,

Enfin il est utile de rappeler ici que le pouvoir politique, au sein du parti qui exerce la dictature en Russie, est en mains du Bureau Politique de ce parti, appelé « Politbureau ». Or le Politbureau contrôle à la fois le Gouvernement soviétique et la IIIe Internationale ; ses membres font tous partie d'un organe gouvernemental de l'U. R. S. S., ou du Comité exécutif de la IIIe Internationale. Les Congrès de la IIIe Internationale et de ses organes se tiennent à Moscou sous les auspices du Gouvernement soviétique. Le VIe Congrès mondial, qui devait fixer les nouvelles bases du mouvement révolutionnaire et les principes de la « guerre prolétarienne », a été préparé par le Gouvernement soviétique l'année même où il participait officiellement à Genève à la Conférence préparatoire du Désarmement.

II. **Programme de la IIIe Internationale** (1)

« L'Internationale Communiste est l'unique force inter-
« nationale qui ait pour programme la dictature du proléta-
« riat et le communisme et qui agisse au grand jour
« comme *organisatrice de la révolution prolétarienne mon-*
« *diale* ». (p. 1598).

Ce programme ne sera réalisé que par la conquête du pouvoir par le prolétariat. Or

« la conquête du pouvoir par le prolétariat, c'est l'abo-
« lition violente du pouvoir de la bourgeoisie, la destruc-
« tion de l'appareil d'Etat capitaliste..... » (p. 1604).

« *Les communistes jugent indigne de dissimuler leurs opi-*
« *nions et leurs projets. Ils proclament ouvertement que leurs*
« *desseins ne peuvent être réalisés que par le renversement*
« *violent de tout l'ordre social traditionnel* ». (p. 1615).

Dans ce but

l'Etat soviétique désarme entièrement la bourgeoisie et con-
« **centre toutes les armes dans les mains du prolétariat** ; c'est
« l'*Etat du prolétariat armé* ». (p. 1604).

« Lorsqu'une *poussée révolutionnaire* a lieu....., le parti
« du prolétariat a pour but de mener les masses à l'assaut
« de l'Etat bourgeois... A ces actions de masses se rappor-
« tent : les grèves, les grèves et les manifestations com-
« binées, les grèves combinées avec les manifestations
« armées, enfin la grève générale liée à **l'insurrection armée**
« contre le pouvoir de l'Etat. **Cette dernière forme supérieure**

(1) Publié dans *La Correspondance Internationale*, numéro spécial du 23 novembre 1928.

« de la lutte est soumise aux règles de l'art militaire, elle sup-
« pose un plan stratégique des opérations offensives... des ac-
« tions de cette sorte sont obligatoirement conditionnées par
« l'organisation des grandes masses en formation de combat...
« et par un renforcement du travail révolutionnaire dans
« l'armée et dans la flotte ». (p. 1614).

Ces citations établissent l'opposition absolue qui existe entre les Etats dits bourgeois ou capitalistes, c'est-à-dire tous les Etats du monde à l'exception de l'U. R. S. S., et l'Etat soviétique, puisque ce dernier ne peut être établi qu'après la destruction des premiers. Ce programme prouve qu'en prenant part aux travaux de la Commission préparatoire du Désarmement, le Gouvernement soviétique poursuit en réalité le désarmement d'une partie de la population afin que l'autre partie, le prolétariat puisse s'armer et ne plus trouver d'adversaires qui comptent le jour où il tentera de conquérir le pouvoir par les armes avec l'appui du Gouvernement soviétique. Ainsi, si la Société des Nations laissait les délégués de Moscou continuer à jouer leur odieuse comédie, elle favoriserait la réalisation du programme que nous venons d'exposer et par conséquent compromettrait l'œuvre de paix pour laquelle elle a été créée.

Lorsqu'on connaît le programme communiste, on s'explique aisément l'énorme effort militaire de l'U. R. S. S., les effectifs formidables de l'armée rouge, la militarisation de la jeunesse communiste, le développement donné à l'instruction militaire, la création de la puissante société destinée à favoriser la préparation de la guerre chimique et aérienne : l'Osoaviachim, et l'organisation de formations de combat que Moscou poursuit, ouvertement ou en secret, dans les autres pays.

Ce programme a été adopté le 1er septembre 1928. Comment s'expliquer alors le zèle de M. Litvinoff en ce qui concerne le désarmement ? Nous le saurons mieux encore après avoir examiné le troisième document que nous avons mentionné.

III. **Thèses sur la lutte contre la guerre impérialiste et la tâche des communistes**

Ces thèses, publiées dans *La Correspondance Internationale*, numéro spécial du 11 décembre 1928, pages 1710 et suivantes, ont été également adoptées le 1er septembre 1928. Elles donnent la réponse officielle soviétique à quelques questions essentielles que nous allons poser :

Le Gouvernement soviétique est-il un partisan sincère du désarmement ?

On vient de voir qu'il est partisan du désarmement des autres et de la concentration des armes en mains du prolétariat. Examinons cela de plus près.

« Le léninisme rejette toutes les théories pacifistes sur « la « suppression de la guerre » en régime capitaliste, et indi- « que aux masses ouvrières... la seule voie qui conduise au « but : le renversement du capitalisme ». (§ 7, p. 1712).

« La position du Gouvernement soviétique dans la question « du désarmement est la continuation de la politique de Lénine « et la réalisation méthodique de sa doctrine ». (§ 62, p. 1724).

Le Gouvernement soviétique proclame la nécessité de la guerre et son devoir de s'y préparer de toutes ses forces :

« Des guerres entre Etats prolétariens et Etats bour- « geois... sont *inévitables et nécessaires*. Aussi le premier « devoir du prolétariat soviétique... est-il de faire tous les « préparatifs indispensables, dans sa politique, dans son « économie, dans son armée, pour le cas d'une guerre ; **« il doit fortifier son armée rouge,** puissant instrument du « prolétariat, **il doit former les masses laborieuses aux exer- « cices militaires.** Dans les Etats impérialistes, il y a une « contradiction criante entre leur politique de formidables « armements et leurs doucereuses phrases de paix. Cette « contradiction *n'existe pas* du côté du pouvoir soviétique « qui prépare sa défense, **qui prépare la guerre révolution- « naire...** » (§ 32, p. 1718).

« Les pacifistes « radicaux » ou « révolutionnaires » re- « vendiquent le désarmement intégral non seulement de la « bourgeoisie mais aussi du prolétariat, c'est-à-dire le renon- « cement au mot d'ordre de l'armement du prolétariat... **« Remplacer le mot d'ordre de l'armement du prolétariat par « celui de son désarmement, ce ne peut être actuellement « qu'une devise contre-révolutionnaire ».** (§ 60, p. 1724).

Le Gouvernement soviétique désire-t-il le maintien de la paix internationale ?

Non, car c'est à la faveur de la guerre que la dictature du prolétariat sera instaurée.

« La guerre prochaine éveillera de puissants mouvements « révolutionnaires qui s'étendront aux ouvriers de l'indus- « trie américaine, aux larges masses paysannes dans les « pays d'économie agricole et aux nombreux millions d'ha- « bitants des colonies opprimées. La crise du capitalisme, « dont l'expression la plus nette est la guerre, peut provo- « quer un large mouvement révolutionnaire des masses, « *même avant* que n'éclate le conflit. » (§ 6, p. 1711).

« Lénine avait parfaitement raison quand il écrivait, en « 1922, d'après l'expérience de la guerre mondiale : **« Boy- « cotter la guerre, c'est une phrase stupide.** Les communistes « doivent marcher pour n'importe quelle guerre réac- « tionnaire ». (§ 21, p. 1716).

« Il faut expliquer... aux masses ouvrières l'expérience « de la dernière guerre mondiale (1914-1918)... le mot d'or- « dre essentiel (des bolchéviks est) : transformons la guerre « impérialiste en guerre civile ». (§ 14, p. 1714). En temps « de guerre « **le mot d'ordre essentiel doit être non la paix, « mais la révolution prolétarienne** ». (§ 18, p. 1715).

Le Gouvernement soviétique a-t-il pu et peut-il signer sincèrement le pacte Kellogg et les traités d'arbitrage ?

Au moment où ce Gouvernement cherche à utiliser le Pacte Kellogg, et sa participation à la Commission préparatoire du Désarmement pour les fins que révèlent les textes que l'on vient de lire, il est intéressant de connaître le fond de la pensée de tout membre de la IIIe Internationale, donc des membres du Gouvernement soviétique en ce qui concerne ces pactes :

« **Réactionnaires sont ceux qui**, par des plans utopiques, « par des phrases vides de sens, **par des traités, des pactes, « prétendent arriver à supprimer la guerre** ». (§ 7, p. 1711).

Or le Gouvernement de l'U. R. S. S. a signé le pacte Kellogg en se sachant lié par les résolutions du VIe Congrès de la IIIe Internationale.

« La politique de paix de l'Etat prolétarien ne signifie pas « du tout que le pouvoir soviétique se soit résigné à agréer « l'existence du capitalisme, comme le racontent des calom- « niateurs ». (§ 31, p. 1718).

« On ne peut éviter des guerres de la dictature prolétarienne contre les Etats bourgeois et le capitalisme mondial; « on ne peut éviter des guerres nationales révolutionnaires « des peuples opprimés contre l'impérialisme. C'est pour- « quoi précisément, **le prolétariat révolutionnaire... ne peut « en aucune manière se prononcer indistinctement contre « toute guerre** ». (§ 8, p. 1712).

Ainsi l'Etat soviétique se réserve le droit de faire des guerres révolutionnaires, mais il s'est bien gardé de formuler cette réserve lorsqu'il a signé le Pacte Kellogg.

« L'U. R. S. S... joue un rôle révolutionnaire d'une im- « portance exceptionnelle, énorme : moteur international « de la révolution prolétarienne, **incitant les prolétaires de « tous les pays à la conquête du pouvoir...** » (*La Correspon- « dance Internationale*, du 23-11-1928, p. 1610).

Ces textes signifient que, malgré tous les traités, l'U. R. S. S. entend se réserver le droit de faire la « guerre prolétarienne », c'est-à-dire d'utiliser la guerre en tant qu'instrument de sa politique, ce que le Pacte Kellogg (Article premier) a précisément pour but d'interdire. Ils établissent que le Gouvernement soviétique sabote dans un sens particulier l'œuvre de la Commission

préparatoire du Désarmement; la seule raison d'être de la IIIe Internationale, que l'on a appelée à juste titre le Ministère de la révolution mondiale du Gouvernement soviétique, c'est la révolution et la guerre prolétarienne.

En se donnant comme le champion du désarmement, le Gouvernement soviétique crée un faux sentiment de sécurité qui risque de provoquer l'affaiblissement des forces de défense constitutionnelle et nationale et de faciliter ainsi le déclanchement de la révolution bolchéviste.

Cela étant, les Gouvernements et la Société des Nations doivent considérer comme un facteur d'importance essentielle dans la question du désarmement le fait que le Gouvernement soviétique et la IIIe Internationale préparent, partout hors de Russie, la guerre civile et la révolte coloniale. Il est donc utile de donner quelques précisions sur les moyens qu'ils emploient.

1. **Désagrégation des forces nationales**. — On prêche tout d'abord la trahison à l'ouvrier :

> « De la position de principe adoptée par le prolétariat, « devant chaque guerre en particulier, dépend l'attitude « qu'il doit aussi adopter dans la question de la « défense « de la patrie ». Le prolétariat n'a point de patrie tant « qu'il n'a pas conquis le pouvoir politique..... Quand le « prolétariat ou un Etat prolétarien lutte contre l'impé- « rialisme, les travailleurs ont le devoir de défendre leur « *patrie socialiste* ». (§ 10, p. 1712).

Or il n'y a qu'un Etat se disant prolétarien : l'U. R. S. S. Aussi,

> « en cas d'attaque par les armes contre l'Union soviéti- « que, les communistes des nations opprimées et des Etats « impérialistes doivent appliquer tous leurs efforts à pro- « voquer le soulèvement des minorités nationales en Eu- « rope et dans les colonies ou semi-colonies..... » (§ 28, b. 1717).
>
> **« Le prolétariat des pays impérialistes ne doit pas seulement « lutter pour la défaite de son gouvernement dans cette guerre, « il doit activement chercher la victoire du pouvoir soviétique... « L'armée rouge n'est pas une armée « ennemie » ; c'est « l'ar- « mée du prolétariat international ».** (§ 29, p. 1717).

On exploite tous les mécontentements :

> « Les mouvements nationaux révolutionnaires dans les « Balkans, en Pologne et ailleurs doivent jouer un rôle très « considérable..... pour la transformation de la guerre « impérialiste en guerre civile ». (§ 15, p. 1714).
>
> « Le mouvement national-révolutionnaire dans les colonies « et semi-colonies se développe formidablement ; cela crée

« une large base pour la diffusion de l'influence de l'Inter-
« nationale communiste... » (§ 6, p. 1711).

On cherche à atteindre des éléments essentiels des forces nationales et la jeunesse :

« Le travail du parti dans les entreprises et dans les syn-
« dicats doit en premier lieu viser les branches industrielles
« indispensables pour la mobilisation et la conduite de la
« guerre : la métallurgie, les produits chimiques, les trans-
« ports... » (§ 15, p. 1714).

« C'est une question d'une importance décisive que le
« travail parmi les jeunesses et, avant tout, dans la jeunesse
« ouvrière ». (§ 15, p. 1714).

On cherche aussi à créer, conformément à l'instruction essentielle de Lenine, une « situation révolutionnaire » :

« Il faut que, *plus que d'ordinaire*, la situation des masses
« soit devenue pénible ». (§ 25, p. 1716).

Enfin, il est indispensable de travailler énergiquement à provoquer la décomposition des armées nationales :

« L'activité antimilitariste, le travail dans l'armée et la
« flotte, parmi les conscrits et les réservistes, *dans les orga-*
« *nisations de défense bourgeoise*, où les éléments prolétа-
« riens doivent être fortement représentés, voilà un tout
« organique, constituant le travail révolutionnaire du parti
« dans les masses, travail qui doit atteindre tous les ou-
« vriers ». (§ 15, p. 1714).

« Lénine estimait que « le seul moyen » de poursuivre
« tout le travail révolutionnaire *après* la déclaration de
« guerre serait de créer *une organisation clandestine*. Il faut
« également qu'il y ait une organisation illégale..... avant
« même la déclaration du conflit ». (§ 16, p. 1714).

Ainsi on va plus loin que Lénine dans les méthodes de révolution. Qui donc prétendait que les soviets « évoluaient » ?

Enfin

« Il est nécessaire de se liver à un travail systématique
« d'agitation et de propagande parmi les armées colo-
« niales ». (§ 57, p. 1723).

2. Constitution d'éléments de combat révolutionnaires.

« Les communistes doivent grouper les masses, les
« organiser et les diriger dans ce mouvement (un puissant
« mouvement révolutionnaire) comme dans la lutte quo-
« tidienne, afin d'obtenir par des actes révolutionnaires,
« la conquête du pouvoir par le prolétariat »..... (§ 6,
p. 1711).

« **Les guerres civiles exigent une préparation sérieuse du « prolétariat et de son parti** ». (§ 24, p. 1716).

« Il faut de l'art dans une insurrection : c'est... un pro- « blème de politique, et non pas seulement de science mi- « litaire..... Au moment de l'insurrection, le parti doit « subordonner toute son activité aux besoins de la lutte « armée ». (§ 25, p. 1717).

« La garde rouge est un organe d'insurrection. Faire de « l'agitation en vue de sa constitution et la constituer, tel « est le devoir des communistes en présence d'une situa- « tion immédiatement révolutionnaire ». (§ 50, p. 1722).

On sait que les communistes ont déjà constitué, clandestinement ou non, cette garde rouge en plusieurs pays sans attendre que la situation soit « immédiatement révolutionnaire ». Mais pour que les formations révolutionnaires soient capables de se battre, il faut que nombre d'entre ceux qui les composent aient appris le métier de soldat. Aussi :

« Les communistes..... combattent la propagande de ces « recettes contre la guerre » qui sont en faveur parmi les « éléments petits-bourgeois dans le mouvement ouvrier, « comme par exemple « le refus de porter les armes », « le refus de tirer », etc... Cette propagande est absurde et « nuisible... » (§ 19, p, 1715).

« Les communistes repoussent le mot d'ordre du *refus « du service militaire* (boycottage de la guerre) que préconi- « sent certains pacifistes « radicaux » et des social-démo- « crates de gauche ». (§ 21, p. 1715.)

« Il en résulterait que les ouvriers les plus résolus, les « plus conscients, *ne se trouveraient pas* dans l'armée... Les « partis communistes doivent conseiller aux ouvriers et « aux paysans pauvres **d'accepter le service militaire, d'ap- « prendre à se servir des armes,** de faire dans l'armée du « travail révolutionnaire, afin de pouvoir, le moment venu, « **tourner leurs armes contre la bourgeoisie** ». (§ 21, p. 1715, « 1716.)

CONCLUSION

Le gouvernement soviétique et la III[e] Internationale poursuivent de concert la destruction de l'ordre existant et l'avènement de la dictature bolchéviste.

Pour y parvenir, ils préparent la révolution prolétarienne, la révolte des peuples coloniaux, la désagrégation des forces nationales. Leur effort militariste est formidable en Russie, considérable et persévérant dans les autres pays, où ils organisent des formations de combat, sections de l'armée rouge. Un règlement pour la guerre civile hors de Russie donne à ces formations les instructions nécessaires.

Le gouvernement soviétique et la III[e] Internationale souhai-

tent la guerre prochaine ; ils méprisent les traités par lesquels on cherche à supprimer la guerre (ce qui n'empêche pas le gouvernement de Moscou de les signer). Ils se réservent, sans le dire, de déclancher la « guerre prolétarienne ».

Ainsi leur manœuvre est claire :

Désarmer les autres, et se servir pour cela des pacifistes et du mouvement de désarmement ;

s'armer soi-même (c'est-à-dire d'une part la Russie soviétique et, d'autre part, les formations de combat de la IIIe Internationale) ;

réaliser par tous les moyens les conditions qui rendront possible la guerre civile, la révolte coloniale et la conquête violente du pouvoir hors de Russie.

Comme on ne saurait demander à un Etat de désarmer tant que la guerre civile est préparée sur son territoire avec l'aide d'un Etat étranger, la solution du problème du désarmement se trouve conditionnée par le facteur bolchéviste. Si ceux qui ont entrepris la tâche d'assurer la paix n'en tenaient pas compte, leur œuvre serait fragile. Bien plus, s'ils travaillent au désarmement des forces nationales et constitutionnelles sans chercher en même temps à mettre un terme à l'action bolchéviste, ils contribueraient en fait — on l'a vu — à la réalisation du programme de la IIIe Internationale.

Le besoin d'une paix véritable et durable est aujourd'hui si grand — et il est si légitime — que personne ne saurait prendre la responsabilité de décevoir les espoirs qu'on a mis dans la Société des Nations et dans les Gouvernements qui ont accepté de collaborer sincèrement à l'œuvre du désarmement.

La Commission préparatoire du Désarmement doit se réunir à Genève au mois d'avril prochain.

Le Bureau de l'Entente Internationale contre la IIIe Internationale,

considérant la nécessité qu'il y a, pour ceux qui étudient le problème du désarmement, de se préoccuper des préparatifs faits par l'U. R. S. S., conformément aux résolutions du VIe Congrès mondial de la IIIe Internationale, en vue de la guerre prolétarienne (guerre civile, révolte coloniale, intervention de l'armée rouge soviétique),

demande respectueusement aux Gouvernements représentés à cette Commission de bien vouloir examiner l'opportunité de donner dès maintenant à leur délégués des instructions propres à provoquer l'étude, par les organes compétents, des moyens d'écarter cette menace contre la paix du monde.

Genève, février 1929.

Au nom du Bureau permanent de l'Entente Internationale contre la IIIe Internationale ;

Le Président : Théodore AUBERT.

CONFERENCE ON FORCED LABOUR, ARRANGED BY THE BRITISH LEAGUE OF NATIONS UNION, LONDON, MARCH 6 AND 7, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, March 7 and 8, 1929)

A two-days' conference on forced labour arranged by the League of Nations Union opened this morning at the London School of Economics. Forced labour is to be discussed at the International Labour Conference at Geneva in May on thé interesting report which the International Labour Office recently issued reviewing the working of the systems throughout the world.

Lord Buxton presided in the morning, and said that, thanks to the League of Nations, the international conscience had been aroused on the question and the whole trend of public opinion was in the direction of better conditions for the native worker.

Mr. Amery, the Secretary for the Dominions, opened the conference with a speech of welcome, in which he referred to the practical problem of bridging over the transition between, for example, Africa as they had found it and Africa as they wished it to be. The question was how gradually to limit, confine, and in process of time eliminate these forms of customary service, more particularly on public roads, drainage works, and so on, which were indispensable in some backward areas, and without which native administration and, to some extent, European administration could not have gone on up to the present.

A review of the situation as to forced labour in the British colonies was contributed by Mr. Ormsby-Gore, Under Secretary for the Colonies, who said that forced labour still survives in all the British dependencies in tropical Africa, but elsewhere it has been virtually eliminated. It is not surprising (said Mr. Ormsby-Gore) that Africa, particularly those parts of Africa were there is comparatively little European or non-native enterprise, should be the territories where the practice still obtains. For example, there is a good deal of compulsory labour in the Protectorate of Sierra Leone on the West Coast, and in Uganda on the East Coast.

The conditions under which compulsory labour is resorted to by British administrations for the carrying out of essential public works and services are free from the type of abuses which we had to guard against, and there is a gradual but definite improvement in the conditions under wich native chiefs employ compulsory labour in accordance with tribal custom.

Colonel Josiah Wedgwood, M. P., introduced a livelier note into the discussion. Referring to the official speeches, he remar-

ked that there was the suggestion that the British Empire was not as other empires in this matter. We should remember that human nature is just the same in British colonies as elsewhere. If the British Empire came out of the Forced Labour Report rather better than other countries it was largely because of the existence of our Anti-Slavery Society and of workers in the cause such as the Buxton family.The prise of freedom, he said, was perpetual interference with the exploiters and with those bureaucrats whom they were unfortunately able to use—few, he was glad to say—in our Colonial Office.

Colonel Wedgwood developed the point that the existence of freed labour is largely the result of the economic independence of the native. Where the natives own land, some other weapon besides economic necessity had to be found to obtain their labour—hence the labour ordinances that are in force in some colonies.

Mr. W. Mc Gregor Ross, discussing native conditions in Kenya, drew attention to the prevalence there of unpaid forced labour. This was defended as in accordance with native custom, for the labour was required for maintaining roads and sanitary services in the villages. But this defence did not apply in cases where capitalist enterprise had intervened and disturbed the economics of native life.

Mr. Ross described the heavy fines—sometimes equal to nine months' wages—that are imposed upon natives in Kenya for refusing to leave their own work and obey the administrator or headman and go out on forced labour. As no proper record of the work done by the natives was kept, natives were often victimised by being made to do more than the allotted period labour.

Lord Olivier said that Mr. Amery and Mr. Ormsby-Gore assured them that forced labour was only used for works of recognised public importance. The complaint was that this definition was given far too vide an application. The last occasion when forced labour was used in Kenya was on the completion of the northern branch of the Uganda railway. Enormous pressure was put upon the Government to use forced labour as a matter of recognised public importance. The fact was that the completion of the railway was needed by the white settlers in Kenya to send their maize and coffee into Uganda, while settlers in the latter colony wished to transport their cotton. The forced labour was needed for a purely commercial purpose.

In some cases taxation of the natives worked out as an indirect compulsion to labour.The taxation of the natives in Kenya was grossly excessive—about onethird of a mans' earnings in a year, and a great deal more if he did not go out to work. What would happen in this country if taxation of that kind was imposed upon the working classes ? Such taxation was an indirect form of compulsion. Another form of compulsion was the

registration ordinances which were detested throughout the African communities. Tey were defended as police and vagrancy measures, but that was not the real reason why they were imposed.

In the afternoon a discussion on contract labour was opened by Lord Olivier, who said : " We no more regard the conditions of the natives as a matter which can be settled by nationalist individualism than we so regard the question of war. The International Labour movement is solid upon this question.

Mr. J. H. Harris, secretary of the Anti-Slavery Society, said that it was essential that the natives should voluntarily enter into these contracts. To force a contract upon unwilling natives was equivalent to slavery. It should be the duty of the judicial authorities to see that the natives did not enter into a contract which he did not understand, as there were places where breaches of contract were used as the means for keeping the native at work for years beyond the time contracted for.

The Labour conditions of women and children in India and the Far East was the chief subject of discussion today at the final meetings of the conference on forced labour held by the League of Nations Union at the London School of Economics. Interesting descriptions of the economic position of women workers in India and China were given, and incidentally there was an account of the system of mui tsai, or the domestic slavery of girls, which still obtains in China, despite official assurances to the contrary.

Lord Lytton, the former Governor of Bombay, who presided in the morning, spoke of the hopeful change in the position of women and children's labour which had followed from the work of the International Labour Organisation at Geneva. In countries like our own, which had been long industrialised, legislation had secured for women and children something like a general standard of employment, but in the East, which was now in process of becoming industrialised, this was for from being the case.

Some striking illustrations of Lord Lytton's statement were provided by Lady Chatterjee (wife of the High Commissioner for India) in her account of women and children in Indian industries. Speaking of the dangers consequent upon the rapid transition from agriculture to factory conditions of production, she said that evils of overcrowding and the lack of home life pressed more heavily on the women and children than on the men. The death-rate among women in Bombay and Calcutta was much higher than among men—in certain parts of Calcutta twice as high—and the statistics showed the close connection between overcrowding and a high death-rate. The infantile death-rate both in Bombay and Calcutta was a very disquieting problem. She spoke of the overcrowding of the workers in Bombay, and said that home life was impossible in the industrial centres,

where single-room tenements were frequently occupied by more than one family (sixty-six per cent of the population of Bombay are housed in one-room tenements).

Lady Chatterjee gave the following account of the life of factory workers :—

"When once a makeshift home has been secured the family have to seek work. There are no labour exchanges where accurate information can be obtained with regard to vacancies and rates of pay and hours of work. They have to go to one factory after another unless they have been recruited from their village by a contractor. In the factories they will find no welfare department or employment supervisor ready to explain the nature of the work and the system of payment. They may or may not get work together. If they are fortunate enough to get employment in a cotton mill the men will probably be drafted to the spinning or weaving shed, the boy or girl will be taught to remove the bobbins, and the woman will go to the reeling department.

"When the midday spell comes the family may reunite in the yard to get some air, but they will find no sheds to shelter them from the heat of the sun, and the pouring sun is a feature of the climate for three months every year. After work they will return to their wretched tenement. As wages are generally paid monthly in the cotton industry, a week to a fortnight in arrears, the man will soon find himself compelled to resort to the moneylender.

"In the jute mills wages, are paid weekly, but the monthly system of payment is generally prevalent in spite of the fact that the workers are extremely poor and have absolutely no savings on which to draw. The high rate of interest charged by the money lender reduces very considerably the actual wages and makes it difficult for the family to maintain their health and strength. If the woman is handicapped by children and a baby she will be hard pressed to know what to do with them while at work. There are no day nurseries where they can be left. If she is employed near machinery she will not be allowed to take them with her into the factory, and only comparatively few factories have crèches. Later, should she give birth to a child its chances of life will be extremely small. The infant death-rate in the one-room Bombay tenements is nearly 50 per cent. As the majority of women employed in industry are married, it is surely necessary that same provision should be made for the children while the mother is at work."

Recent labour legislation, largely influenced by international labour conferences, had very considerably improved the lot of women and children, and in discussing remedies she said that the people as a whole must be made to realise that if industry is allowed to sap the health and strength of the workers the whole nation will suffer in the long run.

Dame Adelaide M. Anderson, who was a member of the child labour commission at Shanghai, described the abuses of women's industrial labour in China and the efforts that are being made to remedy them.

The only effectual regulation of Chinese labour evils must come through a Chinese Government. In the new draft legislation of the Nanking Government for factories the standard for age of entry of children in factories in future is to be fourteen years. Night work between 10 p. m. and 6 a. m. will be prohibited for them and also for female workers. The working day for "minors" under sixteen years will not be allowed to exceed eight hours or for female workers ten hours a day. It is also to be gathered that proper pauses for meals, rest periods, and holidays will be required, and conditions for apprentices will be largely improved. There will be Governmental control of contracts of employment, and there will be some kind of regulation for minimum wages based on costs of necessities of life in each locality.

The Rev. W. W. Clayson, a missionary from Canton, gave an account of domestic slavery in China, which was, he said, entirely due to economic pressure. Mui tsai had religious sanction, for it was allied with filial piety that demanded the sacrifice of children to their parents. Mui tsai was condemned by the best minds in China, and it was on the programme of the Nationalist Government to abolish it. The slaves were often treated very well, but sometimes they were treated very badly, and it was often stated that in some parts of the country the girls at the end of the period of the contract were sold to the brothels.

Miss Mary Dingman gave a few facts about the women workers in the Japanese factories. More than half the factory workers were women, and a very large proportion were girls under sixteen. The country was scoured by about 19.000 agents collecting girls for the factories, and she spoke of a house over which a notice was placed "No girls here." She criticised the dormitory system as a cause of ill health, and said that it was accompanied by a serious lack of freedom.

In the discussion Mrs. Pethick Lawrence said that underneath all these questions of forced labour was the idea, still prevalent in many parts of the world, that women were to be regarded as property and not as human beings. These matters would never be nut right until women were far more largely represented on the Council and Committees of the League of Nations. Women were profoundly uneasy about the situation and the methods of the League. There was a danger that the economic position of European women might suffer under international legislation carried out by men of other races in which a more degrading view of the position of women obtained.

In the afternoon session there was a discussion on labour sys-

tems analogous to slavery, which were defined by Mr. J. H. Harris as debt slavery, contract labour, forced labour, and pawning. In reply to a question Mr. Harris said that little was known about pawning, which was in operation in Nigeria and Sierra Leone. It appeared to be a system under which a person placed a relative in pawn for a period and returned for money, that is to say pawned his labour. The chief cause of slavery and systems allied to it was the actual shortage of labour throughout Africa, and it was because of that that the Belgians were now considering the reintroduction of Chinese into the Congo.

Mr Harris gave some particulars of the transport of boys and girls from the East Indies and the African continent for sale as slaves at Mecca at the time of the pilgrimage every year. One example of what might be done by international action would be to limit the age at which pilgrims were allowed to go to Mecca.

Mr. W. Benson, of the International Labour Organisation, said it was hoped that in 1930 an international agreement would be reached on the question of forced labour.

Mr. Charles Roberts, the chairman of the Anti-Slavery Society, said that, like slavery, forced labour was inefficient labour. "It does not educate the native into the habit of work. It educates him out of the habit of work."

APPEL DU BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DE LA PAIX AUX GOUVERNEMENTS, AUX PARLEMENTS ET AUX SOCIETES DE LA PAIX, JANVIER 1929.

(Le Mouvement Pacifiste, janvier-mars 1929)

Le fait de la signature du Pacte de Paris et sa ratification probable par tous, ou presque tous les Etats du monde imposent aux Gouvernements, aux Parlements, à tous les organismes et à tous les individus qui, suivant les termes consacrés par ce Pacte *condamnent le recours à la guerre*, des devoirs nouveaux et stricts sur l'accomplissement desquels nous appelons avec instance leur plus sérieuse attention.

Le Pacte de Paris ne contient que deux affirmations : la renonciation solennelle et collective à la guerre, la solution de tous les différends entre les Etats par des moyens pacifiques. Il ne prévoit aucune mesure d'exécution, ne stipule ni obligation, ni sanction. Tout reste donc à faire pour rendre efficaces et effectives les affirmations proclamées. Elles comportent d'autre part des conséquences diverses sur lesquelles nous croyons devoir insister.

La première de ces conséquences, c'est qu'il y a lieu de faire

disparaître du Pacte de la Société des Nations toutes les dispositions qui légitiment un recours à la guerre, notamment à l'article 12, ensuite de supprimer dans les lois constitutionnelles des divers pays les prescriptions qui règlent la déclaration de guerre, devenue désormais un acte délictueux.

Il faut frapper de peines sévères ceux qui par l'écrit, le théâtre, la parole ou par tous autres moyens incitent à la guerre et suscitent des haines capables de la provoquer, mais aussi, d'autre part, ne plus considérer comme punissables ceux qui dénoncent des agissements belliqueux des autorités publiques de leur pays ou des actes clandestins de préparation militaire.

En outre, dans le cas de carence des pouvoirs judiciaires nationaux, une instance devra pouvoir être engagée devant la Cour internationale de Justice.

Mais la mesure la plus importante à promouvoir, c'est de préciser la situation qui sera faite à l'Etat qui violera le Pacte de renonciation à la guerre ou se refusera à résoudre pacifiquement un différend survenu entre lui et un autre Etat, et l'attitude à adopter à son égard par les autres Etats signataires ou adhérents.

Il paraît non moins indispensable de rendre enfin obligatoire le recours à l'un des modes pacifiques qui font l'objet de l'Acte général du 26 septembre 1928, auquel il faut espérer que les ratifications de tous les Etats qui ont acquiescé au Pacte de Paris, seront bientôt acquises. Cet acte, dont les stipulations n'ont malheureusement pas un caractère obligatoire, n'en constitue pas moins la substitution la plus complète qui ait été formulée à ce jour du droit à la violence.

Enfin, le Pacte de Paris serait un geste bien vain et inutilement ostentatoire, s'il n'avait pas au moins pour résultat prochain une forte réduction des armements, préparatoire du désarmement général.

Nous invitons tous ceux qui, à quelque titre que ce soit, détiennent des pouvoirs publics, ainsi que les hommes de bonne volonté groupés dans les associations qui œuvrent en faveur de la paix, à unir leurs efforts pour doter enfin le monde d'un régime politique et juridique qui élimine définitivement la lutte armée des rapports entre les nations comme elle a été éliminée des rapports entre les individus au sein des nations. Il y va de l'avenir et de l'existence de l'Europe et de la civilisation toujours menacée à l'heure actuelle de la pire des catastrophes. Les tergiversations, les lenteurs, les atermoiements dont les représentants des Etats ont abusé, au cours des dix années qui se sont écoulées depuis la fondation de la Société des Nations, doivent prendre fin. C'est une question de salut public mondial. Ceux qui s'entêteront à ne pas saisir la tragique urgence d'une solution rapide et immédiate, encourront une responsabilité qui les marquera, devant l'histoire, d'une tare indélébile.

LETTRE DU BUREAU INTERNATIONAL DE LA PAIX AUX GOUVERNEMENTS REPRESENTES DANS LA COMMISSION PREPARATOIRE DE LA CONFERENCE DU DESARMEMENT, GENEVE, AVRIL 1929.

(Le Mouvement Pacifiste, janvier-mars 1929).

L'imminence de la réunion de la Commission préparatoire du Désarmement a soulevé dans les milieux pacifistes des discussions qu'il importe d'autant plus de porter à votre connaissance qu'elles ne sont que l'écho affaibli des doléances qui se font entendre non seulement dans les masses, mais encore dans nombre de milieux intellectuels.

Ceux qui ont la lourde charge d'être les porte-parole des Sociétés de la Paix savent à quelles résistances se heurtent, quant à la question du désarmement, les Gouvernements les mieux intentionnés, et les difficultés que soulève ce problème si complexe et d'une si vaste portée politique et morale.

Mais ils estiment que ce serait trahir leur devoir, comme aussi les espoirs les plus fermes de ceux dont ils sont les mandataires, que de renoncer à signaler l'impérieuse nécessité d'aboutir enfin à une réduction immédiate et substantielle des armements.

Cette réduction des armements, le Covenant l'exige, les récents traités l'imposent, les peuples l'attendent avec juste impatience.

Si les études préliminaires, dont nous apprécions d'ailleurs la valeur, devaient se prolonger encore, les masses ne manqueraient pas de se dire, et avec infiniment de raison, que la Société des Nations et tout l'appareil institué après la guerre en vue d'organiser et d'assurer la paix, ne sont que des constructions de façade, des apparences vaines destinées uniquement à dissimuler des intentions qui n'attendent que l'occasion pour se manifester au grand jour.

Les difficultés techniques, ni vous M. le Ministre, ni aucun des membres de votre Gouvernement ne l'ignorez, seront surmontées le jour où on le voudra vraiment, car elles ne sont, en fin de compte, que la manifestation extérieure de difficultés politiques, de difficultés psychologiques.

C'est le sentiment d'insécurité, bien souvent entretenu par une presse tendancieuse, qui empoisonne l'atmosphère et qui rend inextricable la situation dont souffre l'Europe.

Or, il est incontestable que, à cet égard, la situation s'est sensiblement éclaircie. Le 27 août 1928, 16 puissances, dont les plus grandes, se sont solennellement engagées à renoncer à la guerre comme instrument de leur politique nationale. Depuis cette date d'autres Etats ont pris le même engagement et les ratifications interviennent selon un rythme accéléré. Le Pacte de Paris sera d'ici quelques mois une loi liant la plupart des peuples du monde et qu'aucun d'eux n'osera enfreindre sans

s'exposer aux plus âpres reproches et à de graves dangers.

Il y a ensuite les accords qui viennent d'être signés entre le Gouvernement des Soviets et plusieurs des Etats voisins, affectant précisément la zone la plus névralgique de l'Europe, accords qui font apparaître sous un jour nouveau les propositions successives que M. Litvinoff a formulées en novembre 1927.

Des arguments que l'on avance pour essayer d'affaiblir la portée de ces événements, il n'en est aucun qui résiste à un examen impartial.

Si la prochaine Session de la Commission préparatoire de Désarmement devait se clore sans qu'aient été prises des résolutions énergiques, sans que des satisfactions positives, réelles, aient été données à ceux qui considèrent l'existence d'armées nombreuses et toujours prêtes à franchir les frontières comme un péril et comme une provocation, il est à craindre que l'œuvre de pacification confiée à la Société des Nations ne soit définitivement compromise et que la course aux armements ne reprenne une allure catastrophique. Ceux qui en seront responsables doivent savoir qu'ils préparent ainsi pour les peuples le plus effroyable des désastres.

Nous faisons appel à tous les Gouvernements qui seront prochainement représentés à Genève pour qu'ils donnent à leurs délégués des instructions qui tendent à la réalisation effective des engagements qu'ils ont solennellement pris en devenant membres de la Société des Nations.

ANNUAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL REFORM UNION, MANCHESTER, APRIL 1929

(The Manchester Guardian, april 4, 1929).

" Apart from this, the present Foreign Minister seems to be content with the laurels of Locarno, which are withering for want of further nourishment. In the associated problems of arbitration and disarmement, the negative attitude of the Government has been deplorable. The persistent work of tbe League of Nations, culminating in the General Act for the pacific settlement of international disputes, has received no support, and the declared preference of Conservative England for bilateral treaties of arbitration has been rendered ridiculous by the Government's failure to promote any such treaties.

" The Optional Clause still lacks the signature of this country, and Mr. Kellogg's historic gesture was accepted only after long delay and subject to dangerous qualifications. "

The report goes on to say : — " The most distressing of the

public acts of the present Government in foreign affairs were the eagerness with which, at Geneva, it demanded trifling reductions in the carefully restrained Budget of the League and the few constructive suggestions which it made during the 1928 Assembly. It is obviously difficult for a Protectionist Government to give whole-hearted support to the League policy of breaking down tariff barriers, to which unanimous international expert opinion has given its blessing, and on which the economic organisation of the League has even in a short time concentrated with such unexpected success. But to make as its chief contribution to the deliberations of the nations a plea for reductions in the necessary expenditure of the League in order to achieve an inconsiderable saving is unworthy of a great nation, and of a Govecnment which expects the electorate to take its declarations at their face value ".

RESOLUTION ADOPTEE PAR LE CONGRES DE LA LIGUE FRANÇAISE DES DROITS DE L'HOMME ET DU CITOYEN, RENNES, AVRIL 1929.

(Le Mouvement Pacifiste, janvier-mars 1929)

Le Congrès, fidèle à la tradition constante de la Ligue, proclame que le premier droit de l'homme est le droit à la vie et que le premier droit des peuples est le droit à la paix.

Fidèle à la méthode toujours suivie par la Ligue, alliant à l'affirmation absolue des principes la préoccupation de les traduire, dès à présent, en réalités positives, méthode qui, déjà, pour l'organisation de la paix par le rapprochement des peuples, a fait ses preuves, méthode, en effet, qui a permis, dès le lendemain de la guerre, l'entente de la démocratie française et de la démocratie allemande, la lutte commune contre le nationalisme allemand et le nationalisme français, l'opposition victorieuse à l'occupation de la Ruhr, les pactes de Locarno et l'entrée de l'Allemagne dans la Société des Nations, il ne répudie, par principe, aucun des moyens propres à empêcher la guerre, mais il établit entre eux une hiérarchie et décide que la Ligue vouera principalement sa force de propagande à ceux d'entre ces moyens qui lui paraissent les plus efficaces.

En conséquence, considérant que la suppression radicale de toutes armes, en laissant subsister d'autres moyens de violence comme les procédés de guerre chimique et les effectifs de police intérieure, n'aurait point pour effet la suppression de toute guerre, il ne croit pas pouvoir recommander la proposition Litvinof ;

Considérant que la grève générale, si elle n'éclate pas en

même temps dans tous les pays sous menaces de guerre, risque de favoriser les Etats oppresseurs aux dépens des nations plus respectueuses des libertés ouvrières et de se tourner ainsi contre la paix et la justice il estime, au contraire, qu'une grève internationale, organisée suivant les résolutions de la Fédération syndicale internationale pour « réagir contre toute menace de guerre et exiger le retour à l'arbitrage » peut arrêter les gouvernements belliqueux dans leurs entreprises criminelles et seconder efficacement la Société des nations dans son effort pour le règlement juridique des litiges internationaux ;

Considérant qu'une propagande en faveur de l'objection de conscience, dans un pays plus sensible et plus généreux, risque de le livrer sans défense aux appétits et à l'agression des pays moins évolués ;

Considérant que la forme de l'objection de conscience consistant pour une nation à ouvrir ses frontières à l'étranger plutôt que de recourir à la guerre favoriserait les entreprises impérialistes ;

Considérant qu'elle ne saurait être, en aucun cas, un mode d'organisation de la paix, il ne croit pas pouvoir s'associer à la doctrine et à l'action des objecteurs;

Considérant que si la Société des Nations a été impuissante jusqu'ici à réaliser la moindre réduction des armements, elle a, en revanche, réussi à élaborer des formules juridiques qui, si elles étaient adoptées et ratifiées, permettraient la solution pacifique des différends internationaux et contribueraient à accroître les sentiments de sécurité dans les nations ;

Considérant que des accords engagés entre nombre d'Etats de première importance comme l'accord de Locarno, le pacte de Paris, le pacte oriental de mise hors la loi de la guerre, certains traités bilatéraux d'arbitrage ont sensiblement réduit les risques de guerre, le congrès estime le moment venu d'accorder une première satisfaction à l'attente anxieuse des peuples en réalisant sans délai une première étape de la réduction générale des armements.

A cet effet, il invite énergiquement le Gouvernement français :

1° A donner mandat à ses représentants à la prochaine session de la commission préparatoire de provoquer la réunion immédiate de la conférence internationale du désarmement avec mandat de réaliser une première réduction portant sur le temps de service, sur le matériel, sur le budget des armées terrestres, navales et aériennes, et d'organiser en même temps un contrôle international pour l'exécution des conventions adoptées ;

2° A proposer ensuite, pour l'étape suivante, une diminution des armements suivant le taux imposé par les traités aux pays ex-ennemis.

En outre, et pour ajouter à la sécurité acquise il demande instamment à l'opinion publique de faire pression sur le gouvernement :

a) Pour qu'il ratifie au plus tôt l'acte général d'arbitrage et de sécurité recommandé au gouvernement par la dernière assemblée de la Société des Nations, en intervenant avec force pour que soient enlevées du texte de cet acte toutes les exceptions et réserves qui en ôteraient en grande partie l'efficacité ;

b) Qu'il souscrive immédiatement à la clause facultative du statut de la Cour de justice internationale qui implique pour l'Etat signataire l'engagement de déférer à la Cour tous différends juridiques pouvant surgir entre lui et un autre Etat ;

c) Qu'il donne vie à la convention sur le trafic des armes demeurée jusqu'ici lettre morte, faute de ratification générale ;

d) Enfin et surtout qu'il propose à la prochaine assemblée de la Société des Nations un nouvel examen du protocole de Genève et qu'il fasse le maximum d'efforts pour en obtenir l'adoption.

Il fait appel enfin à tous ceux qui exercent une action sur l'opinion publique pour qu'ils emploient tous leurs efforts à extirper de l'enseignement les germes de haine et apaiser le dissentiment de peuple à peuple et préparent ainsi le désarmement moral, prélude indispensable du désarmement matériel, comme le désarmement matériel, une fois ébauché, accélérera par la leçon de l'exemple le rythme du désarmement moral.

Le congrès considère enfin que la formation des Etats-Unis d'Europe, union fédérative d'Etats autonomes, rendue possible par le rapprochement moral des peuples, la disparition des barrières douanières et l'organisation rationnelle de l'économie européenne, doit marquer l'étape décisive dans l'établissement de la paix mondiale.

Pour faire aboutir ce programme, la Ligue fait appel à l'énergie et à l'enthousiasme de ses membres. Elle demeure, comme elle n'a jamais cessé d'être, intransigeante en sa doctrine et militante en son action.

Elle continuera à travers le pays la campagne acharnée qu'elle a commencée contre la course aux armements. Elle exposera à tous les citoyens leur droit absolu : la paix ; et, conjointement avec les ligues sœurs, elle poursuivra son effort jusqu'à ce que l'opinion internationale, réveillée, brise le fascisme impérialiste et impose à tous les gouvernements la réalisation effective de la paix.

EINGABE DER DEUTSCHEN FRIEDENSCESELLSCHAFT AN DEN REICHSKANZLER, BERLIN, 16. APRIL 1929.

(Die Friedenswarte, Juni 1929)

Während diese Zeilen geschrieben werden, sind die Pariser Verhandlungen über die Schwere des wirtschaftlichen „Bleigewichts", das Deutschland durch Jahrzehnte mit sich schleppen

soll, noch nicht abgeschlossen. Wir haben volles Verständnis dafür, dass jeder der Verhandelnden für sein Land so günstig wie möglich abschliessen will. Wenn jedoch in dieser Zeit deutsche Rechtszeitungen darüber, dass Deutschland als Kriegsverlierer überhaupt zahlen soll, sich sittlich entrüsten, so treiben sie ein bewusst unehrliches Spiel, das unseren Verhandlungsführern ihre Aufgabe nicht erleichtert ; denn ein Rechtspolitiker, Herr Helfferich, war es, der in einer Zeit, wo er die Kriegslage als für uns günstig ansah, das Wort in die Welt hinaus ausposaunte, dass die Verlierer das Bleigewicht der Kriegsschulden durch die Jahrhunderte tragen müssten. Wenn selbst Linkszeitungen von diesem Spiel nich klar abrücken, so tun sie dem deutschen Volke keinen guten Dienst.

Die Verhandlungen in Paris drehen sich darum, welche Summen Deutschland wirtschaftlich tragen kann. Wir halten es für sicher, dass bei diesen Erwägungen auf der Gegenseite auch die eine grosse Rolle spielt :

ein Land, das, ohne irgendwie gefährdet zu sein, 700 Millionen für seine Wehrmacht ausgibt, kann unmöglich wirtschaftlich so schwach sein, wie seine Regierung und seine Presse es darstellt.

Zu dieser Erkenntnis scheinen, reichlich spät, auch die derzeitigen Regierungsparteien gekommen zu sien, da sie bei den vorgeschlagenen Etatsabstrichen endlich auch die bisher unantastbare Reichswehr wenigstens etwas bedacht haben.

Aber wie die Reparationsverhandlungen auch ausgehen mögen, eines ist sicher : Europa wird an Amerika grosse Summen zahlen müssen, und innerhalb Europas wird Deutschland das am schwersten belastete Land sein.

Wir werden, wenn wir als Volk jemals wieder zu Wohlstand kommen wollen, auf Jahrzehnte hinaus eine Pfennigwirtschaft in den öffentlichen und privaten Betrieben treiben müssen.

Bei dieser Wirtschaft wird in allen europäischen Ländern die Wehrausgabe eine überragende Rolle spielen, und zwar nicht nur wegen der Höhe der Ausgabe, sondern auch deswegen, weil sie auf die Wirtschaft einen starken mittelbaren Einfluss ausübt :

Dem grossen autonomen amerikanischen Wirtschaftsgebiet steht als Schuldner ein Europa gegenüber, das durch 26 Zollgrenzen zerschnitten ist. Wenn wir Europäer wirtschaftlich leistungsfähig bleiben wollen, müssen wir nicht nur betriebstechnisch rationalisieren, sondern auch europäisch-politisch. Alle wirtschaftlichen Verhandlungen zwischen den europäischen Ländern werden in ihrem Erfolg bestimmt von dem Masse des zwischen ihnen herrschenden politischen Vertrauens oder Misstrauens. Durch den Kelloggpakt ist nun jeder Angriffskrieg formell unmöglich gemacht worden. Wenn daneben aber überall zur Verteidigung weiter gerüstet wird, so zeigt man da-

durch, dass man irgendeinem Nachbarn zutraut, dass er die im Pakt übernommenen Verpflichtungen nicht zu halten beabsichtigt. Wir behaupten danach mit aller Bestimmtheit :

Ohne europäische Radikalabrüstung ist die notwendige europäische Wirtschaftsunion nicht zu erreichen.

Deutschlands Hinweis, es habe abgerüstet, und es sei jetzt Sache der andern, zu folgen — geht am wesentlichen vorbei : erzwingen konnte man nur die Ablegung der Waffen, die durch die Kriegstechnik mehr und mehr in den Hintergrund gedrängt worden sind : die moderne Kriegstechnik beruht in der Hauptsache auf der Kraft der Wirtschaft, und die lässt sich durch Diktate nicht abdrosseln. Das gegenseitige Misstrauen, das die notwendige europäische Wirtschaftsunion verhindert, beruht nun darin. dass jeder befürchtet, der andere würde bei Gelegenheit seine wirtschatliche Kraft zu ungunsten des missliebigen Nachbarn militärisch ausnützen.

Da in bezug auf die Industrien, die im militärischen Sinne umstellbar sind, Deutschland in Europa an erster Stelle steht, haben unsere Nachbarn Furcht vor diesem unsern Kriegs-„potentiel,,. Der Potitiker, der gegenüber dieser Tatsache die Augen verschliesst, begeht entweder einen verhängnisvollen Fehler, oder er verschliesst die Augen absichtlich, um diese Lage eines Tages im militaristich-imperialistischen Sinne ausnützen zu können. Aufgabe des wahrhaften Volksführers muss sein, das gegenseitige europäische Misstrauen zu überwinden. Dass das nicht durch Verkrüppelung der auch zu Kriegszwecken geeigneten Industrien geschehen kann,ist ohne weiteres klar. Es muss dadurch erreicht werden, dass der offenkundige Beweis erbracht wird, dass ein Missbrauch dieser Industrien zu Kriegszwecken in Zukunft ausgeschlossen ist. Ist nun dafür ein eindeutiger Beweis möglich ? Er ist möglich :

Wenn auch die Waffen, die der Versailler Vertrag im Auge hatte, heute in die zweite Reihe gerückt sind, ganz zwecklos sind sie doch nicht. Im Zukunftskriege wird zwar der Hauptstoss gegen das feindliche Volk von Flugzeugen mit Gift und Brandbomben geführt werden ; wenn dadurch aber auf der einen oder der anderen Seite eine geringe Ueberlegeneit erzielt worden ist, dann werden auch die Waffen alter Art in Wirkung treten. So wichtig die neuen technischen Waffen auch sind, ohne ein kleines Eliteheer, wie wir es haben oder ein grosses Milizheer, wie andere es haben oder anstreben, ist auch die stärkste chemische und Flugzeugindustrie militärisch unwirksam.

Der Wille, die Auch-Kriegsindustrien niemals zu Kriegszwekken zu missbrauchen, wird dadurch zweifelsfrei bekundet, dass die Heereseinrichtungen aller Art beseitigt werden.

Um diese Art Abrüstung geht der Kampf.

Was aber würde einem Lande geschehen, das ohne Rücksicht auf die anderen radikal abrüstet ? Die landläufige Ansicht geht dahin, dass dann der böse Nachbar über das Land herfallen, es

wirtschaftlich vergewaltigen oder gar politisch annektieren werde. Diese Ansicht hat scheinbar die Lehren der Geschichte für sich, aber auch nur scheinbar. Denn nur für die oberflächltiche Betrachtung haben in den Jahrtausenden geschriebener menschlicher Geschichte die Waffen die letzte Entscheidung gebracht, der Hintergrund jedes Waffenganges war immer wirtschaficher Art. Die geschichtlichen Zusammenschlüsse von kleineren zu grösseren menschlichen Interessengemeinschaften erfolgten immer aus wirtschaftlichen Gründen.

Darum glauben wir, dass dem Volke, das aus der nach dem Weltkriege deutlich erkennbaren Lage entschlossen die Folgerung zieht, also mit alten, veralteten Gewohnheiten und Anschauungen radikal aufräumt, die politische und wirtschaftliche Führung zufallen wird.

Deutschland, in der Mitte Europas gelegen, könnte durch Vorangehen in der radikalen Abrüstung, auch der ihm durch den Versailler Vertrag belassenen Waffen, das Kernstück des neuen, politisch und wirtschaftlich befriedeten und dadurch Amerika ebenbürtigen Europa werden.

Es ist ganz ausgeschlossen, dass ein solchermassen radikal abgerüstetes Deutschland jemals von irgendeinem seiner Nachbarn vergewaltigt werden könnte. Soweit ist die Welt doch schon gekommen, dass sich gegen einen offenkundigen Friedensbrecher das Weltgewissen empören würde. Da kein Staat heute noch einen Angriffskrieg wagen kann, ist radikale Entblössung von allen sog. Verteidigungsmitteln der beste — nach unserer Meinung einzige Schutz der Nachbarländer auch des angriffslüsternsten Staates. Das Land, das zuerst und freiwillig wirklich abrüstet, wird nicht nur die Keimzelle des Weltvertrauens werden, sondern es wird auch seine Wirtschaft dadurch ungeheuer kräftigen, dass es grosse Summen wirtschaftlich und kulturell anlegen kann, die heute nutzlos für seine „Verteidigung" vergeudet werden. Eine leistungsfähige Wirtschaft mit gesunden sozialen Verhältnissen ist eine bessere Wehr als jede irgendwie geartete, durch die Entwicklung überholte, alte Waffenwehr.

Es kann keinem Zweifel unterliegen dass im heutigen Europa der erste scharfe Schuss an einer der vielen Grenzen automatisch einen neuen Weltkrieg entfesseln würde, einen Krieg, bei dem auch die Sieger, mehr noch als es bei dem vorigen der Fall war, wirtschaftlich und politisch zum Krüppel geschlagen würden. Wenn die Regierungen auf dem Wege zur Abrüstung nicht vorangehen, dürfen sie sich nicht wundern, wenn die Völker schliesslich aus eigenem Entschluss die Entwaffnung zu erzwingen suchen.

Dass Berufsoffiziere und ihnen geistig nahestehende Politiker als Führer oder Sachverständige bei Abrüstungsverhandlungen nicht gerade die geeigneten Personen sind, haben die bisherigen Verhandlungen einwandfrei erwiesen. Diese Fragen müssen aus

dem Dunkel der Beratungszimmer und Kanzleien in die breite Oeffentlichkeit der Blut und Steuern zahlenden Massenmenschheit getragen werden.

Wir richten dies Schreiben an Sie, Herr Reichskanzler in der Hoffnung, dass Sie klardazu Stellung nehmen und dadurch dies wichtigste politische Thema zur Debatte stellen werden.

gez Frhr. v. Schoenaich.

EINGABE DES DEUTSCHEN FRIEDENSKARTELLS AN DIE UNTERRICHTSVERWALTUNGEN DER DEUSTCHEN LAENDER, BERLIN, 22. APRIL 1929.

(Die Friedenswarte, Juni 1929)

Das Deutsche Friedenskartell gestattet sich, die Aufmerksamkeit der dortigen Unterrichtsverwaltung auf die Tatsache hinzulenken, dass es in den meisten deutschen Ländern noch an Ausführungsbestimmungen zu Artikel 148 Absatz 1 der Reichsverfassung fehlt, zu jenem Artikel, der bekanntlich bestimmt, dass fn allen Schulen " sittliche Bildung, staatsbürgerliche Gesinnug, persönliche und berufliche Tüchtigkeit im Geiste des deutschen Volkstums und der Völkerversöhnung " zu erstreben ist.

Wir erlauben uns, im nachfolgenden als Muster die Vorschriften wiederzugeben, die schon im Jahre 1920 in Braunschweig erlassen sind. Sie sind unter einer sozialistischen Regierung entstanden, sind aber vollkommen frei von jeder parteipolitischen Tendenz, so dass unsere auf dem Boden verschiedener Parteien stehenden Mitglieder rückhaltlos für sie eintreten können, und sie sind auch von der in Braunschweig den Sozialisten nachfolgenden Regierung der Rechtsparteien nicht ausser Kraft gesetzt worden :

1. Im Religionsunterricht ist bei den Kindern das Verständnis dafür zu wecken, dass in den höchsten sittlichen Fragen keine Unterschiede zwischen den Menschen und Völkern bestehen. Die Gedanken des Friedens, der Versöhnung und der gegenseitigen Hilfe sind als die Gesinnung Jesu den Kindern so stark zum Erleben zu bringen, dass sie diese in der Familie, unter den Volksgenossen und gegenüber fremden Völkern praktisch zu bestätigen vermögen. Ein Herabsetzen und Verächtlichmachen anderer Religionen und Bekenntnisse — auch der Weltanschauung Religionsloser — ist streng zu vermeiden (Artikel 148 Absatz 2).

2. Der Unterricht im Deutschen hat im engen Anschluss an die Heimat, nach gebührender Berücksichtigung der Vorstel-

lungs-und Gefühlswelt des gesamten deutschen Volkes, den Begriff des eigenen Volkstums zu dem der Menschheit zu erweitern. Lesestücke mit völkerverhetzendem Charakter sind deshalb — soweit sie in den Lesebüchern noch enthalten sind — im Unterricht nicht zu verwenden, dafür Dichter und Schriftsteller, die der ganzen Menschheit gehören, in der freien Lektüre heranzuziehen. Vor allem ist hier im Geiste der Zusammengehörigkeit der Menschheit die Erziehung zum reinen, freien Menschentum zu erstreben.

3. Im Geschichtsunterricht sollen die Kinder, ausgehend von der engsten Heimat und einer ausführlichen Behandlung des deutschen Volkes, einen Einblick in die geschichtlichen Weltzusammenhänge gewinnen, und somit Heimat, Nation, Menschheit als die notwendig einander ergänzenden und bedingenden Lebenskreise kennen lernen. Sie müssen verstehen, dass jedes Volk nur einen Teil der Gesamtmenschheit bildet und umso wertvoller ist, je mehr es zu den Fortschritten der Gesamtkultur beigetragen hat. Kriege zwischen den Völkern sind deshalb nicht als die Höhepunkte geschichtlicher Entwicklung, sondern zumeist als die Zerstörer menschlicher Kulturerrungenschaften zu werten. Sie sind nur in kleiner Auswahl und nach Massgabe ihrer kulturellen Auswirkungen im Unterricht zu behandeln. Dafür ist auf die Kulturgeschichte als die eigentliche Arbeitsgeschichte der Menschheit das grösste Gewicht zu legen und vornehmlich ihr Werdegang von den Anfängen bis zu der heutigen Höhe den Kindern in grossen Zügen darzustellen. Solange Staatsbürgerkunde nicht als besonderes Lehrfach in unseren Schulen eingeführt ist, schliesst sich die staatsbürgerkundliche Unterweisung eng an den Geschichtsunterricht an. Sie hat das Verständnis für die bestehenden staatlichen Einrichtungen zu wecken, die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Verhältnisse des deutschen Volkes mit denen anderer Völker zu vergleichen sowie die bedeutsamen Werte der zwischenstaatlichen und überstaatlichen Organisationen und internationalen Einrichtungen auf völkerrechtlicher Grundlage (Schiedsgericht, Abrüstung, Völkerbund, internationale Gewichts- und Massvereinbarungen, Weltpostverein, lateinische Münzkonvention usw.) den Kindern vor Augen zu führen, damit in ihnen allmählich das Bewusstsein einer europäischen und weiter einer Weltgemeinschaft entsteht.

4. Auch im erdkundlichen Unterricht gilt es wieder, die Schüler organisch von der Heimat zum Volk, zur Menschheit zu führen, durch eine vertiefte völkerpsychologische Bildung des Lehrers ein besseres Verständnis des Auslandes, eine gerechtere Beurteilung fremder Völker anzubahnen, das rein völkische Denken durch ein planetarisches zu vervollständigen. Es sind die internationalen Wirtschaftszusammenhänge aufzuzeigen, klarzumachen, wie die Völker wirtschaftlich aufeinander angewiesen sind und warum die Entwicklung der Weltwirt-

schaft notwendig zu einer sozialen Zusammenarbeit der einzelnen Wirtschaftsländer führen muss.

5. In der Naturlehre ist die Einsicht zu vermitteln, dass die hier behandelten Fragen Gemeingut der ganzen Menschheit sind, und dass sich alle Kulturvölker an ihrer Lösung beteiligen. In der Naturgeschichte ist als Ergänzung der Lehre vom Kampf ums Dasein nachzuweisen, wie daneben bei einzelnen Tiergattungen schon der Grundsatz der gegenseitigen Hilfe, des Einordnens in eine soziale Gemeinschaft befolgt wird, so dass diese Forderung mit umso grösserem Recht für die menhliche Gesellschaft erhoben werden muss.

Der fremdsprachliche Unterricht hat zukünftig dem Gedanken der Völkerversähnung in ganz besonderem Masse zu dienen. Schon bei der Auswahl des fremdsprachlichen Sckrifttums ist dieses Ziel mehr als bisher zu berücksichtigen. Der Lehrer soll mit dem tieferen Eindringen in den Geist der fremden Sprache auch die Eigenart und den Eigenwert des fremden Volkes in gerechter Würdigung den Kindern verständlich machen.

Wir benutzen die Gelegenheit, um an unsere frühere Eingabe zu erinnern, in der die Notwendigkeit, in allen Schulen über Wesen und Ziele des Völkerbundes zu unterrichten, betont war. Mit Genugtuung können wir feststellen, dass einige Unterrichtsverwaltungen, unter ihnen auch die preussische, in der gewünschten Richtung vorgegangen sind. Auch auf die von uns zur allgemeinen Anschaffung empfohlene Wehbergische Ausgabe der Völkerbundsatzung ist mehrfach hingewiesen worden. Was bisher gescheben ist, betrachten wir aber nur als den ersten Anfang. Manche Verwaltungen sind, wie es scheint, noch ganz im Rückstand. Wichtiger auch als die blosse Vermittlung von Kenntnissen über den Völkerbund ist die Durchdringung des ganzen Unterrichts mit Völkerbundsgesinnung, im Geist eben des Artikels 148 unserer Verfassung.

Darauf zu dringen ist der Zweck unserer heutigen Eingabe.

Der Unterrichtsverwaltung wären wir sehr dankbar, wenn sie uns in Beantwortung dieser Eingabe wissen liesse, was in ihrem Bereich zur Durchführung des Artikels 148 der Reichsverfassung bisher geschehen ist.

Deutsches Friedenskartell :

gez. Quidde. gez. Fark.

1. Vorsitzender. Referent.

RESOLUTION ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, GENEVA, APRIL, 19, 1929.

The Executive Committee of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, now in session in Geneva, representing organised groups of women in 25 countries, has seen with feelings of the warmest satisfaction the draft amendment which has been presented to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference by the Delegate of the National Government of the Republic of China.

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom has, since its foundation in 1915, repeatedly urged that the system of universal military service should be abolished as a first step in the reduction of national armaments to which all the States Members of the League of Nations are now pledged under article VIII of the Covenant and by the specific undertakings given at the time of the signing of the Versailles Peace Treaty. The International Executive Committee endorses all that is so admirably staded in the Chinese amendment, and there are many other reasons why a proposal to abolish conscription makes a particularly strong appeal to women.

The International Executive Committee believes that if all the Governments would adopt the proposal made by the Delegate of the Chinese Republic an important step would be made towards establishing the peace of the world on a more secure foundation. It therefore urges the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference to give serious and favourable consideration to this proposal and calls upon all its National Sections to obtain for it the fullest publicity and the effective support of public opinion.

LABOUR'S ELECTORAL PROGRAMME, LONDON, APRIL 30, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, May 1, 1928)

Peace is one of the greatest issues of the election. The Labour Government found Europe distracted by hostility, and left it in a peaceful frame of mind. The party's record when in office entitles it to the confidence of all lovers of peace. It desires to resume its work and to regain for this country the proud position it held in 1924.

The Tory Government has hampered disarmament and systematically obstructed the work of the League of Nations and of the International Labour Office, Labour's policy is precisely the opposite. It will establish the largest possible measure of political

and economic co-operation amongst the nations, and give the fullest and most cordial support to the League and the International Labour Office.

Labour stands for arbitration and disarmament. It will accept the general act of arbitration, conciliation, and judicial settlement approved by the League. A drastic reduction of armaments is long overdue. Labour welcomes the initiative of the United States. It will press for the speedy completion of the Disarmament Treaty and the convocation of a general disarmament conference.

MEETING OF THE WOMEN'S PEAGE CRUISADE, LONDON, MAY 9, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, May 10, 1929)

"This mass meeting of the Women's Peace Crusade, representing twenty-nine organisations, declares that the supreme need of the world is peace. It calls upon the voters of all parties to elect a Parliament of peacemakers pledged to make the renunciation of war a reality by accepting the obligations to settle all international disputes by peaceful means, and pledged to take the lead in pressing forward the progressive reduction of all armaments".

This resolution was passed at the meeting to-night in the Central Hall, at which women prominent in the three political parties were present.

Miss K. D. Courtney, hon. secretary of the Women's Peace Crusade, who presided, said the meeting was of a unique character, representing as it did all parties on theeve of a general election. The meeting was the rallying point of a great national movement—a women's movement to make the question of peace a real issue at general election.

Lady Acland, moving the resolution pointed out that the countries had to make a choice. Either the maintenance of peace and order, the judgment and defence of the rights of individual nations must be entrusted to the collective will of mankind embodied in the League of Nations and reinforced by the Kellogg Pact or they must go back to the old anarchic theory that each nation was to be the sole judge and defender of its own rights. The Governments of the nations, sincerely anxious as they were for peace, were giving themselves a sort of moral vertigo and paralysis by contemplating the abyss of war-dangers when they met to make plans for peace. Every disarmament conference started from the hopeless premise that no plan could be made till a parity formula for reduction and limitation had

been discovered providing with mathematical and ethical certainty that if any given two nations were to declare war on each other in ten years' time each must be guaranteed the same relative chance of victory as if they declared war to-morrow. When we and our allies of the Great War were confronted with the fact that we had for ten years been guilty of a breach of the Treaty of Versailles by our failure to disarm in proportion to German disarmament we excused ourselves. We said it was difficult to find this precious formula for relative parity of sacrifice. We had far better be honest and say it was impossible.

"We could perhaps go on then", said Lady Acland, "to realise that luckily such a formula was also unnacessary and futile in our advance towards world-disarmament. Take, for instance, our well-worn plea. 'We must have a navy strong enough to defend all our trade routes'. Before any nations would attack us there must be a cause of dispute which could only lead to war if the other nations bad broken the Kellogg Pact or if we ourselves had done so. In either case the innocent party could mobilise in its favour the now tremendous forces of the world's will to peace, and call not only on her own resources but on those of the League of Nations.

"Until we relinquish the belief in which we have been trained for centuries that a nation's pride and independence depends on her confidence in being able to maintain her rights and will by her own strong right arm against all comers, we shall remain as a nation on the side of world anarchy and refuse to commit ourselves to the side of world unity. We must set our faces one way or the other. We must know, too, which way every candidate who asks for our vote is facing, and, therefore, I whole-heartedly commend to you the resolution".

Lady Winifred Elwes, who seconded the resolution and spoke as a member of the Conservative party, said that peace was a non-party question, but the Conservative party had always done what it could to promote peace. Now that women had the vote they must use their influence to return a Parliament that would work for peace. They must also bring up their children to respect other nations and to realise that the different characteristics of nations gave a great charm to the world.

Miss Ellen Wilkinson, M. P., supporting the resolution, said that during the next few weeks the women of the nation would hold the future of the country in their hands. Members of Parliament frequently said to her, "What do the women want?" and she always answered "First of all they want peace". A few women might support big navy leagues, but she was convinced that the mass of the women of all parties would be dead against another war. She hoped that the next Government would be one courageous enough to lift the curtain that covered the financial transactions with nations in regard to reparations and the war debt. There were far too many influential people in the

country who had an interest in war. The people of the world spent every year £890.000.000 sterling on armaments. Yet the peoples of the world had no quarrel, and each Government declared it had no enemy to build against.

Mrs. Pethick-Lawrence, returning to her famous rôle as collector of funds, appealed for the one or two hundred pounds still required to see the Women's Peace Crusade through the election campaign. "It is only people like ourselves multiplied by the million", she said, "who can change the mental atmosphere and transform public opinion.

Dr. Alice Salomon, of Germany, a vice president of the international Council of Women, said those living in peaceful surroundings could hardly imagine what it meant for Germans to read about the riots that had just occured in Berlin, where in times of so-called peace men, women, and children were killed in what might be called a civil war. Peace between nations could never be achieved as long as there was war between classes, parties and individuals in a nation, nor could there be real peace within a nation till there was peace, and understanding between countries. To bring peace within or without more than treaties were required. A disarmament of souls was needed, and it was much less difficult to bring this about in a nation of victors than in a defeated nation that had seen tremendous changes within the last ten years.

"You will agree", she said "that the German Republic has made a wonderful attempt to be loyal to the ideas of peace in the most difficult and heartrending circumstances. I think we are the only country in the world which has pledged itself in its Constitution to bring up its children to work for peace, the only country in this world of glittering armies that is entirely disarmed ".

Dr. Salomon congratulated the Women's Peace Crusade on its pledge to work for the withdrawal of the armies on the Rhine. Their presence was the greatest impediment to the spiritual disarmament of Germany. "The children in the Rhineland who are just leaving school", she said, "have never known a day when they were not surrounded by soldiers to remind them of war".

STATEMENT ON THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE LIBERAL PARTY, ISSUED BY THE LIBERAL PUBLICATION DEPARTMENT, LONDON, MAY 23, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, May 24, 1929)

"The primary object of Liberal foreign policy is to abolish war as a method of settling international disputes from the face of the earth". Thus begins an "authorised statement" outlining

the foreign policy of the Liberal party issued by the Liberal Publication Department in London, to which are appended the names of Mr. Lloyd George, Earl Beauchamp, Sir Herbert Samuel, Sir Charles Hobhouse, and Lady Acland. The nine points of Liberal foreign policy set forth in the statement embrace the following : —

1) To use and strengthen the existing treaties for the prevention of war and the pacific settlement of international disputes.

2) To maintain a vigorous initiative at Geneva in promoting those political and humanitarian activities which the League has so conspicuously fostered.

3) To work for an early, large, and all-round reduction of armaments.

4) To sign the "optional clause" by which all "justiciable" disputes are referred to the Court of International Justice at the Hague, with the necessary reservation regarding differences between members of the British Commonwealth of Nations.

5) To accept and apply the principle of the peaceful settlement of all international disputes of every kind by conciliation, arbitration, or reference to the Permanent Court of International Justice.

6) To accept naval parity with the United States in the spirit and in the letter, and to consider what changes should be made in international law relating to neutral and belligerent rights at sea.

7) To develop pacific procedure through the League of Nations whereby defects in the treaties of peace or in other international treaties can be raised without imputation of unfriendliness, and fairly considered with a view to their revision by agreement.

8) To re-establish normal political and economic relations with Russia at the earliest possible date on the basis of the non-interference of each country in the domestic affairs of the other.

9) To do all in its power to reduce tariff and other hindrances to international trade to the absolute minimum.

MEMOIRE DE L'UNION CATHOLIQUE D'ETUDES INTERNATIONALES SUR LE TRAVAIL FORCÉ, FRIBOURG, MAI 1929.

L'Union Catholique d'Etudes Internationales approuve le projet d'une convention par laquelle les Etats, membres de l'Organisation Internationale du Travail, s'obligeraient à restreindre le recours au travail forcé aux cas où il est jugé absolument nécessaire, et à l'entourer de règles dont l'application tendrait à

en rendre les conditions vraiment humaines, en attendant qu'on puisse ne plus user que d'une main-d'œuvre libre. Elle déclare qu'une telle convention en contribuant à détruire des formes de travail qui entraînent souvent « des conditions analogues à l'esclavage » correspondrait pleinement à l'esprit de l'article 23 du Pacte et de la convention du 25 septembre 1926.

Elle y voit le moyen efficace de tenir compte, dans le développement économique des territoires, des facultés actuelles de travail de leur population, et d'étendre à tous les travailleurs du monde entier les règles de droit qui réalisent la « protection des travailleurs ». Partout où elles ont été introduites, ces règles, qui ne sont pour la plupart que l'application aux relations nées du travail, des principes de la morale sociale chrétienne, ont été fécondes en résultats. Elles ont permis d'améliorer sérieusement les conditions du travail ; elles ont contribué au développement de l'hygiène et à l'amélioration de la santé des populations ouvrières ; elles ont rendu possibles leur éducation économique, leur relèvement moral ainsi que le respect de la vie de la famille.

Voilà pourquoi l'*Union* donne son approbation complète à l'adoption par la XII[e] Conférence Internationale du Travail d'un questionnaire détaillé destiné à préparer la susdite convention.

L'*Union* souscrit sans réserve :

1° Au principe de l'interdiction du travail forcé ou obligatoire pour des fins d'intérêt privé. Nul ne peut être contraint, fût-ce par des voies indirectes, de mettre son activité au service d'une entreprise privée ne travaillant que pour des intérêts privés, quelle que soit par ailleurs l'importance de cette entreprise pour la prospérité et le développement économique d'une région.

2° Au principe que le travail forcé, lorsqu'il est appliqué à des fins d'intérêt public, ne doit être autorisé qu'après qu'ont été vérifiées les conditions d'absolue nécessité qui seules peuvent rendre légitime le recours à cette forme de contrainte. Les quatre conditions énumérées dans le projet de questionnaire (nécessité, urgence, défaut de main-d'œuvre volontaire, compatibilité avec les forces de la génératiion présente), lui paraissent les conditions essentielles, à la fois nécessaires et suffisantes, pour que l'autorité publique soit fondée, à titre exceptionnel, à recourir à ce travail.

3° Au principe qui, déniant aux autorités locales indigènes ou européennes le droit d'ordonner ce recours au travail forcé, réserve cette autorisation à l'autorité supérieure du territoire et lui en fait assumer la responsabilité sous le contrôle, qui va de soi, de l'Etat métropolitain dont dépendrait éventuellement ladite autorité.

L'*Union* estime nécessaire qu'au cours de son exécution ce travail soit entouré de toutes les précautions et garanties qui

en rendent les conditions justes et humaines. Le travail, qu'il soit forcé ou qu'il soit libre, quels que soient l'origine, la race ou le degré de civilisation des travailleurs, ne peut jamais être considéré comme une marchandise, ainsi que l'a affirmé l'art. 427 du Traité, Charte de l'Organisation internationale du Travail. Il faut toujours, comme l'a dit Léon XIII dans l'Encyclique « Rerum Novarum » du 15 mai 1891, que dans le travailleur soit respectée la dignité de l'homme.

En conséquence, des règles doivent être posées, munies de sanctions précises et suffisamment sévères pour être efficaces, qui, dans le recrutement des travailleurs et dans l'exécution du travail, sauvegarderont à la fois le bien commun des collectivités qui fournissent la main-d'œuvre et les droits essentiels de ces travailleurs.

A. — Recrutement

Il faut obtenir notamment que des mesures soient prises pour que la réquisition ne risque pas de retomber plusieurs fois de suite, à de mêmes intervalles, sur les mêmes individus;

pour que ni la durée de cette réquisition, ni l'éloignement du lieu d'habitation ne soient excessifs ;

pour que le transport des travailleurs du lieu d'habitation au chantier ne soit autorisé que si les conditions de célérité et de confort correspondent aux prescriptions imposées par l'administration responsable ;

pour que le recrutement ne porte que sur des individus reconnus capables de supporter le travail dans les conditions où il doit s'accomplir, à l'exclusion des inaptes, des vieillards, des femmes et des enfants ;

qu'en conséquence un examen médical préalable écarte tous les individus atteints d'une maladie contagieuse et tous ceux qui ne présenteraient pas les aptitudes physiques requises par les conditions dans lesquelles doivent s'exécuter les travaux exigés;

pour qu'en aucun cas ne soit imposé aux travailleurs un changement de climat ou d'alimentation auquel ils risqueraient de ne pouvoir s'adapter facilement malgré les précautions prises pour ménager la transition et favoriser cette adaptation ;

pour que soient exemptés du recrutement les soldats, les chefs, les fonctionnaires de l'administration indigène,

ainsi que tous les individus qui sont déjà liés par un contrat de travail en cours d'exécution,

et tout le personnel des écoles, professeurs et élèves, ainsi que les catéchistes.

Il faut que des mesures soient prises pour que le recrutement des travailleurs ne se produise pas à un moment où la collectivité dont ils font partie, a besoin de leur présence pour l'exécution des travaux nécessaires à sa subsistance et à son dévelop-

pement normal, notamment en certaines périodes de travaux agricoles saisonniers ;

pour que le nombre des travailleurs formant le contingent réquisitionné, ne dépasse pas la proportion compatible avec les nécessités de la vie normale de cette collectivité ;

et pour que leur éloignement momentané ne compromette pas leur vie familiale.

Il faudrait rédiger le questionnaire, puis le projet de convention, de telle sorte que soient énumérés avec précision les différents cas d'exemption qui donneraient le droit de se refuser à cette réquisition, et qu'un recours soit ouvert devant une juridiction aisément accessible, qui constatera l'existence des motifs sur lesquels se fonde cette exemption.

B. — **Conditions de travail**

Les conditions de ce travail lui-même doivent être telles que ne soient mises en danger ni la santé, ni la moralité des travailleurs ;

que, notamment, les conditions de logement et d'alimentation leur soient assurées d'une manière aussi voisine que possible de leurs habitudes, et soient en tous cas soigneusement adaptées au climat, au genre de travail et aux prescriptions d'une saine hygiène ;

que des repos suffisants leur soient ménagés au cours de la journée de travail de façon à assurer leur adaptation à un travail régulier, continu et monotone dont ils n'ont pas l'habitude et à éviter un excès de fatigue qui risque d'amener un incurable surmenage dont les suites retomberaient sur la collectivité indigène ;

que la journée de travail soit limitée en principe à une durée moyenne de huit heures, ou à une durée inférieure toutes les fois que l'exigeraient les conditions dans lesquelles s'effectue ce travail ;

que soit assuré le repos de la nuit ainsi que le repos hebdomadaire dont la nécessité a été universellement reconnue, et proclamée en 1921 par la III[e] Conférence Internationale du Travail ;

que soit garantie au travailleur la liberté de remplir les devoirs de son culte, au jour fixé par celui-ci toutes les fois où il ne sera pas possible de faire coïncider le repos hebdomadaire avec le jour déterminé par sa religion ;

qu'un salaire satisfaisant aux exigences de la justice, c'est-à-dire au moins suffisant pour assurer la subsistance du travailleur et de sa famille, lui soit alloué et remis périodiquement dans des conditions telles que la propriété lui en soit garantie et que soit encouragée et rendue possible la pratique de l'épargne ;

qu'en cas de maladie ou d'accident toutes les précautions

soient prises pour assurer immédiatement au travailleur les soins requis par son état;

qu'en conséquence les groupements de travailleurs puissent recevoir la visite régulière du médecin dont la présence permanente serait exigée pour tous les groupements importants;

que le rapatriement des malades et des blessés au lieu d'habitation dans les meilleures conditions possibles de célérité et de confort soit imposé à l'administration compétente;

qu'une équitable indemnité vienne, en cas d'incapacité de travail temporaire ou permanente, compenser au moins une partie notable des salaires perdus;

qu'en cas de décès la subsistance des membres de la famille du travailleur soit assurée.

Toutes ces mesures ne seront efficaces qu'à condition qu'une surveillance méthodique soit confiée à un corps d'inspecteurs comprenant à la fois des médecins et des administrateurs, et que des sanctions soient appliquées dans tous les cas d'infractions constatées.

L'*Union* croit devoir attirer l'attention de la Conférence sur la nécessité d'introduire dans le questionnaire des clauses qui permettent de garantir au travailleur le respect de sa vie morale et religieuse, de ses coutumes ancestrales et de sa vie familiale. Il est important qu'en aucun cas la pratique du travail forcé, lorsqu'elle est jugée nécessaire, ne vienne compromettre ni l'équilibre et le développement économique de la société indigène, ni les conditions essentielles de la vie des collectivités naturelles auxquelles appartient le travailleur : famille, village ou tribu.

Au Nom de l'Union Catholique
d'Etudes Internationales

Le Secrétaire, GREMAUD. — *Le Président,* G. DE REYNOLD.

SPEECH OF MR. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, LONDON, LUNCHEON TO THE LIBERAL CANDIDATES, MARCH 1, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, Mareh 2, 1929)

"And as for foreign policy, quite frankly, the inflnence of this country abroad has gone down beyond anything I have seen in my time. I am all for being friendly with France, but we are not a French province. If it is a proposal for peace you have got to wait until you hear what France has got to say. If it is a proposal for armaments you must listen until you know what the French Minister has got to say.

"Britain has no voice of its own. It has no soul of its own.

But the British Empire is an independent concern and has something to say for itself in the councils of humanity. (Cheers). Sir Austen Chamberlain—and I am very glad he is better, because it enables me to say these things—said last week that there were people in France who said that M. Briand was in the pocket of Sir Austen Chamberlain. I said, 'What a clever man! And what a simple man poor Sir Austen is!' He made a most remarkable speech, did Sir Austen Chamberlain, one of the most beautiful I have ever listened to, except that by his brother in the House of Commons when he talked about the perfection of his bill. He said. "When I first of all looked through the windows of the Foreign Office at the world—(laughter)—I saw confusion, darkness, chaos. Now that I have been looking after it for five years—(laughter)—order, light, security'. I never read anything like it since I read the first chapter of Genesis. (Laughter). He was looking through the windows of the Foreign Office. Let him rub his eyeglass and take another look. (Laughter.)

"Eastern Europe, Does he see nothing there? Central Europe —is there nothing to disturb him there? The strained feeling in the United States of America since the Anglo-French Pact-does he see nothing there? Mussolini, with a much more realistic vision, said the other day that he signed all these pretentious papers and he said. 'When I have signed them they are always followed by an increase in armaments.' On sea and land and in the air they are preparing.

"Now Sir Austen Chamberlain says they do it because they feel more secure than ever. Let him take another real look through his windows and I think he will marvel at his self-complacency. There they are, and I do not believe you have ever seen in the whole history of this country a number of people who have made a greater hash of their joh. They have taken rather to abusing their own supporters.

STATEMENT OF MR. ELIHU ROOT, GENEVA, MARCH 20, 1929.

The Committee of Jurists appointed by the Council of the League last December to make a preliminary study of the World Court Statute, with a view to the introduction of any amendments which experience may have shown to be necessary, has completed its labours, after sixteen sessions of the full Committee, characterised by very thorough discussion, which resulted in complete agreement.

The duty suggested for the Committee at the time of its appointment was to consider whether the actual experience of the

Court during the past eight years suggested improvements in the Statute, to facilitate the future operation of the Court.

In the year 1920 when the Court Statute was devised by a Committee similar to the one which has just been in session, the undertaking was largely experimental. There never had been such a court as this in the world, and the Committee of 1920 had to base its provisions upon a knowledge of national courts, a knowledge of international affairs, and a conception of the nature of the judicial process. This Committee of 1929 has had to test the conclusions of the earlier Committee by applying the lessons of eight years of actual application.

It is gratifying to find that the Committee of 1929 has found that in substance the improvements in the Statute which they were able to recommend consisted in changes required by the unexpectedly rapid development of the Court's business, a general recognition of the usefullness of the Court in disposing of some critically dangerous controversies seems to have made the existence of the Court a factor in the thought of both sides of most international controversies, and the tendency to resolve such controversies by an appeal to the Court has increased so that instead of being a Court to be called upon occasionally in case of need, it has become an almost continuous tribunal, like the great national courts of the civilised world. Accordingly, the lessons which the Committee of 1929 has had to apply have been the lessons, not of failure, but of success. The recommendations made by the Committee have been designed to increase in various ways the capacity of the Court for meeting this larger demand for its service.

Shortly before the meeting of the Committee, the Secretary-General of the League received a letter from the Secretary of State of the United States of America regarding the proposed adherence of the United States to the Protocol of the Court. This letter commented upon certain conclusions reached by the signatories to the Protocol at a conference held in Geneva, September 23rd, 1926. The letter indicated some reasons why the conclusions of that conference could not be accepted as a whole and suggested that a further informal exchange of views, as contemplated by the Conference, might lead to some provision which in unobjectionable form would protect the rights and interests of the United States as an adherent to the Court Statute, and the letter concluded by saying : « this expectation is strongly supported by the fact that there seems to be but little difference regarding the substance of these rights and interests »

The Council of the League referred Mr. Kellog's letter to the Committee of Jurists for an expression of opinion, this calling upon the Committee to review the whole subject. The Committee accordingly made a careful study of the views of the signatories to the Protocol of the Court, expressed in the Final Act of their Conference of September, 1926, and of the views

expressed by the Government of the United States, and it found that Mr. Kellogg was justified in intimating that there did indeed appear to be no real difference on any matter of substance between the signatories to the Protocol and the United States. The only thing necessary appeared to the Committee to be the establishment of a method of procedure through which the intentions of both the United States and the signatories of the World Court Protocol, about which there is no difference or dispute, could be applied with promptness and certainty, in case the United States adheres to the Statute.

The Committee has framed a brief agreement, based upon the conclusions of the Signatories' Conference of September, 1926, and upon the reservations of the United States Government embodied in the Senate Resolution of January 27 th, 1926. This agreement, in the form of a protocol to be annexed to the Statute of the Court, will, in the opinion of the Committee, protect the interests of all parties concerned, in the practical application of undisputed principles of action. This proposed protocol has been, or is about to be, communieated to all parties concerned.

The cordial expressions by all parties now supporting the Court of an evidently sincere wish for the cooperation of the United States justify a hope for a favourable consideration of this proposed agreement on their part and the terms of Mr Kellogg's letter inspire a similar hope as to the action of the United States ».

DISCOURS DE M. LOUIS DE BROUCKERE, AU NOM DE L'INTERNATIONALE OUVRIERE SOCIALISTE, ET REPONSE DU JONKHEER DR. J. LOUDON, PRESIDENT DE LA COMMISSION PREPARATOIRE DE LA CONFERENCE DU DESARMEMENT, GENEVE, LE 15 AVRIL 1929.

Discours de M. de Brouckhere

Monsieur le Président,

C'est au nom de l'Internationale ouvrière socialiste que nous sommes venus vous trouver.

Nous venons signaler à votre bienveillante attention les milliers et les milliers de pétitions qui vous ont été adressées de tous les coins du monde et qui toutes demandent à la Commission préparatoire de hâter ses travaux afin que la promesse de désarmement si solennellement faite à tous les peuples du monde soit enfin tenue.

Croyez bien, Monsieur le Président, que les pétitionnaires ne méconnaissent pas les difficultés de la tâche que vos collègues

et vous-même avez assumée. Peut-être voudrez-vous bien vous rappeler que celui qui parle aujourd'hui en leur nom a eu l'honneur de collaborer à vos côtés et sous votre haute direction à cette œuvre ardue. Il sait, d'expérience, combien d'obstacles s'accumulent sur votre chemin. Il sait que l'élaboration d'une convention internationale de désarmement est sans doute ce qu'il y a de plus compliqué et de plus délicat dans cette organisation juridique et politique de la paix qui est le but même de la Société des Nations. Ces considérations nous incitent à la patience mais cette prudence nous serait sans doute plus facile si nous n'éprouvions pas de si graves inquiétudes quant à l'aboutissement même des travaux.

Certes les efforts de votre Commission n'ont pas été dépensés en vain. Ses nombreuses études, celles de ses sous-commissions et de ses comités, si elles n'ont pas mené à l'accord entre tous les experts, ont prouvé du moins que le désarmement est techniquement possible et qu'il existe des méthodes concrètes et précises permettant de le mener à bien. Ce qui déconcerte l'opinion, c'est que, justement depuis la découverte de ces méthodes les travaux paraissent arrêtés. Comment ne pas aboutir à cette conclusion que ce sont des raisons politiques désormais qui empêchent de réaliser l'accord nécessaire des bonnes volontés.

Vous avez, Monsieur le Président, prononcé de fortes paroles au cours de la dernière session de l'Assemblée. Vous avez fait appel aux peuples et il semble bien en effet que sans leur volonté agissante on ne pourra sortir de la situation dangereuse qui a été créée.

C'est cette volonté agissante des peuples que nous avons voulu contribuer à exprimer en organisant notre pétitionnement. C'est un mouvement d'opinions que nous voulons susciter. Une opinion publique internationale qui l'inspire est aussi indispensable à la Société de Genève qu'une opinion nationale aux Gouvernements des Etats modernes. Sans elle, rien ne se peut faire de grand, de durable et de fécond. C'est en se manifestant, en se faisant entendre et en se faisant écouter, que l'Assemblée des Gouvernements pourra dans le sens le plus réel et le plus noble du mot devenir la Société des Nations.

Nous sommes convaincus, Monsieur le Président, que nos pétitionnaires expriment fidèlement l'opinion publique. Celle-ci veut dans son immense majorité qu'on aille d'un pas ferme vers le désarmement parce que la paix ne saurait jamais être solide dans un monde encore tout retentissant du bruit des armes et que l'intérêt de la paix est désormais l'intérêt suprême devant lequel toute autre considération doit céder. L'opinion veut la paix. Elle ne cessera pas d'exprimer sa volonté avec une force grandissante jusqu'à ce qu'elle ait obtenu satisfaction.

Voilà en peu de mots, Monsieur le Président, ce que nous voulions vous dire, et par vous, à la Commission, aux Gouver-

nements qui y sont représentés, à la Société des Nations dont elle émane. Il me reste l'agréable devoir de vous remercier pour la courtoisie de votre accueil. Puis-je vous dire aussi quel heureux souvenir je conserve de notre longue et active collaboration ?

Réponse du Jonkheer Loudon

Je vous remercie vivement de la démarche que vous avez bien voulu faire auprès de moi en ma qualité de Président. Rien ne saurait m'être plus agréable que d'entendre prononcer les paroles que vous venez de m'adresser par celui qui, pendant les années trop courtes de notre collaboration s'est toujours montré l'ardent, le plus actif, le plus intelligent champion de la réduction des armements.

Vous parlez au nom d'une des plus vastes associations ouvrières du monde. Ce matin encore vous avez pu m'entendre dire quel prix j'attache à une manifestation de plus en plus forte, de plus en plus étendue de la volonté des peuples en vue de stimuler l'action des gouvernements pour aboutir à une véritable réduction et limitation des armements.

Notre tâche est ardue, elle est de longue haleine. Il lui faut le soutien de l'opinion publique, la volonté agissante des peuples. Sans eux les gouvernements, très naturellement retenus par des raisons de politique, sont incapables de faire tout ce que nous sentons que l'humanité, meurtrie par la sanglante et ruineuse lutte d'il y a dix ans à peine, réclame d'eux.

L'opinion publique, dites-vous, veut la paix. En général oui, j'en suis convaincu, mais dans l'opinion publique il y a encore trop de facteurs belliqueux. Ce qui pourra nous aider au-dessus de tout, c'est, comme je le disais ce matin, la foi des jeunes, des générations nouvelles dans la possibilité de régler les conflits internationaux qui pourraient surgir par la voie pacifique de la conciliation et de l'arbitrage. C'est de ce désarmement moral, secondé par les traités, pactes de non-agression et autres que dépend dans une large mesure le succès de nos efforts. Je crois que des associations comme celle que vous représentez pourront faire énormément dans cette voie. Continuez-donc, Messieurs, continuez aussi à stimuler les gouvernements et permettez-moi de vous dire que la Commission préparatoire aura tout lieu de voir en vous, en votre labeur incessant, en l'influence que vous exercerez, des auxiliaires puissants.

LETTER OF LORD CECIL OF CHELWOOD TO A CORRESPONDENT, APRIL, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, May 1, 1929)

You ask for my advice as to how you are to vote at this election. The natural reply would be to advise you to vote for the candidate of my party, since our Constitution as it now exists is based on the party system. That is what I should have said in normal times. But the times are not normal. As I see the situation, the country, nay civilisation itself, is still threatened with an overwhelming catastrophe. If there is another war like the last there is no ascertainable limit to the disasters which may ensue. There was not a great margin between us and destruction in 1918 when the Armistice was signed. Had the war gone on for another year or two it is doubtful if the economic system of the country would have survived in spite of victory. Even as it is, the fact that we have more than a million unemployed shows how heavily we suffered. That is the material damage : the moral and religious injury to us and to the world was perhaps as great and infinitely more lamentable.

In other nations wich bore the full brunt of the war, men are as anxious for the future as they are or ought to be here. To me, then, the question which immeasurably transcends in importance all ordinary political issues is : Can we erect trustworthy barriers against war before it is too late ? We have not unlimited time to accomplish the necessary work. If it is not done before the recollection of the realities of war has faded it will not be done at all. A vigorous and progressive peace policy is literally vital to every one of us.

Therefore my counsel is, disregarding all party ties, to vote only for candidates who can be trusted to stand for such a policy. In some cases the choice may not be easy. Perhaps the following indications may help. The personality of the candidate should count for much. Where one of them has rendered personal service to the cause of peace, that would give him a strong claim. He may have been prominent in the activities of the League of Nations Union ; he may have preached peace in Parliament, on the platform, and in the press ; he may even have worked at Geneva in the organs of the League. But in many constituencies so much may be said for none—or all—of the candidates. In that case the political programme of each of them should be studied. Do they accept without reserve the memorandum of policy issued by the League of Nations Union ? Are they whole-heartedly in favour of international arbitration and disarmament ? Will they energetically support the League itself and the International Labour Office, and resist any attempt to hinder their usefulness by cutting off their supplies ?

Will they show the same conviction and devotion in the cause of peace as our fellow-countrymen did in confronting war ?

Finally, if all the candidates pass these tests equally, electors must consider and compare the programmes of the parties to which they belong and the records, professions, and personalities of their leaders. It is on these principles that I recommend you to cast your vote, remembering that war is equally the enemy of stability and of progress, and that without peace the objects and ideals of Conservatism, of Labour, and of Liberalism are alike unattainable.—Yours, etc.

CECIL.

SPEECH OF MR. DAVID LLOYD GEORGE, LONDON, MAY 9, 1929.

(The Manchester Guardian, May 10, 1929)

Mr. Lloyd George was greeted by ten thousand Liberal women at the Albert Hall, London, last night, and the speech was relayed to sixteen other meetings in twelve towns in different parts of the country. Miss Nancy Samuel, the 22-year-old daughter of Sir Herbert Samuel, presided.

Mr. Lloyd George said that in common with his colleagues he had visited a great many parts of the country.

There are a million more women voters than men. There is nothing alarming in that—(laughter)—not even to men. There are no women's questions that ought not equally to concern the men, and there are no men's questions that ought not equally to concern women. What's best for each is best for both ; what's best for both is best for each. All the same women had their own special knowledge, experience, and outlook which constituted a really independent contribution to the solution of the issues with which statesmanship was confronted. There were many questions of vital moment where it was essential that the voice, attitude, vision, and sympathy of women should be brought in to help in their solution. Take that all important question of peace and war.

I have many a time wondered what would have happened in Europe in 1914 if Germany, Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Serbia, France, Italy, and Britain, had conferred the franchise upon their women. I believe the story of the nations would have been a different one. The great progressive movement that was dealing with the social evils of the people would not have been arrested, would not have been flung back. We would have had peace. (Cheers). Is there nothing more that women can do to help the cause of peace? Everything! The real key was not treaties, pacts, or covenants, but disarmament. Are you prepa-

ring for war or are you resting on peace? Those are the questions that women must force Governments to solve.

In spite of the blessing of the League of Nations, the Treaty of Locarno, and the Kellogg Pact, we have more formidable armies in Europe to-day than in 1914, more destructive navies, and air forces. The temple of peace is being built of paper—adorned, frescoed, glittering,—but paper. Every new wing which is added to it with great ceremony when it is opened is constructed of paper. The temple of war on the other hand is of solid steel—yea, and its pillars are solid gold. We are spending a million a year on the service of the temple of peace. All the nations contribute between them somewhere about that figure—grudgingly.

We are spending in this country £114,000,000 on the service of the other temple, and Europe and the world are spending hundreds of millions on perfecting the methods of slaughter. The pacts, covenants, treaties are all filed on bayonets, and the biting steel is gleaming through them. Women must put an end to that (Applause).

Look at what the present Government has done, full of professions of their attachment to the cause of peace. A disarmament conference had been sitting at Geneva for years—a stupid farce, paralysed, dragging its limbs through the corridors and committee-rooms at Geneva, doing nothing, a pitiable spectacle. Are you going to depend on armed forces or upon judgment? Women should take this matter in hand. They should go to that commission at Geneva and ask the men engaged there if they were sweeping the room or simply creating a dust.

When Viscount Cecil appealed to the Government to sign the Optional Clause, which meant that every legal question at issue between nations should be referred to arbitration, the Government replied that the suggestion was too risky. Moreover, the Government did not accept the Kellogg Pact except with reservations. That was the way the Government had advanced the cause of peace.

The cause of peace has gone back, and women must take the matter in hand. (Hear, hear.) Woman is the maker of peace. (Applause).

It is no good for Labour Ministers to go to Geneva and make grandiloquent speeches on peace and then come home with the proposal to lay down five strong and powerful cruisers. That is not the way to make peace. (Cheers.) The next war will be an indiscriminating war. The next war will not be for the fighting men alone.

A Voice: There won't be another war.

Mr. Lloyd George: That will depend on what women do. If women return a Government like this one, who trifle and falter with the question of peace, nothing will prevent another terrible catastrophe. Women must take it in hand at once.

The dominant issue of this election was the return of a Parliament who would place first disarmament here and in the world as an urgent, insistent, and continuous duty. In the second place, they wanted a Parliament that would see that there was a Government who would press for the substitution of arbitration in international disputes for war.

SI NOUS PARLIONS DE GENÈVE, PAR M. J.-PAUL BONCOUR.

(L'Œuvre du 19 mai 1929)

Tout est aux experts ; et c'est bien naturel ; depuis de trop longues semaines nos nerfs sont tendus et nos yeux fixés sur la peau de chagrin dont on nous a fait cadeau ; nous mesurons la faute d'avoir coupé dans le bobard des « experts indépendants », comme si tôt ou tard tout ne devait pas se régler sur le terrain politique.

Du moins, sur celui-là, restons fermes et, quand se posera l'inévitable question de l'évacuation rhénane, ne lâchons pas le contrôle international, à l'idée duquel les grandes puissances ont tant de mal à s'habituer. Tellement même que, pour aboutir, il a fallu céder là-dessus lors de cette dernière session de la Commission préparatoire à Genève, dont les experts ne doivent pas nous faire négliger les succès comme aussi les insuffisances afin de consolider les uns et de corriger les autres.

Car il faut agir ; il faut mener campagne. Sans contrôle international, pas de limitation possible des stocks de mobilisation et, sans cette limitation, où est le désarmement ? Où les économies ? Où l'allègement des charges militaires espéré par les peuples ?

Il ne faudra pas se lasser de proclamer cette vérité, d'affirmer ce lien. Il ne faut jamais se lasser d'avoir raison. Notre double succès sur le mode de limitation navale et sur celui des effectifs terrestres en est bien la preuve. Pendant trois années, que d'assauts il a fallu repousser ! Et ces campagnes de presse étrangère qui se déclenchaient comme sur un coup de baguette d'un invisible chef d'orchestre ; c'est ma fierté de n'avoir pas fléchi.

Sous prétexte que l'Allemagne a dû subir dans le traité de Versailles un certain mode de limitation, — d'ailleurs fort contestable et en partie inopérant du fait des organisations libres, qui suppléent à l'incorporation obligatoire dans un pays qui a le goût de la discipline et de l'éducation militaire, — il ne s'agissait de rien moins que d'imposer le même à des nations qui, pour une foule de raisons militaires et politiques dont elles sont juges, n'entendent pas renoncer à l'obligation et à l'éga-

lité du service militaire. En même temps qu'une atteinte intolérable à leur souveraineté, c'eût été enterrer pour toujours le désarmement en le subordonnant à des formes inadmissibles pour elles.

Quel illogisme, d'ailleurs, et quelle injustice de prétendre limiter les citoyens armés que pourra utiliser un pays quand ayant vainement épuisé les procédures de conciliation et d'arbitrage, il devra mobiliser toutes ses forces, alors qu'on ne limite pas et qu'on ne peut pas limiter les navires marchands qui, tout aussitôt armeront en course, alors qu'on ne limite pas et qu'on ne peut pas limiter les avions de transport qui ne transporteront plus que des bombes, alors qu'on ne limite pas et qu'on ne peut pas limiter les usines et la main-d'œuvre qui deviendront des usines et de la main-d'œuvre de guerre. Ah ! c'est que l'idée du « potentiel de guerre » n'est pas une fantaisie de l'esprit, une habileté de procédure, c'est une réalité évidente et troublante. Les réserves équilibrent les bateaux, les avions, les usines, les minerais, les produits chimiques, les ressources démographiques et géographiques, économiques qui sont autant d'éléments de supériorité possible et qui ne peuvent pourtant être l'objet d'aucune limitation et d'aucune convention.

Bornons donc nos efforts à ce qui est limitable et contrôlable et qui, d'ailleurs, constitue le fardeau immédiat, le plus lourd, celui dont les peuples ont un besoin pressant d'être allégés : les armements permanents du temps de paix, effectifs et matériel.

On se demande comment une idée aussi claire a eu tant de peine à être admise par la grande majorité des Etats membres de la Commission, comment elle est encore contestée par quelques-uns. Ce n'est qu'en l'affirmant, sans se lasser et sans céder, qu'elle a fini par être admise, et admise de telle sorte que la minorité ne peut se flatter sérieusement de pouvoir la remettre en cause devant la Conférence, ce qui est bien heureux pour la Conférence, car ce serait en assurer l'échec.

Il en sera de même pour le contrôle international. Il faut qu'il en soit de même. Car, si la limitation des effectifs présents sous les drapeaux peut, à l'extrême rigueur, se passer d'un contrôle international, — encore que par des artifices budgétaires le camouflage soit parfaitement possible, — la limitation du matériel et des stocks, elle, ne se conçoit pas sans ce contrôle. Or, la même force logique qui nous a fait triompher sur les réserves commande la limitation du matériel en usage dans les corps de troupe et du matériel stocké, puisque là nous sommes en plein dans ces armements permanents du temps de paix, ceux-là mêmes dont nous avons proclamé qu'ils étaient limitables et contrôlables. Nous ne pouvons nous dérober ni fléchir sans affaiblir l'ensemble de notre position.

Telle fut, d'ailleurs, toujours notre thèse. Sur ce point, pas de malentendu. A lire les comptes rendus de presse lors des

derniers travaux de la Commission préparatoire il eût semblé qu'en 1927 nous avions opposé la limitation des dépenses budgétaires à la limitation directe du matériel et des stocks. Non. Elles ne s'opposent pas, elles se complètent, et si, en 1927, nous avons pris une position très ferme sur la limitation des dépenses budgétaires, ce n'était pas pour écarter la limitation directe, mais parce que des résistances, hélas ! unanimes ou presque au contrôle international s'étaient déjà manifestées et que, la limitation directe étant inséparable du contrôle, à défaut de celle-ci nous demandions *au moins* la limitation des dépenses budgétaires.

Il semble que les grandes puissances ne veulent plus ni de l'une ni de l'autre.

Tout l'effort des démocraties, d'ici la Conférence, doit tendre à leur faire accepter l'une et l'autre.

DISCOURS DE M. LE PROFESSEUR WILLIAM RAPPARD, ZURICH, LE 16 MAI 1929.

(Journal de Genève du 21 mai 1929)

La section zuricoise de l'association suisse pour la S. d. N. a coutume de célébrer chaque année l'anniversaire du 16 mai par une manifestation publique de quelque envergure. Elle a eu cette fois-ci l'heureuse inspiration de faire appel, comme conférencier, à M. William Rappard, dont tous les milieux sympathiques à la cause de la paix suivent ici avec un vif intérêt l'activité internationale qui fait si grand honneur au pays.

Nul n'a oublié à Zurich la brillante intervention de l'orateur genevois dans le fameux débat de la Peter-Kirche qui précéda de peu l'adhésion de la Suisse à la S. d. N. Aussi l'annonce d'une conférence de M. Rappard avait-elle attiré dans la vieille salle des Zimmerleuten un auditoire de choix, composé en grande partie d'intellectuels. On y remarquait plusieurs professeurs universitaires et tout un groupe d ex-étudiants alémans de l'Université de Genève qui, venus pour applaudir leur ancien maître, eurent la satisfaction de le retrouver plus entraînant et plus en verve que jamais.

Dans son magistral exposé, dont Zurich a eu la primeur pour la Suisse, M. Rappard a retracé l'histoire du système des mandats au cours des dix années écoulées depuis la fin de la guerre. Après en avoir révélé la genèse à ses auditeurs, il en a écrit l'économie. Puis il a montré, par de nombreux exemples, la nature et l'importance du travail accompli, ainsi que des difficultés *suis generis* rencontrées par la Commission des man-

dats dont il est membre. Il s'est étonné, en s'en félicitant, de voir qu'à Zurich on paraissait être un peu moins indifférent qu'ailleurs en Suisse à l'égard d'un problème qui, pour ne pas nous toucher directement en apparence, n'est pas moins d'un intérêt capital pour la paix du monde. Il faut, à vrai dire, pour comprendre cela, une certaine imagination intellectuelle assez rare chez nous où l'horizon de l'esprit coïncide souvent avec celui des yeux.

Le président Wilson ne possédait, en 1918, aucun plan concernant la « liquidation des colonies dont on avait, dès l'origine, déclaré qu'elles ne pourraient, en aucun cas, être annexées par les conquérants ni rendues à leurs anciens maîtres, pas plus ailleurs qu'il n'eût été possible de leur accorder l'indépendance. C'est à Paris que Wilson fit connaissance avec les idées du général Smuts. Il s'en éprit et les fit siennes, d'autant plus volontiers que la création de mandats coloniaux soumis au contrôle de la S. d. N. avait l'avantage de donner à celle-ci une tâche positive qui allait obliger les chancelleries à compter avec elle. Par une singulière inconséquence, le même général Smuts, dont le projet témoignait d'un assez noble libéralisme, n'en prétendit pas moins annexer purement et simplement l'Ouest africain allemand, ce dont, comme de juste, Wilson ne voulut pas.

C'est à ce moment que s'élabora l'article 22 du Pacte, qui régit l'institution des mandats. Cet article fut rédigé par le secrétaire particulier de M. Lloyd George dans un style biblique, imité de Wilson, qui rappelle tout à fait hors de propos le ton de l'oraison dominicale. Le partage des colonies enlevées aux puissances centrales s'opéra ensuite, selon les lignes mêmes de la conquête, de sorte que chaque territoire fut dévolu, à titre de mandat, à celui des Alliés qui l'avait pris par les armes. Une exception fut faite, dans l'Est africain, en faveur de la Belgique, qui s'estimait lésée. Le terme de mandat, selon l'interprétation authentique qu'en donne M. Rappard, s'applique également aux pays confiés par la S. d. N. à la gérance d'une des nations victorieuses et à l'acte juridique sanctionnant et réglant cette attribution.

La puissance mandataire ne doit s'approprier d'aucune façon les bénéfices qui pourraient résulter de l'administration de la colonie. Elle doit y interdire l'esclavage, le trafic des armes et en assurer la démilitarisation. Mais si elle ne se conforme pas strictement à ces obligations et que des abus se produisent — et il s'en est produit, comme M. Rappard l'a montré — comment la S. d. N. interviendra-t-elle ? Voilà le point délicat du système et c'est ici que paraît la commission des mandats coloniaux. Celle-ci est chargée du contrôle. De quelle manière l'exercera-t-elle ? Quels sont ses pouvoirs et ses moyens d'action ? Les trois conditions d'une surveillance efficace sont évidemment l'indépendance des membres de la commission vis-à-

vis des puissance mandataires, leur impartialité, enfin la rapidité et la sûreté de leurs informations.

Tout cela semble, à première vue, la quadrature du cercle. La plupart des pays sont représentés à la commission des mandats par leurs ministres des affaires étrangères. Il est clair que la commission idéale serait celle dont les membres n'auraient aucune attache avec une puissance mandataire quelconque, ce qui est pratiquement irréalisable. Quant aux modalités de la surveillance, elles semblent offrir de plus grandes difficultés encore. Comment contrôler à distance et comment, surtout, obtenir des renseignements qui ne soient pas tendancieux, puisqu'il faut bien passer, pour les avoir, par les agents de la puissance directement intéressée ? On le voit, le problème paraît insoluble. Du reste, la commission des mandats est purement consultative. Incapable de contrôler la véracité des rapports qu'on lui soumet, elle se borne elle-même à renseigner le Conseil de la S. d. N., composé des plus hauts représentants des puissances mandataires. Comment la vérité pourrait-elle se faire jour, dans ces conditions, en cas d'accusation grave, et comment appliquer des sanctions ?

Pourtant, en dépit de tout, ainsi que M. Rappard l'a prouvé admirablement, le contrôle est réel et les sanctions sont efficaces. C'est qu'il ne faut pas négliger les facteurs moraux qui l'emportent ici, comme dans l'œuvre entière de la S. d. N., sur les facteurs matériels.

Les informations relatives à l'administration des mandats parviennent à la commission sous deux formes : les rapports envoyés par les fonctionnaires coloniaux supérieurs de la puissance mandataire et les pétitions de la population indigène. En théorie, rien n'empêche d'admettre que les rapports puissent être mensongers et les pétitions cuisinées ou même interceptées. En pratique, de telles manœuvres sont inconcevables, car la puissance qui y recourrait se déshonorerait à ses propres yeux, sans compter que tôt ou tard la vérité sera connue, vu que les scandales coloniaux sont toujours éventés et exploités par les oppositions parlementaires, ainsi que le prouve surabondamment l'histoire de l'Europe au XIX^e^ siècle. C'est pourquoi, par parenthèse, il est si important que les puissances investies de mandats soient des puissances libérales où le contrôle de l'opinion ne soit pas jugulé par la raison d'Etat. On ne conçoit pas, par exemple, en ce moment, un mandat italien.

Au reste, depuis qu'un jour le commissaire de la Palestine a tenu à venir exposer lui-même, devant la commission, ses méthodes administratives, le contact est devenu beaucoup plus étroit entre les mandants et l'autorité de contrôle, car tous les pays ont suivi cet exemple. La compétence de la commission est donc reconnue par les puissances mandataires, de même que son action est renforcée par la surveillance que ces dernières exercent les unes et les autres. Par une réaction natu-

relle des amour-propres nationaux et l'effet d'une sorte d'émulation de la bonne foi qui attestent l'invincible puissance des forces morales dans la société humaine, les abus signalés tendent à corriger d'eux-mêmes, sans que les membres de la commission prennent la peine d'aller, comme quelques-uns l'ont fait, visiter les colonies. Quoi qu'en prétendent les adversaires de la S. d. N. c'est par de tels impondérables que, de plus en plus, se gouverne le monde.

La place nous manque pour résumer ici la substancielle discussion qui suivit l'exposé chaleureusement applaudi de M. Rappard. Y ont pris part MM. Wenger, avocat, Klötzli, rédacteur à la *Nouvelle Gazette de Zurich*, Schlindler et Fleiner, professeur à l'Université. Ce dernier, dont M. Rappard avait rappelé les belles conférences faites récemment à Genève, a souligné le rôle joué par les missions catholiques dans les pays du proche Orient. Les questions soulevées par ces divers orateurs ont permis à M. Rappard de préciser sa pensée sur un certain nombre de points, en particulier sur l'attribution éventuelle d'un mandat à l'Allemagne.

SPEECH OF LORD CECIL OF CHELWOOD, PARIS, MAY 29, 1929.

(The Arbitrator, July, 1929)

Viscount Cecil of Chelwood addressed a meeting in the hall of the Institut Océanographique, Paris, on May 29th, on the organisation of peace in Europe. Lord Cecil referred to the progress made by the League of Nations as a part of the machinery of peace during the ten years which had elapsed since it was founded. Deserted by its original parents, and regarded by the rest of the world as an interesting foundling, it had become a vigorous adolescent. The League, as it now was, had developed from two great principles, the one being the solidarity of nations, whose interest was greater than their hostility, and the other a genuine desire on the part of mankind for peace. Many of the questions which came before the League in Geneva were proof of this solidarity, among them the matters dealt with by the Opium Conference and the Economic Conference. Fear remained the principal obstacle in the desire for peace and it was an element with which the League was not able to deal. The League, however, could delay and discuss, it could provide the machinery for arbitration, and could impose outlawry, and it could promote the reduction of armaments, which were in effect the three principles afterwards discovered by Mr. MacDonald and M. Herriot as Arbitration, Security, and Disarmament.

The establishment of the Permanent Court had already had an immense success in the prevention of wars, and it had been supplemented by the Briand-Kellogg Pact, but there were gaps in the structure which must be filled up. The Pact was only a beginning. While it gave an indication of the way to arbitration it still provided no machinery for carrying it out. Lord Cecil went on to say that, with the great exception of Locarno, little progress had been made towards security, but disarmament, apart from Washington, had made considerable strides, the preparatory work at Geneva being full of hope, especially with regard to naval disarmament. In a concluding survey of the great advances made since the institution of the League, he referred to the necessity for developing the arbitration side of the peace problem, and lai particular emphasis on the duty of the nations to keep the peace now that their right to it was safeguarded by Article II of the Covenant. He also appealed for support for the voluntary League societies, which acted as links between the representatives at Geneva and public opinion at home. In this respect there was great opportunity for development.

REDE VON LORD CECIL OF CHELWOOD, BERLIN, 6. JUNI 1929.

(Volkerbund, Berlin, Juni-Juli 1929).

LORD CECIL ÜBER ABRUSTUNG

Im Rahmen der Veranstaltungen des Komitees für internationale Aussprache sprach am 6. Juni Lord Robert Cecil in Berlin über die Abrüstung. Man sah bei der glänzend besuchten Versammlung im Plenarsaal des Reichstages den englischen Botschafter und Lady Rumbold, den Reichstagspräsidenten Löbe, Kultusminister Becker, die Reichsminister von Guérard und Dr. Wirth, den früheren Botschafter in Japan Dr. Solf, General a. D. von Seeckt, Professor Einstein uud viele andere führende Köpfe aus Berliner geistigen und politischen Kreisen.

Reichsminister a. D. *Koch*-Weser bezeichnete in seiner Begrüssungsansprache es als die Aufgabe der ganzen Welt, die Nebel, die noch über der Völkerverständigung schweben, zu zerstreuen. Der sei ein schlechter Staatsmann, der gesagt habe, das Misstrauen sei eine demokratische Tugend. An Stelle des Misstrauens müsse Vertrauen treten, gestützt auf eine Gemeinsamkeit der Interessen und der Ziele. Denn die Völker seien nicht schlecht und nicht streitlustig, die grossen Katastrophen seien immer eher durch Fahrlässigkeit als durch Vorsatz geschehen. Deutschland will heute keine neuen Kriegslorbeeren mehr und keinen blutigen Hader, Deutschland will weiter nichts als Frieden, Freiheit und Gleichberechtigung. Deshalb strecke

er im Namen des deutschen Komitees für internationale Aussprache dem englischen Gast die Freundschaftshand entgegen, einem Staatsmann, der auf der genzen Welt als guter Europäer und Weltbürger und trotzdem gleichzeitig als guter Brite berühmt sei. Er begrüsst in Lord Robert Cecil den Staatsmann, der als erster die Organisation des Völkerbunds verlangt und organisiert, und der als Erster an dem gegenwärtigen Völkerbund das Messer der Kritik angewandt und gegen Chauvinismus und Völkerverhetzung gekämpft habe : einen Fackelträger zu Fortschritt und Frieden.

Darauf nahm *Lord Robert Cecil* in englischer Sprache das Wort :

Meine Absicht ist, über Abrüstung zu sprechen, denn zwei der neuesten Ereignisse liessen mir das Thema sehr geeignet erscheinen. Dies sind einmal die Unterzeichnung des Kellogg-Paktes durch England und die führenden Mächte. Wir verzichten in diesem Abkommen auf den Krieg als Mittel, einen Streit zwischen den verschiedenen Nationen auszutragen, und wir verzichten auch auf Angriffskriege. Die Konsequenz dieses Vertrages muss die Abrüstung sein. Das zweite, viel kürzer zurückliegende Ereignis sind die englischen Wahlen. Was das Ergebnis dieser Entscheidung des britischen Volkes sein wird, darüber wird heute noch viel gestritten, eins ist aber klar, das neue britische Parlament wird eine überwältigende Mehrheit zugunsten des Völkerbunds und der internationalen Abrüstung haben.

Das Thema meines Vortrages ist die Herabminderung und Beschränkung der Rüstungen auf dem Wege eines internationalen Abkommens. Im Laufe der letzten Jahre hat häufig dieses oder jenes Land darauf hingewiesen, dass es seine Rüstungen beträchtlich herabgemindert hat. Dies mag für das betreffende Land eine grosse Wohltat sein. Es kann auch sehr erwünschte internationale Konsequenzen haben. Aber es ist nicht dasselbe wie die Herabsetzung der Rüstungen auf dem Wege einer internationalen Vereinbarung. Die einseitige Einschränkung mag und wird sicherlich bei zunehmendem Wohlstand von einer einseitigen Aufrüstung abgelöst werden. Nur wenn die Herabminderung das Ergebnis eines internationalen Vertrages ist, kann sie dauernd sein, und nur die dauernde und allgemeine Herabsetzung der Rüstungen hat einen ernsthaften Wert für die Sache des Friedens.

I. — Gründe für Abrüstung.

Ich will versuchen, sie hier kurz zu skizzieren. Es gibt in erster Linie internationale Verpflichtungen für einseitige Abrüstung. Ich stehe vor einem deutschen Publikum und darf annehmen, dass Sie mit diesen internationalen Verpflichtungen vertraut sind. Es genügt mir daher, die internationalen Doku-

mente zu erwähnen, durch die eine allgemeine Einschränkung versprochen worden ist.

Das ist erstens der Brief Clemenceaus, der am Vorabend der Unterzeichnung des Versailler Vertrags Deutschland mitteilte, dass die Alliierten entschlossen wären, Einschränkungen durchzuführen. Dasselbe besagt die Einleitung zu den Entwaffnungsbestimmungen des Versailler Vertrages. Der Artikel 8 des Vertrags legt dem Völkerbund diese Verpflichtung auf. Der letzte Akt ist der Vertrag von Locarno. Die Resolutionen, die in der Vollversammlung des Völkerbunds angenommen worden sind, und die Versprechungen von den verantwortlichen Männern der führenden Länder wiederholen alle diese Verpflichtungen. Ich will die juristische Seite dieser Verpflichtungen nicht diskutieren, aber die moralische Verpflichtung, die auf den grössten europäischen Staaten lastet, kann nicht angezweifelt werden.

II. — Wirtschaftliche Gründe.

Die wirtschaftlichen Schwierigkeiten Europas sind auf mancherlei Ursachen zurückzuführen. Aber zwei Gründe heben sich so klar hervor, dass sie allgemein zu erkennen sind : die übermässige Last der Besteuerung und die Schwierigkeiten des Kredits und des Vertrauens. In England nehmen die Rüstungen ein Achtel unserer gesamten Ausgaben in Anspruch. In anderen europäischen Ländern wird wahrscheinlich der Prozentsatz ebenso gross sein. Dazu kommt noch die Verwendung einer grossen Anzahl von Männern im besten Mannesalter, statt im Erwerbsleben, in einer unproduktiven Beschäftigung. Wenn diese Ausgabe herabgemindert werden könnte, würde sie beträchtlich die Lasten erleichtern, die auf der Weltindustrie und dem Welthandel ruhen.

III. — Schutz des Friedens.

Dieser ist der wichtigste aller Gründe. Er hängt eng mit dem Wirtschaftsleben zusammen. Die grossen Heere sind eine Bedrohung der internationalen Sicherheit und eine Schädigung des Kredits und des Vertrauens, auf denen der moderne Handel beruht.

Wegen der grossen Rüstungen müssen die Völker dazu gebracht werden, sich mit den Ausgaben und Entbehrungen abzufinden, die die Unterhaltung kostspieliger Heere und Luftflotten erforderlich macht. Dazu ist eine systematische, auf den Krieg eingestellte Propaganda notwendig. In einigen Ländern wurde sie vor 1914 im stärksten Masse durchgeführt. Die Begeisterung für den Krieg und die Glorifizierung der Kriegsmittel wurde in Literatur und Presse, in Universitäten und Schulen, ja selbst in den Kirchen betrieben. Der Beruf des Soldaten wurde durch gesetzliche Vorrechte und soziale Bevorzugungen

ausgezeichnet. Die Angehörigen dieses Berufes wurden durch farbenprächtige Uniformen, die sie ständig zu tragen hatten, von dem gewöhnlichen Bürger hervorgehoben. Viel hat sich in dieser Beziehung geändert, aber selbst jetzt wird noch in unserem eigenen Lande, das nicht ausgesprochen militaristisch ist, viel getan, um die Bewunderung für Heer und Flotte künstlich hervorzurufen, damit der Staatsbürger bereit bleibt, in das Heer einzutreten oder mindestens die notwendigen Steuern zu zahlen. So ist es auffallend, dass die hunderttausend Pfund jährlich, die Grossbritannien an den Völkerbund zahlt, so häufig in der Offentlichkeit kritisiert und als viel zu hoch bezeichnet werden, während die Ausgabe einer Summe, die mehr als tausendmal so gross ist, für unseren Militär-und Marinehaushalt bis vor kurzer Zeit kaum beachtet wurde. Das ist nicht nur widersinnig, sondern geradezu verhängnisvoll, da eine derartige Einstellung der geistigen Kriegsvorbereitung dient.

Darüber hinaus hat das Vorhandensein grosser Rüstungen noch eine andere sehr üble Folge. Sie erzeugt Misstrauen gegen andere Länder und Misstrauen und Furcht sind die reichsten Quellen des Krieges. Das Rüsten des einen Landes ruft das Rüsten der Nachbarländer hervor. Jedes Land sucht seine Sicherheit zu wahren, indem es sich besser und stärker bewaffnet als das andere. Einem solchen Wettstreit der Rüstungen hat bisher immer nur der Krieg ein Ende bereitet.

IV. — Die Vorteile der Abrüstung.

Ebenso gross wie die Schäden einer unbegrenzten Aufrüstung sind die Vorteile einer Herabminderung der Rüstungen. Diese würde genau die umgekehrte Wirkung hervorrufen. Sie würde eine gewaltige Geldersparnis mit sich bringen und eine Erfüllung der Vertragspflichten bedeuten. Sie würde zu einer Beschwichtigung des internationalen Misstrauens führen und ein entschiedener Schritt auf dem Wege des Friedens sein. In dieser Hinsicht unterscheidet sich die Abrüstung von allen anderen Friedensmassnahmen. Schiedsverfahren und Sicherheit beruhen letzten Endes auf dem guten Glauben, dass die Verträge im entscheidenden Augenblick innegehalten werden. Die Abrüstung ist viel mehr. Sie ist nicht nur ein Versprechen, sondern eine positive Leistung zugunsten des Friedens. Wenn aggressive Rüstungen unterdrückt werden, so ist eine aggressive Politik unmöglich. Die Abrüstung ist der Eckstein des internationalen Friedens.

V. — Was bis jetzt geleistet wurde.

Man sagt, dass der Völkerbund auf eine fast zehnjährige Lebensdauer zurückblickt und dass trotzdem kein Fortschritt auf dem Wege der Abrüstung erzielt wurde. Dies ist unzutref-

fend. Der Fortschritt war nicht so schnell, wie man ihn gewünscht hätte. Aber es wurden trotzdem Fortschritte erzielt. Bei der ersten Völkerbundversammlung wurde beschlossen, eine besondere Kommission zur Prüfung dieser Frage zu ernennen. Sie wurde die temporäre, gemischte Kommission genannt. Temporär, um sich von den permanenten Organen des Völkerbundes zu unterscheiden, und gemischt, weil sie neben Soldaten und Marinesachverständigen politische und andere Vertreter enthielt. Sie bestand nicht aus Vertretern der Regierungen, obwohl die Regierungen bei der Ernennung zu Rate gezogen wurden. Sie hat eine ausgezeichnete Arbeit geleistet, und zwar eine so hervorragende, dass die Bürokraten unruhig wurden und die Regierungen überredeten, sie im Jahre 1924 zu zerstören. Trotzdem hat sie eine Konvention zur Kontrolle des Waffenhandels und der privaten Waffenherstellung entworfen. Das erste Abkommen ist seither mit einigen Veränderungen von einer grossen Anzahl europäischer Staaten unterzeichnet und von einigen bereits ratifiziert worden. Das zweite steht noch zur Besprechung. Etwas guter Wille sollte beide zu internationalen Gesetzen machen. Dieselbe Kommission hat den Vertrag der gegenseitigen Unterstützung entworfen, der sich auf das Prinzip stützt, dass die Beschränkung der Rüstungen pari passu mit der Organisierung der Sicherheit vor sich geben sollte. Dieser Vertrag scheiterte jedoch und wurde durch das Genfer Protokoll ersetzt, das auf die drei Prinzipien des Schiedsverfahrens, der Sicherheit und der Abrüstung aufgebaut war. Auch das Protokoll scheiterte seinerseits, aber dieser Fehlschlag wurde in gewissem Mass durch die Locarno-Verträge ausgeglichen. Diese Verträge bedeuten zweifellos einen grossen Fortschritt und sind wahrscheinlich das Höchstmass dessen, was sich in jenem Augenblick erzielen liess. Aber ich bedaure, dass sie sich nur auf die Ost-und Westgrenzen Deutschlands beschränkten. Sie wären wirksamer geworden und hätten manchen politischen Druck vermindern können, wenn sie sich auf ganz Europa erstreckt hätten.

Dies sind die indirekten Versuche der Abrüstung, die bisher gemacht wurden. Sie boten einen Fortschritt auf dem Wege des Schiedsverfahrens und der Sicherheit im Austausch gegen Abrüstung an, obwohl die Methoden, die in dieser Hinsicht in den Locarno-Verträgen angewandt wurden, sich von denen des Vertrages zur gegenseitigen Unterstützung und des Protokolls unterscheiden. Trotzdem blieb der Gedanke bestehen, die Abrüstung durch Schiedsverfahren und Sicherheit zu erzielen, und erst nach ihrem Fehlschlag versuchte man die Abrüstung *direkt* auf dem Wege einer Konferenz herbeizuführen. Deshalb wurde die Vorbereitungskommission im Jahre 1925 ernannt. Sie hat zwei Jahre lang mühsam ihren Weg verfolgt und begann im Frühjahr 1927 den Vorvertrag der Abrüstung zu entwerfen. Dann kam der verhängnisvolle Fehlschlag der Flottenkonferenz

der drei Mächte im August 1927, die zu einer fast vollkommenen, zweijährigen Stockung führte. Um diese Lage zu verstehen, muss man auf die Washingtoner Verträge vom Jahre 1922 zurückgreifen. In diesen Verträgen wurden die Linienschiffe erster Klasse der grossen Seemächte eingeschränkt, aber eine Einschränkung der Kreuzer und anderer Hilfsschiffe war nicht vorgesehen. Im Jahre 1926 schlug die amerikanische Regierung eine Konferenz vor, um das Prinzip des Washingtoner Vertrages auf alle Schiffe auszudehnen. England und Japan gingen auf diesen Vorschlag ein, aber unglücklicherweise ist infolge von Gründen, die ich lieber nicht erörtern möchte, die Konferenz zusammengebrochen und hat die oben erwähnten verhängnisvollen Ergebnisse gezeitigt.

Seitdem ist der Kriegsverzichtsvertrag unterzeichnet worden. Er beruht auf dem Gedanken, dass, so gerecht deine eigene Sache sein mag, du sie nicht in die eigene Hand nehmen darfst. So ist die Zeit gekommen, einen direkten Angriff auf das Rüstungsproblem zu unternehmen. Allerdings hat sich gezeigt, dass er nicht in der Hand von Fachleuten liegen darf, die von ihren Regierungen abhängig sind.

VI. — Die gegenwärtige Lage.

Dies war die Lage, die das letztemal die Vorbereitungskommission vorfand. Sie sah nicht sehr hoffnungsvoll aus, und die meisten Leute erwarteten, dass die Stockung weiter fortdauern würde. Dann kam das Angebot der amerikanischen Regierung, die Flottenverhandlungen wieder aufzunehmen — ein Angebot, das von der britischen und japanischen Regierung günstig aufgenommen wurde. Es scheint fast sicher, dass eine Aufnahme der Verhandlungen zu einem Abkommen führen wird. Das britische Volk hat klar zu erkennen gegeben, dass es den Wunsch hat, zu einem Abkommen zu gelangen, und man weiss, dass auch die japanische und die amerikanische Regierung dasselbe Ziel erstreben. Dies ist eine Tatsache von grösster Bedeutung.

Es stimmt, dass nur geringe Fortschritte auf dem Wege der Entwaffnung des Landheeres, die Deutschland am meisten interessiert, erzielt worden sind. Aber selbst dort sind die Ergebnisse nicht so ungünstig, wie man sie darzustellen versucht. Selbst der provisorische Beschluss — der nur provisorisch ist — in bezug auf die ausgebildeten Reserven scheint mir nicht so verhängnisvoll zu sein, wie die meisten ihn darstellen. Es ist in Wirklichkeit eine Frage der Wahl zwischen der allgemeinen Wehrpflicht und dem freiwilligen Heere. Wenn man die allgemeine Wehrpflicht mit kurzer Dienstzeit hat, ergibt sich zweifellos eine grosse, ausgebildete Reserve. Aber wenn die Dienstzeit kurz genug ist, wird diese Reserve, die wahrscheinlich dazu ausreicht, um die Schützengräben zu halten, bei einem Angriff

vollkommen nutzlos sein. Es ist noch fraglich, ob Europa einer Kriegsgefahr mehr ausgesetzt ist, wenn seine Heere verhältnismässig gross sind und nur eine Milizausbildung bekommen, oder wenn die Heere zwar klein bleiben, aber dafür zur höchsten Leistungsfähigkeit gebracht werden.

Es scheint mir, dass eine Begrenzung der Zahlen das beste Mittel ist, um zum Ziel zu gelangen. Glauben Sie nicht, dass wir dem Frieden näher kommen, wenn alle Armeen so vermindert werden und die Dienstzeit so herabgeschraubt wird, dass die Truppen nur für die Verteidigung nicht aber für den Angriff ausgebildet werden.

VII. — Die Zukunft.

So liegen die Dinge heute. Ich stehe hier, um Ihnen mit aller Aufrichtigkeit zu sagen, dass ich die Lage mit grosser Hoffnung ansehe. Ich sehe Möglichkeiten für eine Abrüstung zur See und auch Möglichkeiten für eine allgemeine Abrüstung. Es wird einige Zeit dauern. Es dämmert erst. Wie könnten wir uns mit dem Gedanken, nicht helfen zu können, zur Ruhe setzen? Sehen Sie nicht, wie die grossen Kräfte der öffentlichen Meinung zugunsten der Abrüstung immer mehr Terrain gewinnen? Die ganze Welt drängt heute danach und wir müssen auf diese Forderung zu hören verstehen. Erwecken Sie in allen Völkern der Erde den Wunsch nach Frieden! Ich tue es in meinem Land und schäme mich auch nicht, es hier zu tun, denn es ist nicht eine Frage, die ein Land angeht, sondern die ganze Welt. Und was ist Abrüstung? Sie ist kein Selbstzweck, sie ist nur ein Mittel zum Zweck, ein Mittel, den Frieden zu schaffen. Wünschen die Völker der ganzen Welt Frieden? Ja, die grösste Mehrheit. Die Reaktionäre und die Revolutionäre sind unzufrieden mit diesem Fortschritt, aber sie sind nur eine kleine Minderheit.

Ist nicht für alle unsere Ideen vom Fortschritt der Friede notwendig? Friede bedeutet gleichmässigen Fortschritt, nicht Revolution und Reaktion. Ich warne die Anhänger alter Ideen, „Nehmt euch in acht!“ Ich sage zu meinen eigenen Landsleuten „Nehmt euch in acht!“ Krieg zieht Revolution nach sich, so war es immer, so wird es immer sein. Ich sage mit den Worten des alten Hebräers: „Ich rufe Himmel und Erde zu Zeugen für das, was ich Euch sage, seid friedlich, auf dass Ihr und Eure Nachkommen leben möget...“

THE GENEVA PROTOCOL, BY MRS. H. M. SWANWICK.

(The Manchester Guardian, June 14, 1929)

Sir, Now that a Labour Government will, in all probability, represent the British Empire at the Tenth Assembly of the League of Nations, I think it would interest many old readers of the "Manchester Guardian" if you would make clear to us exactly where you stand in regard to what is left of the Geneva Protocol.

The "Manchester Guardian" is never factious, but you have more than once made the suggestion (repeated in the issue of Saturday the 8th) that Mr. Arthur Henderson had, in 1924, allowed himself to be in some way hoodwinked over the Protocol by the French; this I believe to be without any foundation in fact. Doubtless the British Delegation could have shaped, alone, something nearer to its own desire. But at Geneva, as elsewhere, you must get as much as you can, not all you want. The British did not like the Continental system of alliances; but they had not the power to abolish them, and could only hope that something much better might gradually supersede them.

It strikes me as five years out of date to be discussing the revival of the Protocol in its original form, because a portion of it has been accepted by all the world, another portion has been laid down for acceptance, while America's increasing interest and the entrance of Germany into the League have made it imperative to discuss the remaining portions from a new standpoint.

May I summarise the five main object of the Protocol?

1) The "outlawry" of war. This negative declaration is embodied in the Pact of Paris, and our present Government has expressed the intention of making it absolute, by renouncing any interpretations which would whittle away its meaning.

2) All-in arbitration. This is embodied now as a positive undertaking in the General Act, which our present Government has declared its intention to sign. (The French Government has brought in a bill authorising the accession of France).

3) The definition of aggression, which followed and depended upon the acceptance of all-in arbitration.

4) The agreement that sanctions (which are already included in the Covenant, but under dangerously vague conditions) shall follow, not by decree of the Council but as the consequence of resort to war in defiance of a judicial or quasi-judicial judgment which all have agreed to accept.

5) Disarmament, which was closely bound up with the other four.

So far as I have been able to understand the attitude of the "Manchester Guardian" (and I freely confess that this has been an arduous and only partially successful effort) your main ob-

jections (besides the objection we all share to partial alliances) are as follows :—

1. "A definition of aggression is undesirable because a clever diplomat could always work the machine for his own ends". In reply to this I would say that no one can make a diplomatic instrument fool-proof or proof against Machiavellian tamperings. But is it not better that certain plain and ascertainable acts should be laid down as illegal rather than that aggression should be a figment of the imagination for diplomatic fears and fancies and similar interests to sport with?

2. "Sanctions are dangerous and should be abolished." I happen to agree with this, and, personally, I wish they had never been included in the Covenant. But they were, and it is certain that the Covenant would never have been accepted without them. They were not introduced by the Protocol; the obligation to contribute to them was, as a matter of fact, considerably mitigated by the words in the Protocol (afterwards incorporated in the Franco-British Note to Germany on the occasion of the signing of the treaties of Locarno) that a member was expected "to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant and in resistance to any act of aggression to an extent which is compatible with its military situation and takes its geographical position into account".

We are here a very long way from the truly terrifying provisions of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, against which no such exaggerated campaign has ever been waged in the daily press, or even the formidable undertaking of Great Britain in the Treaty of Locarno. The trend has been recently to emphasise not sanctions against the aggressor so much as help to the victims.

3. "The Protocol would tend to stereotype the status quo, bad as well as good." I can see no sense whatever in this objection, unless one still believes that one can "right wrongs" more quickly and efficaciously by fighting or threatening to fight than by the steady growth of respect for law and appreciation of the benefits of co-operation. Half the injustices inflicted on minorities are due to the nervous brutality of those who fear that force will be used unless they anticipate it by repression.

The inappropriate frontiers of Europe can be largely rendered innocuous by rational treatment of neighbours and minorities; they can be altered only by war or by agreement. I am all the time and every time opposed to altering them by war, which makes more problems than it solves. And keeping the threat of war up your sleeve for diplomatic use is as bad, because in the long run it is bound to lead to armaments, alliances, and—war.

—Yours, etc.,

H. M. Swanwick.

[We cannot briefly discuss the several points of this letter. We think, as Mrs. Swanwick herself appears to do, that the Covenant of the League should be interpreted in the light of the living Kellogg Pact rather than of the defunct Protocol. The Pact is itself a criticism of the Protocol. It represents the moral rather than the physical force approach to the problem of maintaining international peace. Nevertheless we think that, just as the Covenant needs interpretation in the light of the Pact, the Pact needs supplementing in the light of the Covenant. To harmonise the Covenant and the Pact, not the Covenant and the Protocol, seems to us the aim to be held in view. Our answers to Mrs. Swanwick's questions would follow from that starding-point.— Ed. "Guard."]

DER KONFLIKT ZWISCHEN BOLIVIEN UND PARAGUAY, VON DR. HANS WEHBERG.

(Die Friedenswarte, Februar 1929)

Am 6. Dezember 1928 wurde ein bolivianischer Posten (Fort Vanguardia) durch Truppen Paraguays innerhalb des sogenannten Chaco-Grenzgebietes überrumpelt. Während Bolivien behauptete, der Zwischenfall habe sich auf seinem Territorium zugetragen, stellte sich Paraguay auf den Standpunkt, es handle sich lediglich um die Zurückweisung des unberechtigten Vorgehens bolivianischer Truppen in das Gebiet Paraguays. Eine starke Spannung entstand zwischen den beiden Ländern. Die diplomatischen Verhandlungen wurden abgebrochen. Der Krieg schien unvermeidlich, zumal Bolivien erklärte, es werde jeden Aussöhnungsversuch ablehnen, solange es nicht vollständige Wiedergutmachung erhalten habe.

Als der gerade in Lugano zu seiner 53. Tagung versammelte Völkerbundrat durch Pressemeldungen von diesem Ereignis erfuhr, erinnerte er die Regierungen der beiden im Streit befindlichen Staaten am 11. Dezember 1928 telegraphisch an ihre in der Völkerbundsatzung übernommenen Verpflichtungen. Obwohl darauf die beiden südamerikanischen Staaten das Versprechen abgaben, sich an die Satzung halten zu wollen, blieb die Lage auch weiterhin gefährdet, da Bolivien sein Verlangen nach sofortiger Genugtuung wiederholte und auf die Notwendigkeit hinwies militärische Massnahmen, wenn auch nur zur Verteidigung, zu ergreifen.

Als daher der Rat am 15. Dezbr. 1928 von den Antworttelegrammen der beiden Regierungen Kenntnis nahm, sprach er die

Erwartung aus, dass die Parteien sich jeder Handlung enthielten, die geeignet wäre, die Lage zu verschlimmern und eine friedliche Regelung zu erschweren. Er betonte, dass es nach seiner Meinung sehr wichtig wäre, alle militärischen Massnahmen auf solche zu beschränken, die nicht als aggressiv betrachtet werden könnten und nicht die Gefahr in sich schlössen, die bewaffneten Streitkräfte miteinander in Verbindung zu bringen. Weiterhin erinnerte er die Parteien erneut an die durch die Satzung übernommenen Verpflichtungen.

Am folgenden Tage empfing der Präsident des Völkerbundrates, Briand, nach Schluss der Ratssession eine telegraphische Mitteilung von Bolivien, wonach neue militärische Zwischenfälle angeblich durch Schuld Paraguays vorgekommen seien. Briand ersuchte darauf erneut beide Parteien, alles zu vermeiden, was einen militärischen Zusammenstoss herbeiführen könnte. Paraguay protestierte in seiner Antwort gegen den Vorwurf, dass seine Truppen einen Angriff unternommen hätten, und erklärte, es nehme die Vermittlung der panamerikänischen Schiedsgerichtskonferenz an. Bolivien seinerseits teilte dem Rate mit, es habe dem Kommandanten des Grenzschutzes den Befehl erteilt, sich jedes Vorrückens und jedes Angriffes zu enthalten und sich auf Verteidigungsmassnahmen zu beschränken.

Inzwischen war die Ratssitzung beendet, und die weitere Verfolgung der Angelegenheit wurde in die Hände des Präsidenten Briand gelegt. Am 18. Dezember 1928 setzte sich Briand mit den Pariser diplomatischen Vertretern von Argentinien und den Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika in Verbindung und eröffnete ihnen, es scheine ihm im Interesse des Friedens wesentlich, die Bemühungen derer, die sich für eine friedliche Beilegung einsetzten, miteinander in Einklang zu bringen. Es würde seiner Ansicht nach im Interesse des Friedens liegen, wenn die Regierungen von Argentinien und der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika ihn über ihre Ansichten in Kenntnis setzen würden, welche Mittel am besten geeignet wären, den Frieden zu sichern. Er fügte hinzu, dass, wenn die beiden südamerikanischen Regierungen in den allernächsten Tagen nicht eine Vermittlung im Interesse des Friedens annehmen würden, der Völkerbund zu einer ausserordentlichen Sitzung werde zusammentreten müssen, um die geeigneten Massnahmen zur Verhütung des Krieges zu beschliessen. Auch mit den Pariser Geschäftsträgern von Bolivien und Paraguay nahm Briand Fühlung. Nunmehr erklärte sich auch Bolivien in einem Telegramm vom 18. Dezember 1928 bereit, die Vermittlung der panamerikanischen Konferenz anzunehmen. Es wurde in der Tat eine Einigung darüber erzielt, die Frage der Verantwortlichkeiten für den zwischen den beiden Ländern ausgebrochenen Konflikt einem neungliedrigen Ausschuss, in dem auch die beiden Parteien durch je zwei Delegierte vertreten sein sollten, zu unterbreiten.

Die friedliche Beilegung dieses Falles bedeutet seit dem griechisch-bulgarischen Zwischenfall (1925) zum ersten Male wieder einen Erfolg dez Völkerbundes. Hierbei hat es sich erfreulicher Weise gezeigt, dass die Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika die Vermittlungstätigkeit des Völkerbundes bei einem Streite zwischen den südamerikanischen Republiken nicht als eine Verletzung der Monroedoktrin betrachten.

Sodann ist wiederum in Erscheinung getreten, welch grosse Bedeutung eine gerechte Grenzziehung für die Aufrechterhaltung friedlicher Beziehungen zwischen zwei Nachbarländern hat. Als man 1880 eine Grenzlinie zwischen Bolivien und Paraguay zog, hat man sie nur in grossen Strichen auf der Karte festgesetzt, auf eine bis in's Einzelne gehende Grenzabsteckung aber verzichtet. Die Tatsache nun, dass aus dieser Unvollkommenheit der Grenze ein bewaffneter Konflikt hervorgegangen ist, zeigt uns aufs neue die Wichtigkeit der Schaffung gerechter Grenzen im internationalen Leben der Völker. Man braucht nur an Tacna-Arica, an die Wilnafrage und eine Fülle von anderen Problemen, vor allem in Europa, zu denken, um einzusehen, dass der Völkerbund für die Lösung solcher Konflikte bisher herzlich wenig getan, dass er wohl versucht hat, auftauchenden Streitigkeiten von Fall zu Fall ein Ende zu bereiten, dass er aber eine grundsätzliche Regelung der Festsetzung und Veränderung von Grenzen abgelehnt hat. Die allmähliche Schaffung solcher allgemeinen Grundsätze würde die Lösung aktueller Grenzkonflikte schon um dessentwillen erleichtern, weil dann jeder Staat wüsste, dass die gleichen Grundsätze, die das eine Mal zu seinem augenblicklichen Nachteil auf ihn selbst angewandt werden, sich bei anderer Gelegenheit zu seinem Vorteil auswirken können.

Man sollte daher nach und nach damit beginnen, genaue Verfahrensvorschriften für die Festlegung von Grenzen auszuarbeiten, gleichzeitig aber materielle Normen zu schaffen, nach denen Grenzen auf friedlichem Wege abgeändert werden können. Das wichtige Problem der Selbstbestimmung der Völker muss einmal in Angriff genommen werden, wenn auch seine Lösung noch in weiter Ferne liegen sollte.

Wie der Völkerbundrat auf seiner letzten Tagung trotz aller Widerstände eine internationale Kommission geschaffen hat, um die Ausarbeitung einer Systematik für die Kodification des Völkerrechts in Angriff zu nehmen, so wird er auch eines Tages eine Kommission für die Festlegung und Veränderung internationaler Grenzen einsetzen müssen.

Der jüngste Streitfall hat uns weiterhin die Gefahren zum Bewusstsein gebracht, die daraus entstehen, dass der Völkerbund keine Machtmittel, d. h. keine Befehlsgewalt besitzt, um einen Waffenstillstand anzuordnen und die Mobilisierung zu verhindern. Auf das Telegramm des Völkerbundrates, das Bolivien ebenso wie Paraguay an seine internationalen Pflichten

erinnerte, antwortete Bolivien, es werde, um das notwendige moralische Gleichgewicht in der öffentlichen Meinung wiederherzustellen, nur schwer möglich sein, den Weg des Schiedsverfahrens zu beschreiten. Bolivien machte also gewissermassen den Einwand, dass seine Ehre den Verzicht auf militärische Massnahmen nicht zulasse. Und in dem zweiten Telegramm Boliviens, wonach dem Militärkommandanten Anweisung gegeben sei, den Vormarsh einzustellen, war die Erklärung enthalten, dass man nicht weiter vorrücken und angreifen, sondern " nur " Verteidigungsmassnahmen ergreifen werde. Es ist zuzugeben, dass in diesem Falle wegen der grossen Entfernung des eigentlichen Kriegsschauplatzes von den Zentren der beiden Länder nur wenig Streitkräfte in die Feindseligkeiten verwickelt waren, so dass Angriffs- und Verteidigungshandlungen zunächst auf einen kleinen Teil der Truppen beschränkt blieben und die weitere Entwicklung des Streitfalles nicht präjudizierten. Trotzdem hielt es der Rat für bedeutsam, die Parteien zu ermahnen, sich aller Handlungen zu enthalten, welche die beiderseitigen Streitkräfte miteinander in Verbindung bringen könnten. Hätte es sich aber um einen Konflikt zwischen europäischen Mächten gehandelt und hätte der Völkerbund tatenlos zusehen müssen, wie beiderseits militärische Verteidigungsmassnahmen usw. ergriffen werden, so wäre dadurch die Aktion des Rates ganz erheblich gestört, ja vielleicht sogar zum Scheitern gebracht worden. Deshalb sollte der Völkerbundrat mit aller Deutlichkeit die Mitglieder des Völkerbundes ermahnen, so schnell wie möglich Verträge nach dem Muster des auf deutschen Antrag vom Sicherheitsausschuss ausgearbeiteten und von der neunten Bundesversammlung angenommenen " Modellvertrages zur Verstärkung der Mittel der Kriegsverhinderung " zu schliessen, damit der Rat die Vollmacht besitzt, durch Anordnung sofortigen Waffenstillstandes, der sich die Mitglieder des Völkerbundes ein für alle Mal im voraus unterworfen haben, die weitere Zuspitzung eines Konfliktes zu verhindern.

Aus der Entwicklung des Chaco-Grenzkonflikts kann man schliesslich die Lehre ziehen, dass die sofortige Anordnung militärischer Sanktionen nach Feststellung des Angreifers die grössten Gefahren mit sich bringt und die Chancen friedlicher Erledigung des Streites zerstören kann. Würde der Völkerbund in dem vorliegenden Falle, etwa nach dem Vorbild des Genfer Protokolls, einen der beiden Kontrahenten als Angreifer festgestellt und gegen ihn sofertige Sanktionen angeordnet haben, dann würde er die Bereitwilligkeit des betreffenden Staates zur friedlichen Erledigung eher gefährdet als gefördert haben. Ganz abgesehen davon, dass es selbst jetzt noch fast unmöglich ist, zu sagen, wer in diesem Falle als Angreifer anzusehen wäre Es hat sich auch bei diesem Konflikte deutlich gezeigt, dass sich der Völkerbund vor einer Ueberspannung des Sanktionssystems hüten muss.

Nicht das Einsetzen militärischer Machtmittel zwecks Hinaustreibung eines eingedrungenen Feindes durch den angegriffenen Staat bezw. die anderen Mitglieder des Völkerbundes darf bei einem solchen Konflikte die Hauptsache sein, sondern die Anwendung der Machtmittel des Völkerbundes gemäss Artikel 11 der Satzung, um den Streitfall nach Möglichkeit ohne Blutvergiessen aus der Welt zu schaffen.

ROME ET GENÈVE, PAR M. WILLIAM MARTIN.

(Journal de Genève du 3 mars 1929)

Nous n'avons pas attaché, au premier abord, grande importance aux rumeurs d'après lesquelles le Saint-Siège devenu un Etat demanderait son admission dans la Société des Nations. Nous avons tenu ces bruits lorsqu'ils coururent dans la presse à sensation, au lendemain de l'accord de Rome, pour dénués de tout fondement et même de toute vraisemblance. Mais puisqu'en dépit des démentis officiels les plus catégoriques, il y a des publicistes qui continuent à s'y attacher et à faire là-dessus des gloses, on s'étonnerait peut-être du silence de ce journal, si attaché à la fois à la Société des nations et à la Réforme. Nous donnerons donc, nous aussi, notre avis, dans cette discussion purement académique.

Lorsque la Société des nations a été fondée, certains ont voulu y voir une machine de guerre contre le catholicisme, parce que le président Wilson était protestant. Depuis qu'elle fonctionne, d'autres y ont vu une succursale du Vatican, parce que son secrétaire général est catholique. Elle n'est rien de tout cela. La Société des nations est une institution politique, c'est-à-dire, comme toutes les institutions politiques de notre pays, qu'elle est laïque et interconfessionnelle. Aucune religion, en tant que telle, ne l'intéresse.

Il est vrai que la Société des nations est née d'une idéologie pacifiste qui a ses racines chez les puritains anglo-saxons; il est encore vrai qu'elle a collaboré, en diverses occasions et avec beaucoup de respect, avec le Vatican. Mais elle n'est pas pour cela plus protestante que catholique, ou musulmane ou bouddhiste.

Cela dit, pour dégager le terrain, voyons comment se pose la question de l'entrée éventuelle du Saint-Siège dans la Société des nations.

En droit, elle n'est pas si simple que paraissent le croire certains publicistes. La Cité du Vatican, a-t-on dit, est un Etat, donc elle peut poser sa candidature comme tout autre Etat. On oublie que l'Assemblée de 1920, statuant exemplairement sur

le cas du Liechtenstein, mais en ayant en vue les situations analogues de Monte-Carlo et de Terre-Neuve, a décidé que les Etats minuscules ne pourraient pas faire partie de la Société. Certes la définition d'un Etat minuscule est difficile, et l'Assemblée reste maîtresse de son vote. Mais l'Etat le plus minuscule qu'il y ait au monde — 44 hectares — c'est le Vatican.

A certains égards, nous en convenons, c'est une grande puissance, la plus grande de toutes, puisque ses ambassadeurs sont de droit doyens du corps diplomatique dans toutes les capitales. Mais c'est à titre de puissance morale que le Saint-Siège jouit de ces privilèges. Et l'on se heurte à ce dilemme : ou le Vatican est un Etat, et c'est un Etat minuscule ; ou il est une puissance morale, et ne peut faire partie, à ce titre, de la Société des nations.

Mais la question de droit est secondaire, parce que la question politique est, à elle seule, décisive. Le Saint-Siège ne demandera pas son admission dans la Société des nations, il ne se soumettra ni aux enquêtes ni aux votes que cela comporterait, pour la raison suffisante qu'il ne veut pas faire partie de la Société. Il ne le peut pas. S'il y a une idée à laquelle la papauté tient pardessus tout, au moins dans l'époque moderne, c'est sa neutralité en temps de guerre. Le pape ne veut pas risquer, et on le comprend, d'apparaître à une partie de ses fidèles, comme un adversaire.

Membre de la Société des nations, c'en serait fait pour lui de cette politique. Au cas où le Conseil ordonnerait des sanctions, le pape devrait, sinon y participer activement, au moins en porter la responsabilité collective. On s'illusionne beaucoup si l'on croit qu'il y aura, dans une prochaine guerre, une neutralité, dans le sens où on l'entendait jusqu'ici. Il y aura peut-être des Etats qui ne participeront pas activement aux sanctions militaires, et nous en serons. Mais les sanctions politiques et économiques seront communes à tous les membres de la Société des nations et l'on peut être bien sûr qu'aucun n'apparaîtra comme neutre aux yeux de l'Etat en rupture de pacte.

Il n'est pas besoin d'aller plus loin ; le pape ne peut pas faire partie de la Société des nations, ses délégués ne peuvent pas s'asseoir dans la salle de la Réformation — ô ironie ! — sans qu'il soit obligé de renoncer, entre des peuples en guerre, au rôle moral qui est sa raison d'être.

Est-ce à dire qu'entre la Société des nations et le Saint-Siège les relations ne peuvent pas être cordiales, et même étroites ? C'est là un tout autre problème.

Depuis plusieurs années déjà, le Saint-Siège a participé à diverses activités de la Société des nations. La réforme du calendrier est la plus connue, mais ce n'est pas la seule. Il est entré en relation avec la Société même sur une question hautement politique, comme la commission des Lieux-Saints. Et le pape a témoigné à diverses reprises l'intérêt qu'il portait à toutes les

œuvres de pacification internationale et de rapprochement des peuples, ce qui a permis à des associations catholiques de se constituer dans divers pays, notamment le nôtre, et de faire en faveur de la Société des nations une propagande active et intelligente.

Ces liens ne peuvent aller, dans la situation nouvelle de la papauté, qu'en se resserrant, et pour plusieurs raisons.

Le Vatican devient un Etat. Puisqu'il n'est pas un Etat membre, il est donc un Etat non membre. C'est là une notion qui, avec le temps, a pris dans la pratique de la Société des nations une signification précise. Le Conseil a pris l'habitude d'inviter les Etats non membres à participer à certaines activités de la Société des nations qui sont de nature à les intéresser. Il n'agira certainement pas avec le Vatican autrement qu'avec les Etats-Unis, par exemple. Dans le domaine de l'entr'aide, dans toutes les activités morales ou humanitaires, comme la lutte contre les stupéfiants ou contre la traite des femmes et des enfants, il y a un grand nombre de problèmes qui peuvent intéresser l'Eglise ; il ne serait donc pas étonnant de voir la participation de délégués pontificaux aux conférences et commissions de la Société des nations devenir fréquente.

Cela est d'autant plus vraisemblable que le gouvernement italien, qui jadis voyait d'un mauvais œil la participation du Saint-Siège aux activités internationales, ne s'y opposera certainement plus désormais et la favorisera peut-être.

Les autres Etats catholiques feront bien certainement de même. Car une participation de plus en plus active et régulière du Saint-Siège aux œuvres de la Société des nations peut être de nature à compléter utilement et même à renforcer les garanties un peu faibles qu'offrent à l'indépendance internationale de l'Eglise les accords de Latran.

On s'est déjà inquiété dans plusieurs pays du caractère purement fictif que revêt cette indépendance, dépourvue de sanctions, et même de force propre. Le pape a cru devoir renoncer à toute garantie internationale expresse, et sans doute a-t-il bien fait, à son point de vue. Mais la garantie implicite qui résultera de sa participation active à la vie internationale n'a aucun des inconvénients qu'aurait eus une garantie juridique, et elle présente des avantages qui sautent aux yeux.

WHO IS THE ENEMY, BY MR. H. WILSON HARRIS.

(Daily News, April 15, 1929)

Disarmament discussions are going to be renewed at Geneva this morning, and they are going to lead to no result.

I hope that depressing prediction may prove completely

wrong, but I have no doubt whatever that it will prove completely right. It could hardly be anything else in view of the coming election here.

Other countries want to know where they stand. They see no special point in entering on important negotiations with a Government that may be out of office in six weeks, particularly as, if it is out of office, its successor is pretty certain to take substantially different views about some of the main issues.

Consequently the League's Preparatory Commission will no doubt concentrate on various secondary matters, and leave the great questions of naval and military and air reduction for a few months longer. It is a pity, but it could hardly be otherwise. Meanwhile, the Kellogg Pact to abolish war is being ratified by more and more States ; and the same States are steadily mechanising their armies and increasing their navies and strengthening their air forces with as diligent an endeavour as ever to reconcile two irreconcilables.

France, it is true, is reducing her army numerically, but she is spending more money on it than she ever did, and increasing its technical efficiency every day. New French naval activity is advertised, stimulated by the fact that Germany has concentrated all the skill and ability in her dominions on the production of a super-cruiser, or preter-battleship, of 10.000 tons, capable of blawing any other vessel of equal tonnage out of the water.

CRUISERS AND AEROPLANES.

The United States is launched on her 15 cruiser programme. Signor Mussolini is still out for an air fleet so large as to darken the heavens. In this country the Admiralty has won its usual victory over the Treasury in regard to its building programme, and the "Times" prints a column letter from a Big Navy advocate on what "the enemy" might to do British commerce in a future war.

Well, here is something concrete. Who is this potential enemy ?

It is no use to answer that it may be anyone. It may not be anyone. Even the Navy League is not asking us to build cruisers against Abyssina, or even Albania, or even Belgium. We can rule out a few States at any rate at that end of the scale.

What about the other end ?

Can we, or can we not, rule out the United States ? Lord Grey has done well to force that vital issue to the front once again. I know, of course that the Prime Minister has said that we have no intention of building against the United States. But I know too that the Three Power Conference of 1927 broke down because it was understood that the United States meant to use her allotted tonnage to build big cruisers, which would give her a battlestrength superior to ours, and that Mr. Churchill, then

the acting-leader of the House of Commons, declared categorically on the morrow of the failure of that Conference that we could accept mathematical parity neither with the United States nor with any other nation.

What does it matter to us if America's battle-strength is greater than ours. It matters a great deal, of course, if we think we are likely to want to fight her. It matters exactly nothing at all if we are sure we are not. Lord Grey has always insisted that we should rule the contingency of war with the United States definitely out of all our plans and calculations. The Prime Minister has said vaguely that we don't intend to build against the United States. And the Admiralty keeps its own counsel and goes its own way, and its supporters write about what "the enemy" might do in the next war.

Where are we ? Or rather, does the ordinary elector know, and can the know, where we are ?

But perhaps the enemy is France—against whom we have not fought since the days of Napoleon and at whose side we have fought in two great wars in the last 70 years. We are celebrating 25 years of the Entente Cordiale. Our heir-apparent is just back from honouring the memory of the greatest French soldier. Are we really building ships against France ?

WHAT DOES IT MEAN ?

Or Japan ? Japan was our pledged ally from 1902 to 1922. As such she came into the Great War. That alliance is as strong as ever in spirit, if (for good reasons) not in form. Japan joined with us in the Washington Arms Conference, and in the Four Power Pacific Pact that came out of that conference. Are we in reality building for protection against Japan ?

Everyone can complete the catalogue for himself. At the end of it the fundamental question remains. Can you sing pæans over a treaty whose signatories bind themselves never to attack one another, but at the same time pile up so-called defensive preparations because someone may break his word and attak after all ? Of course, someone may.

There can never be any certain guarantee against that. But the best way to bring treaties into disrepute is for nations to proclaim by their acts that they prefer armaments to treaties. We are not the worst sinners in that regard. But we are bad enough. And so long as we pursue that particular policy we disable ourselves absolutely from challenging other States that are pursuing it too.

LA SANTE D'UN PEUPLE, PAR M. WILLIAM MARTIN.

(Journal de Genève du 5 mai 1929)

On a parfois reproché à la Société des Nations de faire du travail trop théorique. Reproche injuste, car le général est toujours théorique et la nature même des fonctions de la Société, qui s'appliquent au monde entier et ne comportent pas de pouvoirs exécutifs, veut que la Société étudie les problèmes et les règles juridiquement en laissant aux Etats le soin d'appliquer ses décisions.

Mais la Société des Nations ne s'est jamais refusée à faire du travail pratique. Chaque fois qu'elle y a été invitée, comme en Autriche, elle s'est précipitée au secours des Etats qui le lui ont demandé. Elle est en train de faire de même, dans un domaine particulier mais très important, l'hygiène et la santé publique, vis-à-vis de la Grèce.

Le peuple grec a été, au cours de cette génération, terriblement éprouvé. Il a traversé les deux guerres de 1912 et 1913 et a vu se poser à lui les graves problèmes que comportait l'annexion de la Macédoine. Il avait à peine eu le temps de les envisager que la grande guerre est venue arrêter son effort. L'occupation de Salonique par les Alliés et de la Macédoine par les Bulgares, la guerre étrangère sur les confins et la guerre civile au cœur du pays, ont paralysé pendant cinq ans tout effort constructif.

Puis ce fut la campagne de l'Asie Mineure, qui absorba toutes les forces du pays et se termina par la plus terrible catastrophe que l'histoire ait jamais enregistrée, la destruction des colonies millénaires de la Grèce d'outre-mer, le reflux soudain sur le sol national d'un million et demi de réfugiés, nus, misérables, affamés, malades.

Une première fois, la Société des Nations est venue au secours de la Grèce, financièrement et administrativement, pour l'aider à organiser ses secours aux réfugiés. La preuve que son intervention dans ce domaine a paru efficace et généreuse c'est que le gouvernement grec vient de s'adresser une seconde fois à la Société des Nations.

On n'a pas oublié l'épidémie de dengue qui a sévi en Grèce l'automne dernier. A certain moment, la ville d'Athènes s'est trouvée en état de panique, 80 % de la population étant atteinte par la maladie. Le gouvernement demanda alors l'aide du Comité d'hygiène, qui lui envoya le Dr Mackenzie.

L'œuvre accomplie par le Dr Mackensie a été si appréciée que cette requête fut suivie, peu après, d'une seconde. Le sous-secrétaire d'Etat de l'hygiène, Dr Doxiadès, demanda à la Société des Nations de l'aider de ses conseils techniques pour l'organisation du service sanitaire dans tous le pays :

Vous n'ignorez pas, écrivait-il le 20 octobre dernier, que de

graves maladies telles que la peste et le typhus exanthématique se trouvent à l'état endémique dans plusieurs villes et que, d'autre part, le paludisme sévit pour ainsi dire dans toute notre population. De plus, la tuberculose revêt généralement un aspect menaçant et finalement la trachome, la lèpre, la syphilis et d'autres maladies contagieuses, surtout des maladies infantiles, minent notre santé et menacent tout notre édifice national.

Et devant le Conseil, le Dr Doxiadès ajoutait :

La Société des Nations a jusqu'ici très largement contribué à l'établissement de centaines de milliers de réfugiés. Elle a, d'autre part, renforcé l'armature économique de mon pays en mettant à sa disposition les moyens d'équilibrer son budget et d'assainir sa monnaie. De ce fait, le peuple grec a assumé de lourdes responsabilités fiscales et autres. En augmentant sa vitalité, la Société des Nations contribuera à accroître sa productivité et lui permettra de faire face à ses nombreuses obligations.

Cet appel fut entendu. En décembre dernier, le Conseil a autorisé l'organisation d'hygiène à se mettre à la disposition du gouvernement hellénique. Au cours des derniers mois, le Dr Rajchman, plusieurs membres du comité d'hygiène et des collaborateurs de la section d'hygiène du Secrétariat ont séjourné en Grèce, visité la plupart des régions, étudié à fond leurs conditions sanitaires et établi un plan qui est soumis en ce moment à l'examen du comité d'hygiène.

Ce plan, après avoir été adopté par le gouvernement grec, sera appliqué avec la collaboration des organes de la Société des Nations. L'expérience acquise et les études faites par le Comité d'hygiène dans la lutte contre le paludisme, contre la tuberculose, contre la mortalité infantile, entre autres, trouveront là des applications pratiques. Il sera possible de mettre à la disposition de la Grèce un personnel de choix et de hâter la formation du personnel national, grâce aux échanges internationaux qui ont été organisés depuis longtemps et sur une grande échelle.

Si nous insistons ici sur cette œuvre, ce n'est toutefois pas en raison de son importance pratique, qui est considérable, mais à cause de sa portée morale.

Il s'agit là d'une œuvre essentiellement internationale, car qu'y a-t-il de plus international que les épidémies ? Personne ne songe à limiter la souveraineté des Etats dans ce domaine, mais on doit reconnaître que si un pays néglige ses devoirs, il menace par là directement tous les autres.

M. Venizelos a manifesté, une fois de plus, ses talents d'homme d'Etat en faisant profiter son pays du secours de la Société des Nations, qui joint à son efficacité technique l'avantage considérable d'être absolument gratuit et désintéressé, aussi bien au point de vue politique que financier.

Mais si la Grèce doit, en cette affaire, de la reconnaissance à

la Société des Nations, on se montrerait injuste en dissimulant que la Société des Nations, à son tour, doit savoir gré à M. Venizelos de lui fournir l'occasion de montrer au monde les services qu'elle peut rendre.

Il a fourni aussi un champ d'expérience, et cela à un double point de vue. Pour la première fois, la Société des Nations se trouve en mesure de contrôler elle-même l'application de ses recommandations. Et pour la première fois elle peut expérimenter un système cohérent et complet d'organisation sanitaire appliqué à tout un pays. Ce pays est petit, mais si le système fonctionne, il pourra sans doute demain être appliqué sous d'autres cieux, plus vastes.

Rien n'est contagieux — puisqu'il s'agit ici d'épidémies — comme le bien et l'utile. Il est vraisemblable que si l'expérience grecque réussit — et personne n'en doute — elle sera répétée ailleurs. La Société des Nations est désireuse de rendre service, et il y a bien d'autres pays que la Grèce dont l'état sanitaire n'est pas satisfaisant et qui pourraient retirer de grands profits d'une collaboration directe avec la Société des Nations.

DER WELTSCHIEDSVERTRAG DER GENERALAKTE, VON PROF. DR. HANS WEHBERG.

(Völkerbund, Berlin, Juni/Juli 1929)

Am 13. Mai 1929 ist als erste Macht Schweden der von der neunten Bundesversammlung beschlossenen Generalakte beigetreten. Bereits am 18. Mai 1929 hat Belgien und am 11. Juni 1929 Norwegen die Beitrittsurkunde auf dem Völkerbundsekretariat hinterlegt. In Frankreich wird auf Grund eines einstimmigen Beschlusses des Auswärtigen Ausschusses der Kammer mit der Regierung über eine Einschränkung der von der Regierung vorgeschlagenen Vorbehalte verhandelt. Auch andere Mächte haben inzwischen ihre Absicht kundgegeben, der Generalakte beizutreten.

Die Frage des Beitritts zur Generalakte wird somit im Lauf der nächsten Zeit die besondere Aufmerksamkeit aller an dem Fortschritt des Völkerbundes interessierten Kreise in Anspruch nehmen. Die deutsche öffentliche Meinung hat sich mit der Generalakte bisher nur wenig beschäftigt. Es soll daher im folgenden versucht werden, einen Überblick über die Entstehung, den Inhalt und die Bedeutung der Generalakte zu geben.

Bei der Generalakte handelt es sich um den Versuch, durch einen möglichst alle Mitglieder der Staatengemeinschaft umfassenden Vertrag die internationalen Streitigkeiten einem friedlichen Streitverfahren zu unterbreiten.

Der Völkerbund hat den Mitgliedern des Bundes in Art. 12 die Pflicht auferlegt, bei Streitigkeiten, die zu einem Bruch führen können, entweder die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit oder die Vermittlung anzurufen. Dies Verfahren ist sehr unvollkommen. Denn selbst bei rechtlichen Streitigkeiten besteht nach der Völkerbundsatzung keine Verpflichtung zur Anrufung einer schiedsrichterlichen Instanz. Die vermittelnde Tätigkeit des Rates bei politischen Streitigkeiten, wie sie in der Satzung vorgesehen ist, hat deswegen grosse Bedenken, weil der Rat als politische Instanz kein idealer Vermittler ist und weil das Verfahren im allgemeinen mit einem die Parteien nicht bindenden Gutachten abschliesst.

Schon die erste Bundesversammulung hat die Ideen eines weitergehenden Weltschiedsvertrages zu fördern gesucht. Im Zusammenhang mit dem Statut des Weltgerichtshofs wurde ein Spezialprotokoll geschaffen, um den Staaten, die dazu bereit waren, die Möglichkeit zu geben, unter Voraussetzung der Gegenseitigkeit alle oder bestimmte Rechtsfragen dem Weltgerichtshof zu unterbreiten. An dieses Spezialprotokoll sind bisher 16 Staaten, von Grossmächten nur das Deutsche Reich, gebunden. Aber Frankreich hat das Spezialprotokoll bereits unterzeichnet und Grossbritannien wird, wenn die britische Arbeiterpartei ihre Wahlversprechungen erfüllt, gleichfalls eine Ratifikation des Spezialprotokolls nicht mehr aufschieben können. Zum Verständnis des Spezialprotokolls muss man sich vergegenwärtigen, dass dadurch nur rechtliche, nicht auch politische Fragen der Entscheidung des Gerichtshofes unterbreitet werden und dass ferner der Inhalt des Spezialprotokolls nicht etwa wie Art. 12 der Satzung ohne weiteres für alle Mitglieder des Völkerbundes gilt, sondern nur für diejenigen, die das Spezialprotokoll genehmigt haben. Bei dem Beitritt zum Spezialprotokoll sind den Staaten alle Arten von Vorbehalten erlaubt. Von der Befugnis, Vorbehalte anzumelden, haben jedoch die Mächte, die sich bisher dem Spezialprotokoll angeschlossen haben, nur in bescheidenem Masse Gebrauch gemacht.

Der zweite grosse Versuch, im Rahmen des Völkerbundes ein System friedlicher Streiterledigungsmittel zu schaffen, wurde in dem berühmten Genfer Protokoll (1924) unternommen. Dieses Protokoll unterbeitete Rechtsfragen dem Weltgerichtshofe, politische Streitfragen einem Schiedsgerichtsverfahren, das besonders deswegen sehr eigenartig war, weil es zahlreiche Elemente der Vermittlung enthielt. Die Schiedsinstanzen des Genfer Protokolls für politische Streitigkeiten waren in enge Verbindung mit dem Völkerbundrat gebracht, so dass die wahrhaft unparteiische Erledigung von Streitigkeiten nicht gesichert war. Ausserdem enthielt das Schiedsgerichtssystem des Genfer Protokolls nicht unwesentliche Lücken, indem Streitigkeiten, welche die Revision von

Verträgen oder die Veränderung der territorialen Integrität betreffen, ferner solche Streitigkeiten, die nach völkerrechtlichen Grundsätzen in die ausschliessliche innere Zuständigkeit eines Staats gehören, dem Schiedsverfahren nicht unterworfen sein sollten. Wir wissen aber, dass trotzdem der konservativen englischen Regierung das Schiedsgerichtssystem des Genfer Protokolls noch zu weit ging. Ausserdem wollte das Genfer Protokoll nicht lediglich das friedliche Verfahren regeln, sondern gleichzeitig den Krieg ächten und die Staaten gegenüber einem verbotenen Angriff durch automatisch einsetzende militärische Sanktionen schützen. Diese Verkuppelung der Gedanken der Kriegsächtung, der Streitschlichtung und der Sanktionen schuf neue Schwierigkeiten. Grossbritannien widersetzte sich nicht nur dem Schiedsgericht, sondern auch dem weitgehenden Sanktionssystem des Protokolls.

Man wird heute die Frage, ob die Ablehnung des Genfer Protokolls durch die britische Regierung für die Weiterentwicklung des Völkerbundes ein Vorteil war, wesentlich ruhiger beurteilen können als vor fünf Jahren. Besteht wirklich eine Notwendigkeit, um die verwickelten Probleme der Kriegsächtung, der Streitschlichtung und der Sanktionnen in *einem* Vertrage zu regeln? War ferner das Schiedsgerichtssystem des Genfer Protokolls nicht allzu politischer Natur? Und muss, was das entscheidende ist, das Sanktionssystem des Protokolls nicht als völlig überspannt und einer Höllenmaschine vergleichbar angesehen werden?

Es ist eigenartig, dass die Entwicklung neuerdings ganz von selbst darauf hinausgegangen ist, die Ideen der Kriegsächtung und der Streitschlichtung einzeln zu verwirklichen und sie nicht mit den Sanktionen zu verbinden. Der Kellogg-Pakt stellt eine (wenn auch zunächst unvollkommene) Regelung des Problems der Kriegsächtung dar. Die Generalakte der neunten Bundesversammlung hat den Versuch gemacht, ein für alle Streitigkeiten geeignetes Schiedsgerichts- und Vergleichssystem auszuarbeiten, wie es in dem Genfer Protokoll zum erstenmal in grosszügiger Weise in Angriff genommen worden ist. Der Kriegsächtungspakt ist ausserhalb des Völkerbundes, auf Grund des Briand-Kelloggschen Notenwechsels, entstanden. Die Generalakte ist im Rahmen des Völkerbundes geschaffen worden. Die Frage, ob man nun dem dritten Problem, dem Sanktionsrecht, gleichfalls einen selbständigen Vertrag widmem soll, braucht in diesem Zusammenhang nicht entschieden zu werden. Man kann aber vermuten, dass sich die Begeisterung nicht nur für automatische, sondern überhaupt für militärische Sanktionen mit der Zeit ein wenig abgekühlt hat. Als charakteristisch für diese Entwicklung möge die eine Tatsache erwähnt werden, dass die Berliner Tagung des Weltverbandes der Völkerbundligen 1927 im Zusammenhang mit der Frage,

„Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit und Sicherheit" einen allgemeinen Pakt befürwortet hat, der die Achtung des Krieges und die friedliche Erledigung internationaler Streitigkeiten empfahl, aber jede Anspielung auf Sanktionen unterliess.

In der Zeit nach dem Genfer Protokoll ist der Versuch, ein für alle, auch die politischen Streitigkeiten bindendes Verfahren zu schaffen, nur in vereinzelten Schiedsgerichts- und Vergleichsverträgen gemacht worden. Von deutscher Seite wurden bei Gelegenheit des Notenwechsels, der dem Abschluss des Locarno-Pakts vorausging, Bedenken gegen ein umfassendes Schiedsgerichtssystem geltend gemacht. Die Schiedsverträge des Locarno-Pakts machten sich die Auffassung zu eigen, dass politische Streitigkeiten am besten in einem Vermittlungsverfahren, nicht aber in einem mit einem Endurteil abschliessenden Schiedsgerichtsverfahren erledigt würden. Immerhin zeigt die Tatsache, dass auf der sechsten Bundesversammlung (1925) von seiten Schwedens eine erneute Prüfung der Grundsätze des Genfer Protokolls, betreffend die obligatorische Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit beantragt wurde, mit aller Deutlichkeit, dass die Idee der schiedsrichterlichen Erledigung *aller* internationalen Streitigkeiten nach wie vor lebendig war. Die sechste Bundesversammlung ging jedoch auf diese Anregung nicht ein, da sie Bedenken hatte, ob die obligatorische Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit durch die Ausarbeitung eines so strengen Systems gefördert werden würde.

Einen bedeutsamen Schritt auf dem Wege der Ausdehnung der obligatorischen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit stellte sodann ein norwegischer Antrag „Projekt eines freiwilligen Abkommens für die obligatorische Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit" dar, der auf der achten Bundesversammlung (1927) gestellt wurde. Danach sollten rechtliche Fragen dem Haager Weltgerichtshof, politische Streitigkeiten aber nach dem Scheitern des in Art. 15 der Satzung vorgesehenen Verfahrens einem Schiedsgerichtsausschusse unterbreitet werden. Die achte Bundesversammlung überwies diesen Antrag dem Sicherheitsausschuss, dessen Gründung gerade damals in Erwägung gezogen wurde.

Es ist nun unmöglich, die einzelnen Richtlinien, welche die achte Bundesversammlung dem Sicherheitsausschuss zur Lösung der Schiedsgerichtsfrage mit auf den Weg gab, zu erörtern, noch auf die Denkschriften einzugehen, die sowohl von seiten verschiedener Mächte dem Sicherheitsausschusse eingereicht, wie von den Berichterstattern des Sicherheitsausschusses selbst ausgearbeitet wurden. Auch können die Verhandlungen des Sicherheitsausschusses selbst, der übrigens formal als ein Unterausschuss der Vorbereitenden Abrüstungskommission eingesetzt wurde, hier nicht geschildert werden. Immerhin sei erwähnt, dass der Sicherheitsausschuss drei allgemeine Abkommen ausarbeitete, die sich auf das Schiedsgerichts- und Vergleichsverfahren bezogen.

Die neunte Bundesversammlung hat nun, besonders auf Grund der Initiative von Unden (Schweden) und Henri Rolin (Belgien), die drei allgemeinen Abkommen zu einem einzigen Vertrage, der sogenannten „Acte général", verschmolzen. Letztere umfasst vier Kapitel. In dem I, Kapitel wird für Streitigkeiten jeder Art ein Vergleichsverfahren vorgesehen. Gemäss Kapitel II sollen Streitigkeiten, hinsichtlich deren sich die Parteien gegenseitig ein Recht streitig machen, dem Weltgerichtshof überwiesen werden, es sei denn, dass eine Einigung auf ein besonderes Schiedsgericht erfolgt. Streitigkeiten dieser Art sollen einem Vergleichsverfahren nur bei gegenseitigem Einverständnis der Parteien überwiesen werden. Das III. Kapitel unterwirft Streitigkeiten politischer Natur nach dem Scheitern des Vergleichsverfahrens in Ermangelung anderweitiger Einigung der Parteien einem aus fünf Personen bestehenden Schiedsgericht. Dieses Schiedsgericht soll die in Art. 38 des Statuts des Weltgerichtshofs vorgesehenen Rechtsgrundsätze anwenden, soweit aber derartige auf die Streitigkeit anwendbaren Grundsätze nicht bestehen, nach Recht und Billigkeit (ex aequo et bono) entscheiden.

Bemerkenswert ist nun, dass sich der Beitritt zu der Generalakte nicht auf die Gesamtheit der in ihr enthaltenen Verpflichtungen zu erstrecken braucht. Die Staaten können sich nach Kapitel IV darauf beschränken, lediglich die Bestimmungen betreffend das Vergleichsverfahren und die richterliche Erledigung von Streitigkeiten oder auch nur das Vergleichsverfahren anzunehmen.

Weiterhin ist zu beachten, dass die Staaten bei Annahme der Generalakte, aber auch noch nachträglich Vorbehalte machen können, durch die sie gewisse Streitigkeiten von den in der Akte bezeichneten Verfahrensarten ausschliessen, nämlich :

a) Streitigkeiten, die in Tatsachen ihren Ursprung haben, die zeitlich entweder vor dem Beitritt der Partei liegen, welche den Vorbehalt ausspricht, oder vor dem Beitritt einer anderen Partei, die mit der ersteren eine Streitigkeit hat.

b) Streitigkeiten über Fragen, die das Völkerrecht der ausschliesslichen Zuständigkeit der Staaten überlässt.

c) Streitigkeiten, die bestimmte Angelegenheiten oder besondere genau bezeichnete Materien betreffen, wie z. B. den Gebietsstand, oder die zu ganz bestimmten Kategorien gehören.

Ist nicht ausdrücklich das Gegenteil erklärt, so sollen sich die Vorbehalte nicht auch auf das Vergleichsverfahren beziehen.

Trotz der Möglichkeit des teilweisen Beitritts und der Zulässigkeit von Vorbehalten wird man sagen müssen, dass die Generalakte eine Kodifikation des friedlichen Streitverfahrens für alle Arten von internationalen Konflikten darstellt.

Wie soll man sich nun deutscherseits zu der Generalakte

stellen? Diese Frage hängt in erster Linie davon ab, ob man es für richtig hält, auch politische Streitigkeiten einem obligatorischen Schiedsverfahren zu unterbreiten. Glaubt man, dass das Prinzip der Locarno-Schiedsverträge, also das System Gaus, die ideale Lösung darstellt, dann wird man den Beitritt zu der Generalakte als Ganzes ablehnen müssen. Von diesem Gesichtspunkte würde es eine zu grosse Belastung der Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit darstellen, ihr schon heute alle Streitfragen zu unterbreiten, und es wäre vorzuziehen, politische Streitigkeiten nach wie vor durch ein Vergleichsverfahren regeln zu lassen. Man würde nach dieser Auffassung übrigens nicht dazu gelangen, den Beitritt zur Generalakte überhaup abzulehnen, wohl aber den Beitritt auf die Abschnitte I, II und IV zu beschränken.

Es muss ferner beachtet werden, dass nach herrschender Auffassung Konflikte, betreffend die Revision von Friedensverträgen, territoriale Änderungen usw. grundsätzlich nicht zu den Streitfragen gehören, die der obligatorischen Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit unterworfen werden können. Das ist im Bericht zum Genfer Protokoll ausdrücklich anerkannt. Bevor die Staaten diese Auffassung nicht aufgegeben haben, ist nicht daran zu denken, dass die Regierungen solche Streitigkeiten auf Grund einer im weitesten Sinne verstandenen Billigkeit entscheiden lassen.

Man kann zudem überhaupt im Zweifel sein, ob nicht die befriedigende Regelung territorialer und sonstiger wichtiger Fragen durch ein Schiedsgericht zur Voraussetzung hat, dass die Staatengemeinschaft gleichzeitig materielle Grundsätze aufstellt, nach denen solche Streitigkeiten entschieden werden können. Solange man sich nicht über solche Normen einigt, insbesondere über die Bedingungen, nach denen das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker verwirklicht, unbillige Grenzen sowie Friedensverträge revidiert werden können, wird eine Überweisung solcher Konflikte an ein Schiedsgericht gewisse Gefahren mit sich bringen können. Würde nicht unter solchen Umständen die Neuregelung *jeder* Grenze, die Revision *jedes* Vertrages verlangt werden können und würde solche Möglichkeit nicht dem Interesse aller Staaten, auch des Deutschen Reichs, widersprechen?

Bis solche Grundsätze geschaffen und die obligatorische Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit auf alle Streitigkeiten ausgedehnt ist, wird noch einige Zeit vergehen. Inzwischen aber sollte man diesem Ziele immer näher zu kommen suchen.

Es fragt sich nun, ob man nicht in dem Kapitel III der Generalakte eine Etappe auf diesem Wege erblicken soll. Bedeutet nicht das Kapitel III der Generalakte die Anerkennung des Prinzips der obligatorischen Erledigung auch politischer Konflikte einschliesslich derjenigen, betreffend die Revision von Friedensverträgen und die Änderung von Grenzen? Kann

man nicht die Generalakte in ihrer Gesamtheit annehmen und gleichzeitig ihre zukünftige Revision in dem eben erörterten Sinne anstreben? Dass unter diesen Umständen der Beitritt aller Staaten zur Generalakte nicht die Bedeutung hat, die ihm vielleicht vereinzelt zugeschrieben wird, muss zugegeben werden. Aber auf internationalem Gebiete kommt man im allgemeinen nur allmählich vorwärts, und der erste Schritt zur obligatorischen Erledigung aller internationaler Streitigkeiten wäre doch zunächst einmal die Festlegung des Grundsatzes, dass die Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit auch vor politischen Konflikten nicht haltmachen darf.

Als die schwedische Regierung ihren Beitritt zur Generalakte nicht auf Kapitel III ausdehnte, hat sie nur allgemeine politische Bedenken gegen die Uberweisung von Interessenstreitigkeiten an ein obligatorisches Schiedsverfahren geltend gemacht, nicht aber bestimmte Einzelheiten des Kapitels III der Generalakte gerügt. Dass die norwegische Regierung ihren Beitritt in gleicher Weise wie die schwedische Regierung beschränkt hat, ist in erster Linie auf das schwedische Vorbild zurückzuführen. Aber nach den Dokumenten der Regierung und des Parlaments hat die norwegische Regierung den Beitritt zu Kapitel III für später vorbehalten. Aus der Tatsache, dass Schweden und Norwegen dem Kapitel III der Generalakte nicht beigetreten sind, kann daher vom Standpunkte dessen, der die obligatorische Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit für Interessenkonflikte bejaht, kein Argument gegen die Annahme der gesamten Generalakte entnommen werden*).

Politisch muss bei der Stellungnahme zur Generalakte in Betracht gezogen werden, dass das Bekenntnis zur Idee der unbeschränkten Schiedsgerichtsbarkeit von seiten möglichst vieler Staaten die Idee des Rechts in der ganzen Welt stärken würde. Belgien hat sich bereits zu diesem Prinzip bekannt und die Denkschrift von Descamps an den belgischen Senat hat die hohe Bedeutung dieses Fortschritts gewürdigt. Frankreich will, wenn auch mit gewissen Vorbehalten, Kapitel III gleichfalls annehmen. Die britische Arbeiterregierung hat sich vor den Wahlen gegenüber ihren Wählern zur Annahme der Akte verpflichtet. Wäre es unter diesen Umständen klug, nur Kapitel I, II und IV der Generalakte anzunehmen und damit vor der Welt die Erklärung abzugeben oder doch den Anschein zu erwecken, dass die schiedsrichterliche Erledigung von Interessenkonflikten deutscherseits grundsätzlich abgelehnt wird?

Man muss die Generalakte nicht als eine endgültige Regelung eines Systems der Streiterledigung auffassen, sondern als eine Etappe auf dem Wege zu weiterem Fortschritt. Das Ziel muss

*) Neuerdings hat allerdings auch die niederländische Regierung in einem Gesetzentwurf ihre Absicht kundgegeben, ihren Beitritt auf Kapitel I, II und IV zu beschränken.

sein, zu erreichen, dass auch politische Konflikte, wenn diplomatische und Vergleichsverhandlungen gescheitert sind, durch ein unparteiisches Schiedsgericht nach Grundsätzen der Billigkeit entschieden werden. Diese Entwicklung aber kann nur beschleunigt werden, wenn man die Kräfte in der Welt, welche die Herrschaft der Gerechtigkeit im internationalen Leben fördern wollen, mit allen Mitteln unterstützt. Wenn man bei dem Grundsatzte beharrt: „Alles oder nichts", dann kann man Kapitel III der Generalakte ablehnen. Wenn man aber davon ausgeht, dass jeder Fortschritt im internationalen Leben von Etappe zu Etappe erkämpft werden muss, dann wird man seine Bedenken gegen Kapitel III lieber jetzt zurückstellen, um das internationale Vertrauen zu vergrössern und jene endgültige Lösung vorzubereiten, die eines Tages die gerechte Lösung aller internationalen Konflikte garantiert.

L'AGRICULTURE AU CARREFOUR, PAR M. WILLIAM MARTIN.

(Journal de Genève du 12 mai 1929.)

Il serait vain de le nier : au moment où la Société des nations a entrepris son œuvre économique, l'importance de l'agriculture pour ses travaux ne lui est pas apparue nettement. Il semblait possible alors de sérier les questions et de venir en aide à l'industrie éprouvée sans entrer dans le vaste domaine des problèmes agricoles, où l'on redoutait de se perdre.

Au moment de la conférence économique, voici deux ans, ce sentiment de crainte et cette volonté d'abstention prévalaient encore. Si l'on admit une représentation des agriculteurs à la conférence, ce fut moins pour gagner leur collaboration positive que pour ne pas heurter des milieux influents. Mais l'espoir de réussir, en ce qui concerne l'agriculture, une œuvre internationale quelconque, n'existait presque chez personne.

Depuis lors, et à mesure qu'on s'est engagé davantage dans un travail pratique, on s'est aperçu qu'il était impossible de faire, entre l'industrie et l'agriculture, une distinction nette. La vie est une et se rit de nos classifications. Industriels et agriculteurs travaillent avec des matières premières et dans des conditions différentes. Mais les uns et les autres subissent de la même façon la pression des circonstances et des lois économiques.

C'est ce qu'a constaté la Société des nations aussitôt qu'elle s'est trouvée en contact avec les réalités. Nous avons déjà expliqué le mécanisme de son action, qui consiste essentiellement à ouvrir à l'industrie de l'Europe occidentale de nouveaux débouchés dans les pays encore peu développés industriellement. Pour y réussir, il faut persuader les Etats industriels d'ou-

vrir, en retour, leurs propres frontières aux produits agricoles de leurs clients. C'est ici qu'on se heurte à des résistances tenaces, sinon invincibles.

Il suffit de poser ainsi le problème, tel qu'il se pose en fait, pour montrer qu'il ne peut être résolu par les industriels seuls et sans contact avec l'agriculture. C'est ce qu'a constaté, à chacune de ses sessions, le Comité économique et c'est pourquoi il a désiré lui-même se voir adjoindre sous une forme ou sous une autre, des représentants qualifiés des intérêts agricoles.

L'une des fonctions les moins apparentes, mais les plus utiles de la Société des nations, dans le domaine économique, est de faire pénétrer peu à peu, dans des milieux de plus en plus étendus, le sentiment de leurs responsabilités internationales. Des gens qui, jadis, ne concevaient les questions générales que sous l'angle de leurs intérêts particuliers ou nationaux, s'accoutument, au contact des autres pays, à envisager les incidences internationales de leurs actes.

On peut dire que ce fut le cas, tout d'abord, pour les représentants des gouvernements. Les hommes qui, professionnellement, négociaient des traités de commerce, et cherchaient à obtenir pour leur pays le plus d'avantages possibles, fût-ce au détriment des autres, ont peu à peu découvert que leurs actes avaient des répercussions générales et qu'ils faisaient peut-être, en les négligeant, une œuvre mauvaise et nuisible même à leur propre pays.

La même découverte a été faite, aussi, par ceux des chefs d'industrie qui sont en contact direct avec la vie internationale. On peut poser en principe qu'il y a aujourd'hui dans chaque pays une cinquantaine de personnes : banquiers, industriels ou grands commerçants, qui comprennent qu'en beaucoup de domaines, le vrai intérêt national ne peut être recherché que sur le plan international.

Le jour où la même conviction aura pénétré, d'une manière générale, dans la tête des chefs de l'agriculture, le problème économique de l'Europe sera plus qu'à moitié résolu. Ce jour n'est pas encore venu ; c'est pour en hâter l'aurore que le comité consultatif vient de décider d'associer étroitement les organisations agricoles aux travaux de la Société des Nations.

Rien n'est plus légitime, de la part des paysans, que de défendre leurs intérêts. On peut d'autant moins le leur reprocher que la prospérité de l'agriculture est, dans nos pays, une condition de la stabilité sociale et de la paix publique. On ne peut pas nier non plus que le protectionnisme effréné que les Etats européens pratiquent au profit de leur industrie place les paysans, qui achètent cher ce qu'il achètent et vendent bon marché ce qu'ils vendent, dans une situation très difficile.

De ces constastions, les agriculteurs — notre Dr Laur, en particulier, dont l'autorité internationale est considérable — ont tiré la conclusion qu'il fallait étendre le protectionnisme à

l'agriculture. Mais il est de toute évidence qu'on peut obtenir le même résultat en diminuant le protectionnisme industriel.

En d'autres termes, le problème est de savoir si les agriculteurs contribueront encore par leur influence à accroître le protectionnisme, et à diviser l'Europe en vingt-huit cellules irréductibles, ou s'ils se résoudront à poursuivre la satisfaction de leurs intérêts en collaborant avec la Société des nations.

La première de ces politiques conduit l'Europe à sa ruine, peut-être à de nouvelles guerres. La seconde seule peut la sauver et assurer, en face des Etats Unis, la prospérité de notre continent. Aussi n'est-il pas indifférent que les agriculteurs, par leurs représentants, collaborent activement, à Genève, avec les hommes qui s'efforcent de ramener l'Europe à une appréciation plus saine de ses véritables intérêts.

Une seule difficulté restait à vaincre, celle de mettre les agriculteurs d'accord entre eux. Car il existe, dans ce domaine si peu international en apparence, plusieurs organisations internationales qui ne s'entendent pas. L'Institut international d'agriculture de Rome, qui existe en vertu d'une convention de 1905, dénie même à tout autre organisme international, en particulier à la Société des nations, le droit de s'occuper de l'agriculture.

Ce point de vue exclusif, et moins *international* dans le vrai sens du mot qu'il n'en a l'air, a été soutenu devant le comité consultatif et ses commissions par les membres italiens. Mais il n'a pu triompher. Et le résultat positif de cette session sera de faire entrer l'agriculture sur un pied d'égalité absolue dans cette maison du quai Wilson où s'élabore lentement, avec la collaboration de tous, une Europe meilleure.

ARMIES FOR EVER, BY MR. H. WILSON HARRIS.

(Daily News, May 13, 1929)

Great Britain, being a naval State, and naval disarmament having taken a new and promising turn at the recent Geneva discussions, the opinion is generally prevalent that the recent Geneva discussions have been rather a success.

To some extent they have. But to some extent they distinctly have not. And since Great Britain is not only a naval but a European State she can by no means disinterest herself in the form of disarmament which matters supremely to Europe—namely, the limitation, and if possible the reduction, of armies.

The United States, no doubt, can. Her representative, Mr. Hugh Gibson, did in fact say in effect : "We are not concerned with armies. That is an affair for the European Powers. Let them settle it their own way". And, consequently, Mr. Gibson

having hitherto strenuously opposed the French thesis regarding trained reserves, suddenly declared himself no longer interested in trained reserves. Lord Cushendun taking the same line on behalf of Great Britain, the trained reserves question was settled finally—in France's way.

Now it is easy to adopt an untenable attitude about trained reserves, and talk, for example, of abolishing them. You obviously cannot abolish them without abolishing conscription —for conscripts do not become untrained when they have finished their year in barracks—and you cannot abolish conscription because the greater part of Europe is wedded to it. But if countries like France are going to count for purposes of limitation only the men actually under arms, leaving the vast reservoir of ex conscripts unreckoned—if we have to acquiesce in that, as we have—then at least substantial concessions in other regions of the field of disarmament may reasonably be expected.

If they have been expected they have been expected in vain. The Preparatory Commission, having seen new naval conversations put satisfactorily in train, set to work on the military clauses of the coming disarmament convention. As a result of its labours it has achieved just exactly nothing in the direction of limitation. More than that, such hopes as did exist of military limitation have been effectively dispelled.

Take the three heads under which limitation is both possible and essential—men, material, money.

As to men, only those actually in service are to be counted. The trained reserves are to be ignored. It is true that the principle of limiting the period of conscript service has been accepted, but no hope was held out of reduction below the present figure. The one hopeful way of limiting the number of conscripts, and consequently of trained reserves, is to cut down not only the period of service, but also the numbers of the annual contingent. That can be done in various ways, but no one at Geneva agreed to do it. The chief conscriptionist countries will continue to train the whole male population for war as before.

As to material, the obvious direct method of limithing the number of field-guns, the number of machineguns, the number of tanks, and so forth, each country should possess was rejected, on the ground that such limitation was useless without some form of international investigation or supervision to ensure that the limitation was being observed, and no one would accept anything of that kind.

The French thereupon proposed an indirect limitation in the form of a restriction on the money to be spent on war material. The United States, however, refused that, and in the end the best that could be secured was a pledge of full publicity for

expenditure on military material. That publicity, it may be observed, exists already.

The situation thus created is profoundly grave. Germany was assured specifically in 1919 that she was being disarmed in order to make it possible for the Allied Powers to disarm too.

She has to-day a professional army of 100.000 men. France has a professional army of 235,000, to be increased, according to M. Painlevé, the War Minister, to 372,000 by 1931. She has, in addition, a conscript army of about the same size as her present professional army. She has, in addition, serving within her European frontiers, a substantial number (I have not the precise figure) of coloured African troops.

Whatever may be said in condonation of that establishment, it is in plain and flat contradiction of the undertakings in the Treaty of Versailles and the League Covenant, and the hopes held out in the Acte Finale of the Locarno Treaty. And in that connection the armies of Italy, of Poland, of Czecho-Slovakia, of Rumania, of Jugo-Slavia, call for scrutiny equally.

France declares she needs her army for security. She has the disarmament of Germany for security. She has the League Covenant for security. She has the Locarno Treaty for security. (Did Sir Austen Chamberlain really mean us to guarantee a disarmed Germany against an overarmed France ?) She has the Kellogg Pact for security.

But reduce her military strength ? No. Evacuate the Rhineland ? No. Very well. One day—and soon the Germans will claim the right to rearm. And the British Government of that day will have to decide where it stands in relation to a Germany doing simply what no less prominent a Frenchman than M. Paul-Boncour has declared she has a legal and moral right to do. We are not so detached from the military disarmament issue after all.

NACH DER GENFER DEBATTE, VON DER GESCHAEFTSFUEHRUNG DES AUSSCHUSSES DER EUROPAEISCHEN NATIONALITAETENKONGRESSE.

(Mitteilungen, Mai/Juni 1929)

Gewisse Merkmale könnten bei oberflächlicher Betrachtung in der Tat die Anschauung rechtfertigen, als ob der Ausgang dieses ersten Zusammenstosses die Position derjenigen, die für die Minderheitenrechte kämpfen, verschlechtert hätte. So könnte angeführt werden, dass die Reden Chamberlains und vor allem Briands, die den Ausführungen Dandurands, Stresemanns und Procopés folgten, den Eindruck erwecken konnten,

als ob durch sie der Ernst und die Tragweite der gemachten Propositionen entscheidend beeinträchtigt worden wären. Ferner könnte man annehmen, dass die eigenartige Zusammensetzung des Ratsausschusses zur Durchsicht der Vorschläge eine Ausschaltung der Antragsteller oder gar eine « Beerdigung I. Klasse » ihrer Propositionen bedeute. Diese Ansicht wird ja auch von zahlreichen Organen der Presse — speziell in Deutschland — vertreten. Doch die auf den ersten Blick einleuchtenden Argumente sind in der Hauptsache nicht stichhaltig.

Gewiss, die Rede Briands hat bei den Freunden des Redners und Gegnern der Minderheiten lauten Beifall gefunden. Auf alle neutralen Teilnehmer und speziell die den Minoritäten verschiedenster Nationalität nahestehenden Persönlichkeiten hat sie aber genau den entgegengesetzten Eindruck gemacht. Am besten bringt nas ein bekannter schweizerischer Journalist zum Ausdruck, der folgendes schreibt : « Herr Briand hat allerhand Scherze und Ironien in die Debatte gemischt. Doch für Unglückliche und Bedrängte sind auch die guten Witze, schlechte Witze ». Solche Leute gibt es aber in Europa ein paar Dutzend Millionen, also eine Zahl, die auch dem sonst so klug auf sein Prestige bedachten Frankreich imponieren dürfte ». Nein, der Briandsche Spott in bezug auf eine Frage, die Millionen von Menschen materiell und seelish berührt, war — und das dürfte sich künftig noch deutlicher zeigen — weder für Frankreich noch für seine Verbündeten ein Erfolg. Das gleiche lässt sich auch von den Ausführungen Chamberlains sagen, der in der Art eines guten Firmenchefs die Tätigkeit aller Teile seines Unternehmens : des Dreierkomitees, der Minderheitensektion usw. lobte, und sich damit nicht nur mit Herrn Dandurand, dessen Unparteilichkeit ja über allem Zweifel steht, sondern auch dem grös ten Teile der englischen Offentlichkeit inklusive der « Times » in Widerspru h setzte. Dieses Blatt hatte noch am 1. März eine scharfe Kritik an der bisherigen Völkerbundpraxis in den Minderheitenfragen geübt. Allerdings darf nicht übersehen werden, dass Herr Chamberlain seine Rede mit dem Vorschlage, der Rat möge die Frage einem allgemeinen Studium unterziehen, abschloss und sich damit auf einen den Polen und Rumänen entgegengesetzten Standpunkt stellte.

Doch auch das andere Argument, die Zusammensetzung des Ratskomitees, bedeute eine Verschleppung, wenn nicht gar eine Beerdigung der gemachten Vorschläge, kann nicht anerkannt werden. Gewiss, Sir Austen Chamberlain, Herr Quiñones de Léon und Herr Adatci, von denen der eine Gegner der Anderung des heutigen Zustandes ist, während der zweite einen Staat, der seine Nationalitäten prinzipiell zu entnationalisieren sucht, vertritt, und der dritte, aus Japan kommend, dem individuell europäischen Problem des Minderheitenschutzes völlig

fernsteht, sind nicht das geeignete Gremium, um die Formulierung von Vorschlägen für eine Verbesserung des Völkerbundverfahrens zu treffen. Doch so, wie die Dinge heute liegen, wird es sich bei der Arbeit des Komitees — und darüber besteht wie die Blätter berichten, bereits ein Beschluss desselben — vor allem nur um eine Durchsicht und eine Zusammenfassung der bereits vorhandenen sowie der noch einlaufenden Vorschläge und Betrachtungen handeln. In jedem Falle wird der Bericht des Komitees, selbst wenn er auch Werturteile enthalten sollte, dem Rate nur als eine Diskussionsunterlage dienen. Mit anderen Worten, die übrigen Ratsmitglieer werden an die in ihm enthaltenen Urteile in keiner Weise gebunden sein.

So weit die negativ zu bewertenden Momente der Genfer Diskussion. Ihnen steht aber bereits eine Reihe von positiven Ergebnissen gegenüber. Vor allem ist durch den Inhalt und die Form der Stresemannschen Rede sowie den Charakter der Vorschläge Dandurands die ganze Diskussion in ein sachliches Fahrwasser geraten, aus der sie alle taktischen Künste nicht mehr herauszudrängen vermögen. Ferner ist dank der Tatsache, dass Kanada, ein den europäischen Gegensätzen gänzlich fernstehendes Land, den ersten Proponenten stellt und Finnland die Anträge Kanadas in der Hauptsache unterstützte, der ganzen Aktion ein Stempel der Uberparteilichkeit und der Internationalität verliehen. Es dürfte daher nicht leicht sein, die ganze Diskussion als deutsche Mache zu verdächtigen, wie man das anfänglich vorhatte. Schliesslich muss die in Genf gefasste Resolution schon an und für sich, und zwar in vielfacher Hinsicht, als für die Sache der Minoritäten nützlich bezeichnet werden. Aus ihr geht nämlich einwandfrei hervor, dass das Ratskomitee und somit auch der Rat sich künftig mit allen Anregungen Dandurands und Stresemanns, allen dazu geäusserten Gesichtspunkten und mehr noch allen Propositionen, die dazu bis zum 15. April eingereicht werden, zu befassen haben werden. So auch mit der vom Standpunkt der Minoritäten besonders wichtigen Anregung auf Gründung einer Expertenstudienkommission beim Völkerbund, einer Kommission, die mit dem Ratskomitee, dessen Vollmachten zuerst ja nur bis zur nächsten Ratssession reichen, in keinem Falle — wie das leider aber oft geschieht — zu verwechseln ist. Daraus ergibt sich erstens, dass der polnische Vorschlag, das Ratskomitee möge seine Tätigkeit nur auf die Frage beschränken, wie weit die Vorschläge Dandurands den geltenden Vertragsbestimmungen entsprechen, abgelehnt worden ist. Zweitens aber auch, dass der kommenden Ratsdiskussion der weitmöglichste Umfang gegeben sein wird. Die Madrider Session wird daher nicht etwa eine Schmälerung, sondern ganz im Gegenteil eine Erweiterung der bisherigen Diskussionsbasis mit sich bringen, und zwar um so mehr, da das Komitee durch die Resolution

ermächtigt wird, nach eigenem Ermessen auch Eingaben und Gutachten sachverständiger Stellen ausserhalb des Kreises der am Bunde beteiligten Regierungen — also etwa ein Gutachten der Völkerbundligenunion, die, wie man weiss, seit Jahren einen grossen Tel ihrer Arbeiten auf das Minoritätenproblem konzentriert — zu berücksichtigen und entgegenzunehmen.

Doch man wird damit rechnen müssen, dass die Diskussion in Madrid noch keine Einigung, ja eventuell sogar ein noch weiteres Auseinandergehen der Anschauungen bringen könnte. Das würde aber noch keineswegs das Ende bedeuten, denn bereits im September tagt, wie man weiss, die Vollversammlung des Völkerbundes, in deren Mitte sich viele für die Minderheitenfrage sehr kompetente Delegierte befinden. Inzwischen wird sich die Diskussion aber nicht nur innerhalb des Bundes, sondern auch darüber hinaus in der Offentllichkeit und Presse aller Länder weiter fortentwickeln. Hier : Carantie der elementarsten nationalen Rechte, dort: Aufrechterhaltung des durchweg kompromittierten heutigen Zustandes der nationalen Bedrückung. So etwa würden die Parolen lauten, um die sich die Kreise in den einzelnen Ländern Europas zu gruppieren hätten. Dabei müsste es sich im Interesse eines dauernden europäischen Friedens nicht nur um die faktische Garantie der nationalen Rechte in dem einen oder dem anderen der an die Schutzbestimmungen gebundenen Länder handeln, sondern um alle Länder, wo es unterdrückte Volksgruppen gibt, ganz gleich, ob der in Frage kommende Staat klein oder gross, jung oder alt, stark oder schwach ist. Andernfalls wäre eine Desavouierung des 1922 von der Assemblee angenommenen moralischen Grundsatzes unvermeidlich, dass alle Mitglieder des Völkerbundes ihren Minoritäten mindestens die gleichen Rechte wie die Schutzverträge es vorsehen, gewhären sollen. Gerade in dieser Beziehung hat die Genfer Diskussion noch einen weiteren grossen Fortschritt gebracht. Durch die Reden Chamberlains und Briands hat der Rat nicht nur die Assimilationthese Mello-Francos und Politis' endgültig verworfen, sondern er hat auch positiv zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass die Minoritäten sich als selbständige Volksindividualitäten unter Wahrung ihrer Sprache, Religion und Kultur gewissermassen als eine kleine Familie innerhalb der grossen—wie Briand sich ausdrückte—fortentwickeln könnten. Wie sollte es unter diesen Umständen möglich sein, die Unterdrückung der Volksgruppen—dieses wesentlichste Hindernis für ein reibungsloses Zusammenleben der Völker—in dem einen oder dem anderen an die Schutzbestimmungen gebundenen Staate zu bekämpfen und gleichzeitig mit anzusehen und dauernd zu dulden, dass in gewissen Staaten, die rechtlich nicht gebunden sind, die Nationalitäten offen bedrückt und ausgerottet werden ? Mag sein, dass diejenigen recht haben, die immer wieder aus Gründen staatlicher Rücksichtnahme und politischer Klugheit davor warnen, die Frage

einer Verallgemeinerung der Schutzbestimmungen vorzeitig aufzurollen. Neben dieser rechtlichen Frage der Verallgemeinerung aller Schutzbestimmungen gibt es aber auch Staaten, die rechtlich nicht gebunden sind, ihre Minoritäten vergewaltigen und entnationalisieren, noch eine andere Frage, und zwar die der Wirksammachung jener vom Völkerbunde und der europäischen Offentlichkeit anerkannten « moralischen Normen ». Diese Frage kann nicht vertagt oder gar ausgeschaltet werden, denn hier handelt es sich um eine Angelegenheit des europäischen Kulturgewissens. Daher muss das letzte Ziel des Kampfes auch : Freiheit der national-kulturellen Entwicklung einer jeden Nationalität in einem jeden Staate unseres Erdteiles sein.

Gewiss, das Ziel des Kampfes : Freiheit der national-kulturellen Entwicklung einer jeden Nationalität in einem jeden Staate, ist gross und der Kampf kann nicht schon morgen gewonnen werden. Doch das Ringen hat begonnen und die Notwendigkeit der eben erwähnten Regelung wird, je länger. desto mehr, von den wahrhaft fortschrittlichen Elementen der dem Problem bisher verständnislos gegenüberstehenden Staaten erkannt werden.

SIR AUSTEN'S RECORD, BY MR. H. WILSON HARRIS.

(Daily News, June 1929).

The meeting of the Council of the League of Nation opens at Madrid to-day—without Sir Austen Chamberlain. Sir Austen, talking with some British journalists at Geneva in March, looked forward with pleasure to a meeting in the Spanish capital and added that he hoped the Council might one day meet in Berlin, as he had not been there since, I think, 1914. On that I observed encouragingly that if the Foreign Secretary should find himself in command of more abundant leisure after May 30 he would be able to indulge his love of travel in these and many other directions. Sir Austen received the suggestion genially in the spirit in which it was offered. Whether he took the same view as I did regarding what May 30 might have in store I greatly doubt.

Well, May 30 has come and Sir Austen Chamberlain has gone. The moment, therefore, is appropriate for making some sort of survey of his conduct of the country's foreign affairs since 1924—a longer period than any other Foreign Minister has spent in Downing-street since Sir Edward Grey. Arriving at the Foreign Office for the first time Sir Austen found a new portent filling the horizon—the League of Nations. It was not a

portent altogether congenial to his mentality, particularly the Assembly with its set public speeches and its suggestion of the hustings—Sir Austen to the end put a high valuation on the Council and a low one on the Assembly—but he determined to gain personal experience of it at the earliest moment possible. Accordingly, before the Government of which he was a member was well set in office the foreign Secretary was on his way to the impending Council meeting, which happened to be held that time in Rome.

It was not a particularly important Council meeting, but Sir Austen came away impressed, and conscious of the enormous value to a Foreign Minister of the periodical conctacts he could establish four times a year with men in like positions in other countries by the simple expedient of attending the Council meetings of the League with regularity. And Sir Austen's regularity was remarkable. One Council meeting only did he miss in the whole of his term of office, and that was on account of illness.

The mere creation of this habit of personal attendance by the Foreign Minister at the League Council for all previous British Foreign Secretaries had sent substitutes—had effect of the highest importance on the prestige of the League.

That must be set to Sir Austen's credit against a good deal in his conduct of foreign affairs that inspires less satisfaction—notably his part in the disaster of the Council seats in 1926.

Within the limits set by his temperament and his political creed, Sir Austen believed profoundly in the League and what it stood for.He genuinely meant what he said when he declared that the foreign policy of this country rested on the League of Nations. But he did not mean what I should mean, or most of the readers of this article would mean, by the words. He meant a League of Nations that was always something of a danger as well as something of a boon, a League that must always be slowed down by the British delegate lest it should move too fast, a League always seeking to involve its members in obligations from which they had perpetually to be extricating themselves.

For Sir Austen's conception of a world-society astopped short at the idea of obligations, at any rate of progressively increasing obligations. He insisted from first to last on the virtue of this country in accepting arbitration constantly in its past history, but refused absolutely to undertake to accept it as a regular practice in the future, being quite incapable of seeing that if you are to evolve from anarchy to order it can only be by the acceptance of general rules which must be as binding on the virtuous few as on the unruly many. Under Sir Austen Great Britain was to protest its virtuous intentions, but never put them in the form of pledges.

Locarno was, of course, the great exception. It is an achie-

vement Sir Austen never has forgotten and never will, and he may deservedly draw selfsatisfaction from it. But the failure to reap a full harvest from Locarno was almost as notable as the harvest that was reaped. We pledged ourselves open-eyed to support Germany against France in case of need, and we were perfectly content to watch France increasing the effective strength of her army from that day to this, while Germany remained limited to 100,000 men. It is that 100,000 men that we might some day have to help against a French army of some 235,000 professionals and an equal number of conscript soldiers. Locarno has conspicuously failed to lead to disarmament.

At Locano, moreover, Sir Austen successfully and most fortunately persuaded France and Germany to refrain in all circumstances from entering on war with one another, and to accept a practically complete system of arbitration. But we ourselves took no such engagement. To this day Sir Austen has refused even to sign the Optional Clause, referring all legal disputes to the Permanent Court, much less to implement the Kellogg Pact by accepting any comprehensive system of peaceful settlement. All that, of course, will be altered now.

For the failure of the Three Power naval conference Sir Austen cannot be held personally responsible, except as a member as member of the Cabinet that let it fail. The Arcos raid he disliked but acquiesced in. The hopeless muddle of the Anglo-French naval compromise was thrust before the eyes of the public by his disclosure in the House of Commons, but it is fair to remember that that was on the eye of a serious physical breakdown.

Everyone who came in contact with the late Foreign Secretary will pay him one personal tribute at least. He is the best type of an honourable English gentleman. But he is deplorably and disastrously unimaginative, failing perpetually to see what the consequences of actions, perfectly proper in themselves, are bound to be. Closely as he worked with Stresemann as well as Briand, he let the Germans feel that his sympathies always leaned towards Paris, and the consequences of the moral support he conferred on Mussolini by his studied cordiality never occurred to him. I dissociate myself definitely from the fiercer of Sir Austen's critics, but I cannot pretend to regret that he now has leisure to travel.

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